REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge.
The plaintiff, Covidien LP, formerly known as Tyco Healthcare Group LP, filed this civil action against the defendants, Advanced Skeletal Innovations LLC and Bonutti Skeletal Innovations LLC, seeking declaratory relief. Complaint ("Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 4. Specifically, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that its surgical products do not infringe certain patents owned and licensed by the defendants: U.S. Patent No. 5,674,240 (filed June 6, 1995) ("'240 Patent"), U.S. Patent No. 5,961,499 (filed June 6, 1995) ("'499 Patent"), and U.S.
The patents-in-suit "generally relate to cannulas for surgical and medical use." Defs.' Mem. at 2; see also Pl.'s Mem. at 4. Cannulas are "tube[s] that can be inserted into the body, often for the delivery or removal of fluid, to create a bigger workspace, or for the gathering of data." Defs.' Mem. at 2; see also Pl.'s Mem. at 4. Specifically, the patents-in-suit claim expandable cannulas, see, e.g.,'240 Patent, at [54], as well as methods of using expandable cannulas, see '730 Patent, at [54]. The patents-in-suit are in the same patent family—that is, they share a common parent application and patent: U.S. Patent Application No. 08/013,942, which is now U.S. Patent No. 5,320,611 (filed Feb. 4, 1993) ("'611 Patent"). See '240 Patent, at [60]; '499 Patent, at [60]; '730 Patent, at [60]; see also Corrected Answer and Counterclaim ("Countercl.") at 10, 24-25.
This action came to the Court by way of a dispute between the parties regarding whether the plaintiff owed the defendants certain royalties under a particular licensing agreement involving the patents-in-suit.
"It is a `bedrock principle' of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.'" Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (en bane) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). In return for that exclusionary right, the patentee must precisely define the invention. See id. And the Court cannot construe the invention "in a manner different from the plain import of its terms." Id.; see also Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2006) ("[T]he claims [cannot] enlarge what is patented beyond what the
In construing the parties' disputed claim terms, the Court must afford the terms their "ordinary and customary meaning" as understood by "a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13. A person of ordinary skill in the art is "deemed to read the claim term[s] not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term[s] appear[], but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification" and the prosecution history. Id. at 1313; see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) ("[I]n interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history."). The specification "is the single best guide to the meaning of . . . disputed [claim] term[s]." Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
It can also be appropriate to use extrinsic evidence to determine a term's meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; see also Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir.1990) ("Claim interpretation involves a review of the specification, the prosecution history, the claims (including unasserted as well as asserted claims), and, if necessary, other extrinsic evidence. . . ." (emphasis added)). Extrinsic evidence "consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (internal quotations omitted). But "while extrinsic evidence can shed useful light on the relevant art, . . . it is less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Claim terms are not afforded their ordinary and customary meaning in only two circumstances: "(1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution." Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2012) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1580); see also Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed.Cir. 2009) (explaining that ordinary meaning of claim terms controls unless "the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where the patents-in-suit are derived from the same parent application, sharing many common terms, claim terms must be construed consistently across the patents-in-suit. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed.Cir.2004).
The following claim terms and constructions have been agreed to by the parties. Joint Statement at 2; Pl.'s Mem. at 45; see also Defendants' Argument: Power-Point Slides and Corresponding Transcript at 20.
The parties' dispute here boils down to whether the terms "pierce" and "piercing" in the context of the patents-in-suit are necessarily limited to the formation of an
First, particularly instructive is asserted method claim 45 of the '730 Patent. Claim 45 distinguishes between the formation of an opening, i.e., "piercing," and the movement through that opening. Claim 45 reads:
'730 Patent col. 25 l. 66—col. 26 l. 9 (emphasis added). Claim 45 states that only after the cannula has "pierc[ed]" the side wall of a vessel, can the sheath and wires of the cannula then be "mov[ed]" through the vessel. Id. The use of the term "thereafter" indicates that the act of "piercing" the vessel is a separate step that precedes the actual movement of the sheath and wires of the cannula through the vessel. If "piercing" included movement of the sheath and wires of the cannula through a pre-existing hole, there would be no need to include the "thereafter" clause regarding the movement through the vessel. See, e.g., Digital-Vending Servs. Int'l, LLC v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed.Cir.2012) (explaining that it is important to construe "claim terms in light of the surrounding claim language, such that words in a claim are not rendered superfluous"); Lexion Med., LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., 641 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2011) (preferring "a claim interpretation that harmonizes the various elements of the claim to define a workable invention").
Second, the specification is likewise informative on the meaning of the terms "pierce" and "piercing." In the Summary of the Invention, the inventors explained that "pierce" means the following:
'730 Patent col. 1 ll. 40-44 (emphasis added); see also id. col. 12 ll. 35-46, col. 16 ll. 8-15. Thus, in providing an overview of the claimed invention, the inventors used "pierce" to describe only the formation of an opening.
Also informative is Figure 26 in the specification, which is described as "a fragmentary schematic illustration depicting the relationship between the contracted cannula and a blood vessel after the cannula has pierced skin and body tissue adjacent to the blood vessel and prior to piercing of a side wall of the blood vessel." '730 Patent col. 2 ll. 56-60 (emphasis added). The specification goes on to explain in detail that
Id. col. 12 ll. 38-46 (emphasis added); see also id. col. 13 ll. 25-29 ("Since the cannula 400 is in the contracted condition of FIG. 22 when the side wall 456 of the blood vessel 458 is pierced, a relatively small opening 476 is formed in the side wall 456 of the blood vessel 456 by the cannula 400." (emphasis added)). Together, these two descriptions of Figure 26 indicate that "pierce" means, in the context of the '730 patent, to form an opening where none exists.
The defendants, in a somewhat convoluted fashion, maintain that "pierce" must also encompass "push through" because while Figure 32 is said to illustrate the relationship between the cannula and the skin "immediately prior to piercing of the skin," id. col. 3 ll. 15-20, it actually depicts the cannula as "already initiat[ing] . . . [an] opening in the skin," and so it would be inconsistent for the Court to construe "pierce" or "piercing" to mean initiate or initiating the formation of an opening.
'730 Patent col. 15 ll. 17-26 (emphasis added). This passage confirms that Figure 32 depicts a cannula "immediately prior to piercing of the skin," id. col. 3 ll. 15-20, because the cannula must first pierce the outer side surface of the skin "before" it can do the same to the skin, id. col. 15 ll. 17-26.
Third, the plaintiff's limiting construction is buttressed further by the prosecution history of the '730 Patent. Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1268 ("The prosecution history is considered to determine whether or not there were any express representations made in obtaining the patent regarding the scope and meaning of the claims." (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582)); see also 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1364-65 (Fed.Cir.2008) (consulting prosecution history to "use . . . as support for the construction already discerned from the claim language"); Dunhall Pharm., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 243 F.3d 564, 2000 WL 1608803, at *4 (Fed.Cir.2000) (unpublished) ("The exchange between the patentee and the patent examiner often reveals representations made in obtaining the patent from the Patent and Trademark Office. . . regarding the scope and meaning of claim terms, even those with definitions provided for in the specification."). During the prosecution of the '730 Patent, both the PTO examiner and the inventors shared a common understanding that "pierce" meant to "initiate an opening where there is no opening," which is consistent with the plain language of asserted claim 45, as well as the specification. See Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d 549, 559 (Fed.Cir.2013) (limiting claim term because, inter alia, "the examiner shared" the patentee's "stated view of the claimed device"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1023, 188 L.Ed.2d 138 (2014); ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (Fed.Cir.2010) ("Arguments made during prosecution regarding the meaning of a claim term are relevant to the interpretation of that term in every claim of the patent absent a clear indication to the contrary." (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Honeywell Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 298 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2002) (highlighting significance of prosecution history in determining the meaning of claim terms). In rejecting a proposed claim, the examiner stated:
'730 Patent Prosecution History ("'730 Patent History"), August 12, 1997 Examiner's
'475 Application, September 17, 2009 Response to Final Office Action and Request for Continued Examination Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 ("Response"), J.A. at FH 7149-50. The plaintiff's narrow construction of "pierce" and "piercing" is therefore supported by compelling intrinsic evidence.
The Court is unmoved by the defendants' efforts to undermine the intrinsic evidence, which strongly demonstrates that their construction is overbroad and incorrect. First, the defendants' invoke the doctrine of claim differentiation. Defs.' Mem. at 12. Specifically, they argue that because independent claim 23 of the '240 Patent has the following limitation —"said cannula having a pointed end portion to pierce body tissue," and because its dependent claim 25 further adds the following limitation—"during insertion of said pointed end portion of said cannula
Claim differentiation is the "presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope." Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). It "refers to the presumption that an independent claim should not be construed as requiring a limitation added by a dependent claim." Id. The presumption is "especially strong" where "the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim." SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir.2003) (emphasis added) (citing Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2002)). This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Id. (explaining that the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a rebuttable presumption that the limitation at issue is absent from the independent claim).
Here, although reading independent claim 23 and dependent claim 25 of the '240 Patent in conjunction could potentially impose an additional limitation on the term "pierce," such that the term is as broad as the defendants suggest, there is an additional limitation unrelated to the term "pierce" that is found in dependent claim 25. See '240 Patent col. 23 ll. 14-18 ("wherein said sheath has an outer end surface which engages body tissue at locations between adjacent wires"). And where, as here, the dependent claim has multiple limitations, claim differentiation arguments are routinely discounted in claim construction analyses. See, e.g, Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2001) (noting that because the dependent claim "embraces additional limitations not encompassed within" the independent claim, the claim differentiation argument was unpersuasive); see also GeoTag, Inc. v. Frontier Commc'ns Corp., No. 10-cv-265(JRG), 2013 WL 693852, at *10 (E.D.Tex. Feb. 26, 2013) (reasoning that claim differentiation argument is inapplicable where the dependent claim at issue contains more than just the limitation in dispute); Premier Int'l Assocs. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 512 F.Supp.2d 737, 743 (E.D.Tex.2007) (finding that "claim differentiation argument fail[ed] because the relevant dependent claims . . . add[ed] additional limitations other than the limitation" in dispute). Even if the doctrine of claim differentiation assisted the defendants in creating the rebuttable presumption, the presumption is defeated by the aforementioned intrinsic evidence. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.2012) (en banc) ("[C]laim differentiation is `not a hard and fast rule and will be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written description or prosecution history.'" (quoting Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2005)); InterDigital Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2012), on reh'g, 707 F.3d 1295 (Fed.Cir.2013) ("[T]he doctrine of claim differentiation creates only a presumption, which can be overcome by strong contrary evidence such as definitional language in the patent or a clear disavowal of claim scope. . . ."); Backyard Nature Prods., Inc. v. Woodlink, Ltd., 81 Fed.Appx. 729, 731-32 (Fed.Cir.2003)
The defendants also direct the Court's attention to certain portions of the '240 Patent specification where they contend "pierce" entails activities in addition to the formation of an opening where none existed because "the specification distinguishes between initiating an opening and `piercing.'" Defs.' Mem. at 12-13. In light of the intrinsic evidence outlined earlier, however, the Court does not read these portions of the specification in the same manner as the defendants. Rather, they demonstrate that references to the forming of an opening and "pierce" or "piercing" are used to describe the same activity. See Curtiss-Wright, 438 F.3d at 1380 ("[C]laim drafters can also use different terms to define the exact same subject matter."); see also Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed.Cir. 2010) (explaining that the "implication" that different terms have different meanings can be overcome by evidence to the contrary); Edwards Lifesciences, 582 F.3d at 1329 ("The interchangeable use of the two terms is akin to a definition equating the two."); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 182 Fed. Appx. 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.2006).
Lastly, the Court finds it unnecessary to consult extrinsic evidence in construing the terms "pierce" and "piercing," as the intrinsic evidence clearly demonstrates that the terms are not entitled to the broad construction proposed by the defendants.
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote
The heart of the parties' conflicting positions here is whether the scope of the disputed term, found only in asserted claim 23 of the '499 Patent, encompasses wires in the orientation of tubular braids. See Pl.'s Mem. at 25. Otherwise, their proposed constructions are nearly identical. See Hr'g Tr. at 4:20-5:9, 20:2-16, 110:17-111:20, 112:23-113:11; see also Hr'g Tr. at 111:3-10 (suggesting scope of term is disputed, but not the meaning).
The determination of claim scope is a function for the Court. See O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed.Cir.2008) (explaining that where parties agree on a "common meaning" of a disputed claim term, "but then proceed[] to dispute the scope of that claim term . . . [,] claim construction requires the court to determine what claim scope is appropriate in
During the prosecution of the '499 Patent, asserted claim 23 was initially rejected by the PTO examiner as being "unpatentable over Fogarty et al. in view of Leckrone."
The defendants' primary response is to invoke the "exacting" standard necessary to prove prosecution disclaimer, Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366, and insist that it has not been satisfied, see Defs.' Mem. at 18-20, 23. But the inventors were not required to state precisely that "tubular braids are not within the scope of the invention" during the prosecution of the patent, id. at 23 (emphasis omitted), see also Defs.' Reply at 18, in order for the Court to find that they sufficiently disavowed tubular braids from their claimed invention, Saffran, 712 F.3d at 559 ("[A]pplicants rarely submit affirmative disclaimers along the lines of `I hereby disclaim the following . . .' during prosecution and need not do so to meet the applicable standard."); see also Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2001) ("[T]he scope of the disclaimer must be determined by what a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The inventors' distinction of the claimed invention over the prior art was sufficient for the prosecution disclaimer.
The parties dispute these derivatives of the word expand. While the defendants propose the plain and ordinary meaning for the proper construction of these terms, Defs.' Mem. at 24, the plaintiff seeks to narrow the defendants' construction, such that the terms only encompass "stretching" (or some derivative of this word) "without breaking, to a larger cross-sectional area," Pl.'s Mem. at 33. But the plaintiff's proposed construction is convoluted and without intrinsic support, so the Court will reject it for several reasons.
First, the notion that the expandable cannula must have a "larger cross-sectional area" upon expansion is already captured by other terms in the asserted claims. E.g., '240 Patent col. 20 ll. 2-19 ("said expandable cannula comprising a longitudinally extending tubular sheath formed of a material capable of being extended from a condition in which a longitudinally extending passage through the tubular sheath has a relatively small cross sectional size to a condition in which the passage has a relatively large cross sectional size upon expansion of said cannula from the contracted condition to the expanded condition" (emphasis added)); '499 Patent col. 22 ll. 9-13 ("said longitudinally extending array of wires having a relatively small cross sectional size when said sheath is in the contracted condition and a relatively large cross sectional size when said sheath is in the expanded condition" (emphasis added)). Thus, the plaintiff's proposed construction, which includes other claim terms, introduces redundancies into the asserted claims. See Rozbicki v. Chiang, 590 Fed.Appx. 990, 996 (Fed.Cir. 2014) (rejecting claim construction that did "not make any sense" or would "at least be redundant"); Digital-Vending Servs. Int'l, LLC v. Univ. of Phx., Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed.Cir.2012) ("[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim. In Phillips, [415 F.3d at 1314,] this court reinforced the importance of construing claim terms in light of the surrounding claim language, such that words in a claim are not rendered superfluous." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); IGT v. Bally Gaming Int'l, Inc., 659 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed.Cir.2011) ("Extracting a single word from a claim divorced from the surrounding limitations can lead construction astray."); Lexion Med., 641 F.3d at 1356 (preferring "a claim interpretation that harmonizes the various elements of the claim to define a workable invention").
Second, the plaintiff fails to cite any intrinsic evidence that supports importing a "without breaking" limitation into the disputed term. While the plaintiff points out that the specification teaches that certain "portions" of the expandable cannula are "resilient," permitting it to return to its contracted position after expansion, Pl.'s Mem. at 35, "resilient" and "without breaking" are not necessarily synonymous. And the plaintiff has cited no aspect of the
Close examination of the parties' disputes regarding these terms reveals that the crux of these disputes is whether these terms should be construed in a manner such that the "leading end portion" of the cannula or the "pointed end portion" of the cannula is "sharp," and thus capable of either cutting or severing body tissue. See Pl.'s Mem. at 38, 41. The patents-in-suit broadly claim leading end portions or pointed end portions of the cannula that can pierce body tissue. E.g., '730 Patent col. 26 ll. 2-4; '240 Patent col. 20 ll. 16-19; '499 Patent col. 22 ll. 39-42. Neither the claims nor the specifications of the patents-in-suit, however, explicitly place limitations on whether these portions of the cannula must be sharp. Although the specifications of the patents-in-suit cited by the plaintiff discuss the use of sharp leading end portions and pointed end portions to pierce body tissue, the discussion is in the context of preferred embodiments. See Pl.'s Mem. at 40, 42. And contrary to settled law, the plaintiff has improperly imported limitations from the specifications of the patents-in-suit again.
The parties' proposed constructions of these terms are vastly different. Essentially, the plaintiff's construction would require that the wires and the sheath of the cannula be made from the same material, i.e., same composition, while the defendants' construction would only require that the wires and the sheath be formed as a unit, i.e., that the wires and the sheath be integrated. Review of the intrinsic evidence strongly suggests that for several reasons the defendants' construction must prevail over the plaintiff's construction, which again seeks to import limitations from the specification of the '240 Patent.
First, according to the language of asserted claim 8 of the '240 Patent, the purpose of having the wires and the sheath "integrally formed" is "to interconnect" them. '240 Patent col. 20 ll. 51-54. This language is consistent with the defendants' proposed construction, more so than the plaintiff's proposal, as the "formation" of the wires and the sheath as "a unit" would ensure that the wires and sheath are interconnected. And second, portions of the '240 Patent specification also reveal that "integrally formed" alludes to the integration, as opposed to the composition, of the wires and the sheath. For example, the specification states:
Id. col. 4 ll. 8-13 (emphasis added). And as another example, the specification notes:
Id. col. 9. ll. 31-38 (emphasis added); see also id. col. 9 ll. 2-5 ("Since the jackets 412 are integrally formed as one piece with the sheath 402, the wires 404 are maintained in a parallel relationship with the longitudinal central axis 418 of the cannula 400." (emphasis added); id. col. 15 ll. 5-7 ("The jacket 412b is integrally formed as one piece with the sheath 402b and cooperates with the sheath to enclose one of the cores 410b." (emphasis added)). Because the intrinsic evidence supports the defendants' proposed construction, the Court construes the phrase "integrally formed" to mean "formed as a unit."
For the foregoing reasons, the Court construes the disputed claim terms in this case in the manner set forth above.
Further, the applicant went so far as to acknowledge that the '611 Patent—the parent patent of the patents-in-suit—was "material to the examination" of the '475 Application. '475 Application, June 29, 2005 Information Disclosure Statement Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 ("IDS"), J.A. at FH 7297, 7300. Thus, the Court cannot disregard the '475 Application when construing the disputed claim terms. See, e.g., Capital Mach. Co. v. Miller Veneers, Inc., 524 Fed.Appx. 644, 649 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding "that the prosecution history regarding a claim term is pertinent when interpreting the same term in both later-issued and earlier-issued patents in the same family"); Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1184 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that "statements made by the inventor during continued prosecution of a related patent application can, in some circumstances, be relevant to claim construction"); see also V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Grp. SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.Cir. 2005) ("This court has established that `prior art cited in a patent or cited in the prosecution history of the patent constitutes intrinsic evidence.'" (quoting Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2003))).
Second, whether the specifications "teach" that "dull" "leading end portions" and "pointed end portions" can cut or sever body tissue, Pl.'s Mem. at 40, is an enablement question that is also not currently before the Court, see, e.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.Cir.2007) (explaining that a patent is invalid for lack of enablement where the "challenged patent fails to teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to make the invention"); Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2014) ("Courts should be cautious not to allow claim construction to morph into a mini-trial on validity. Claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning to one of skill in the art at the relevant time and cannot be rewritten by the courts to save their validity."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 719, 190 L.Ed.2d 463 (2014).
