MEMORANDUM OPINION

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, District Judge.

On September 8, 2017, Petitioner Curtis Lee Watson was paroled from a term of life imprisonment imposed under the D.C. Code and began serving a one-year federal sentence. Dkt. 4 at 1; Dkt. 6 at 1-2. Although Watson's federal sentence expires on September 7, 2018, Dkt. 10 at 1-2, he seeks his "immediate release" from custody, Dkt. 1 at 1, 3. His various filings in this matter—captioned "Official Complaint," "Motion" for "Unsecured Bond or Bail," and "Emergency Petition Seeking the Right to be Released"—touch upon numerous episodes since his D.C. conviction forty years ago, but, at base, they all allege that the United States Parole Commission failed "to follow its own protocol" or otherwise acted unlawfully when determining the date on which he would be paroled and begin serving his federal sentence. Dkt. 1 at 1, 3; Dkt. 6 at 2. But for the Parole Commission's errors, Watson contends, he would have been paroled on his D.C. Code conviction earlier and would have already served the entirety of his federal sentence. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 11 at 3-5. Because Watson seeks his immediate release, he has made the type of "core challenge[]" to "present physical confinement" that is subject to the "immediate custodian rule." Day v. Trump, 860 F.3d 686, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That "default rule" reflects the "longstanding practice . . . that the proper respondent" in an action challenging present physical confinement "is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held." Id. at 689-90; see also Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the Parole Commission is not the immediate custodian of a prisoner in a federal facility for purposes of habeas corpus challenges to Commission decisions). This Court, moreover, "may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction." Day, 860 F.3d at 689 (quoting Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Here, Watson is currently confined in Hazelton, West Virginia, Dkt. 1-1 at 1, which means that the proper respondent in this case is the warden of that facility and that the proper forum is the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.

"Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, `when a court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction, it has the authority to dismiss the action or [to] transfer it in the interest of justice.'" Evans v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 177 F.Supp.3d 177, 182 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Smith v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 971 F.Supp.2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2014)). The Parole Commission argues that dismissal is appropriate in this case because the decision to grant Watson parole mooted his claims. Dkt. 10 at 1, 4. Watson's petition, however, at least appears to sweep more broadly than the Parole Commission's position presumes. In particular, he alleges that the Parole Commission's unlawful actions resulted in his present confinement by delaying when his incarceration began to count toward his federal sentence. For present purposes, the Court need not—and will not— decide whether Watson's claims are moot but, rather, merely "finds it in the interest of justice to. . . transfer this action to the proper court" so as to "avoid the inefficiency of dismissing this action and requiring Petitioner to refile it."1 Bailey v. Fulwood, 780 F.Supp.2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2011).

The Court will, accordingly, TRANSFER Watson's petition to the Northern District of West Virginia.

A separate order will issue.