COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Presently before the Court is Carlos Aguiar's [867] Traverse to the Government's Answer under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Dismiss or Alternative Request for Summary Judgment ("Traverse") received in chambers on February 25, 2015, which the Court shall treat as a motion for reconsideration of its [862] February 12, 2015, Order denying Aguiar's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for the reasons described herein. Upon a searching
On December 16, 2014, the Court issued an [847] Order directing the government to file a supplemental brief to its [804] Memorandum in Opposition to Aguiar's § 2255 Motion responding to specific questions regarding a plea offer that was placed on the record during a status hearing held in this matter on January 31, 2005. On January 14, 2015, the government filed its [852] response to that Order as directed. On February 12, 2015, this Court issued an [862] Order denying Aguiar's § 2255 motion along with an accompanying [863] Memorandum Opinion based on the record before it. See Memo. Op. (Feb. 12, 2015), at 2 n.1, ECF No. [862]. Aguiar's Traverse was received in the Clerk's Office on February 9, 2015, but was mistakenly forwarded by the Clerk's Office to the U.S. Probation Office rather than to the Court. The error was discovered, and the Traverse was entered in ECF and first received in chambers on February 25, 2015. Accordingly, it was not considered by the Court in its February 12, 2015, decision. The Court notes that Aguiar's Traverse was submitted in response to the government's [852] response to the Court's order requesting specific information regarding the plea offer extended to Aguiar.
In its response the Court's order, the government provided some additional details about the plea offer that was extended to and rejected by Aguiar, and discussed on the record during the January
In his motion, Aguiar raises three concerns related to the government's response. First, Aguiar contends that his trial counsel never showed him the plea letter and, if he had, Aguiar would have accepted the plea offer. Def.'s Traverse at 3, 5-6, ECF No. [867]; Def.'s Traverse, Ex. A, at 1 (Declaration of Carlos Aguiar). Aguiar also argues that his trial counsel never advised him that the plea offer would not have required Aguiar to cooperate with the government and, if he had known this information, he would have accepted the plea offer. Def.'s Traverse at 4-5. Finally, Aguiar argues that he would have accepted a 30-year plea offer instead of proceeding to trial had he fully understood the terms of the plea offer. Id. at 6. The Court notes that Aguiar's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his original § 2255 motion and reply was premised on his trial counsel's alleged failure to advise him of the sentencing consequences of being convicted of two violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) prior to his rejection of the plea offer which the Court denied in its earlier Memorandum Opinion. See Memo. Op. (Feb. 12, 2015), at 8-16; Def.'s Memo. at 6-10, ECF No. [808-1]; Def.'s Reply at 2-8, ECF No. [817]. Aguiar's argument in his instant motion differs slightly from his original contention.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) "that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms," and (2) "that this error caused [him] prejudice." United States v. Hurt, 527 F.3d 1347, 1356 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citation omitted). Here, assuming arguendo for the sole purpose of considering Aguiar's motion for reconsideration, that Aguiar's trial counsel did not show him the plea letter or explain to him that he was not required to cooperate with the government as a condition of accepting the plea, the Court finds that Aguiar cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced in any way by these actions because the terms were explained to him on the record at the January 31, 2005, status hearing and he maintained that he rejected the plea offer after being fully advised of the terms.
On January 31, 2005, the Court held a status hearing to discuss on the record the plea offers that were extended to Aguiar and his codefendants. As the Court explained, "[T]his is my best way of making sure that everybody is on the same page, that whatever the government has said everybody hears, whatever defense counsel has said and your client, so that there's no issues at a later point." Tr. 15:18-21 (Jan. 31, 2005). The Court also indicated, "All I want to do is to make sure that all of these options are discussed, presented to the defendants and that you have the option of making your decision about it in consultation with your lawyer."
Id. at 33:8-19 (emphasis added).
The parties went on to discuss the sentencing implications both if Aguiar were to accept the plea agreement and if he were to proceed to trial. See generally id. at 33:19-36:9. Indeed, the parties discussed different possible calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines, and at one point indicated that if Aguiar was considered a career criminal under the Guidelines, he would have had a range for a term of imprisonment of 360 months (30 years) to life. See id. at 34:9-14. While Aguiar in his motion appears to pick up on this point by discussing a 30-year plea offer, the Court notes that other possible sentences involving longer terms of imprisonment were discussed on the record during that hearing.
Nonetheless, after the terms of the agreement were placed on the record in the presence of both Aguiar and his counsel, Aguiar expressly indicated that he had previously discussed the plea offer with his attorney and decided to reject the plea offer. Specifically, the Court asked Aguiar after the discussion of his potential sentence if he accepted the plea offer:
Id. at 35:15-19. Further, after a discussion about Aguiar's potential sentence if he proceeded to trial, the Court again asked Aguiar
Id. at 36:10-22.
Based on the record from the hearing, the Court finds Aguiar's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to show him the plea letter provided by the government in response to this Court's order, and for failing to notify him of the fact that he would not have been required to cooperate with the government if he had accepted the plea offer is without merit. It is clear from the record that the pertinent information was provided to him, at the very least, during the January 31, 2005, status hearing. Further, even after a full discussion on the record of the terms of the plea offer, Aguiar confirmed that he had a discussion with his counsel, that he did not have questions, and that he rejected the offer.
Moreover, to the extent that Aguiar is now asserting that he would have accepted the terms as stated in the plea letter even though he rejected the plea deal as verbally described by his attorney and discussed on the record at the hearing, this argument is without merit because the plea letter actually prescribes a term of imprisonment longer than 30 years. In his original § 2255 motion, Aguiar asserted: "My attorney, Mr. Booker informed me verbally that the government had offered me a thirty (30) year plea to resolve my case." Def.'s Mot., Ex. A (Affidavit of Carlos Aguiar), at 1, ECF No. [779-1]. Further, as discussed on the record during the January 31, 2005, hearing, a 30-year term of imprisonment was the minimum sentence that was discussed if Aguiar entered in to the plea agreement. In contrast, the plea letter provides for a longer potential sentence. As explained in the plea letter, the RICO charge carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the § 924(c) charge carried a mandatory minimum term of 30 years imprisonment and a maximum prison term of life imprisonment which could not run concurrently, and the felon-in-possession of a firearm charge carried a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. Govt.'s Resp. to Order of the Court, Ex. A (Sept. 17, 2004 Letter), at 2, ECF No. [852-2]. However, even with his understanding based on his conversation with Mr. Booker and the discussion on the record that the
The Court cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that Aguiar would have accepted the plea offer such that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failures because he expressly rejected the plea offer in open court after being presented with the terms of the offer and informed that the plea offer did not require his cooperation. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) (holding that in order to establish prejudice under the Strickland standard, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer).
For foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Aguiar cannot establish that he was prejudiced in any way by the alleged failures of his trial counsel as raised in his motion for reconsideration because he clearly was informed of the pertinent terms of the plea offer and rejected it nonetheless. Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Carlos Aguiar's [867] Traverse to the Government's Answer under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Dismiss or Alternative Request for Summary Judgment, which the Court has treated as a motion for reconsideration of its [862] Order denying Aguiar's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
