RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Joseph Poindexter ("plaintiff' or "Poindexter") brings this action against two groups of defendants: (1) Pamunkey Regional Jail Authority ("PRJA") and its employees, Superintendent James Willett, Corrections Officer Mark A. Claveau, Corrections Officer Kimberly D. Hopkins, Corrections Officer Thomas L. Eckert, and Grievance Corrections Officer Eugene G. Emelianov (collectively, "Virginia defendants"), in their official capacities; and (2) the District of Columbia (the "District"). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages, for violations of his constitutional rights arising out of plaintiffs imprisonment at the District and Pamunkey Regional Jails. Before the Court is the District's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
Plaintiff Joseph Poindexter has been a District of Columbia inmate since August 2005. Second Am. Compl. ("Compl.") ¶¶ 20-21, ECF No. 71. On March 17, 2008, however, plaintiff was transferred to and temporarily detained at the Pamunkey Regional Jail ("Pamunkey") in Hanover, Virginia pursuant to an agreement between the District and Pamunkey regarding the housing of District inmates. Id. ¶¶ 7, 22.
Upon becoming a District of Columbia inmate in 2005, plaintiff asserts that the District registered him under the incorrect last name of "Leaks"
On December 8, 2011, the District moved to dismiss this suit, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. See generally District's Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alt., for Summ. J. ("Dist.'s Mot."), ECF No. 74. For the following reasons, the District's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
The District moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In evaluating the District's Motion to Dismiss, the Court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true" and "grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint."
Petitioner brings this suit against the District and its "agents, assistants or employees," seeking to hold the municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to allege that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional or federal right; and (2) such deprivation was the result of a government policy or custom. Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C.Cir.2004). This second requirement not only rebuffs a respondeat superior theory of liability, which would hold a municipality accountable for the torts of its employees, but it also limits the liability of a municipality to its own unlawful conduct, i.e., action taken pursuant to official municipal policy. See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011); Atchinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 420-21 (D.C.Cir. 1996); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) ("[W]hile Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability on municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige municipalities to control the conduct of others.") (citation omitted). Such "official municipal policy" can include "the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359; Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
A municipality's "fail[ure] to act affirmatively at all" can also constitute a municipal policy or custom for purposes of liability under § 1983 "when it can be said that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain." Brown, 520 U.S. at 418, 117 S.Ct. 1382; Daskalea v. Dist. of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This theory of "deliberate indifference" has been described by the Supreme Court as:
Brown, 520 U.S. at 418, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To state a claim of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to contend that a municipality, such as the District, knew or should have known of a risk that constitutional violations would occur, but did nothing. Baker v. Dist. of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (D.C.Cir.2003). Put simply, if a municipality adopts a policy of inaction when faced with actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will likely violate constitutional rights, it is "deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm [that] is equivalent to the intentional action that setting policy presupposes." Brown, 520 U.S. at 419, 117 S.Ct. 1382; Warren, 353 F.3d at 39.
Last, plaintiff must plead facts to support an inference that some government custom or policy "caus[ed] an employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, plaintiff bears the burden of showing an "affirmative link such that a municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Warren, 353 F.3d at 39. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, he has done none of these things. How so?
Plaintiff alleges that the District, or "officers, agents, assistants or employees working under its supervision," denied him "access to the [c]ourts in violation of the First Amendment" by failing to correct his last name in its official records or remedy the lack of District of Columbia legal materials in Pamunkey's law library. Compl. ¶¶ 30-35, 40, 44-46, 51, 53. As a result of the District's failure to act, plaintiff asserts that he "was unable to effectively correspond with his attorney to raise a claim at his sentencing hearing that there were erroneous crimes on his pre-sentence report" or "research and bring colorable constitutional claims concerning his injuries" inflicted by the District and the Virginia defendants during incarceration. Id. ¶¶ 36-38, 41-42, 44, 48-50. Even if such allegations are sufficient to plead a constitutional violation, the Court holds that plaintiff fails to state a claim that a government policy or custom was the driving force behind the District's conduct here.
Relying on Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36 (D.C.Cir.2004), plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged a District custom of inaction that caused the deprivation of his First Amendment right to access the courts.
Accepting plaintiffs factual allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the plaintiff has not identified any facts illustrating a government practice or custom, or alleged how the District was deliberately indifferent in taking on such a practice, to sufficiently form the basis of liability under Section 1983. More specifically, plaintiff does not allege a violation of his constitutional right to access the courts, assuming that one occurred, resulting from a District custom of "ignoring inmates" that was "so widespread as to have the force of law," Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, nor does he sufficiently plead, outside of purported wrongful conduct as to him, a purposeful lack of response on the part of the District to the risk that inmates' constitutional rights were likely being deprived, see Konah v. Dist. of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 61, 75 (D.D.C.2011).
In addition to his failure to sufficiently allege any custom of inaction, or deliberate indifference, on the part of the District, plaintiff also fails to plead facts to support an inference that such a practice was the moving force behind the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights. Indeed, aside from conclusory allegations that the District was "deliberately indifferent to [his] injuries," Compl. ¶ 51, plaintiffs factual contentions do not allege how such a practice by the District was the moving force behind the alleged violation of his constitutional right to access the courts.
In addition to First Amendment violations, plaintiff also claims that the District is directly and vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by the Virginia defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 54-79. More specifically, plaintiff alleges that, while he was incarcerated at Pamunkey, the Virginia defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and violated his right to due process by putting him in administrative segregation without notice or a hearing, denying him access to legal calls to his attorney, placing him in unnecessary and abrasive belly chains, handcuffs and leg irons during his recreation time, forcing him to remain in a cell containing the feces and urine of other inmates, and refusing to give him his blood pressure medication for days at a time. Id. Plaintiff contends that, under a theory of municipal liability, the District is liable for the allegedly unconstitutional actions of the Virginia defendants on the basis that the latter served as the District's "agents" pursuant to an agreement under which "the PRJA was, among other things, to house and care for District of Columbia inmates." Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
Even if there were some basis to argue a violation of plaintiffs Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights, or that the Virginia defendants can properly be considered "agents" of the District, municipal liability under § 1983 may not rest on a theory of either vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Graham v. Davis, 880 F.2d 1414, 1421 (D.C.Cir.1989). Instead, § 1983 imposes liability on a municipality when its own alleged misconduct, i.e., action taken pursuant to municipal policy or custom, causes a deprivation of a person's rights. See Carter v. Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C.Cir.1986) ("To succeed, a plaintiff must show a course deliberately pursued by the city, as opposed to an action taken unilaterally by a nonpolicymaking municipal employee.") (quoting Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 829, 105 S.Ct. 2427) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, the Court addresses only whether plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state a claim against the District under Monell.
Although the complaint contains numerous allegations about the injuries plaintiff sustained at the hands of the Virginia defendants, it fails to identify a policy, practice or custom on the part of the District undergirding the Virginia defendants' allegedly unlawful behavior. Indeed, the complaint itself discredits the notion that the Virginia defendants were guided by any District policy at all, stating, "[a]t all times relevant herein, the Virginia [d]efendants acted pursuant to the policies, regulations or decisions officially adopted or promulgated by those in the PRJA whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy or were pursuant to the practices and customs of the PRJA." Compl. ¶ 17. Although a complaint "need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory," Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted), it must contain "some factual basis for the allegation of a municipal policy or custom," Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 422; see also Gabriel v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 211 F.Supp.2d 132, 138-39 (D.D.C. 2002) ("The mere assertion that the [municipality's
Finally, plaintiff alleges that the District "subjected [p]laintiff to violation of his right to due process" and have "caused plaintiff to suffer physical injuries, severe emotional distress, and damages" in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. ¶ 79.
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, is not applicable to the actions of the District or its officials or employees. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) ("The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the states."); Powers-Bunce v. Dist. of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 173, 179 n. 6 (D.D.C.2009). Accordingly, plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim against the District must also be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the District's Motion to Dismiss
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion entered this date, it is this 19th day of September, 2012, hereby
