RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, District Judge.
Miminco, LLC, John Dormer Tyson, and Ilunga Jean Mukendi ("Petitioners") filed a petition in this Court to confirm an arbitral award rendered under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention"). See generally Pet., ECF No. 1. The award obligates the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("Respondent") to pay Petitioners $13 million for the satisfaction of certain claims. See Miminco LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/14 (Nov. 19, 2007) (Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1). In addition to the unpaid balance of the award, Petitioners seek post- and pre-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. See Pet. 9. After the Court ordered Petitioners to provide an update on their efforts to serve Respondent, Petitioners filed a Status Report contending that service was unnecessary. See Status Report, ECF No. 3. For the reasons that follow, the Court confirms the arbitral award and orders post-judgment interest to be paid at the statutory rate. The Court declines, however, to calculate the outstanding balance owed by Respondent or to award pre-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, or costs.
In 1965, the United States acceded to the ICSID Convention. See generally ICSID Convention, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090. Article 54 of the ICSID Convention sets forth general procedures for recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards rendered under the Convention:
ICSID Convention, ch. IV, § 6, art. 54. To implement these mandates of the ICSID Convention, Congress passed legislation providing that federal district courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions and proceedings" to enforce ICSID awards. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(b); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-532, § 3, 80 Stat. 344, 344 (1966). The statute also sets forth principles governing such enforcement actions:
22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a).
This Court is satisfied that ex parte proceedings suffice for recognition of ICSID arbitral awards. Such a procedure is consistent with the statutory mandate that ICSID awards "shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit" as a state court judgment. Id. Moreover, by filing a certified copy of the award, Petitioners have complied with the requirements of Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention.
The Court, however, declines to calculate the precise balance of the award owed by Respondent. Petitioners allege that the unpaid balance of the award amounts to $11,585,468.25. See Pet. ¶ 28. But the amounts that Respondent has already paid in furtherance of its obligations might be disputed as a factual matter, and in any event, Petitioners seek only recognition of the award. See Pet. 1 ("Petition to Confirm ICSID Arbitration Award . . . and Enter Judgment"); Status Report 2 ("[S]ervice of process is not required for the mere recognition of an ICSID award." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court defers the calculation of the actual outstanding balance to a future enforcement proceeding. See Status Report 2 ("Once the Consent Award is recognized, and Petitioners begin collection efforts in whatever state or states Respondent's assets are located, Petitioners will be required to serve notice on the DRC.").
Although this Court will not determine the balance of the award still due to Petitioners, because the Court recognizes the award as if it were its own judgment, the Court must order that post-judgment interest be paid on the full award amount. By statute, post-judgment interest must be imposed on "any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court." 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). "A money judgment consists of two elements: `(1) an identification of the parties for and against whom judgment is being entered, and (2) a definite and certain designation of the amount which plaintiff is owed by defendant.'" Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (holding that district court's confirmation of monetary arbitral award "without modification" was a "money judgment" subject to mandatory post-judgment interest). For purposes of the present action, the parties are clearly identified, and the amount owed to Petitioners is "definite and certain"—the $13 million specified on the face of the arbitral award confirmed by this Court. Id. Accordingly, post-judgment interest shall accrue on this sum.
The Court, however, denies Petitioners' request for pre-judgment interest. In contrast to mandatory post-judgment interest, whether to award pre-judgment interest is generally a matter of discretion. See Cont'l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov't of Nigeria, 932 F.Supp.2d 153, 163 (D.D.C. 2013). But this Court's discretion to grant pre-judgment interest "must be exercised in a manner consistent with the underlying arbitration award." Id. at 164 (quoting Cubic Def. Sys., 665 F.3d at 1103). "A court may not award pre-judgment interest when the arbitration tribunal has determined that such interest is not available." Cubic Def. Sys., 665 F.3d at 1103. By contrast, where an award is "silent" as to pre-judgment interest, the district court retains discretion to consider the availability of such interest "under the circumstances of [the particular] case." Id.
Here, as Petitioners concede, the Award "does not expressly mention interest." Pet. ¶ 23; see also Miminco LLC, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/14, at 8-9. This Court declines to graft new requirements onto the award's plain terms given that a court's confirmation of an ICSID award should entail nothing more than ministerial verification that the award is genuine. See ICSID Convention, ch. IV, § 6, art. 54(2). Moreover, courts awarding post-award, pre-judgment interest on ICSID awards have done so when the award itself provided for such interest, unlike the award at issue here. See, e.g., Duke Energy Int'l Peru Invs. No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, 904 F.Supp.2d 131, 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding judgment for interest, where "plain language" of award provided for interest); Mobil Cerro Negro, No. 14-CV-8163, Order and Judgment (awarding interest "provided in the Final Award"); Grynberg, No. 11-mc-00045, Order and Judgment (same); Sempra Energy Int'l, No. M-82, Order and Judgment (same).
Nor does the Court award attorneys' fees or costs. Petitioners rely on a case in which this Court, after confirming an arbitral award, awarded attorneys' fees and costs as an inherent power sanction upon finding that the respondent state's "inaction is inherently unjustified and in bad faith." Concesionaria Dominicana de Autopistas y Carreteras, S.A. v. Dominican State, 926 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013). In that case, the Court explained that the respondent state "obstinately refused to participate" in the litigation, even after the petitioner went "above and beyond its obligations by serving the [respondent] with almost all of the relevant filings in this case." Id.
Here, Petitioners have alleged only that, after seven years, Respondent has yet to pay a substantial portion of the $13 million award. See Mem. Supp. Pet. 9. But there is no basis—let alone the requisite "clear and convincing evidence"—for concluding that Respondent has acted in bad faith in this litigation; Respondent is not even a party to these proceedings. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (explaining that court may draw on "inherent power to police itself" and award attorneys' fees sanction if "fraud has been practiced upon it" or a party "shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation" (emphasis added)); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining that proof by "clear and convincing evidence" of misconduct in litigation is prerequisite for imposing punitive inherent power sanctions such as fee awards). Accordingly, this Court declines to award fees and costs as an inherent power sanction.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition to confirm the ICSID arbitration award (ECF No. 1) is
As an alternative basis for applying the D.C. UEFJA, Petitioners ask this Court to follow the New York City Bar's recommendation, which in part endorses Siag, an opinion of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applying section 5402 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR")—that state's counterpart to the D.C. UEFJA. See Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, No. M-82, 2009 WL 1834562, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009); Status Report 4 n.1 (citing New York City Bar Report). But in applying the CPLR, Siag misread the Second Circuit's Keeton decision. In Keeton, the CPLR governed the analysis because the plaintiff originally sued under the CPLR in New York state court to enforce an out-of-state federal district court judgment, before the diverse defendant removed the case to the New York federal district court. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 815 F.2d 857, 858 (2d Cir. 1987); accord Siag, 2009 WL 1834562, at *2 (citing Keeton and concluding that the CPLR is "relevant"). Keeton and state-law rules governing recognition of foreign judgments have no place in an ICSID enforcement action commencing in federal court. Cf. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, 893 F.Supp.2d 747, 753 (E.D. Va. 2012) (concluding that rules allowing state courts to "domesticat[e]" foreign judgments do not govern recognition of ICSID awards, and that federal courts can only enforce, not recognize or confirm, such awards).
