RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.
When a pension fund determines that an employer has withdrawn from a multiemployer pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and notifies the employer accordingly, the employer is obligated to make withdrawal liability payments to the fund. Even when withdrawal liability is disputed, the employer must make interim payments under a "pay now, dispute later" rule. In this action, a pension fund's trustees ("Trustees") seek to recover interim payments from two employers. Before this Court now is the Trustees' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having reviewed the parties' filings and the relevant authorities, this Court shall grant the Trustees' motion.
Defendants Wasco, Inc., and Lovell's Masonry, Inc. (collectively "WASCO"), are building and construction companies that employ members of the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Union. See Answer & Countercl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 5. The Union and WASCO entered into collective bargaining agreements requiring WASCO to make pension contributions to the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund ("IPF"). See id. ¶¶ 7, 8. The IPF is a "multiemployer plan" governed by ERISA, as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act ("MPPAA"). See Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), (37)).
Congress enacted the MPPAA to ensure the financial integrity of multiemployer pension funds, whose solvency can be jeopardized when employers withdraw from those plans. See Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1120 (D.C.Cir. 1989). The MPPAA provides that when an employer withdraws from a multiemployer plan,
In December 2011, the IPF determined that WASCO had withdrawn from the fund and notified WASCO of its withdrawal liability under the MPPAA. See Answer & Countercl. ¶ 9. After making the first twelve monthly interim payments, WASCO ceased paying. The IPF made further demands upon WASCO to no avail. See id. ¶¶ 12-14.
On behalf of the IPF, the Trustees filed the instant action against WASCO, seeking outstanding interim payments, interest, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs. See Compl. 5-6. WASCO admitted nearly all of the Trustees' factual allegations but claimed that WASCO had no legal obligation to make interim payments "in this case," during the pendency of arbitration. See Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 15, 16.
The Trustees now move for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that WASCO has admitted all relevant facts, and that this Court's order dismissing the counterclaims forecloses WASCO's LMRA and unclean hands defenses. Mem. Supp. Pls.' Mot. J. Pleadings 2-6, ECF No. 17-1. The Trustees further contend that WASCO's "irreparable injury" defense would contravene the text and purpose of the MPPAA and this Court's precedents. Id. at 6-10. In response, WASCO does not press its LMRA and unclean hands defenses, but maintains its request that this Court — sitting as a "court of equity" — reject the Trustees' demand for interim payments in order to prevent irreparable injury. Defs.' Resp. Pls.' Mot. J. Pleadings 5, ECF No. 18.
A party moving for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1249 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987), overruled on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006). The court must accept the non-movant's allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 287 (D.C.Cir.2014); Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1249 n. 11.
WASCO asks this Court to exercise its equitable power to suspend WASCO's obligation under the MPPAA to make interim payments, 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2), on the grounds that it would suffer irreparable injury otherwise.
Although this Court generally has discretion in granting equitable relief, the Supreme Court has cautioned that equitable discretion must not frustrate Congress's ends. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the district court found that de facto segregation in the plaintiffs' workplace had deprived them of opportunities to advance into more skilled, higher-paying positions, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 422 U.S. 405, 409, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Nonetheless, the district court declined to award the equitable remedy of back pay, in part because there was "no evidence of bad faith." Id. at 410, 95 S.Ct. 2362. In remanding to the district court, the Supreme Court held that lack of "bad faith" was not a "sufficient reason" for denying back pay. Id. at 422, 95 S.Ct. 2362.
Similarly, this Court concludes that the MPPAA's "transcendant legislative purposes" foreclose an equitable irreparable injury exception to the interim payment obligation. Id. at 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362. The MPPAA mandates that interim withdrawal liability payments "shall be payable ... notwithstanding any request for review or appeal of determinations of the amount of such liability or of the schedule." 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2). In even clearer terms, the statute elsewhere provides that these interim payments "shall be made" until an arbitrator orders otherwise. Id. § 1401(d).
By requiring employers to make interim payments, Congress sought to "alleviate the risk that during the course of arbitration, an employer will become insolvent, and [that] the fund will not be able to collect in the event of a favorable award." Findlay Truck Line, Inc. v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 726 F.3d 738, 742 (6th Cir.2013).
WASCO submits that Congress could not have intended employers to be forced into bankruptcy by frivolous demands for interim payments or by lengthy arbitral proceedings. Defs.' Resp. Pls.' Mot. J. Pleadings 5. This Court disagrees with this characterization of the MPPAA's design. Frivolous claims likely would not survive long in arbitration. In closer cases, arbitration might be more burdensome, but Congress determined that regardless of potential costs to employers, arbitration would serve as the initial forum for withdrawal liability disputes. See 29 U.S.C. § 1401(d). This Court "hesitate[s] to use an `equitable' standard that causes the MPPAA to achieve the opposite of Congress'[s] aim." Cent. Transport, 935
Moreover, recognizing an equitable "irreparable harm" exception would run afoul of the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in I.A.M. National Pension Fund Benefit Plan A v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 789 F.2d 21, 23-24 (D.C.Cir.1986). In that case, the district court ordered an employer to make an overdue interim withdrawal liability payment, but indicated that it would determine whether the payment was correctly assessed in a subsequent final order. The employer appealed only from the initial order, and the D.C. Circuit held that the order was not appealable. Id. at 25. The court first concluded that the district court's order mandating interim payments was an interlocutory order granting injunctive relief. Id. at 23-24. But for such an order to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),
Alternatively, even if the MPPAA were to permit discretionary suspension of interim payments to prevent irreparable injury, this Court would not
Nor could WASCO seek refuge in the Fifth Circuit's approach, even if this Circuit were to adopt it. See Trustees of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Mar-Len, Inc., 30 F.3d 621 (5th Cir.1994). In Mar-Len, the Fifth Circuit panel articulated a two-step inquiry: If the court finds that a demand for interim payments is "frivolous" or "not colorable," then it can exercise "a narrow measure of discretion to excuse payments...." Id. at 626.
For the foregoing reasons, the Trustees' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be separately issued, directing the Trustees to file with this Court within thirty (30) days an updated statement of all monies owed by WASCO and of any relief it otherwise seeks, and directing WASCO to respond within thirty (30) days thereafter. This Court will base its subsequent final order on these additional filings.
The D.C. Circuit in I.A.M. did not venture as far as the Sixth Circuit's more recent conclusion that the MPPAA "divest[s] courts of their equity powers" to forestall interim payments. Findlay Truck Line, 726 F.3d at 753 (emphasis added); see also Cent. Transport, 935 F.2d at 119 ("[J]udges have no general equitable power to excuse interim payments"). The Sixth Circuit relied on the principle that "when district courts are properly acting as courts of equity, they have discretion unless a statute clearly provides otherwise." United States v. Oakland Cannibis Buyers' Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 496, 121 S.Ct. 1711, 149 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001) (emphasis added). This Court need not decide the broader question of whether the MPPAA's interim payment provisions are clear enough to "divest" it of all equitable powers — i.e., to foreclose any equitable discretion. Findlay Truck Line, 726 F.3d at 753. It suffices that in I.A.M., the D.C. Circuit determined that no irreparable harm would result from an order requiring interim payments. Thus, even assuming that this Court could excuse WASCO's obligation on other equitable grounds, the language in I.A.M. suggests that it would be inappropriate for this Court to do so on grounds of irreparable harm.
