MEMORANDUM OPINION

PETER J. WALSH, Bankruptcy Judge.

This opinion is with regard to motions to dismiss (the "Motions") filed by certain defendants (the "Movants") in several adversary proceedings.1 (Adv. Proc. No. 10-54648(PJW), Doc. #146; Adv. Proc. No. 10-53991(PJW), Doc. # 15; Adv. Proc. No. 10-53918(PJW), Doc. # 17; Adv. Proc. No. 10-54827(PJW), Doc. # 15; Adv. Proc. No. 10-54882(PJW), Doc. # 16; Adv. Proc. No. 10-54899(PJW), Doc. # 17; Adv. Proc. No. 10-55219(PJW), Doc. # 16; Adv. Proc. No. 10-54995(PJW), Doc. #21.)2 Movants have styled their Motions a "Motion to Dismiss in the Absence of Article III Authority to Adjudicate" and argue that this Court "lacks the authority to adjudicate this proceeding per Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989), and 28 U.S.C. § 157(e)." (Adv. Proc. No. 10-54648, Doc. # 146, at 1.) For the reasons described below, I will deny the Motions.

Background

In November 2008, DBSI Inc. ("DBSI") and several of its affiliates (collectively "Debtors") filed for bankruptcy protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Debtors' plan of liquidation was confirmed in October 2010, naming James R. Zazzali ("Trustee") as litigation trustee of the DBSI Estate Litigation Trust. (Case No. 08-12687(PJW), Doc. # 5924.)

Shortly after his appointment, Trustee commenced these adversary actions. In the 1031 Exchange Action, Trustee is seeking the avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 5443, 5483, 5504, and 5515, and asserting claims for declaratory relief related to federal securities laws, unjust enrichment, rescission of certain agreements between Debtors and defendants, and the disallowance of claims against the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 5026. In the Air Performance Action and the Blind Gallery Action, Trustee asserts claims for the avoidance and recovery of preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 5476, fraudulent transfers under § 548, and post-petition transfers under § 5497, recovery of the avoided transfers under §§ 550 and 551, and disallowance of claims under § 502. In the remaining actions—the Atlas Vans Action, Brooks & Amaden Action, Hoefer Action, IBF Group Action, and New West Action—Trustee asserts avoidance and recovery claims under §§ 544, 547, 548, 550, and 551, as well as unjust enrichment premised on the avoidance actions.

Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over these adversary actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a). Section 1334 provides that the district courts have jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11," and section 157 permits the district court to refer any such civil proceedings to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) & 157(a) (2005).

Section 157 also provides that "[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 . . . and may enter appropriate orders and judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2005). Where the matter is not a core proceeding but is otherwise related to a case under title 11, the bankruptcy court may hear the proceeding but must submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2005).

This Court has already determined that these matters involve both core proceedings and non-core proceedings.

Discussion

As the Motions were filed in conjunction with motions to withdraw the reference, Movants ask this Court to dismiss these proceedings if the District Court does not grant the motions to withdraw the reference. (Adv. Proc. No. 10-54648, Doc. # 147, at 3.) In support of their Motions, Movants argue that 1) under Stern, "a bankruptcy court, not being an Article III court, cannot adjudicate an adversary proceeding seeking to recover money from the defendant on causes of action sounding in preference or fraudulent conveyance"; and 2) under Stern and Granfinanciera, these particular adversary actions cannot be adjudicated in this Court because the Movants did not consent to bankruptcy court adjudication, intend to demand a jury trial in their answers to the complaints, and certain of the Movants did not file proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case. (Id. at 4.)

It is customary—and indeed, necessary—for courts to state the standard of review in evaluating a motion to dismiss. As Movants have admitted here that they have invented this "motion to dismiss for lack of authority to adjudicate" as a procedural device, there is no established standard of review to apply. Essentially, Movants are seeking to have the adversary actions dismissed entirely because, on their reading of Stern, this Court cannot enter final judgments in these proceedings. In so arguing, I find that Movants both misinterpret Stern's narrow holding and do not acknowledge the distinction between the bankruptcy court's ability to hear a proceeding and to adjudicate such proceeding.

The facts of the case and the holding in Stern have been discussed at length by other courts since that opinion was issued, so I will only provide a brief summary of the factual background and decision here. The Stern decision concerned an adversary proceeding arising in the bankruptcy case of Vickie Lynn Marshall ("Vickie"), better known as Anna Nicole Smith. Prior to the commencement of her bankruptcy case, Vickie entered into a dispute in state court with E. Pierce Marshall ("Pierce"), the son of her late husband J. Howard Marshall, over the older Marshall's estate. 131 S.Ct. at 2601. While the state court action was pending, Vickie filed for bankruptcy, and Pierce filed a complaint for defamation and a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case. Id. Vickie then filed a counterclaim for tortious interference, claiming that Pierce had interfered with the elder Marshall's promise to leave a large sum of money to his wife Vickie. Id. The bankruptcy court conducted a bench trial on the action, and entered an order in Vickie's favor. Id. Pierce appealed, arguing that the bankruptcy court could not enter a final order in the action, even though such a counterclaim by the estate is specifically listed as a core proceeding in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). Id. The appeal reached the Supreme Court, which held that although there was statutory authority in § 157 for the bankruptcy court to finally adjudicate the counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution did not permit such a result. The Court concluded that "[t]he Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim." Id. at 2620.

There has been much debate about the scope of the Stern decision and its effect on the division of labor between the bankruptcy courts and the district courts. In a recent opinion from this Court, Judge Gross noted that as of January 2012, there had been "in excess of 130 cases in which bankruptcy courts have addressed Stern" and that "the analyses and decisions [were] not consistent." Burtch v. Seaport Capital, LLC (In re Direct Response Media, Inc.), 466 B.R. 626, 638 n. 7 (Bankr. D.Del.2012). As of the writing of this opinion in April 2012, there are more than 325 decisions citing Stern.

As Judge Gross explained in detail in Direct Response, courts have split between a broad interpretation of Stern and a narrow interpretation. Id. The broad interpretation holds that bankruptcy judges cannot enter final adjudications on avoidance actions because such actions are "quintessentially suits at common law" and thus must be decided by an Article III judge. Id. at 640 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56, 109 S.Ct. 2782). In contrast, the narrow view restricts Stern's holding to its facts in that the decision "only specifically removed a debtor's state law counterclaims under § 157(b)(2)(C). . . from final adjudicatory authority of the bankruptcy court." Id. at 641. After an analysis of both interpretations, Judge Gross adopted the narrow interpretation and held that "Stern does not remove the bankruptcy courts' authority to enter final judgments on other core matters, including the authority to finally adjudicate preference and fraudulent conveyance actions." Id. at 644.

Though Movants cite several cases from other jurisdictions embracing the broad interpretation of Stern8, I am not persuaded that I should follow these decisions. The majority opinion in Stern contains language that could support either the broad or the narrow interpretation. See Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, Inc.), 461 B.R. 276, 286-92 (Bankr.D.Del.2011) (listing the instances of both broadening and narrowing language). As in Direct Response, this Court concluded in USDigital that Stern's repeated reference to its "narrow" holding that would not "meaningfully change[] the division of labor" between bankruptcy and district courts meant that the narrow view is the correct view. Id. at 290 (citing Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2619).

I agree with my colleagues that Stern's holding should be read narrowly and thus restricted to the case of a "state-law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim." 131 S.Ct. at 2620. I note also that numerous other recent decisions have agreed with the narrow interpretation. See, e.g., Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco, Inc.), 461 B.R. 181 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2011); Fox v. Picard (In re Madoff), -F.Supp.2d-, Nos. 10 Civ. 4652(JGK), 10 Civ. 7101(JGK), 10 Civ. 7219(JGK), 11 Civ. 1298(JGK), 11 Civ. 1328(JGK), 2012 WL 990829 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012). Like this Court in Direct Response, both the Refco and Madoff courts concluded that a fraudulent transfer action can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Direct Response, 2012 WL 112503, at *11 ("[P]reference and fraudulent transfer claims arise both under Title 11 and in a case under Title 11 and are by definition `core' issues under § 157(b)(2)(F) & (H) for which a bankruptcy court has authority to enter final adjudications."); Refco, 461 B.R. at 192 ("Given the repeated and emphatic limiting language in Stern, . . . and the role of fraudulent transfer claims under the Bankruptcy Code, including their management and resolution ultimately by the bankruptcy courts in the context of Congress' bankruptcy scheme, Article III of the Constitution does not prohibit the bankruptcy courts' determination of fraudulent transfer claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 548 by final judgment."); Madoff, 2012 WL 990829, at *12 n. 5 ("[Appellant] points to no language in Stern that can reasonably be interpreted as holding that the power explicitly accorded by Congress to the bankruptcy courts to enter judgment in fraudulent transfer actions . . . violates Article III of the United States Constitution. The specific issue in Stern was the constitutional authority for a bankruptcy court to enter judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim. . . . The adjudication of fraudulent transfer and avoidance actions is a basic feature of that division of labor.") (citations omitted). Thus, I find that Stern is not applicable to this action, as it does not involve a state-law counterclaim by the estate. Consequently, I conclude that I can enter a final judgment on the core preference, post-petition transfer, fraudulent transfer,9 and unjust enrichment claims and issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the non-core causes of action.

Movants also argue that in the event that this Court determines that it does not have the authority to finally adjudicate the actions, it must dismiss the actions because there is no statutory authority for a bankruptcy court to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court where the proceeding is "core but precluded by Article III," as it were. Movants base their argument on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 157(c), which provides

28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (emphasis added). According to Movants, this provision means that the bankruptcy court has no authority to make recommendations to the district court where the matter is "core" under the statute but cannot be finally adjudicated by the bankruptcy court because of Article III considerations as expounded in Stern. (Doc. # 147, at 16-17.)

Aside from the fact that I conclude that I do have authority to finally adjudicate the core matters in these actions, I reject this argument, as it implies that Stern has eviscerated the grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a)—a reading that the Stern majority expressly disavowed. 131 S.Ct. at 2607 ("Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment between the bankruptcy court and the district court. That allocation does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citation omitted). As the court noted in Refco, there is language in the Stern majority opinion that strongly suggests that any such "core but precluded" proceedings are to be treated as matters "related to" the bankruptcy case, i.e. that the bankruptcy court should make recommendations to the district court:

131 S.Ct. at 2620 (cited in Refco, 461 B.R. at 193) (citations omitted). If Movants' reading of Stern were correct, it would both implicate the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear certain matters and dramatically change the respective roles of the district and bankruptcy courts—two things the Stern court repeatedly insisted it did not do with its decision. Further, as the Refco court points out, "when addressing the consequences of holding a statute unconstitutional[,] courts must impose a remedy that best corresponds to what Congress would have intended if it had known about such holding." 461 B.R. at 193 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). Applying that principle to § 157, I agree that "it would be absurd to conclude that the bankruptcy courts are deprived of jurisdiction over matters designated by Congress as core when, for Article III reasons, Congress gave jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in non-core matters." Id. Stern has not changed the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction, and consequently, this Court can hear any claims—including those at issue here—over which it has at least "related to" jurisdiction. Where there is such a "related to" matter, this Court can issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.

Lastly, Movants argue that since this Court cannot conduct a jury trial (which Movants state they intend to demand), it would be a waste of resources for this Court to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review. Movants insist that this would somehow result in "two trials, the first leading to a bankruptcy court recommendation; the second to a district court final order." (Doc. #147, at 17.) Going further, Movants argue that the hearing in this Court would "be a mere `rehearsal' because its outcome will be non-binding on objecting parties and on the court that will conduct the second hearing. It is difficult to conceive of a greater or more unnecessary waste of judicial resources and of the time, money, and other resources of the litigants." (Id. at 18.)

The recommendation system that Movants are disparaging is the exact mechanism that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)—and the court in Stern—contemplates and that has long been used by bankruptcy and district courts across the country. These concerns about judicial economy were undoubtedly considered when § 157 was enacted. Moreover, Movants misconstrue what is meant by "de novo review." De novo review does not mean a de novo hearing; rather, it means that "district judge may accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the bankruptcy judge with instructions." Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9033(d). See also In re Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1519 (5th Cir. 1990) (contrasting review that is "truly de novo—i.e., a further trial proceeding at which the determination will be based solely on the evidence freshly presented in open court at that further proceeding" to "review under Rule 9033(d) which may be solely on the record and without any additional hearing or evidence"). Thus, there will not be "two trials."

With regard to Movants' argument that they will demand a jury trial, which I cannot conduct, this issue is not before me as there has been no demand made. Further, once the jury demand is made, it is customary in this district for the bankruptcy court to preside over the action until the case is ready for trial. See, e.g., Residual Trustee v. The Upper Dock Co., LLC (In re KB Toys, Inc.), No. Civ.A. 06-363-KAJ, 2006 WL 1995585, at *1 (D.Del. July 17, 2006); Wakefern Food Corp. v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. (In re Big V Holding Corp.), Civ.A. 01-233(GMS), 2002 WL 1482392, at *5 (D.Del. July 11, 2002); Liquidating Trustee of the MPC Liquidating Trust v. Granite Fin. Solutions, 465 B.R. 384, 393 (Bankr.D.Del.2012). Thus, a right to a jury trial, even when invoked, is not grounds to dismiss the action from this Court.

Lastly, I note that the determination of whether this Court can enter a final judgment in this matter has been rendered academic by the recently issued Amended Standing Order of Reference by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The existing standing order was amended to add:

Amended Standing Order of Reference, dated Feb. 29, 2012. In other words, the District Court can treat any order issued by this Court as a recommendation if it later determines that Article III precluded me from entering a final judgment.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I hold that Stern does not preclude this Court from hearing these actions. Accordingly, I will deny the Motions.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the Court's memorandum opinion of this date, the motions of certain defendants to dismiss the adversary proceedings are denied as to 1031 Exchange Group, et al., Adv. Proc. No. 10-54648(PJW), Doc. #146; The Blind Gallery and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-53991(PJW), Doc. # 15; Air Performance Service, Inc. and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-53918(PJW), Doc. # 17; Atlas Van Lines, Inc. and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-54827(PJW), Doc. # 15; Hoefer Wysocki Architects LLC and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-54882(PJW), Doc. # 16; IBF Group and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-54899(PJW), Doc. # 17; Brooks & Amaden, Inc. and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-55219(PJW), Doc. # 16; and New West Paving and John Doe 1-10, Adv. Proc. No. 10-54995(PJW), Doc. # 21.