AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge.
This action involves two requests under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), made by plaintiff Vern McKinley ("McKinley"), seeking documents related to deliberations undertaken by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board") concerning what systemic effect, if any, the failure of American International Group ("AIG") and Lehman Brothers might have on financial markets. McKinley seeks a declaratory judgment that the Board violated FOIA by failing to fulfill his requests for non-exempt responsive records and an injunction compelling the Board to comply with the FOIA requests. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment [Dkt. # 13, 17, and 19]. Because the Court finds that the Board conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA exemptions, the Court will grant both of the Board's motions for partial summary judgment [Dkt. # 13 and 17] and will deny McKinley's cross-motion [Dkt. # 19].
The Federal Reserve System is composed of the Board and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks ("FRBs"). The Board is the central supervisory authority of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). It oversees the operation of the system, promulgates and administers regulations, and plays a major role in the supervision and regulation of the United States banking system. The Board is "authorized and empowered ... (1) [t]o examine at its discretion the accounts, books, and affairs of each Federal reserve bank and of each member bank and to require such statements and reports as it may deem necessary" and (2) "[t]o require any depository institution specified in this
AIG and Lehman Brothers were among several institutions facing severe capital and liquidity problems toward the end of 2008. Thro Decl. ¶ 11. At that time, the Board became increasingly concerned about the effects that a possible AIG or Lehman Brothers bankruptcy would have on financial markets and individual financial institutions, including on large complex banking organizations ("LCBOs"). Foley Decl. ¶ 6. As a result, the Board undertook to determine whether or not to authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRBNY") to extend a loan to either or both institutions under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. In making this determination, the Board sought information from the FRBNY concerning the real-time exposures of certain counterparties to AIG and Lehman Brothers.
Over the weekend of September 13, 2008, the Board, FRBNY, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and Securities and Exchange Commission brought together leaders of major financial firms in an attempt to craft a private sector solution to address Lehman Brothers' worsening capital and liquidity shortfalls. Thro Decl. ¶ 11. No solution could be crafted and Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2010. Id. "Convinced," however, "that the failure of AIG would be catastrophic for a financial system already in acute distress," the Board invoked section 13(3) and authorized the FRBNY to loan up to $85 billion to AIG. Mosser Decl. ¶ 6. The FRBNY, in turn, approved the loan. Id.
McKinley made two separate but related FOIA requests that give rise to this action.
Ex. E to Thro Decl. "Th[is] analysis," McKinley asserts in his request, "would likely have been undertaken in the context of considering whether to take action under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to avoid a Lehman bankruptcy." Id.
The Manager of the Freedom of Information Office at the Board acknowledged receipt of the AIG request on March 22, 2010 and the Lehman request on March 30, 2010. Thro Decl. ¶ 4, 8. On May 11, 2010, prior to the Board's review and release of the responsive documents, but after the statutorily prescribed waiting period for filing a FOIA action had expired, McKinley brought this suit. McKinley alleges a "violation of FOIA" as the sole count and seeks to compel the Board "to search for and produce" any and all non-exempt responsive records, and to enjoin the Board from "continuing to withhold" any and all non-exempt records responsive to the FOIA requests. Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.
Beginning in August 2010, attorneys at the Board conducted searches to identify any and all records responsive to McKinley's requests. Thro Decl. ¶¶ 15, 22. On November 9, 2010, the Secretary of the Board informed McKinley that staff had searched Board records, and had found a large number of documents responsive to the AIG and Lehman requests.
The Board filed motions for partial summary judgment on June 8, 2011 and on July 15, 2011 [Dkt. # 13, 17]. McKinley cross-moved for summary judgment on August 31, 2011 [Dkt. # 19]. McKinley challenges the adequacy of the Board's searches and maintains that the Board continues to improperly withhold information in eighty-three records. Specifically, McKinley asserts that the Board has improperly withhold seventeen records because they are readily-available to the public, and challenges the withholding of sixty-six records as improper under the Board's asserted FOIA exemptions. The Board contends that the searches conducted were adequate and that it is entitled to withhold the eighty-three disputed records under applicable FOIA exemptions.
"FOIA cases are typically and appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment." Moore v. Bush, 601 F.Supp.2d 6, 12 (D.D.C.2009). In the FOIA context, "the sufficiency of the agency's identification or retrieval procedure" must be "genuinely in issue" in order for summary judgment to be inappropriate. Weisberg v. DOJ, 627 F.2d 365, 370 (D.C.Cir.1980), quoting Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 836 (D.C.Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a plaintiff "cannot rebut the good faith presumption" afforded to an agency's supporting affidavits "through purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents." Brown v. DOJ, 742 F.Supp.2d 126, 129 (D.D.C.2010), quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In any motion for summary judgment, the Court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in his favor, and eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Montgomery v. Chao, 546 F.3d 703, 706 (D.C.Cir.2008); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, where a plaintiff has not provided evidence that an agency acted in bad faith, "a court may award summary judgment solely on the basis of information provided by the agency in declarations." Moore, 601 F.Supp.2d at 12. The district court reviews the agency's action de novo, and "the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006); accord Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981).
The purpose of FOIA is to require the release of government records upon request and to "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). At the same time, Congress recognized "that legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of
To prevail in a FOIA action, an agency must satisfy two elements. First, the agency must demonstrate that it has made "a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested." Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990). "[A]t the summary judgment phase, an agency must set forth sufficient information in its affidavits for a court to determine if the search was adequate." Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C.Cir.1995), citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Such agency affidavits attesting to a reasonable search "are afforded a presumption of good faith," Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 314 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2004) ("Defenders of Wildlife I"), and "can be rebutted only `with evidence that the agency's search was not made in good faith,'" id., quoting Trans Union LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 141 F.Supp.2d 62, 69 (D.D.C.2001). Second, an agency must show that "materials that are withheld ... fall within a FOIA statutory exemption." Leadership Conference on Rights v. Gonzales, 404 F.Supp.2d 246, 252 (D.C.Cir.2005).
McKinley first argues that the searches performed by the Board were not adequate. Pl.'s Cross-Mot. at 3. "An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was `reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.'" Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C.Cir.1999), quoting Truitt v. Dep't of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C.Cir.1990). "To meet its burden, the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain in reasonable detail the scope and method of the agency's search." Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 91 (D.D.C.2009) ("Defenders of Wildlife II"). However, "the issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate." Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984). The process of conducting an adequate search for documents requires "both systemic and case-specific exercises of discretion and administrative judgment and expertise" and is "hardly an area in which the courts should attempt to micromanage the executive branch." Schrecker v. DOJ, 349 F.3d 657, 662 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Board argues that it performed an adequate search because it thoroughly searched materials in the Project Collect Repository, which was created to hold materials related to the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis. McKinley does not argue that the search of the repository was itself inadequate, but instead argues that the Board was required to search at the FRBNY in addition to searching the repository. Pl.'s Cross-Mot. at 4. The Court agrees with the Board that the Board was not required to search beyond
Public interest in the AIG loan and Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy prompted the Board's General Counsel to direct "Legal Division staff to gather all materials related to the AIG loan and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, among other topics, as part of a larger effort to collect documents related to the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis, known as Project Collect." Thro Decl. ¶ 12. The Project Collect repository contains hundreds of thousands of documents collected from approximately 190-200 Board members, officers, and staff in nine divisions who were involved in any aspect of the Board's response to the financial crisis. Id. ¶ 13. To create the repository, Legal Division staff contacted "those involved in the response to Lehman Brothers' capital and liquidity crisis as well as those involved in the response to AIG's liquidity crisis and request for the AIG loan." Id. In particular, staff "sought all documents relating to AIG from January 1, 2008 through the date of collection and all documents relating to Lehman Brothers from January 1, 2008 through the date of collection." Id. Board members, officers, and staff were informed of FOIA and Congressional requests for information that the Board had received and were asked to forward any potentially responsive documents for inclusion in the Project Collect repository. Id.
McKinley argues that the Board conducted inadequate searches because it "failed to search records [located] at the FRBNY." Pl.'s Cross-Mot. at 4. He argues this not because he disputes that the FRBNY is not a component of the Board, but because he believes that "certain records of FRBNY are nevertheless agency records." Id. But, even if the Court were to agree with McKinley on that point, any records that remain at the FRBNY and not in the Project Collect repository — to the extent that such records exist — are beyond the scope of McKinley's FOIA requests.
And the Lehman request directs the Board to produce records regarding analysis "undertaken in the context of considering whether to take action under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act" as to Lehman Brothers. Ex. E to Thro Decl. Since the Board was the only body that considered whether to take action under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve act — not the FRBNY — the request refers only to information that the Board itself considered, which again is contained entirely in the Project Collect repository. See Thro Decl. ¶¶ 12-14; see also Pl.'s Reply at 1, 2 (characterizing his own requests as: "Specifically, McKinley sought all records relating to the information relied upon or used by the Board when it decided to authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRBNY") to extend credit to the American International Group ("AIG") as well as the information it relied upon or used when it determined that it would not authorize the FRBNY to extend credit to Lehman Brothers") (emphasis added).
The Court therefore concludes that the scope of the information compiled in the Project Collect repository is sufficiently broad to reasonably capture all Board records that are responsive to McKinley's request.
The Board has submitted affidavits to the Court "explain[ing] in reasonable detail the scope and method of the agency's search,"
Finding the Board's searches to be adequate, the Court next addresses whether
When Congress enacted FOIA, it "set forth a policy of broad disclosure of Government documents in order to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society." Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C.Cir.1992) (en banc), quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. at 621, 102 S.Ct. 2054 (citations omitted). "At the same time, however, `Congress realized that legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information.'" Id., quoting Abramson, 456 U.S. at 621, 102 S.Ct. 2054. "Balancing these private and public interests, Congress enacted nine exemptions to FOIA." Id.
When an agency seeks to withhold a document from disclosure, it must specify the exemption claimed and explain why it is entitled to claim it. The agency bears the burden of justifying the decision to withhold records under FOIA's statutory exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). A court may grant summary judgment based solely on information provided in an agency's affidavits or declarations if they "describe the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith." Casey, 656 F.2d at 738. Such affidavits or declarations "are accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents." Safe-Card Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although an agency may be entitled to summary judgment based solely on information in its affidavits or declarations, a court may also conduct an in camera review of disputed records.
McKinley alleges that the Board continues to improperly redact or withhold eighty-three records. His challenges fall into four categories:
McKinley challenges the withholding of seventeen records on the grounds that the Board has waived its FOIA Exemptions because the records have been published by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ("FCIC") and appear in the public domain. Pl.'s Opp. at 7-8. McKinley does not challenge the fact that the records fall within a valid exemption;
Under the public domain theory, the "Government waives its right to invoke an otherwise applicable exemption to the FOIA when it makes an `official and documented' disclosure of the information being sought." Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C.Cir.1999), quoting Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C.Cir.1990) (emphasis added). To be "official," the release must have been by "the agency from which the information is being sought." Id. Disclosures to Congress are not official disclosures within the meaning of FOIA and do not waive an agency's FOIA Exemptions. Murphy v. Dep't of the Army, 613 F.2d 1151, 1155-59 (D.C.Cir.1979); see also Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. DOJ, 235 F.3d 598, 603-04 (D.C.Cir.2001) (noting that the rule applies with even greater force when the agency took steps to preserve the confidentiality of the information provided to Congress).
Here, the Board asserts and McKinley does not dispute that it provided sixteen of the seventeen records in question to a Congressional committee under a written confidentiality agreement and that the seventeenth record was not provided to the FCIC at all. Def.'s Reply at 13 & n. 15. Contrary to McKinley's claim, and in accordance with the law of this Circuit, the mere fact that the committee subsequently, and without authorization, published the records does not constitute a waiver of the Board's FOIA Exemptions. To hold otherwise would frustrate "public policy [encouraging] broad congressional access to governmental information" because agencies "would invariably become more cautious in furnishing sensitive information to the legislative branch." Murphy, 613 F.2d at 1156. As such, the Court finds that the Board has not waived its FOIA exemptions to the seventeen records published by the FCIC.
McKinley next challenges the Board's withholding of four records under FOIA Exemption 4.
Whether commercial or financial information is protected turns in part on whether it was provided to the government voluntarily or under compulsion: if the financial or commercial information was disclosed to the government voluntarily, it will be considered confidential for purposes of Exemption 4 if it is the kind of information "that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained." Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879. If the information was required, however, it will be considered confidential only if disclosure would be likely either (1) "to impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future"; or (2) "to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained." See id. at 878-84, reaffirming and quoting test of National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.Cir.1974), but confining it to cases of compelled disclosure.
The Board asserts that two of the four challenged records are properly withheld under the Critical Mass standard because they contain voluntarily provided commercial or financial information that would not ordinarily have been made public. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879. McKinley agrees that Critical Mass governs, but alleges that the Board has failed to demonstrate that the withheld records contain information that would not ordinarily have been made public. McKinley's argument is purely speculative,
Record 10-251-000847 is an email regarding the "severity of AIG's capital hole" and contains the "identity of [an] outside analyst." Thro. Decl. at 108. This "confidential market source[] ... would not customarily disclose to the public that they had provided information to Board or FRBNY staff." Id. at 45. And record 10-267-001172 is an email exchange containing "confidential commercial or financial information regarding Lehman's foreign operations supplied voluntarily by foreign bank supervisory agencies," id. at 204, and includes "details on briefings of ... foreign bank supervisors regarding Lehman." Parkinson Decl. ¶ 15. The Board asserts that "disclosure of this information likely would impair the Board's ability to obtain necessary information in the future as foreign bank supervisory agencies would be unlikely to provide information if they knew that it would be disclosed to the public." Thro. Decl. at 204.
The Board asserts that the two remaining records are properly withheld under the National Parks standard because they contain involuntarily provided commercial or financial information, disclosure of which would likely either (1) "impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future"; or (2) "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained." See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 498 F.2d at 770. McKinley alleges that the Board has failed to justify nondisclosure under National Parks. Again, however, McKinley's allegations are speculative,
Record 10-267-000349-353 is a spreadsheet that provides counterparties' exposure to Lehman. Ex. I to Thro. Decl. at 43. The Board asserts that "[p]rovision of this information was mandatory" and that "[d]isclosure is likely to cause substantial competitive injury to financial institution(s) or impair the Board's ability to obtain similar, necessary information in the future by diminishing the quality or reliability of information provided." Ex. I to Thro. Decl. at 23. Similarly, record 10-267-000799 is an email "conveying information obtained by examiners regarding those institutions' exposure to Lehman Brothers and steps taken by those institutions in response to Lehman Brothers' capital and liquidity shortages." Foley Decl. ¶ 8. The Board contends that "these regulated financial institutions provided this information to FRB examination staff on the understanding that it would remain confidential, and would be used for supervisory purposes" and that "[d]isclosure of this information would have a chilling effect on the exchange of information between the Board or FRBs and regulated financial institutions." Id.
In light of these uncontroverted declarations, which "are accorded a presumption of good faith [that] cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims," SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200, the Court finds that the Board has "demonstrate[d] that the information withheld logically falls within [Exemption 4]." Casey, 656 F.2d at 738. McKinley points to no evidence in the record that would controvert the Board's declarations, nor any evidence of agency bad faith. See Id. Furthermore, in camera review of the disputed records confirms the declarations proffered on behalf of the Board. As such, the Court holds that records 10-251-000847, 10-251-000349-353, 10-267-000799 and 10-267-001172 were properly redacted or withheld under FOIA Exemption 4. McKinley's request to produce them will be denied.
McKinley next challenges the Board's withholding of sixty-two records under FOIA Exemption 5.
With regard to the second condition, the Supreme Court has determined that:
Id. (internal citations omitted); accord Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 237 (D.C.Cir.1983).
"The deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery," and the goal behind its exemption "is to enhance `the quality of agency decisions' by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government." Klamath Water, 532 U.S. at 8-9, 121 S.Ct. 1060 (internal citations omitted). The deliberative process privilege, however, only "protects agency documents that are both predecisional and deliberative." Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C.Cir.2006) (emphasis added).
The Board claims that the sixty-two redacted or withheld records constitute intra-agency memoranda or letters and are properly withheld under the deliberative process privilege. McKinley does not contest that the records are intra-agency memoranda or letters within the meaning of Exemption 5. Instead, he contends that the records are factual rather than deliberative.
Here, as in his previous lawsuit, McKinley argues that the withheld material is "purely factual" and therefore not deliberative. Pl.'s Cross-Mot. at 14; see, e.g., Pl.'s Cross-Mot. at 17, 19, 21-25. And, just as in that case, the record here demonstrates that Board and FRBNY staff culled selected facts and data from the mass of available information regarding AIG and Lehman Brothers so as to assist the Board in its decision making process. See, e.g., Ashton Decl. ¶ 7 ("Federal Reserve officials sought to form an opinion about the extent of the financial pressures facing [AIG], about the availability and effectiveness of any financial assistance from the private sector to resolve those pressures, about the availability and effectiveness
Absent evidence in the record that would controvert the Board's declarations, the Court accords them a presumption of good faith and finds that the factual materials redacted or withheld in the sixty-two records were deliberative within the meaning of Exemption 5. In camera inspection confirms that the disputed records contain a mix of factual material and analysis in the form of spreadsheets, emails, and memoranda. Because McKinley's sole argument for disclosure rests on the flawed assumption that factual material is not deliberative, the Court finds each of the sixty-two redacted or withheld records to be protected from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5.
Finally, McKinley challenges the Board's withholding of two records under Exemption 8.
McKinley v. F.D.I.C., 744 F.Supp.2d at 142-43 (D.D.C.2010)
Although FOIA exemptions are generally construed narrowly, DOJ v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8, 108 S.Ct. 1606, 100 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), it is well-established that the scope of Exemption 8 is "particularly broad," Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C.Cir. 1978). The D.C. Circuit considered FOIA Exemption 8 for the first time in Consumers Union and concluded that "[i]f the Congress has intentionally and unambiguously crafted a particularly broad, all-inclusive definition, it is not our function, even in the FOIA context, to subvert that effort." Id. at 533.
McKinley does not contest the Board's assertion that Exemption 8 protects information obtained from supervised financial entities. Pl.'s Cross-Mot. at 20, 22. Instead, he alleges only that the Board failed to clearly articulate whether records 10-267-000349-353 and 10-267-000782 actually contain information from supervised financial entities. Id. Characterizing the Board's purported justifications as vague, McKinley asserts that he is entitled to disclosure. Id.
The Vaughn index, however, plainly describes that the Board redacted or withheld the two records at issue because they contain information from supervised financial entities. Record 10-267-000349-353 is described as "contain[ing] information obtained by FRB and/or Board supervisory staff from supervised LFIs, financial utilities or clearing banks ... in order to assess the risks to supervised financial institutions of a possible Lehman bankruptcy." Ex. I to Thro. Decl. at 24, 43 (emphasis added). Likewise, record 10-267-000782 is described as the continuation of an email "contain[ing] information [that] was obtained by the Board or, its delegee, the FRBNY, as a result of its oversight authority over financial institutions." Ex. J to Thro. Decl. at 39-40, 69. Such information was "collected by the Board and FRBNY in a supervisory capacity from regulated payment, clearing and settlement systems ...." Stehm Decl. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
In light of these declarations, the Court finds that the Board has "demonstrate[d] that the information withheld logically falls within [Exemption 8]." Casey, 656 F.2d at 738. As the Court has already mentioned, agency declarations "are accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims," SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200, and McKinley points to no evidence that would controvert the Board's declarations, nor any evidence of agency bad faith, see Casey, 656 F.2d at 738. In camera review confirms that the disputed records contain properly exempted information from supervised financial entities. The Court finds that records 10-267-000349-353 and 10-267-000782 were properly redacted or withheld under FOIA Exemption 8, and McKinley's request to produce them will be denied.
Finding that the Board has conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA Exemptions 4, 5, and 8, the Court will grant the Board's June 8, 2011 [Dkt. # 13] and July 15, 2011 [Dkt. # 17] motions for partial summary judgment and
