TANYA S. CHUTKAN, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Navajo Nation (the "Nation") alleges that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"), an agency within the United States Department of the Interior ("DOI"), violated the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (the "ISDEAA"), by failing to disperse calendar year ("CY") 2014 funding to the Nation according to the Nation's proposed CY 2014 annual funding agreement (the "Proposal"). Specifically, the Nation contends that DOI Secretary Sally Jewell (the "Secretary") failed to approve or decline the Proposal within the statutorily-mandated 90-day window for doing so and that, as a result, the Proposal must be deemed approved as a matter of law.
The parties have each moved for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' motions and supporting briefs, and for the reasons set forth below, the Nation's motion for summary judgment is hereby
Congress enacted the ISDEAA in 1975 to help Indian tribes assume responsibility for government programs that benefit their members. Under the ISDEAA, federally recognized Indian tribes may enter into what are termed "self-determination contracts" with federal agencies. These self-determination contracts enable Indian tribes to take control of a variety of federally funded programs that would otherwise be administered on their behalf by the federal government. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 450f.
After a tribe and an agency, such as DOI, memorialize this transfer of authority in a self-determination contract, they negotiate annual funding agreements, which become part of the contract once they are approved by the agency's secretary. When a tribe submits a proposed annual funding agreement to DOI, "the Secretary shall, within ninety days after receipt of the proposal, approve the proposal and award the contract unless the Secretary provides written notification" to the tribe that one of five statutory reasons for rejection applies. Id. § 450f(a)(2).
The Nation is a federally recognized Indian Tribe with its seat of government at Window Rock, Arizona. In 2012, the Secretary
Due to a lapse in congressional appropriations during the 2013 government shutdown, BIA was unable to operate normally between October 1 and October 16, 2013. (See Compl. Ex. I). On October 4, 2013, Ronald Duncan, a contract analyst for the Nation, hand-delivered the Proposal to Raymond Slim at the receptionist's desk of the Self-Determination Office in BIA's Navajo Regional Office. (See Compl. Ex. C ¶¶ 8-11; Defs.' Cross-Mot. Ex. B ¶ 11). BIA has consistently taken the position that Slim, as an exempt employee whose salary was funded by non-lapsing multi-year appropriations for road construction contracts, was only authorized to receive and work on road construction contracts during the government shutdown, not self-determination contracts and their associated funding agreement proposals. (See Compl. Ex. I; Defs.' Cross-Mot. Ex. B ¶ 10). Notably, Duncan admits that he knew that he was delivering the Proposal during a government shutdown. (See Compl. Ex. C ¶ 8).
Upon receiving the Proposal, Slim marked it for intra-office mail delivery to Jeannette Quintero, the BIA official "responsible for making award and declination decisions for Navajo Nation contracts" under the ISDEAA. (Defs.' Cross-Mot. Ex. B ¶¶ 1, 11).
On October 21, 2013 — two business days after normal governmental operations resumed — BIA sent a letter to the Nation acknowledging its receipt of the Proposal. (See Compl. Ex. D). The letter stated that, due to the government shutdown, "which included mail delivery to [its] office," BIA considered the Proposal to have been received on October 17, 2013. (Id.).
If the Proposal was properly considered "received" on October 4, 2013 (and not on October 17, as BIA stated in its October 21 letter), then the 90-day window for the Secretary to act on it closed on January 2, 2014 (and not on January 15, as BIA stated in its October 21 letter). But January 2 came and went without BIA approving or declining the Proposal, or sending any further communications to the Nation aside from its unanswered October 21 and November 7 letters.
On January 9, 2014, BIA sent a letter to the Nation requesting a 45-day extension to the 90-day window — which, per the October 21 letter, BIA understood to be closing six days later, on January 15, 2014. (See Compl. Ex. E). BIA stated that it was requesting the extension so that the Nation could have additional time to respond to the issues raised in BIA's November 7 letter. (See id.). Again, the letter directed the Nation to contact Quintero, Price or Largo if it had any questions. (See id.). As with BIA's October 21 and November 7 letters, the Nation did not respond to the January 9 letter.
On January 15, 2014 — the last day of the 90-day window that BIA had established in its October 21 letter — BIA sent the Nation a letter partially declining the Proposal. (See Compl. Ex. F). BIA authorized approximately $1.3 million in funding, which was in line with the Nation's CY 2013 budget, but was only about one-thirteenth of the approximately $17 million that the Nation had requested for CY 2014. (See id.). According to Quintero's declaration, the reasoning behind BIA's partial declination did not change between its November 7 letter and its January 15 letter, such that the agency could have issued the partial declination any time after November 7, 2013. (Defs.' Cross-Mot. Ex. B ¶ 19). Quintero further explains that, had the Nation notified BIA of its position regarding the date the Proposal was received and the resulting deadline, the agency would have issued its partial declination on that deadline — January 2, 2014 — in order to give the Nation the maximum amount of time to respond to the concerns it had raised in its November 7 letter without triggering 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2). (See id. ¶ 22; cf. Compl. Ex. F).
On January 27, 2014, the Nation sent BIA a letter asserting that the 90-day review window had actually closed on January 2, 2014 — i.e., 90 days after the Nation delivered the Proposal to the Regional Office on October 4, 2013, in the middle of the government shutdown. (See Compl. Ex. G). The letter stated that BIA's partial declination thirteen days later on January 15, 2014 was therefore untimely, and that the Proposal was automatically deemed approved as a matter of law as of January 2, 2014. (See id.).
On February 4, 2014, BIA sent the Nation a letter providing additional information
On February 7, 2014, BIA responded to the Nation's January 27 letter, setting forth its view as to why its partial declination of the Proposal was timely:
(Compl. Ex. I).
In March 2014, the Nation submitted a claim to BIA under the Contracts Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., which authorizes parties to submit contract-based claims to government contracting officers for decision. (See Compl. Ex. K). BIA denied the Nation's claim in May 2014. (See Compl. Ex. L).
The instant action was filed in November 2014. The parties now cross-move for summary judgment.
Summary judgment may be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.") (emphasis in original); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006). Summary judgment may be rendered on a "claim or defense ... or [a] part of each claim or defense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "A fact is `material' if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law;
In considering a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C.Cir. 2006) ("We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor."). The nonmoving party's opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials, and must be supported by affidavits, declarations or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The non-movant is "required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find" in its favor. Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987).
The core dispute in this case centers on when the statutorily-mandated 90-day clock for responding to the Proposal began to run. The Nation claims that the clock began to run on October 4, 2013, when it hand-delivered the Proposal to its local BIA office. DOI disagrees, and contends that, because the Proposal was delivered during the 2013 government shutdown, it was not actually "received" by the agency until normal governmental operations resumed about two weeks later on October 17, 2013, at which point the 90-day clock began to run. Because the Secretary partially declined the Proposal exactly 90 days after October 17, she acted in a timely manner according to DOI's clock, but in an untimely manner according to the Nation's clock.
Both parties have marshaled several arguments as to why the court should agree with their position on when the Proposal was received. DOI also argues that, even if the court agrees with the Nation that the Proposal was received on October 4, 2013 — meaning that the Secretary's deadline for responding to it was January 2, 2014 — then either (i) that deadline should be equitably tolled because of the unique circumstances presented by the government shutdown, or (ii) the amount of funding requested by the Nation should be rejected because it grossly exceeds what is called "the Secretarial Amount."
The court need not determine the validity of any of these arguments, however, because it agrees with another of DOI's arguments, which is dispositive of the parties' motions: That the Nation should be equitably estopped from asserting the January 2, 2014 deadline because of its silence in response to BIA's October 21, 2013 and November 7, 2013 letters, which made clear the agency's understanding that its deadline for acting on the Proposal was January 15, 2014.
"Equitable estoppel means that `he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to
In order to establish estoppel by silence, there must be "`both the specific opportunity and apparent duty to speak.'" Wiser v. Lawler, 189 U.S. 260, 272, 23 S.Ct. 624, 47 L.Ed. 802 (1903) (quoting Viele v. Judson, 82 N.Y. 32, 40 (1880)). In order to create a duty to speak, it is essential that "`the party maintaining silence knew that someone else was relying upon that silence, and either acting or about to act as he would not have done, had the truth been told.'" Id. (quoting Viele, 82 N.Y. at 40); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 57 (2016) ("The rule is that a person who stands by and sees another about to commit, or in the course of committing, an act infringing on his or her rights, and fails to assert his or her rights or title, will be estopped from thereafter asserting them. The principle underlying such estoppels is embodied in the maxim `one who is silent when he ought to speak will not be heard to speak when he ought to be silent.'") (footnotes omitted). Equitable estoppel also "requires a weighing of the equities." Smirnov v. Clinton, 487 Fed.Appx. 582, 585 (D.C.Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
The evidentiary record in this case demonstrates that:
The Nation offers no explanation for why it did not attempt to correct BIA's purportedly incorrect date of receipt and its resulting deadline calculation after receiving the October 21 and November 7 letters. Instead, it simply claims that it had no duty to speak and "engaged in no affirmative misconduct," and that BIA could not rely on its silence for purposes of equitable estoppel:
(Pl.'s Resp. at 30).
DOI disagrees, and argues that the Nation had a duty to speak because it knew that BIA was basing its calculation of the 90-day statutory deadline off of an October 17, 2013 receipt date. DOI contends that BIA was "relying upon that silence and that [it] would have acted differently had [the Nation] spoken." (Defs.' Resp. at 17-18).
The court agrees with DOI, and finds that the record establishes the existence of all of the elements needed for the court to equitably estop the Nation from asserting the January 2, 2014 deadline.
As an initial matter, while the Nation may have believed that BIA's deadline for acting on the Proposal was January 2, 2014, it knew from BIA's October 21, 2013 letter that the agency believed the deadline to be almost two weeks later, on January 15, 2014. The letter directed the Nation to contact BIA if it had any questions about the date of receipt and deadline set forth therein. The letter therefore gave the Nation an opportunity to speak, but the Nation chose not to avail itself of that opportunity.
Moreover, the Nation subsequently learned from BIA's November 7, 2013 letter
The record also belies the Nation's claim that BIA "did not change [its] position for the worse in reliance on anything the Nation did." (Pl.'s Resp. at 30). The record shows that the reasoning behind BIA's partial declination did not change between its November 7, 2013 and January 15, 2014 letters, such that the agency could have issued the partial declination any time after November 7, 2013. (Defs.' Cross-Mot. Ex. B ¶ 19). The record also demonstrates that, had the Nation notified BIA of its position prior to January 2, 2014, the agency would have issued its partial declination by that date, which would have prevented the Nation from being able to argue that the Proposal was automatically approved pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2). (See id. ¶ 22).
These facts establish the requisite duty to speak because they show that the Nation was well aware of the fact that BIA was relying on its silence in believing that both parties were on the same page as to the deadline being January 15, 2014. And despite the Nation's carefully hedged assertion that it "engaged in no affirmative misconduct" (Pl.'s Resp. at 30) (emphasis added), the record leads inexorably to the conclusion that the Nation maintained its silence in bad faith, as common honesty and fair dealing compelled it to speak, and not remain silent in the hope that BIA would wait until its own secret deadline had passed. See, e.g., 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 57 ("There must be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence or inaction by which the other party is misled to his or her injury.... Generally, a person is required to speak only when common honesty and fair dealing demand that he or she must do so, and in order that a party may be estopped by silence, there must be on his or her part an intent to mislead, or at least a willingness that others should be deceived, together with knowledge or reason to suppose that someone is relying on such silence or inaction and in consequence thereof is acting or is about to act as he or she would not act otherwise. Thus, to work an estoppel, silence must amount to bad faith.") (footnotes omitted).
Of course, "[o]ne cannot claim an estoppel based on silence where he or she had actual knowledge of the facts or the means of acquiring knowledge," or "where the parties have equal knowledge of the facts or the same means of ascertaining that knowledge." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 124 (footnotes omitted). But this is not the case here. BIA did not have "actual" or "equal knowledge" of the Nation's position as to when the 90-day clock
BIA was also materially prejudiced by the Nation's silence. "The courts are especially disposed to uphold a claim of estoppel by silence or inaction where one party with full knowledge of the facts has stood by without asserting his or her rights or raising any objection while the other party, acting on the faith of such apparent acquiescence, incurred large expenditures that will be wholly or partially lost if such rights or objections are subsequently given effect." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 57 (footnotes omitted). Here, while BIA did not incur large expenditures on the basis of the Nation's apparent acquiescence, it clearly relied on it in a manner that, according to the Nation, exposes the federal government to more than $15 million in liability under 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2).
The balance of the equities also tips in favor of estopping the Nation from asserting the January 2, 2014 deadline. As noted above, the record demonstrates that the Nation acted in bad faith by maintaining its silence where common honesty and fair dealing demanded that it speak. Moreover, the Proposal was only partially declined, and the Nation was still awarded approximately $1.3 million, which was roughly the same amount of funds that it had received for CY 2013. BIA, on the other hand, (i) adhered to the deadline that it set out in its very first piece of correspondence to the Nation after receiving the Proposal; (ii) informed the Nation of its concerns about the Proposal shortly thereafter; (iii) gave the Nation ample opportunity to respond to those concerns; (iv) informed the Nation that it would hold its approval of the Proposal until certain documents were submitted to it; and, after receiving no response to its entreaties, (v) only declined that portion of the Proposal that exceeded what had been awarded to the Nation the prior year, and (vi) did so on January 15, 2014, thereby giving the Nation as much time as it possibly could to submit the aforementioned documents without running afoul of 25 C.F.R. § 900.18. In short, the record demonstrates that BIA acted diligently and in good faith in working on the Proposal. Under the circumstances present here, the court will not sanction the Nation's gamesmanship in taking advantage of a government shutdown by rewarding it with the windfall that it seeks. Instead, the court finds that the Nation is equitably estopped from asserting the January 2, 2014 deadline, and that BIA's January 15, 2014 partial declination was therefore timely.
For the reasons set forth above, the Nation's motion for summary judgment is hereby
