RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Jefferson Morley brings this action to recover attorney's fees and costs from the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See Pl.'s Renewed Mot. for Att'y's Fees and Costs [Dkt. # 135] ("Pl.'s Mot."). The CIA opposes. Def.'s Opp'n to Pl's Renewed Mot. for Att'y's Fees and Costs ("Def.'s Opp'n") [Dkt. # 139]. After review of the motion, the applicable law, and the record herein, plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
This case has been ongoing since 2003. This Court and our Circuit have outlined the facts and procedural history of plaintiff's FOIA request in numerous prior opinions. See generally Morley v. CIA, 699 F.Supp.2d 244 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Morley III"); Morley v. CIA, 453 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.D.C. 2006) ("Morley I"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 508 F.3d 1108 (D.C.Cir. 2007) ("Morley II"). Indeed, this is plaintiff's second request for attorney's fees, and the specific facts relevant to his fee request are detailed in Morley v. CIA, 828 F.Supp.2d 257 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Morley IV"), vacated, 719 F.3d 689 (D.C.Cir. 2013) ("Morley V"). Accordingly, a brief summary will suffice here.
Morley is a journalist and news editor. Morley II, 508 F.3d at 1113. On July 4, 2003, Morley submitted a request under FOIA to the CIA for "all records pertaining to CIA operations officer George Efythron Joannides." Pl.'s Mot., Exh. 1 [Dkt. # 135-3]. The letter makes clear that Morley sought information connected to President John F. Kennedy's assassination. See id. (explaining that the documents sought would "shed new light on the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963"). The CIA responded in the beginning of November, 2003, with a letter explaining that the National Archives and Records Administration
Morley subsequently filed suit in this Court on December 16, 2003, to enforce his FOIA request. Morley II, 508 F.3d at 1113. After further processing of the request, along with an appeal up to our Circuit, the CIA ultimately provided Morley with a total of 524 responsive records (some of which were segmented and/or redacted). Morley IV, 828 F.Supp.2d at 260. Of those records, 113 were from the files the CIA previously had transferred to NARA. Id.
Morley then moved this Court for attorney's fees. Id. at 261. Applying the four-factor standard courts in this Circuit use to determine whether a FOIA plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, see Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C.Cir. 1992)., superseded by statute on other grounds, OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub.L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, I concluded that Morley was not so entitled, Morley IV, 828 F.Supp.2d at 265-66.
Morley appealed. The Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to "apply the four-factor standard in a manner consistent with Davy [v. CIA, 550 F.3d 1155 (D.C.Cir. 2008)]," a case in which our Circuit "recently elaborated on one of the four factors, the public-benefit factor." Morley V, 719 F.3d at 690. The opinion did not mention this Court's analysis of any of the other three factors. Morley has now filed a Renewed Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs.
FOIA permits a court to "assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). The FOIA attorney fee provision was not designed as a "reward for any litigant who successfully forces the government to disclose information it wished to withhold." Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 711 (D.C.Cir. 1977). Instead, it has "a more limited purpose—to remove the incentive for administrative resistance to disclosure requests based not on the merits of exemption claims, but on the knowledge that many FOIA plaintiffs do not have the financial resources or economic incentives to pursue their requests through expensive litigation." Id. With this limited purpose in mind, a plaintiff seeking fees must satisfy a two-part inquiry. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1495 (D.C.Cir. 1984). The plaintiff must be both "eligible" for an award, in that he has "substantially prevailed,"
When it remanded this case to me for reconsideration, our Circuit Court noted its elaboration on the public benefit factor in Davy v. CIA, 550 F.3d 1155 (D.C.Cir. 2008), and instructed me "to apply the four-factor standard in a manner consistent with Davy." Morley V, 719 F.3d at 690. Accordingly, I have reviewed the facts, new briefing, and relevant law in this case, including Davy. Further consideration of our Circuit's elaboration on the public benefit factor in Davy, however, does not alter my original conclusion that "this litigation has yielded little, if any, public benefit —certainly an insufficient amount to support an award of attorney's fees." Morley IV, 828 F.Supp.2d at 262.
Evaluation of the public benefit factor "requires consideration of both the effect of the litigation for which fees are requested and the potential public value of the information sought." Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159. Although "[t]he release of any government document benefits the public by increasing citizens' knowledge of their government," Congress did not intend for this vague benefit to entitle a plaintiff to fees. Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C.Cir. 1979). Instead, the public benefit factor weighs in plaintiff's favor "where the complainant's victory is likely to add to the fund of information that citizens may use in making vital political choices." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
When it remanded this case, the Circuit noted that Davy "concerned a request for records related to President Kennedy's assassination" and had stated "that records `about individuals allegedly involved in President Kennedy's assassination[ ] serve[ ] a public benefit.'" Morley V, 719 F.3d at 690 (quoting Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159) (alteration in original). However, the Davy court did not make a broad statement that all records "about individuals allegedly involved in President Kennedy's assassination" benefit the public. 550 F.3d at 1159. Instead, its conclusion was a much more limited, case-specific one that "[t]he information Davy requested —about individuals allegedly involved in President Kennedy's assassination—serves a public benefit." Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159 (emphasis added). The Davy Court's description of the documents at issue does not create a category of records that automatically satisfy the first factor based on a plaintiff's claims of a relationship to the assassination. The Court must look deeper.
Indeed, analysis of the public benefit factor is a fact-based and document-specific inquiry that must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis. See Cotton, 63 F.3d at 1120 ("The only way to comport with this directive is to evaluate the specific documents at issue in the case at
In Davy, everyone
The information that the CIA released pursuant to Morley's FOIA request can be placed into two broad categories: documents that the CIA previously had transferred to NARA and documents it had not. The CIA agrees that the released records identical to the ones transferred to NARA are "unquestionably assassination-related" and "ordinarily would give rise to public benefit." Id. at 10-11. But these documents already were in the public domain and available for consumption at the National Archives. Whether documents are already in the public domain may be irrelevant on the merits of a FOIA request, but that fact can be taken into consideration when evaluating entitlement to attorney's fees. See Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1094; Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159 (noting that "[a]t least one of the requested documents was not previously available to the public" when finding that the public benefit factor favored plaintiff). Here, the CIA's release to Morley of records identical to those publicly available at the National Archives (with a searchable index online) does not further the public benefit.
Accordingly, Morley emphasizes four records not previously publicly available to support his claim that the public benefit factor weighs in his favor. Pl's Mot. at 24-27. The first two are "travel" documents Morley originally claimed demonstrate that Joannides traveled to New Orleans on two specific dates—April 1, 1964, and May 20, 1964. Id. at 24-25; see Pl.'s Mot., Attachments 1-2 [Dkt. # 135-1; 135-2]; Pl.'s Mot., Morley Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 [Dkt. 135-9]. This, Morley argued, demonstrates Joannides was performing CIA activities in some way related to the Warren Commission's investigation of the assassination. Pl's Mot at 24-25. In response, the government pointed out, correctly, that although the documents were signed on the dates in question, they indicate only that New Orleans was Joannides's "home leave residence" and shed no light on where Joannides was on any particular date. Def. Opp'n at 14; see Pl's Mot., Attachments 1-2. Morley now argues that the mere fact that Joannides may have been in New Orleans at some point between 1962 and 1964 is new information related to the Kennedy assassination because Lee Harvey Oswald was also in New Orleans during that period. Reply to Def.'s Opp'n at 10-11.
Morley also relies on a photograph and citation relating to the Career Intelligence Medal Joannides received in 1981 after he had retired from the CIA.
The CIA does not dispute that these four records convey newly-released information not already in the public domain. But nothing other than pure speculation connects any of it to the Kennedy assassination. What do the new documents Morley points to tell us? Joannides had a home leave residence in the same city where Kennedy's assassin conducted some activities, and the two may—or may not—have been in that city at the same time. Joannides was recognized for a long career of service in the CIA, and the CIA did not condemn him for any particular Kennedy-assassination-related activities in a way that prevented positive recognition for his overall career. That is about it. This information is not "likely to add to the fund of information that citizens may use in making vital political choices." Fenster, 617 F.2d at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted).
My evaluation of the significance of this information to the public also takes into consideration the language the Morley V Court highlighted from a footnote in Davy: "`[P]laintiffs who obtain information that, while arguably not of immediate public interest, nevertheless enables further research ultimately of great value and interest, such as here the public understanding of a Presidential assassination'" should not be foreclosed from fees. Morley V, 719 F.3d at 690 (quoting Davy, 550 F.3d at 1162 n. 3). I do not interpret the Davy Court's footnote as holding that every new piece of information released pursuant to a FOIA request benefits the public because it may, someday, in some way, contribute to research on a matter of public import. The public benefit factor requires more than speculation of an unknown potential future benefit. Again, plaintiff here has pointed to nothing in the newly-released information demonstrating an actual relationship to the Kennedy assassination or any other topic of "great value and interest."
Our Circuit Court directed me to reevaluate the four factor standard in light of Davy's elaboration on the public benefit factor. Morley V, 719 F.3d at 690. My analysis of the other factors remains the same.
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs [Dkt. # 135] is DENIED. An appropriate order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.