RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against George Washington University Hospital ("Hospital" or "GWUH"), Georgetown University Hospital, Georgetown University ("GTU"), the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"),
The instant complaint presents a series of bizarre events "that began with [plaintiff's] walking into George Washington University Hospital with chest pains and culminated with him seeking political asylum in Canada and then Cuba." GTU's Mem. at 1, ECF No. 23.
Plaintiff alleges that the following events occurred between April 30, 2015, and May 3, 2015. Compl. at 3. After arriving at GWUH's emergency room "on or about April 30
After the staff at GWUH "threatened to throw [plaintiff] out of the E.R.," he left and "drove to D.C. Metro Police Headquarters to make a formal Internal Affairs Complaint." Id. Plaintiff was told that the "2
At MedStar, plaintiff "was left [without any treatment] on a gurney in the E.R. for close to 45 minutes," despite his loud pleas for help. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff "unbuckled [himself] from the gurney and ran outside stumbling to the residential houses off campus outside the E.R., knocking on doors to try to get someone to allow [him] to use the phone." Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff "was being pursued by the D.C. Fire Rescue and D.C. Police Department until a man finally allowed [him] to use his phone." Compl. at 5. Plaintiff called his "Aunt Loretta Leonard ... and explained to her what had occurred[.] [A]t that moment [MPD officer] Tang or Tong arrived and [plaintiff] handed him the phone to speak to [his] Aunt about why the Police were chasing [him] with Rescue and why the two Hospitals were not helping [him]." Id. The officer "verified someone was on the line and abruptly hung up the phone." Id. Plaintiff "then began walking down the
While waiting for a bus outside of the Center, plaintiff "collapsed" and "woke up in the E.R. at George Washington University Hospital to nurses telling [him] to go into a Paded [sic] Room." Id. Plaintiff refused and "ran out of the hospital" only to be "caught and detained" by hospital staff and security. Id. Plaintiff was told that he needed "to sign a Medical Refusal Form," which he "pretended" to do before "running into the sidewalk[.]" Compl. at 6. Plaintiff then "heard them yell `there's no ink on the paper, he didn't sign it' and someone in the bunch made the call to `let him go.'" Id. Plaintiff ran five blocks and then "laid down in the grass" near the White House. He staggered a bit more but then experienced chest pains and collapsed near the National Archives building. Id. A man proceeded to help plaintiff and "offered" to get plaintiff's truck parked at 3
When plaintiff arrived at his truck, he smashed a door window, took his cell phone and "set off to C.N.N. Headquarters which was a few blocks away at Union Station." Id. Plaintiff asked a security guard to allow him into the building because he "needed to speak to someone from C.N.N. about some incidents that had occurred over the past two days." Id. The security guard "refused [plaintiff] access or help." Id. Plaintiff sat on a bench out-side of CNN to "wait[] for a journalist to come along," but his chest and stomach pains returned. Id. Plaintiff does not recall whether he or someone else called 911 but D.C. Fire Rescue arrived and plaintiff left. Id. Plaintiff tried to enter CNN's building through a side entrance but "was told via intercom by Security to `get away from the door.'" Id.
Plaintiff next walked "4 blocks away" to the "F.B.I. Field Office ... to make [a] complaint about what was occurring." Id. He was followed by a "black car w/tinted windows[.]" Compl. at 8. Plaintiff "ran into Georgetown University Law Library," signed the visitors log "on May 01 or May 02, 2015 and wrote help and turned it so that the Docent/Asst. could see what [he] wrote." Id. Plaintiff waited "a few minutes" and then went outside where he "saw the car was gone." Id. Plaintiff then "bolted out for the F.B.I. office 1 block over." Id. When he arrived, plaintiff, speaking through an outside telephone, "advised them who I was, why I was there and requested to speak to the duty offices" but
Having no success at the FBI, and "with no alternatives," plaintiff walked down the street and went inside a church "to hide." Id. Plaintiff "kicked open the Pastor[']s door and barricaded [himself] inside with an Industrial Printer and Furniture blocking the door." Id. Plaintiff called his Aunt Loretta again but she "acknowledged [plaintiff's] concerns but couldn't help [him]." Compl. at 9. Plaintiff left the church and obtained from the Capitol Police his truck keys, a case number, and the D.C. Animal Shelter's contact information. He then drove back to the church "and went inside and barricaded [himself] in the Pastor[']s office until daylight." Id. At daylight, plaintiff sought help from the church's administrator and "had a brief Q & A" with the Pastor, who eventually contacted the "authorities." Id. An MPD officer took plaintiff "outside and contacted D.C. Fire Rescue," which determined that plaintiff needed emergency care and transported him to "University Hospital off N. Capitol St.[.]" Id. According to plaintiff, MPD "attempted to get Hospital staff to inject [him] with some type of psychotropic and Baker Act [him]," but he refused to be injected "with anything unless it was to help with [his] chest & abdominal pains."
After "arguing with the nurses and administrators" about his treatment, plaintiff "left the hospital staggering and struggling to a bus stop," where he again collapsed. Compl. at 10. After "an hour or so," plaintiff hailed a taxi and returned to his truck parked "outside the Church next to the F.B.I. office on 3
In August 2016, plaintiff filed the instant "Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983" in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, ECF No. 1, which transferred the case to this Court on October 12, 2016. See Order, ECF No. 11. The complaint consists of five uncaptioned counts. See Compl. at 11-14. In the Relief section of the complaint, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 15. In addition, plaintiff "want[s] to know who's responsible behind this cloak of shadows and secret lies that's
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim" in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The motion does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits, but only forces the court to determine whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1991). "[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint[,]" Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted), and construe them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).
It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of a prima facie case in the complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F.Supp.2d 25, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2010). Nevertheless, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. When performing the "context-specific task" of deciding whether a plausible claim has been stated, a court must "draw on its judicial experience and common sense[.]" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
A pro se complaint, such as here "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . . But even a pro se complainant must plead "factual matter" that permits the court to infer "more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681-82 (citations omitted).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against
42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim "must allege both (1) that he
Plaintiff has not named any individual defendants, but this omission is not fatal at this pre-discovery phase of the proceedings. See Simmons v. District of Columbia, 750 F.Supp.2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Plaintiff may bring an action against unknown John Doe defendants, but plaintiff must substitute named defendants for those unknown defendants after the completion of discovery."). Furthermore, as a municipal corporation, the District is a "person" within the meaning of the statute and is therefore subject to liability under § 1983 "when an official policy or custom causes [a] complainant to suffer a deprivation of [a] constitutional" or federal right. Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986); accord Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Moreno v. District of Columbia, 925 F.Supp.2d 93, 99 (D.D.C. 2013) ("In order for the District to be held liable for the acts of a wrongdoer under its authority, a plaintiff must show that the District was the `moving force' behind the alleged constitutional deprivation.") (quoting, Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). And at least one of the private defendants has acknowledged that in certain circumstances courts in this circuit have applied municipal liability "to claims against private entities such as Georgetown University." GTU's Mem. at 10, n.4; see Jordan v. District of Columbia, 949 F.Supp.2d 83, 90 (D.D.C. 2013) ("`[A] challenged activity may be state action ... when a private actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'") (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (alteration in original)); see also Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility, 5 F.Supp.3d 7, 17 n.11 (D.D.C. 2013) ("[M]any courts have adopted the custom or policy requirement when adjudicating § 1983 claims against private entities.") (citations omitted). To succeed on a municipal liability claim, however, "a plaintiff must show a course deliberately pursued by the city, `as opposed to
The fatal flaw with the Complaint is that even with the presumption of truth, plaintiff's factual allegations simply fail to support a violation of the Constitution or federal law or a basis for municipal liability. The Court will first address the federal laws plaintiff has invoked and then his alleged constitutional violations.
Plaintiff cites in the counts of the Complaint 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986. See Compl. at 11, 12. Section 1981 "proscribes discrimination based solely on race." Cromeartie v. RCM of Washington, Inc., 118 F.Supp.3d 335, 338 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (other citation omitted)). Section 1985(3), which is the only paragraph possibly applicable here, creates an action against "two or more persons in any State or Territory" who "conspire" to deprive "any person" of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws[.]" Id. The Court of Appeals has explained:
Atherton, 567 F.3d at 688 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (other citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has not alleged (1) that he is a member of a recognized protected class, e.g., a racial minority group, and (2) that defendants' actions were motivated by "some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Martin, 830 F.2d at 258. Therefore, plaintiff has stated no claim under § 1981 or § 1985(3). Nor has plaintiff stated a claim under § 1986 "[s]ince § 1986 imposes liability upon a person who "neglects or refuses" to prevent a wrong under § 1985." Jackson v. Donovan, 856 F.Supp.2d 147, 150 (D.D.C. 2012); see Philogene v. District of Columbia, 864 F.Supp.2d 127, 132 (D.D.C. 2012) ("Because a colorable claim under § 1985 is a prerequisite to a claim under § 1986, the plaintiff's § 1986 claim must also be dismissed.") (citation omitted).
In addition to the civil rights statutes, plaintiff cites federal criminal statutes. See Compl. at 11-12, 14 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1113, 1503, 1510-13, 1964). But "[t]he Supreme Court has `rarely implied a private right of action under a criminal statute,'" and "a `bare criminal statute,' with no other statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action exists, is insufficient to imply Congress intended to create a concomitant civil remedy." Lee v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 859 F.3d 74, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975)). It is established that Sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provide "no private right of action[.]" Crosby v. Catret, 308 Fed.
Section 1964 provides a "private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of [] conduct" proscribed under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008). "RICO makes it `unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt[.]'" Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 216 F.Supp.3d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). A plaintiff asserting a claim under RICO must allege the following elements: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Zernik v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 630 F.Supp.2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Pyramid Secs. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The RICO statute defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as requiring the commission of at least two predicate racketeering offenses within a ten-year period. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). "Predicate offenses satisfying the statute include acts punishable under certain state and federal criminal laws, such as mail and wire fraud." Busby v. Capital One, N.A., 772 F.Supp.2d 268, 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)). The predicate acts must be related and must "amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). The alleged chance encounters supporting plaintiff's § 1983 claim "do not constitute racketeering activities and cannot form the basis of a RICO claim." Cheeks, 216 F.Supp.3d at 156 (citing Taitz v. Obama, 707 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010)).
Also throughout the counts of the Complaint, plaintiff claims that at various times during his ordeal, the defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the outset, the Court finds no claim stated under the Eighth Amendment because this action does not stem from a conviction. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from imposing "excessive fines" and inflicting "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It "has no application" until "there ha[s] been [a] formal adjudication of guilt[.]" City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp. 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983); see Oladokun, 5 F.Supp.3d at 15 n.8 ("Because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, his custody was not punishment and, as such, the Eighth Amendment did not apply.") (citing cases). In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia because it is "a political entity created by the federal government." Doe v. D.C., 206 F.Supp.3d 583, 604 n.11 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 S.Ct. 884 (1954); Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330, n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). But the District of Columbia is subject to the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, see Oladokun, 5 F.Supp.3d at 15 n.8, and the "`due process protections
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. In addition, a warrant is generally required before a search ensues. But "courts from the United States Supreme Court on down have long recognized the important role that police play in safeguarding individuals from dangers posed to themselves and others — a role that will, in appropriate circumstances, permit searches and seizures made without the judicial sanction of a warrant." Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 551 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The "community caretaking doctrine recognizes that police sometimes take actions not for any criminal law enforcement purpose but rather to protect members of the public[.]" Id. at 553-55 (examining Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), upholding warrantless search of an automobile for purposes removed from a criminal investigation).
In Count 1 of the Complaint, plaintiff claims that GWUH, George Washington University, MPD, and the FBI "illegally search[ed] his vehicle" and "deprived [him] of medical care" after he complained about the search. Compl. at 11. By plaintiff's own account, however, his truck "was parked along side [sic] the Hospital," and he left the emergency room voluntarily when he "overheard" hospital staff and police officers "discussing" his dog "having food but no water[.]" Compl. at 3. Those facts do not establish a search of any kind, let alone one implicating the Fourth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving an individual of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Constitutional due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015). "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)).
By his own account, plaintiff exhibited erratic behavior before being taken in handcuffs to "some sort of Mental Health Evaluation Center[.]" Compl. at 5. Among other things, plaintiff voluntarily left MedStar's emergency room after being there for 45 minutes and complaining in a raised voice about the lack of treatment. He then proceeded to "stumbl[e]" to nearby houses and knock on doors seeking to use a phone, all while being pursued by "D.C. Fire Rescue" and MPD. Compl. at 4-5. Allegedly, at the mental health facility, plaintiff was injected "with some type of liquid against [his] will." Id. at 6. Thereafter, the handcuffs were removed and plaintiff was "left [overnight] to sleep on the floor." Id. He was permitted to leave the next morning, having been diagnosed with anxiety. See id. The fact, taken here as true, that plaintiff was "admitted ... without a criminal charge or any other lawful reason," Compl. at 5, undermines the notion that he was in the custody of the District of Columbia. In addition, plaintiff has not alleged that the individuals who held him for a mental health evaluation and injected him against his will did so pursuant to a municipal policy or custom, let alone one that is unconstitutional.
Given plaintiff's self-described odyssey, he has failed to plausibly allege that the Animal Shelter could have located him to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to disposing of his dog. More importantly, plaintiff has not alleged that employees at the Animal Shelter acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom, and he has not refuted the Shelter's argument to the contrary. See Human Rescue Alliance's Mem. at 3-4 (asserting compliance with D.C. laws governing disposal of animals); Mar. 1, 2017 Order (informing plaintiff that the defendant's unopposed arguments may be treated as conceded).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiff has stated no federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any D.C. or common law claims. Therefore, defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted, and plaintiff's motions will be denied. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
