S. MARTIN TEEL, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
An order of dismissal was entered in this case on July 1, 2014, based upon the debtor's failure to pay the filing fee (Dkt. No. 25). In light of the dismissal, on July 31, 2014, the court discharged the trustee and closed the case. More than one year after the dismissal of the case, the debtor has paid the balance due on the filing fee and has filed a Motion to Reopen Case (Dkt. No. 31). Invoking 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), the debtor asks that the "case be reopened for the limited purpose of entering the Order of Discharge." The debtor has offered no explanation for her failure timely to pay the filing fee.
Even if the court were to grant the Motion and reopen the case administratively under § 350, this case would still stand dismissed.
Rule 60, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, would govern a motion to vacate or reconsider the dismissal order in this case. Under Rule 60(b),
Even if the debtor has a compelling explanation for why she failed timely to pay the fee, Rule 60(c)(1) sets time limits for the filing of Rule 60(b) motions. Specifically, Rule 60(c)(1) provides that "a Motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time — and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Accordingly, any motion filed under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) is now untimely because the dismissal order was entered more than one year ago. I likewise conclude that a motion filed under Rule 60(b)(4), (5) or (6) seeking to vacate the dismissal order in this case could not be considered filed "within a reasonable time."
The dismissal order in this case has been in effect for more than a year, and "[u]nlike an order reopening a bankruptcy case, which does not undo any of the consequences of closing, setting aside an order dismissing a bankruptcy case would have potentially enormous, highly disruptive, and unintended consequences." In re Aheong, 276 B.R. 233, 242 n. 10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). An order of dismissal in a bankruptcy case ought to have some meaning and offer some certainty with respect to the final disposition of the case. Although I do, on occasion, vacate dismissal orders if the debtor promptly corrects the deficiency giving rise to the dismissal, this is not such a case. More than a year has passed, and it is too late to revisit the dismissal order.
This case stands dismissed and the debtor is not entitled to an order vacating the dismissal order. It follows that reopening this case would serve no purpose because the court cannot enter a discharge order in a case that stands dismissed.
It is ORDERED that the Motion to Reopen (Dkt. No. 31) is DENIED.