MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER'S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Charles Johnson, Jr., has brought this action seeking damages from Defendant Veterans Affairs Medical Center and four unknown individual defendants ("Does 1-4") for claims arising from Mr. Johnson's inpatient treatment at the Medical Center. Mr. Johnson initially brought common law tort claims against the defendants in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. But the Medical Center removed to this Court and has now moved to dismiss Mr. Johnson's claims against the Medical Center on sovereign immunity grounds. Because the Medical Center correctly argues that Mr. Johnson did not name the United States as a defendant and that he has therefore failed to sue the only proper defendant in this action, the Court will grant the Medical Center's motion and dismiss Mr. Johnson's claims against the Medical Center.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Charles Johnson, Jr., was receiving inpatient care from Defendant Veterans Affairs Medical Center on November 13, 2011, when four Medical Center employees, the Defendants Does 1-4, searched his belongings and his person. Compl. 11 3, 9, 11-13, ECF No. 1-1. At the time, Mr. Johnson was receiving treatment for depression and neurovegetative symptoms, and he had not used illicit substances for eighteen years. Compl. 11 9-10. Suspecting that Mr. Johnson's visiting family members had brought him narcotics, the four Medical Center employees searched Mr. Johnson's bed, his personal effects, and his person. Compl. 11 11-13, 21; Opp'n Mot. Dismiss Exs. A-B, ECF No. 6-2. The employees conducting the search included one female nurse — a member of the opposite sex as compared to Mr. Johnson, who is male. Compl. 11 3, 13, 20. During the search of Mr. Johnson's person, the Medical Center employees made him hold up his arms, lift his scrotum, and bend down and part his buttock cheeks so that the employees could thoroughly search his body. Compl. 11 13, 21.

After the search, Mr. Johnson made several informal complaints to the Medical Center and also sent the Medical Center a letter through counsel, complaining about his treatment. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.'s Opp. Mot. Dismiss 11 1-15, ECF No. 6-1. Unsatisfied with the Medical Center's perfunctory responses, Mr. Johnson filed suit against the Medical Center and its four unnamed employees ("Does 1-4") in the District of Columbia Superior Court on June 2, 2014. See Compl. Seeking damages, he charged the Medical Center with six common law tort violations arising from the search of his belongings and his person: assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, and negligence. Compl. 11 16-39.

The Medical Center removed to this Court and filed an initial motion to dismiss Mr. Johnson's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 2; Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5. However, the Medical Center withdrew its first motion to dismiss, and now it has filed a second motion to dismiss — this time arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson's claims because sovereign immunity bars them. See Def.'s Second Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.'s Second Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10-1.

The Medical Center argues that sovereign immunity bars Mr. Johnson's claims for three reasons:

See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.'s Second Mot. Dismiss 4-7.1

Because the Court agrees with the Medical Center's first argument, the Court need not address the Medical Center's second and third arguments to dismiss Mr. Johnson's claims. But the Court sua sponte grants Mr. Johnson leave to amend his Complaint to substitute the United States as the appropriate defendant under the FTCA and to properly allege whether he believes the Medical Center employees were acting within or outside the scope of their employment, along with the facts supporting such belief.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Medical Center has moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.'s Second Mot. Dismiss 4. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994)). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a court has jurisdiction over his claim. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (standing and Article III jurisdiction); Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C.Cir.2007) (subject-matter jurisdiction). To determine whether jurisdiction exists, a court may "consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C.Cir.2003).

"If sovereign immunity has not been waived, a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Clayton v. District of Columbia, 931 F.Supp.2d 192, 200 (D.D.C.2013) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ("Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.")). Courts "may not find a waiver unless Congress' intent is `unequivocally expressed' in the relevant statute." Hubbard v. Adm'r, EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980)).

The Medical Center has also moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, citing Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.'s Second Mot. Dismiss 4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim" to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). Unlike the standard of review for a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), a court considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000).

But the Medical Center's motion is properly adjudicated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. All three of the Medical Center's arguments allege that sovereign immunity bars Mr. Johnson's claims. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.'s Second Mot. Dismiss 4-7. Because sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), the Court must rule on all of the Medical Center's arguments using the Rule 12(b)(1) standard of review, not the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review. See Kelley v. FBI, 67 F.Supp.3d 240, 255 (D.D.C.2014) (explaining that, when considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as opposed to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "is not limited to the allegations of the complaint" (quoting Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987)); see also CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 144-45 (3d Cir.2008) (adopting the Rule 12(b)(1) standard of review in an FTCA sovereign immunity case, even when adjudicating jurisdictional facts intertwined with the merits). Thus, the burden falls on Plaintiff Mr. Johnson to prove, in response to the Medical Center's contentions, that the government has waived its sovereign immunity. See Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C.Cir.2003) (placing the burden to prove waiver on the party bringing suit). He may not merely rest on the factual allegations made in his Complaint.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that makes the federal government liable to the same extent as a private individual for certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674; United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). The FTCA provides the exclusive remedy "[w]here a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a federal agency for torts committed by federal employees." Lempert v. Rice, 956 F.Supp.2d 17, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. United States, 949 F.Supp.2d 50, 53 (D.D.C.2013)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (declaring the FTCA remedy "exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages"). Congress has also specified that the FTCA remedy is the exclusive remedy for suits, like this one, arising from the alleged malpractice or negligence of Veterans Health Administration2 employees exercising duties in or for the Administration. See 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1).

Here, Mr. Johnson has sued the Medical Center and four unnamed Medical Center employees for torts arising out of actions taken by the employees during his inpatient treatment at the Medical Center. The Medical Center and its employees are agencies of the United States and subject to oversight by the Veterans Health Administration. See Peacock v. United States, 597 F.3d 654, 659-60 (5th Cir.2010) (finding a doctor employed by a Veterans Affairs hospital to be a United States employee for FTCA purposes); Our History, Washington DC VA Medical Center, http://www.washingtondc.va.gov/about/history. asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (affiliating the Medical Center with the Veterans Health Administration and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs). Thus, assuming that the Medical Center employees were acting within the scope of their employment,3 the FTCA provides Mr. Johnson's only possible avenue for relief against the Medical Center.

To establish the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff must show that his claim is

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). For an FTCA claim to be actionable, it must prove all six elements. Id.

The first element — that the FTCA claim must be against the United States — is not a trifling matter: in this case, its absence compels dismissal of Mr. Johnson's claims against the Medical Center. FTCA suits "must name the United States as defendant." Goddard v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343, 345-46 (D.C.Cir.1961). Even if a federal agency may sue and be sued in its own name, FTCA claims against that federal agency are barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). In sum, "[u]nder the FTCA, the United States is the only proper party defendant." Welsh v. Hagler, 83 F.Supp.3d 212, 223 (D.D.C.2015) (quoting Cureton v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 322 F.Supp.2d 23, 25 n. 4 (D.D.C.2004)). Failure to name the United States as the defendant in an FTCA action requires dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kissi v. Simmons, No. 09-1377, 2009 WL 3429567, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2009); Cox v. Sec'y of Labor, 739 F.Supp. 28, 29 (D.D.C.1990).

In this case, Mr. Johnson has failed to name the United States as a defendant. For that reason, his claims must be dismissed for failure to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. The Court grants the Medical Center's motion to dismiss on these grounds, without reaching the Medical Center's other arguments. However, as previously stated, the Court sua sponte grants Mr. Johnson leave to amend his Complaint to substitute the United States as the appropriate defendant under the FTCA and to properly allege whether he believes the Medical Center employees were acting within or outside the scope of their employment, along with the facts supporting such belief.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Medical Center's second motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. As a result, Mr. Johnson's claims against Defendant Veterans Affairs Medical Center are dismissed. Mr. Johnson may, however, file an amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) as set forth above. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.