RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.
This is a class action securities fraud suit against Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), its former accountant, KPMG, LLP, and three of Fannie Mae's former senior executives (collectively, "defendants"), brought by a class of parties represented by lead plaintiffs Ohio Public Employees Retirement System ("OPERS") and State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio ("STRS") (collectively, "plaintiffs"). The parties filed eight separate summary judgment motions in this case.
Fannie Mae, along with its cousin Freddie Mac, operates in the secondary mortgage market as a federally-chartered government-sponsored enterprise, buying home mortgages from banks and issuing debt and mortgage-backed securities. Formerly a private shareholder-owned company, Fannie Mae has been in a conservatorship under the Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA") since September 6, 2008. However, during this litigation's class period, beginning April 17, 2001 and ending December 22, 2004, Fannie Mae's stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and it was regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
The narrative of plaintiffs' securities fraud claims against Howard, not surprisingly, flows directly from an OFHEO investigation of Fannie Mae. In June 2003, following the disclosure of certain accounting issues at Freddie Mac, OFHEO began examining Fannie Mae's accounting policies and internal controls. On September 22, 2004, Fannie Mae released a public statement, indicating that OFHEO had delivered the findings of that investigation to Fannie Mae's board of directors. Fannie Mae's SGIMF ¶ 13; Fannie Mae Form 8-K (Sept. 22, 2004), Decl. of W.B. Markovits in Supp. of Lead Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. on Count I Against Def. Fannie Mae [Dkt. #920] ("Markovits-Fannie Mae Decl"), Ex. 5 [Dkt. # 920-6].
Apparently surprised by these findings, Fannie Mae requested that the SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant review the company's accounting with respect to FAS 91 and FAS 133. Id. ¶ 24. Several months later, on December 15, 2004, the SEC's Chief Accountant, Donald Nicolaisen, issued a press release, stating that the SEC's accounting staff had determined that Fannie Mae's accounting did not comply in material respects with FAS 91 and FAS 133, and that he had advised the company to restate its financial statements after eliminating the use of hedge accounting and reevaluating its amortization of premiums and discounts. Id. ¶ 22 (quoting Markovits-Fannie Mae Decl., Ex. 16 [Dkt. # 922-8]). Shortly thereafter, on December 21, 2004, Howard resigned from his positions as CFO and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. Fannie Mae's SGIMF ¶ 26. The next day, in a Form 8-K, Fannie Mae declared its intention to restate its 2001 to mid-2004 financial results to comply with the SEC's Office of Chief Accountant's recommendations concerning its FAS 91 and FAS 133 accounting. Fannie Mae Form 8-K (Dec. 22, 2004), Markovits-Fannie Mae Decl., Ex. 18 [Dkt. # 922-10]. On December 30, 2004, Howard resigned entirely from Fannie Mae's board of directors. Fannie Mae's SGIMF ¶ 7.
Over a year later, on February 23, 2006, Fannie Mae released the report of Senator Rudman and his team at Paul Weiss, "A Report to the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae" (the "Rudman Report"), which reached similar findings as the OFHEO Interim Report.
Finally, on December 6, 2006, Fannie Mae filed with the SEC its Restatement of its prior financial results in a Form 10-K (the "Restatement"). Fannie Mae's SGIMF ¶ 65. The Restatement resulted in a "total reduction in retained earnings of $6.3 billion through June 30, 2004." Restatement at 2; see also Fannie Mae's SGIMF ¶ 68.
After OFHEO issued its Interim Report in September 2004, several Fannie Mae shareholders filed class action suits alleging that the company and its executives had violated the federal securities laws and committed securities fraud. Compl. [Dkt. #1]. The first of these actions was filed on September 24, 2004. Id. After the other separately-filed cases were eventually consolidated into this multi-district litigation action, I appointed OPERS and STRS as lead plaintiffs on January 13, 2005. Mem. Op. and Order, 355 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005) [Dkt. # 52].
In the end, plaintiffs allege that Fannie Mae and the individual defendants violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), by intentionally manipulating earnings and violating GAAP, causing losses to investors.
On August 22, 2011, Howard moved for summary judgment on all claims against him, arguing that plaintiffs have failed to prove that he acted with the necessary scienter under the securities laws. Mem. in Supp. of Def. J. Timothy Howard's Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [Dkt. # 938-1] ("Howard's Mem.").
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden, and the court will draw "all justifiable inferences" in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Nevertheless, the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Thus, if the evidence presented by the opposing party is `merely colorable' or `not significantly probative,' summary judgment may be granted." Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 519 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505); see also Montgomery v. Chao, 546 F.3d 703, 708 (D.C.Cir.2008) ("The possibility that a jury might speculate in the plaintiffs favor ... is simply insufficient to defeat summary judgment."). Factual assertions in the moving party's affidavits may be accepted as true unless the opposing party submits its own affidavits, declarations, or documentary evidence to the contrary. Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C.Cir.1992).
The elements of a securities fraud claim and the requirements of a summary judgment motion remain constant, regardless of the enormity and novelty of the facts in question. Securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require proof of the following elements: "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148,
Unfortunately, for plaintiffs, they have not established a genuine issue of material fact as to Howard's alleged scienter. There is no direct evidence that Howard intended to deceive Fannie Mae's investors. Indeed, plaintiffs conceded this very point at oral argument. Tr. at 62:4-14. And while proof of scienter may sometimes be inferred from circumstantial evidence, see In re Baan, 103 F.Supp.2d 1, 20 (D.D.C.2000), this is not the case here. In essence, plaintiffs, as they did with Raines, have stitched together a patchwork quilt of evidence that they allege presents a disputed issue of material fact as to Howard's scienter. I disagree. Plaintiffs' cited evidence simply does not rise to an inference of scienter. Although scienter is generally a question of fact for a jury, see, e.g., SEC v. Pace, 173 F.Supp.2d 30, 33 (D.D.C.2001) ("In the ordinary securities fraud case, scienter is a genuine issue of material fact."); see also Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir.1984) ("Issues of motive and intent are usually inappropriate for disposition on summary judgment."), summary judgment is appropriate if plaintiffs present no concrete evidence of scienter, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (recognizing that resolving defendant's "state of mind" may be appropriate on summary judgment and that plaintiff may not defeat "a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment ... without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor"); see also In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1425 (9th Cir.1994) (finding defendants had "conclusively rebutted" plaintiffs' "speculative inferences" of fraud).
Plaintiffs' theories on Howard's scienter are insufficient to withstand his summary judgment motion, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence of Howard's good faith. No witnesses testified that Howard knew that Fannie Mae's financial statements were materially inaccurate or not GAAP compliant. Further, no witnesses testified that Howard sought to misrepresent Fannie Mae's earnings or mislead investors. Throughout the class period, Howard relied on internal and external accounting experts to ensure that the company's financial statements complied with GAAP, and these experts universally assured Howard that Fannie Mae's financial statements were accurate in all material respects.
Moreover, the parties' dispute as to whether Howard possessed the requisite education, experience, and accounting acumen to personally understand the nuances of Fannie Mae's accounting policies does not reveal any evidence of scienter. Howard's Mem. at 2-4; Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 6-10. The Court has no doubt that, as plaintiffs state, Howard "gained an in-depth understanding of Fannie Mae's accounting policies and the accounting standards applicable to the company during his 22-year tenure there." Pls. Opp'n Howard at 7. Nor does the Court doubt that Howard was deeply involved in developing Fannie Mae's accounting policies. See Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 8-10; Pls.' SGIMF Howard ¶¶ 19-20. But Howard's familiarity with accounting policies cannot imply scienter of accounting fraud if no evidence of such fraud was ever brought to Howard's attention. As such, plaintiffs do not put forth any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Howard was told during the class period that Fannie Mae violated GAAP or committed fraud.
In sum, plaintiffs offer no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that any of Howard's statements concerning Fannie Mae's accounting practices or internal controls were made with an intent to deceive, or were otherwise made without any reasonable basis.
When asked during oral argument to present the three best examples of evidence of Howard's scienter, plaintiffs began with what they characterized as "one of the best examples": a 2004 email describing a conversation with Sampath Rajappa, Fannie Mae's Senior Vice President for Operations Risk and head of the Office of Auditing. Tr. at 62:4-24; see also Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 12, 30. In the email, Howard tells Spencer that he "made it `blisteringly clear' to [Rajappa] that on any future calls he gets from the Chairman of our Audit Committee on accounting-related issues he must run the question or issue by you before he or anyone else gets back to [the Audit Committee Chairman]." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 30. According to plaintiffs, this email demonstrates that
Plaintiffs then attempt to muster other evidence that Howard "was aware of ... material internal control weaknesses." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 31. This evidence consists of descriptions of Fannie Mae's organizational structure that allegedly created "clear conflicts of interests." Id. Yet again, plaintiffs provide no evidence that Howard knew that Fannie Mae's organizational structure possessed conflicts or weaknesses.
Next, plaintiffs detail the events leading up to a 1998 audit difference related to
As further evidence related to FAS 91, plaintiffs cite another document predating the class period: a September 23, 1999 memorandum to Howard from Janet Pennewell, Fannie Mae's Vice President for Financial Reporting and Planning. Pls.' Supp'l Mem. Howard at 4; Tr. at 74:15-75:15; Pls.' SGIMF Howard ¶¶ 17, 113; Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 51. The memorandum discusses a recommended amortization policy. Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 51. Plaintiffs allege that this memorandum "warned Howard that FAS 91 required Fannie Mae to record catch-up to adjust prior period amortization in the current period, and that percentage thresholds do not conform to GAAP." Pls.' Supp'l Mem. Howard at 4. What the memo actually states, however, is:
Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 51 at 1, 3. Thus, while the memorandum addresses what "[a]ccounting policy requires," it does not go on to conclude that Fannie Mae's current or proposed policy violates GAAP. Instead, the memorandum states that "we believe that it may be
More importantly, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that this pre-class-period evidence would be admissible as evidence of "what the defendant knew during the class period." Pls.' Supp'l Mem. Howard at 2 (citations omitted). Since plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that Howard knew of any GAAP or FAS violations before the class period, plaintiffs' evidence cannot be probative of Howard's scienter during the class period itself.
Plaintiffs did not address FAS 133 in their portions of oral argument or supplemental briefing related to Howard. However, in their original summary judgment motion, plaintiffs did cite two pieces of evidence that they alleged demonstrates Howard's knowledge of FAS 133 violations. First, plaintiffs pointed to an email from Boyles in which plaintiffs say that Boyles "specifically told Howard that Fannie Mae's policy was `aggressive' and `not one we would want to flash in front of the [Financial Accounting Standards Bureau] for comment or the treatment could get worse.'" Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 20 (emphasis omitted); see Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 66 at 1-2. Plaintiffs, however, conveniently omit the middle of the sentence: "we have KPMG's approval" See Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 66 at 1. With this phrase included, this sentence no longer implies that the accounting policy was somehow improper. To the contrary, the sentence stands as evidence supporting the defendant's assertion that Howard was told that Fannie Mae's accounting policies were acceptable. Plaintiffs also omit Howard's response to this email, in which Howard rejects "attempting to work behind the scenes" in favor of "mak[ing] our argument forcibly to FASB." Delinsky Decl., Ex. 64 at 1. In no way does this email demonstrate that Howard knew about improper accounting practices or supported keeping any accounting practices a secret.
Plaintiffs next allege that "Howard directed Fannie Mae's pervasive and improper earnings management over the entire class period." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 14. In support, plaintiffs point to Fannie Mae's IO/PO accounting, debt repurchases, and on-top adjustments, which they conclude represent "instances where Howard was specifically informed of and tolerated... GAAP violations...." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 17-19. At most, plaintiffs' evidence indicates that Howard was involved with certain transactions that affected earnings. Plaintiffs fail to point to any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Howard believed any of these transactions were improper or sought to conceal them from the public. Indeed, plaintiffs' own expert recognized that earnings management does not necessarily show an improper purpose. See Fierstein Report at 5-5, September 14, 2010, Delinsky Decl., Ex. 69 ("Certain transactions may be executed to manage earnings (i.e., change the pattern of earnings) without violating GAAP. At Fannie Mae, an example of this was its debt buyback program."). With respect to debt buy-backs, the record shows that Fannie Mae disclosed the buy-backs in their public filings. Delinsky Decl., Ex. 71 (2001, 2002, and 2003 disclosures). As to the on-top adjustments, plaintiffs only evidence is an email describing an on-top adjustment "[b]ased on discussions with" Howard. Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 19 (citing Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 41). The email, however, contains no reference to GAAP violations, Howard's knowledge of GAAP violations, or Howard's knowledge of the on-top adjustment.
Plaintiffs also present evidence of alleged "warnings]" Howard received about earnings manipulation. Pls.' Supp'l Mem. Howard at 4. For example, plaintiffs state that KPMG "specifically warned Howard on three separate occasions that earnings manipulations to meet specific goals were impermissible...." Id. The three occasions they cite, however, consist of general communications from the SEC about "earnings management" — not linked to any
Plaintiffs claim that "Howard was informed on several occasions that senior management was hiding certain GAAP violations and other important information from KPMG, but did nothing." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 15. In addition to citing the IO/REMIC package briefing discussed above,
Nor does plaintiffs' class-period evidence indicate that Howard knew that Fannie Mae was hiding information from KPMG. Plaintiffs single piece of class-period evidence is a 2002 email from Spencer to Howard and Boyles. See Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 16; Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 23. In this email, Spencer remarked that "[t]here is at least one thing that we know of where we have a favorable accounting treatment and that is on the IO's we have on our books. Freddie [Mac] is doing IO accounting and we are not. KPMG hasn't figured that out...." Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 23. This comment does not suggest that Fannie Mae was concealing improper accounting practices from KPMG. Rather, Spencer simply observed that KPMG was not aware that Fannie Mae's accounting practices differed from those of Freddie Mac. No mention is made of either company's accounting practices violating GAAP or being otherwise improper. Even if plaintiffs pointed to evidence that Howard read this email, this email could not have tipped off Howard to the presence of accounting fraud.
Plaintiffs also fail to show that Howard was aware of any attempts to conceal information from the SEC. In this regard, plaintiffs present merely a memorandum from Jonathan Boyles, in which he states that "the process we have in place is not exactly what we showed the SEC though it gets close." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 16 (citing Markovits-Howard/Spencer Decl., Ex. 26 at 2). Putting aside the questionable value of this statement, the memorandum's distribution list does not even include Howard. Without evidence that Howard read the memorandum, plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that this memorandum is evidence that Howard intended to deceive anyone. See Novak, 216 F.3d at 309 ("[A]llegations of GAAP violations or accounting irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to state a securities fraud claim. Only where such allegations are coupled with evidence of corresponding fraudulent intent, might they be sufficient.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs again fail to establish Howard's scienter by observing that "Howard
Notably, Howard increased his ownership of Fannie Mae stock and vested stock options by more than 20 percent during the class period. Howard's Reply to Pls.' SGIMF ¶¶ 136-38. Such behavior is, to say the least, inconsistent with a fraudulent intent. See In re KeySpan Corp. Sec. Litig., 383 F.Supp.2d 358, 383-84 (E.D.N.Y.2003) ("The net acquisition of shares cuts against the notion that defendants sought to unload their holdings of KeySpan stock before their likely diminution in value following the disclosure of negative insider information.").
Throughout their opposition brief, plaintiffs lean heavily on the post-hoc reports and litigation documents, which were uniformly prepared after the relevant events in this case, and some of which were explicitly prepared in preparation for litigation, as "evidence" of Howard's scienter. See, e.g., Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 16 (citing OFHEO Report); id. at 9, 17, 21, 28, 29, 30, 39 (citing Fannie Mae's Restatement); id. at 21, 23 (citing Rudman Report); id. at 9, 31 (citing SEC complaint against Fannie Mae); id. at 32 (citing OFHEO's Notice of Charges and Issuance of Consent Orders). Putting aside the obvious and substantial admissibility questions concerning these documents,
Finally, plaintiffs attempt to shore up their case against Howard by pointing to the "sheer scope and magnitude of the fraud." Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 38. But as Shakespeare might have noted: a giant body doth not portend an evil mind. Indeed, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, I warned plaintiffs' counsel that a fraud's magnitude alone was insufficient to establish an inference of scienter. See In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 503 F.Supp.2d at 41. That principle is stronger now at the summary-judgment stage, and the time for simply presenting allegations that give rise to a strong inference of scienter has long since passed. Without any actual evidence supporting a conclusion of Howard's scienter, the magnitude of Fannie Mae's earnings restatement alone is insufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Sustaining claims for securities fraud requires a showing of scienter — either an intent to deceive or an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care — for each individual or entity claimed to have committed such fraud. Put simply, the securities fraud laws are not a means for shareholders to recover for all losses, no matter how sizable or sudden. Upon review of all plaintiffs' evidence, this Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to put forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Howard had such an intent. A failure to understand, or even negligent behavior, is not the equivalent of the necessary intent to deceive or conscious disregard of obvious risks. Therefore, Howard is entitled to summary
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant J. Timothy Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
In turn, the defendants filed six separate summary judgment motions. Of those, all of the defendants joined in filing two of the motions, which focus, respectively, on the loss causation element of the securities fraud claims and on plaintiffs' claims related to Statements of Financial Accounting Standards ("FAS") 133. Defs.' Joint Mot. for Summ. J. for Failure to Prove Loss Causation [Dkt. # 939] ("Defs.' Mot. Loss Causation"); Defs.' Joint Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Based on FAS 133 Accounting Issues [Dkt. #941] ("Defs.' Mot. FAS 133"). Finally, the individual defendants and KPMG have each separately moved for summary judgment. KPMG LLP's Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #937] ("KPMG's Mot."); Def. J. Timothy Howard's Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 938] ("Howard's Mot."); Def. Franklin D. Raines's Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 940] ("Raines's Mot."); Def. Leanne G. Spencer's Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 942] ("Spencer's Mot.").
Briefly, FAS 91, or "Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of Leases," instructs companies on how to account for premiums and discounts on securities and loans — in Fannie Mae's case, mortgages. Pls.' Responses to Fannie Mae's Statements of Additional Material Facts [Dkt. # 990-1] ("Pls. Responses to Fannie Mae's SAUMF") ¶¶ 24, 30 (Ex. 30, FAS 91, ¶¶ 4, 15, 18). And, FAS 133, or "Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities," addresses a company's hedge accounting, or its recording of the value of derivative transactions in its earnings. See OFHEO Interim Report at iv. Fannie Mae used derivatives transactions, particularly interest-rate swaps, to hedge (protect) against interest rate changes in its issued debt and the mortgage loans it owned. See Defs.' Reply SUMF FAS 133 ¶¶ 1-12.
Moreover, the prejudicial effect of these documents substantially outweighs their probative value; these documents, after all, were undoubtedly fashioned with multiple considerations in mind. Plaintiffs argue that inadmissible evidence can be used to defeat summary judgment "so long as it is capable of being converted into admissible evidence," but plaintiffs do not demonstrate that the reports contain "underlying admissible evidence" that could be used at trial. Pls.' Opp'n Howard at 5 n. 7.