Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Walter I. Banks claims that his union, Defendant International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 99 ("IUOE"), and certain of its officials and representatives, discriminated against him based on his race, age, and disability while representing him in grievance proceedings against his former employer. Plaintiff also appears to assert that Defendants breached their duty of fair representation in those proceedings. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, contending that (1) his statutory discrimination claims are preempted by federal labor law; (2) his duty of fair representation claim is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) his discrimination claims are not plausible.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff has stated plausible claims of discrimination against IUOE based on race, age, and disability. Those claims against the named IUOE officials and representatives, however, must be dismissed because there is no individual liability under the relevant federal discrimination statutes. Further, Plaintiff's claim for breach of the duty of fair representation is time-barred and therefore must be dismissed.
Plaintiff is a 62-year old African American male, who, until October 2013, was employed as a "material handler" by LB&B Associates, Inc., in Columbia, Maryland. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, Compl., ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 13.
Plaintiff alleges that Kaplan's representation of him was deficient in multiple respects. Kaplan informed Plaintiff that his employer did not want him to return with a disability or with accommodations. Id. ¶ 10. When Plaintiff asked whether his employer's position would violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, Kaplan told him that he did not know. Id. Kaplan further advised Plaintiff that the union had no intention of moving forward with arbitration proceedings and suggested that Plaintiff consider retirement as an option because of his age. Id. Kaplan also said that Plaintiff's employer had threatened to fire him again even if Plaintiff were to prevail at arbitration and be reinstated to his position. Finally, Kaplan informed Plaintiff that he had no further recourse and would have to accept the employer's settlement offer of $12,000 — and, even if he refused, the union nonetheless would accept the offer and "close the case." Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff further alleges that the union represented white members eight years earlier — in 2006 — in similar grievance proceedings and helped them get their jobs back. Id. ¶ 12. He also claims that the union failed to provide him with various policies and other relevant documents during his grievance process. Id. ¶ 13.
On August 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed a pro se suit in the District of Columbia Superior Court against IUOE and its individual officials and agents. See generally Compl. His Complaint alleges statutory claims of discrimination based on his race under Title VII, 42 U.SC. § 2000e-2; his age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and his disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Id. at 1. And, although far from crystal clear, Plaintiff also appears to allege a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. Id. (alleging "In addition, breach of Fair Representation Duty").
On October 1, 2015, Defendants removed the case to this court. See Notice of Removal. Their Motion to Dismiss followed six days later. See generally Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3, Defs.' Mem. of P&A in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3-1 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot.].
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must construe the complaint liberally, and hold it to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citation omitted).
Further, in evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and "construe the complaint `in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'" Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979)). The court need not accept as true "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,"
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The factual allegations in the complaint need not be "detailed"; however, the Federal Rules demand more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). If the facts as alleged fail to establish that a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must grant defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Am. Chemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 922 F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D.D.C.2013).
The court begins with Plaintiff's claim that IUOE breached its duty of fair representation when counseling him in grievance proceedings against his former employer.
As the exclusive bargaining representative of employees within Plaintiff's bargaining unit, see Compl. ¶ 3, IUOE had a statutory duty to fairly represent Plaintiff and all other covered employees. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). That duty required IUOE, among other things, not to ignore a meritorious grievance against Plaintiff's employer or process such grievance in a "perfunctory fashion." Id. at 191, 87 S.Ct. 903. IUOE risked breaching its duty of fair representation if its "conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit [wa]s arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190, 87 S.Ct. 903.
IUOE argues that Plaintiff's claim for breach of the duty of fair representation must be dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations. Defs.' Mot. at 6-7. The court agrees. Such a claim is governed by a short, six-month limitations period. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Plaintiff alleges that IUOE breached its duty of fair representation by coercing him to accept a settlement against his wishes on or around May 5, 2014. Compl. ¶¶ 9-12. The limitations period began to run no later than that date under the facts alleged. See Simmons v. Howard University, 157 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C.Cir.1998) (stating that the statute
The court now turns to Plaintiff's statutory discrimination claims. Defendants first contend that Plaintiff "seeks redress under the laws of the District of Columbia and Title VII" and "[i]n so doing, [Plaintiff] raises a matter wholly preempted by federal labor law." Defs.' Mot. at 3. But Plaintiff has not asserted any claims under District of Columbia law. And Defendants offer no authority for the proposition that federal anti-discrimination statutes are preempted by federal labor laws. Nor could they. Each of the three federal statutes that Plaintiff invokes — Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA — expressly applies to labor unions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (expressly forbidding a "labor organization" from discriminating "against[] any individual because of his race"); 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (making it unlawful, under the ADEA, for a "labor organization" "to discriminate against[] any individual because of his age"); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (defining, under the ADA, the term "covered entity" to include a "labor organization").
Next, Defendants argue that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an element of a discrimination claim against a union, and that because Plaintiff's breach-of-duty claim is time-barred, so too are Plaintiff's discrimination claims. Defs.' Mot. at 7. Their argument must fail, however, because its premise is wrong — a breach of the duty of fair representation is not an element of a prima facie discrimination case.
Our Court of Appeals has recognized that a union can be held liable under the anti-discrimination laws for failing to carry out its duty of fair representation and the "facts support a finding of [] discrimination" by the union. Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, (D.C.Cir. 1973), disapproved of on other grounds by Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (holding that "if the local's performance is found to be arbitrary or in bad faith and the facts support a finding of racial discrimination, then [the local] would appear liable under Title VII"). It has not, however, articulated the precise elements of such a hybrid claim. Defendants cite York v. AT&T Co., 95 F.3d 948, 957 (10th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that:
See Defs.' Mot. at 7.
Other circuits, however, have not made a breach of the duty of fair representation a
For the reasons set forth in Green, this court agrees with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that a plaintiff is not required to show a breach of a union's duty of fair representation in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discrimination claims must be dismissed because he has failed to plausibly allege that IUOE's decision to settle, rather than arbitrate, Plaintiff's claim "was motivated by race or age discrimination, or
Here, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to give rise to a plausible inference that his union discriminated against him on the basis of race, age, and disability. Plaintiff has alleged that he possessed a valid grievance against his employer, which was acknowledged by union officials. Compl. ¶ 7. Notwithstanding the validity of his grievance, Plaintiff contends that the union's lawyer essentially coerced him to drop his grievance, by telling him that if he refused, the union would settle the matter over his objection. Id. ¶ 10. The union lawyer noted Plaintiff's age — 62 years old — and referenced retirement in urging him to settle. Id. He also ignored Plaintiff's stated concerns that his employer's refusal to reinstate him with reasonable accommodations might be a violation of the ADA. Id. And, finally, although seemingly remote in time, Plaintiff alleges that white union members received more favorable treatment than he did when resolving similar grievances with his employer. Id. ¶ 12. Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff has satisfied the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 to state claims for discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.
Finally, the court dismisses Plaintiff's discrimination claims against the named individual defendants. They cannot be held individually liable under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that an individual employee cannot be held liable under Title VII); Bilal-Edwards v. United Planning Org., 15 F.Supp.3d 1, 12 (D.D.C.2013) (holding that an individual employee cannot be held liable under the ADEA and citing cases); Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, 973 F.Supp. 184, 186-87 (D.D.C.1997) (applying the holding in Gary to the ADA).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is granted in its entirety as to the individual defendants — Murphy, Sexton, and Kaplan — who are dismissed from this action. It is also granted as to Plaintiff's claim against IUOE for breach of duty of fair representation. The Motion, however, is denied in regard to Plaintiff's discrimination claims against IUOE under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.