PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss filed by the defendants,
Dr. Araya seeks damages and injunctive relief, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The District and the Commission respond that Dr. Araya's claims for retrospective relief are untimely and that he fails to state a claim under Section 1983. The defendants also contend that Dr. Araya lacks standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief. Upon careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, the Court will grant the defendants' motions and will dismiss this action.
Dr. Araya was a party to divorce proceedings before D.C. Superior Court Judge John H. Bayly, Jr. A trial was held over several days between July 28, 2010 and January 6, 2011, and on August 24, 2011 Judge Bayly issued a 44-page ruling in the case. See Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d 40, 43-44 (D.C.2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 426, 187 L.Ed.2d 282 (2013). Judge Bayly granted the petitions for divorce filed by Dr. Araya and his wife; awarded joint legal custody of the parties' children; awarded Dr. Araya's wife sole
The present action is Dr. Araya's third lawsuit filed in this federal District Court relating to his divorce case. See Henok v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 13-1621(PLF), 2014 WL 3542121, 58 F.Supp.3d 93, (D.D.C. July 18, 2014) (dismissing Dr. Araya's Fifth Amendment takings claims, premised on Judge Bayly's award of real properties to Araya's wife, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Araya v. Bayly, 875 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2012), aff'd, No. 12-7069, 2013 WL 500819 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 18, 2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 266, 187 L.Ed.2d 150 (2013) (dismissing under Rooker-Feldman numerous other claims arising from the divorce proceedings). In his complaint and proposed amended complaint in this case, Dr. Araya sets forth a variety of allegations, including that: (1) Judge Bayly improperly possessed and used the "Catholic Bible" in the courtroom, see Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 19, 22, 33, 42, 44; (2) Judge Bayly forced Dr. Araya to swear an oath on the Bible, see id. ¶¶ 12, 17, 19, 22, 38, 44; (3) Judge Bayly forced Dr. Araya to pray in the courtroom, see id. ¶¶ 9, 16, 34, 37, 42; (4) Judge Bayly was biased in favor of the Catholic faith, shared by himself and Dr. Araya's wife, see id. ¶¶ 32, 44, 46; (5) Judge Bayly suffered from hearing loss, which interfered with his ability to conduct a fair trial, see id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 29, 35, 36, 42; and (6) Judge Bayly frequently cancelled scheduled court dates without notice, causing Dr. Araya to miss work and to incur substantial financial losses. See id. ¶ 30.
Based on these various allegations, Dr. Araya asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The premise of these claims is that the defendants—the District of Columbia and the Commission—breached a duty to ensure that judges of the Superior Court act in a manner that affords litigants fair trials and that does not violate litigants' rights under the First Amendment or the DCHRA. Dr. Araya demands compensatory, punitive, special, statutory, exemplary, and treble damages, as well as an award of litigation costs. Proposed Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-5, 7-8. In addition, Dr. Araya seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from "carrying, placing, [or] using ANY [B]ible or anything religious" in the D.C. Superior Court, as well as an order "to remove any and all religious paraphernalia" from the grounds of that court. Id. ¶ 6. Alternatively, Dr. Araya seeks injunctive relief that would permit him and other citizens to place their own preferred religious materials on the grounds of the Superior Court. Id. ¶ 11.
The District maintains that all of Dr. Araya's claims for retrospective relief—relating to the injuries that Araya says he suffered during the trial proceedings—are barred by applicable statutes of limitations. District MTD Mem. at 5-7. The District also argues that Araya's Section 1983 claim fails on its merits because he has not set forth factual allegations that plausibly demonstrate his asserted injuries were caused by a custom or policy of the
Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1). In all other circumstances, the Court "will freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires," FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), and "[i]t is common ground that Rule 15 embodies a generally favorable policy toward amendments." Howard v. Gutierrez, 237 F.R.D. 310, 312 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (D.C.Cir. 1989)). Leave may be denied, however, due to "undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or futility." Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). Where the proposed amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave may be denied on the grounds of futility. See Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1996); Elliott v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 521 F.Supp.2d 41, 49 (D.D.C. 2007); Black v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 87 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows dismissal of a complaint if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the "grounds" of "entitle[ment] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). On such a motion, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint "is construed liberally in the [plaintiff's] favor, and [the Court should] grant [the plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v.
In addition, in this case the Court is mindful that the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and therefore his complaint is to be "held to a less stringent standard than complaints drafted by attorneys." Dorsey v. American Express Co., 499 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2007) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197).
After the District and the Commission each had filed a motion to dismiss Dr. Araya's complaint and those motions had been fully briefed, Dr. Araya filed a motion to amend, accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. Dr. Araya maintains that he is entitled to one amendment of his complaint as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. to Amend at 1-2. But as the District correctly points out, Dr. Araya filed his motion to amend more than 21 days after the defendants had filed their motions to dismiss. District Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 1-2 (defendants filed motions in July 2014 but Araya did not file motion to amend until September). Accordingly, he cannot invoke Rule 15(a)(1), which provides that "[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within . . . 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1).
Where a proposed amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss, leave to amend may be denied on the grounds of futility. See Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d at 1003. In this case, because the proposed amended complaint is virtually identical to the original complaint—save for a few additions aimed at curing purported deficiencies identified by the defendants in their motions to dismiss—if the proposed amended complaint fails for futility, then necessarily the original complaint must be dismissed. Specifically, only three substantive differences exist between the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint. See District Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 2-3 (citing the addition of paragraphs 48 and 49, as well as the addition of a sentence to paragraph 18); Comm'n
At the outset, the Court addresses whether any of the prior judicial decisions relating to Dr. Araya's divorce case have an impact on the present case. After Judge Bayly had issued his ruling in August 2011, yet before Dr. Araya's appeal of that ruling had produced a decision from the D.C. Court of Appeals, now-Chief Judge Roberts dismissed an action brought in this District by Dr. Araya against Judge Bayly. See Araya v. Bayly, 875 F.Supp.2d 1. In his decision, Chief Judge Roberts concluded that because all of Dr. Araya's claims would "require review and rejection of findings, decisions, and actions integral to the divorce proceedings," the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded assertion of jurisdiction by a federal court over the matter. Id. at 5-6. Under Rooker-Feldman, federal courts lack jurisdiction over "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
Dr. Araya's claims in his case before Chief Judge Roberts were based on some of the same allegations that he now asserts in this Court. Specifically, Dr. Araya alleged in the earlier action that Judge Bayly bore a religious bias against him, and that Judge Bayly's purported inability to hear prevented him from affording Dr. Araya a fair trial. See Araya v. Bayly, 875 F.Supp.2d at 2-3, 5-6. Dr. Araya makes the same assertions in his proposed amended complaint in this case. See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 44, 46 (religious bias); id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 29, 35, 36, 42 (inability to hear). Chief Judge Roberts' previous jurisdictional ruling bars Dr. Araya's relitigation of claims based on these alleged facts, as, under the preclusive effect of that ruling, this Court likewise lacks jurisdiction to entertain such claims. See Casey v. Dep't of State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1475 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1992) ("[A]lthough a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not have the same broad preclusive effect as a dismissal on the merits, it will `preclude relitigation
The District goes one step further and argues that the D.C. Court of Appeals' rejection of Araya's complaint regarding religious bias precludes all of the claims Araya now asserts. See District Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 4-5 (citing Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d at 44 n.3). But the Court of Appeals did not address some of the issues that Dr. Araya now has placed before this Court, namely whether he was injured by the presence of a Bible in the courtroom and by Judge Bayly's allegedly having forced Dr. Araya to swear an oath upon it.
The statute of limitations in a Section 1983 case "is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). Because District of Columbia law "provides multiple
On the other hand, "the accrual date of a [Section] 1983 action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." Earle v. Dist. of Columbia, 707 F.3d at 305 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091). "A [S]ection 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[B]ecause statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact, dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred." Bregman v. Perles, 747 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C.Cir.2014) (quoting de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 603 (D.C.Cir.2013)) (alteration in original). Dr. Araya's trial before Judge Bayly ended on January 6, 2011, see Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d at 43-44, and he initiated the present action on June 30, 2014, more than three years after the trial's conclusion. Dr. Araya maintains, however, that the accrual date for his Section 1983 claim is August 24, 2011, the date on which Judge Bayly issued his ruling. See Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 18 ("This order completed all the elements of the injury."); Araya Opp'n District MTD at 3 ("The trial, the injury and all its elements were complete [on] August 24th, 2011. Therefore, this suit is timely."); Araya Reply District Opp'n at 4-5. But Dr. Araya is mistaken; the injuries that he asserts on the basis of purported First Amendment violations due to Judge Bayly's use of the Bible during the trial are distinct from any injuries he claims to have suffered as a result of Judge Bayly's ruling. Indeed, were Dr. Araya's Section 1983 claim so bound up with the judgment of the Superior Court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would preclude this Court's assertion of jurisdiction over the claim.
In Dr. Araya's reply to the District's opposition to his motion to amend, he adds the allegation that there was "court interaction" that occurred as late as July 2011. See Araya Reply District Opp'n at 5. This vague contention, however, cannot carry his claim over the threshold into the limitations period. Moreover, the docket sheet in Dr. Araya's domestic relations case shows that he has not appeared before Judge Bayly since April 18, 2011. See District Opp'n Mot. to Amend Ex. 1 [Dkt. No. 12-1].
Dr. Araya contends that his rights under the D.C. Human Rights Act were violated by Judge Bayly's conduct, and that the District and the Commission are liable to him for their failure to ensure that Judge Bayly not violate these rights. See Araya Opp'n District MTD at 2-3; Araya Opp'n Comm'n MTD at 1-3.
Neither of the defendants directly responds to Dr. Araya's assertion of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, it is not clear whether this claim differs at all from his statutory claims under the DCHRA and Section 1983, both of which are based on the premise that the District and the Commission failed to control Judge Bayly's conduct, thus allowing him to violate Dr. Araya's constitutional and statutory rights. Assuming that Dr. Araya does advance an independent claim for common law breach of fiduciary duty, such a claim would nonetheless fail for the same reason that Dr. Araya's other claims founder: his asserted injuries occurred outside of the applicable limitations period, which for this claim is three years. See D.C. CODE § 12-301(8). In addition, Araya's failure to provide notice to the Mayor as required under D.C. CODE § 12-309 provides another reason why this claim must be dismissed. See supra at 462 n.10.
Dr. Araya seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from "carrying, placing, [or] using ANY [B]ible or anything religious" in the D.C. Superior Court, as well as an order "to remove any and all religious paraphernalia" from the grounds of that court. Proposed Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief ¶ 6. Alternatively, Dr. Araya seeks injunctive relief that would permit him and other citizens to place their own preferred religious materials on the grounds of the Superior Court. Id. ¶ 11. The defendants maintain that Araya lacks standing to assert these claims. District MTD at 9-10; District Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 7-8; Comm'n Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 4. The Court agrees with the defendants.
To establish his standing to seek prospective relief, Dr. Araya must allege "a real or immediate threat that [he] will be wronged again." Henok v. District of Columbia, 2014 WL 3542121, at *4, 58 F.Supp.3d at 98 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)); see also NB ex rel. Peacock v. Dist. of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 82 (D.C.Cir.2012) ("The question . . . is whether the complaint contains facts that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, establish an imminent threat of injury."). The threat of injury may not be "conjectural" or "hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Dr. Araya asserts that he is a party to an ongoing domestic relations case in the D.C. Superior Court, which "will remain open for the next 17 years until [his] youngest child reaches age 21." Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 49.
First, Dr. Araya's complaints about the presence and use of the Bible in the Superior Court arise solely from his past interactions with Judge Bayly, and Judge Bayly is no longer assigned to Dr. Araya's case. District Opp'n Mot. to Amend at 8. Although Dr. Araya argues that Judge Bayly is still an active judge, see Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 49, who would likely hear an emergency motion in Dr. Araya's case because he is familiar with the matter, see Araya Reply District Opp'n at 5-6, it is wholly speculative whether Dr. Araya will ever appear before Judge Bayly again.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss Dr. Araya's complaint filed by the District and the Commission; deny Dr. Araya's motion to amend his complaint; and dismiss this case with prejudice. The Court concludes that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because it is apparent that Dr. Araya cannot allege "other facts consistent with [the proposed amended complaint]" that could "cure the deficienc[ies]" in that pleading. Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 131 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam)). As explained, Dr. Araya cannot plead facts that would demonstrate an accrual date that lies within the three-year limitations period, and he cannot demonstrate that he has standing to seek injunctive relief because he can do no more than speculate regarding future interactions with judges of the Superior Court. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
For the reasons stated in the Opinion issued this same day, it is hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss [Dkt. No. 4] filed by the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint [Dkt. No. 10] is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall remove this case from the docket of this Court. This is a final appealable Order. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
SO ORDERED.
