BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge.
On October 13, 2011, Shavonne Bailey ("petitioner") filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner began a five-year term of supervised release on September 29, 2006. See United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("USPC Opp'n"), Ex. C (Certificate of Supervised Release). While under supervision, she was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, an offense for which she was convicted and sentenced on November 5, 2010 in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See id., Ex. D (Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Bailey, No. 2010 CF2 012193 (D.C.Super.Ct. Nov. 5, 2010)). The Superior Court imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment, suspended execution of all but three months of that term, imposed and suspended execution of a five-year term of supervised release, and placed petitioner on a 24-month term of supervised probation. Id., Ex. D.
Based on this conduct, the Commission charged the petitioner with the following violation of the terms of her release:
USPC Opp'n, Ex. E (Warrant Application dated May 11, 2011) at 2 (emphasis in original). A violator warrant was issued on May 11, 2011, id., Ex. E (Warrant dated May 11, 2011), and was executed on May 23, 2011, id. (United States Marshal's Return to United States Parole Commission dated May 23, 2011). According to the petitioner, at the time she filed her habeas petition, she had been "held for 4 months and counting" after the execution of a violator warrant on or about May 23, 2011, without having received a hearing on the matter. Pet. at 5.
The Commission conducted a revocation hearing on December 14, 2011. USPC Opp'n, Ex. H (Hearing Summary) at 1. It revoked supervised release and ordered that the petitioner "serve a new term of imprisonment of 13 month(s) from May 19, 2011, the date the warrant was executed," after which she would "serve a new term of supervised release of 47 months following release from custody." Id., Ex. I (Notice of Action dated January 17, 2012) at 1. Her projected release date was April 30, 2012.
The petitioner alleges a "violation of due process" arising from the Commission's delay in conducting a supervision revocation hearing because the "paper work had gotten lost." Pet. at 5. Delay of a revocation hearing "is not itself a valid ground for immediate release[;]" instead, a releasee's "remedy ... is an action to compel a hearing." Hill v. Johnston, 750 F.Supp.2d 103, 105-06 (D.D.C.2010); see Sutherland v. McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C.Cir.1983) (finding that the appropriate remedy for a delayed parole revocation hearing "is a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission's compliance ... not a writ of habeas corpus to compel release... or to extinguish the remainder of the sentence" (emphasis in original)). The record demonstrates that petitioner's revocation hearing already has taken place, and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief. Habeas relief would be available "only ... where a petitioner establishes that the Commission's delay in holding a revocation hearing was both unreasonable and prejudicial." Sutherland, 709 F.2d at 732. Here, the petitioner neither alleges nor demonstrates that the delay "prejudiced [her] defense at the revocation hearing." Id. at 733.
A District of Columbia prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if she establishes that her "custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This petitioner does not establish that her custody is unlawful, and her claim arising from the Commission's delay in conducting a supervision revocation hearing is moot. Accordingly, the habeas petition will be denied, and this action will be dismissed.
An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby
ORDERED that the order to show cause [Dkt. #2] is DISCHARGED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Dkt. #1] is DENIED as moot; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this civil action is DISMISSED.
This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
SO ORDERED.