RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.
In August 2005, pro se Plaintiff Russell Robinson ("Mr. Robinson") was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to import cocaine, and conspiracy to launder money. The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") subsequently determined
On April 11, 2003, Mr. Robinson was indicted for participating in a multi-defendant drug and money laundering conspiracy in the U.S. Virgin Islands. See Indictment, Def.'s Ex. A at 39- 58, ECF No. 10-1.
As a consequence of Mr. Robinson's convictions, on March 3, 2008, the FAA issued an Order of Revocation, which revoked Mr. Robinson's Commercial Pilot Certificate, Mechanic Certificate, and Ground Instructor Certificate. FAA Order, Pl.'s Ex. 2 at 14-15, ECF No. 1. The order explained that pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44710, the circumstances of Mr. Robinson's convictions — that he served as an airman or was aboard a U.S. civil aircraft to facilitate the offenses of conviction — "mandate the revocation of any and all airman certificates and ground instructor certificates held by you...." Id. at 15. The order further stated that "the Administrator has determined that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest require the revocation ..." Id. at 14.
Mr. Robinson appealed the FAA's March 2008 order to the NTSB's Office of Administrative Law Judges, and an ALJ affirmed the revocation on September 11, 2008. See Compl. at 4; ALJ Order, Def.'s Ex. C, ECF No. 10-3. Mr. Robinson then appealed the ALJ's September 2008 affirmance to the NTSB, but on October 31, 2008, the NTSB dismissed the appeal, finding that Mr. Robinson had withdrawn it. NTSB Order of Dismissal, Oct. 31, 2008, Def.'s Ex. D, ECF No. 10-4. Mr. Robinson petitioned for reconsideration of the September 2008 order on November 14, 2012, and the petition was denied as an untimely appeal on May 2, 2013. NTSB Order, May 2, 2013, Def.'s Ex. B at 1-2, ECF No. 10-2; see also Compl. at 4.
The FAA now moves to dismiss Mr. Robinson's complaint in its entirety, arguing that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Robinson's claims and that his constitutional claims fail as a matter of law.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction...." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C.Cir.2004) ("As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.").
Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the Court's power to hear a claim, the Court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations "closer scrutiny" when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than it would when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). Thus, courts are not limited to considering the allegations contained in the complaint, and can consult extra-pleading materials when "determining the threshold jurisdictional issue." See Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.1987).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). "A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff properly has stated a claim." Johnson v. Sullivan, 748 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2010). "When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197).
Nevertheless, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id. nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
A pro se complaint is held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). But even pro se litigants "must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[a] pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted by the court." Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C.Cir.1981).
The FAA first argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Robinson's claims challenging the revocation of his
49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). The FAA therefore concludes that Mr. Robinson's claims challenging the revocations cannot be considered by this Court, and that "jurisdiction over this matter properly lies, if at all, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 13.
Mr. Robinson disputes the FAA's argument, asserting first that the "instant matter can in fact be considered Nunc Pro Tunc," because his 2008 appeal to the NTSB was "mischaracterized and dismissed unilaterally." Pl.'s Opp'n at 1-2, ECF No. 11. He also argues that "this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to interpret the application of 49 U.S.C. section 44710, and its Constitutionality on a whole." Id. at 2-3. In support of his assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction, Mr. Robinson points to Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 55-56, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993), which held that a similar statutory provision that prevents district courts from hearing an individual's challenge to an agency's decision does not prevent district courts from exercising "jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of a regulation without referring to or relying on" the agency's decision in any individual case. Id. at 56, 113 S.Ct. 2485.
As this Court has previously stated, 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) gives exclusive jurisdiction over FAA administrative revocation orders and claims that are "inescapably intertwined with review of such orders" to the U.S. courts of appeals. Breen v. Peters, 474 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Breen explained that "[a] claim is inescapably intertwined ... if it alleges that the plaintiff was injured by such an order and ... the court of appeals has authority to hear the claim on direct review of the agency order." Id. (quoting Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 245 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir.2001)). As a consequence, district courts may not hear "as-applied challenges in which the plaintiff seeks review of the procedures and merits of an order," but "the inescapable-intertwinement doctrine, as applied to § 46110(a), stops short of preventing a district court from reviewing `broad facial challenges' to a[n] [agency] order." Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 43 F.Supp.3d 4, 14-15 (D.D.C.2014).
Mr. Robinson is therefore correct to the extent that he argues that this Court has jurisdiction over facial challenges to § 44710's "[c]onstitutionality as a whole," but the Court lacks jurisdiction to
Here, Mr. Robinson's complaint repeatedly states that he is challenging the FAA's application of § 44710 in its March 2008 order revoking his certificates. See generally Compl. (requesting remedy for "violations as a result of [FAA's] application of 49 U.S.C. § 44710 to plaintiff," stating that he "challenges an Administrative Agency's Final Action that has resulted" in violations of his constitutional rights, alleging that "the application of 49 U.S.C § 44710 et seq[.] to Robinson by the Permanent Lifetime Revocation of Robinson's [certificates] is Unconstitutional"). In his opposition brief, Mr. Robinson expands on these general assertions, claiming that the NTSB's 2008 dismissal of his appeal was erroneous because his "Appeal was mischaracterized and dismissed unilaterally," that the "FAA utilized an inapplicable statute to revoke" his certificates, and that it based the revocations on "misinformed fact," such that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 2-5. He also complains that his due process rights were violated because his certificates were revoked while he was incarcerated, so he was not "afforded any Hearing" and did not have ready access to his trial transcripts. Id. at 2.
In short, the gravamen of Mr. Robinson's complaint centers not on constitutional deficiencies in the general procedures established by § 44710, but on the manner in which § 44710 was applied to his individual case and on alleged errors of fact and law contained in the FAA and NTSB orders pertaining to the revocation of his certificates. Such claims fall within the scope of § 46110(a), and cannot be heard by this Court.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Robinson's "as-applied" claims are inescapably intertwined with the procedures and merits of the order revoking his certificates. Such collateral attacks on the FAA order could only be reviewed by the courts of appeals, and only if such review was sought within 60 days of the issuance of the order. Here, however, the FAA's revocation order was issued in March 2008 and affirmed in September 2008. Although Mr. Robinson argues that his appeal of the September 2008 order was mischaracterized by NTSB as "withdrawn" in October 2008,
The Court therefore grants the FAA's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction Mr. Robinson's claims that the FAA and NTSB's application of § 44710 in this instance violated Mr. Robinson's constitutional and statutory rights.
Having granted the FAA's motion to dismiss Mr. Robinson's "as-applied" claims as collateral attacks on the FAA's revocation order outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the Court is left with the question of whether the complaint could plausibly be read to include a "broad facial challenge" to the lawfulness of § 44710 over which this Court would have jurisdiction. Although the title and much of the language of the complaint describes as-applied constitutional claims, pro se litigants are granted some leeway, see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, and one portion of Mr. Robinson's complaint asks the Court to find that "the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 44710 et seq[.] are Unconstitutional on its face, as it pertains to the lifetime revocation of Robinson's certificates...." Compl. at 9. Mr. Robinson's opposition brief asserts that his challenge is to both the FAA's application of the statute to his case and "to the Constitutionality of the Statute itself." Pl.'s Opp'n at 4. The Court will therefore proceed to consider the FAA's argument that, to the extent that this Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Robinson's claims, his allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief and must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mr. Robinson's complaint asserts that the lifetime revocation of commercial pilots licenses pursuant to § 44710 violates the "Eighth Amendment Prohibition on `Cruel and Unusual Punishment.'" Compl. at 8-9. The FAA, however, contends
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. "[T]he protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment is limited," however, and "[i]n the few cases where the [Supreme] Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-70, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); see also Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 184-191, 68 S.Ct. 591, 92 L.Ed. 628 (1948) (holding that "[t]he purpose of mail fraud orders is not punishment, but prevention of future injury to the public by denying the use of the mails to aid a fraudulent scheme," such that the Postmaster's order forbidding delivery of a magazine owners' mail due to fraud was not a "punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment). More recently, the Supreme Court has explained that to determine whether the Eighth Amendment's protections apply in a given case, courts must ask whether the government action in question is punitive or remedial in nature. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) (holding that Eighth Amendment applied to civil forfeiture proceedings that were not solely remedial in nature).
In this case, however, Mr. Robinson has repeatedly conceded that the FAA's lifetime revocation of his certificates pursuant to § 44710 constitutes a "remedial sanction that does not involve enforcement of civil fines, penalty or forfeiture." Pl.'s Opp'n at 6 (citing Hinson v. Brzoska, NTSB EA-4288, 1994 WL 808068, at *2 (1994)); Compl. at 5 (same). This concession is fatal to Mr. Robinson's Eighth Amendment claim.
Although Mr. Robinson points to Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003), to suggest that an agency-imposed sanction with a lifetime duration may constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Overton addressed in dicta only whether a hypothetical prison regulation imposing a lifetime ban on receiving visitors might result in unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id. The statute at issue in this case bears no relationship to conditions of confinement for incarcerated individuals, and thus Mr. Robinson's reliance on Overton is misplaced. Cf. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136-37, 123 S.Ct. 2162 (holding that regulation that prevented inmates from receiving visitors for two years fell within the "accepted standards for conditions of confinement," and did not "create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic necessities,
The Court therefore finds that Mr. Robinson's Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law and is dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mr. Robinson also claims that the lifetime revocation of FAA certificates violates the "Constitutional Right To Contract so as to earn a sufficient and adequate lawful[] living." Compl. at 6. More specifically, he alleges that by virtue of the revocations, he is being discriminated against as a "class of one," in contravention of Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (holding that plaintiff who "alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment" states a "class of one" Equal Protection Clause claim).
In the absence of any allegations pertaining to impaired contract obligations or barriers to interstate trade, the FAA has interpreted Mr. Robinson's purported right-to-contract claim as one actually asserting a violation of the constitutional right to follow a chosen trade. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 19. Mr. Robinson does not dispute this reading of his complaint, or the FAA's assertion that such a claim is subject to rational basis review.
The FAA appears to concede that the revocation of pilot or mechanic certificates limits the ability of certain individuals to pursue their chosen professions, but it argues that such infringement is constitutionally permissible because § 44710 is rationally related to the legitimate state interests in combatting illegal drug trafficking and enhancing aviation safety. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 20-22. In support, the FAA points first to the Senate report pertaining to section 44710, which explains that the provision was designed in part to aid law enforcement officers who had been hampered by "an inability to prevent the same pilots and the same aircraft from repeated participation in aerial drug trafficking." S.Rep. No. 98-228, at 2 (1983). The House of Representatives' report further explained that:
H.R.Rep. No. 98-883, at 3 (1984). The FAA therefore concludes that § 44701's legislative history establishes that the statute, which provides for the revocation of the certificate of any pilot convicted of certain drug-related crimes facilitated by
In opposition, Mr. Robinson disputes the assertion that § 44710 is reasonably related to the identified state interests, pointing out that the revocation of a commercial pilot's license under the statute does not prevent someone from flying a foreign registered aircraft with a foreign pilot's license, and arguing that any person who is "determined to break any law, will do so, certificate valid or no certificate." Pl.'s Opp'n at 8. Neither argument holds water.
While it may be true that revoking an airman's certificate under § 44710 does not prevent him from flying a foreign-registered aircraft with a foreign pilot's license to traffic drugs, it has long been established that Congress does not act without a rational basis simply because it chooses to take small or incremental steps at addressing a broader problem like aerial drug trafficking. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) ("[T]he legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally."); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); see also Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., 720 F.3d 915, 923 (D.C.Cir. 2013) (upholding law raising maximum age for pilots that was only partially retroactive, observing that "it would be an odd thing indeed to hold the legislature has acted irrationally in attempting to strike a less draconian balance by providing some measure of protection to over-60 pilots"). Additionally, the fact that some lawbreakers may not be deterred by the revocation of their certificates does not make § 44710 an unreasonable means of pursuing Congress' objectives; complete deterrence is not needed for the statute to pass constitutional muster. All that is necessary is that the statute bear some "rational relationship" to the legitimate governmental purposes of promoting aviation safety and decreasing aerial drug trafficking, and where, as here, "there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end." Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313-14, 113 S.Ct. 2096 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, because Mr. Robinson's allegations fail to establish that 49 U.S.C. § 44710 is not rationally related to legitimate governmental interests in preventing drug trafficking and promoting aviation safety, his claim that the statute constitutes unconstitutional infringement on the right to pursue a chosen trade is dismissed.
Mr. Robinson's next claim asserts that § 44710 violates the "Right to Travel as Guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, i.e., Article IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the Fourteenth Amendment's § 1," reasoning that "if State officials are prohibited from depriving citizens of the right to travel, the same prohibition incorporated in the above two Constitutional Clauses applies to the Federal ... Agencies."
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is similarly inapplicable to a suit against the federal government. In Pollack v. Duff, the D.C. Circuit Court recently held that "the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not constrain the powers of the federal government at all." 793 F.3d 34, 41, No. 13-5263, 2015 WL 4079788, at *4 (D.C.Cir. July 7, 2015). Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV "is a limitation upon the powers of the states," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and it thus provides no basis for Mr. Robinson's right to travel claim in this case.
This does not end the matter, however. The Supreme Court has yet to clarify precisely where in the Constitution the right to travel is located, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999) (saying of the "right to go from one place to another, including the right to cross state borders," that "we need not identify the source of that particular right in the text of the Constitution" and hypothesizing that it "may simply have been conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created") (internal quotation marks omitted). But there is no question that a constitutionally-protected right to travel interstate exists. See Pollack, 2015 WL 4079788, at *3-10, 793 F.3d 34 (analyzing claim of unconstitutional infringement of right to travel under the Fifth Amendment). In light of Mr. Robinson's pro se status, the Court therefore considers whether his complaint could fairly be read as stating a plausible claim that § 44710, on its face, violates the constitutional right to interstate travel protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which "indisputably applies to the federal government." Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995)).
Pursuant to § 44710, if a person is convicted of a felony "under a [state or federal law] related to a controlled substance (except a law related to simple possession...)," the FAA must issue an order revoking any airman certificates issued to that person "if the Administrator finds that — (A) an aircraft was used to commit, or facilitate the commission of, the offense; and (B) the individual served as an airman, or was on the aircraft, in connection with committing, or facilitating the commission of, the offense." 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(1). According to Mr. Robinson, this revocation results in a permanent ban on the exercise
These allegations are clearly insufficient to state a plausible claim of infringement of a constitutionally-protected right to travel. A law "implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right." Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Here, "[t]he case does not involve such a classification," so "[i]f the right to travel is implicated, it can only be because impeding travel is its primary objective or it actually deters travel." Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 441 (D.C.Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither proposition finds support in the complaint.
Mr. Robinson does not allege that impeding travel is the primary objective of § 44710, or that § 44710 is actually deterring travel. He does not claim, for example, that § 44710 restricts in any manner an individual's ability to travel as a passenger by air, either among the states or internationally. Cf. Latif v. Holder, 969 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1296 (D.Or.2013) (holding that right to travel was infringed where plaintiffs were "completely ban[ned] ... from boarding commercial flights to or from the United States or over United States air space"). He does not allege that § 44710 authorizes the revocation of passports or subjects individuals to additional scrutiny when travelling by air. Cf. Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 539 (D.C.Cir.2015) (holding that plaintiff who alleged that a federal agency violated his right to travel by maintaining inaccurate database records suggesting he was linked to terrorism had "not alleged any facts suggesting that his freedom to travel internationally has been infringed or adversely affected" where he retained his passport and was not prevented from accessing international transportation). In fact, Mr. Robinson claims that those subject to revocation under § 44710 are still able to pilot foreign registered aircraft within the United States and to pilot U.S. registered aircraft internationally.
At its core, then, Mr. Robinson's claim is that § 44710 unconstitutionally burdens the right to travel because it prevents those who have had their certificates revoked from piloting U.S. registered aircraft within the United States. But Mr. Robinson has offered no authority to suggest that the constitutionally-protected right to travel encompasses a right to pilot an individual's aircraft of choice. To the contrary, a number of courts have held that an incidental restriction on single a mode of transportation does not implicate the constitutional right to travel. See, e.g., Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 54 (2d Cir.2007) (finding no infringement on right to travel in law banning certain types of ferries because "travelers do not have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel, and minor restrictions on travel simply do not amount to the denial of a fundamental right" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Matthew v. Honish, 233 Fed.Appx. 563, 564 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that denial of
As this Circuit recently reiterated in Pollack, where a law may make a citizen marginally less likely to travel, the resulting effect on the individual's willingness to exercise his constitutional right to travel is "negligible and does not warrant scrutiny under the Constitution." 2015 WL 4079788, at *9, 793 F.3d 34 (holding that hiring criteria that only considered applicants in a certain geographic area did not implicate the right to travel). This is because "[a] law does not `actually deter' travel merely because it makes it somewhat less attractive for a person to travel interstate." Id.; see also Kansas, 16 F.3d at 441 (holding that where legislation generally prohibited airlines from offering interstate flights from a particular airport, any interference with interstate travel was "trivial" and did not implicate the constitutionally-protected right to travel).
In the absence of any allegation that § 44710 was enacted with the objective of deterring constitutionally-protected travel or that it is actually having that affect, the Court finds that the right to travel is simply not implicated by Mr. Robinson's allegations and grants the FAA's motion to dismiss the right-to-travel claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
As a final matter, the Court notes that Mr. Robinson's opposition brief asserts that the FAA's revocation of his certificates was "not in comport with the Constitutional
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1183 (D.C.Cir.2004) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). To determine whether the procedures afforded are constitutionally adequate, courts weigh "the private interest that will be affected by the official action," "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893).
Here, as previously discussed, Mr. Robinson has alleged that § 44710 affects the private liberty interest in pursuing one's chosen profession by revoking pilots' certificates, and the FAA has identified legitimate governmental interests in combatting illegal drug trafficking and enhancing aviation safety that are rationally related to the statute. The Court thus turns to consider the procedures that are provided by § 44710.
By its plain language, § 44710 is triggered after an individual is convicted of certain drug-related felonies if the Administrator of the FAA finds that an aircraft was used to facilitate the offense and the individual served as an airman or was on the aircraft in question in connection with committing or facilitating the offense. 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b). Before the Administrator can revoke the individual's certificates, however, "the Administrator must — (1) advise the holder of the certificate of the charges or reasons on which the Administrator relies for the proposed revocation; and (2) provide the holder of the certificate an opportunity to answer the charges and be heard why the certificate should not be revoked." Id. § 44710(c). If the individual's certificates are subsequently revoked, he is afforded the right to "appeal the revocation order" to the NTSB, which "is not bound by findings of fact of the Administrator," and "shall affirm or reverse the order after providing notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record." Id. at § 44710(d)(1). The revocation is stayed while the appeal is pending except in extraordinary circumstances, and an individual whose appeal is denied "may obtain judicial review of the order." Id. at § 44710(d)(2)-(3).
As the Sixth Circuit explained when finding that "§ 44710 provides adequate procedural safeguards when a pilot's license is revoked," "no additional procedures are required to afford due process." Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir.2003). The statute provides for notice and a pre-revocation hearing, stays the revocation during appeal, affords de novo review of the Administrator's factual findings by the NTSB, and provides for judicial
Mr. Robinson does not appear to allege that these procedures are constitutionally inadequate or suggest additional procedures that he believes should be required.
Thus, because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction as to Mr. Robinson's as-applied claims, and because he has failed to state a plausible claim that § 44710 is facially unlawful, the Court grants the FAA's motion to dismiss the matter in its entirety.
For the foregoing reasons, the FAA's motion to dismiss this case pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is granted. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
