SUE L. ROBINSON, District Judge.
QVC, Inc. ("QVC") and QHealth, Inc. ("QHealth") (collectively, "plaintiffs") brought claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (hereinafter, "§ 43"), common law false advertising, violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, 6 Del. C. § 2531 et seq., and violation of the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") against defendants Andrew Lessman ("Lessman") and Your Vitamins, Inc. d/b/a ProCaps Laboratories ("ProCaps"). (D.I. 1) Plaintiffs' claims stem from a series of internet posts (or "blogs") by Lessman relating to his and plaintiffs' respective dietary supplement products. Four days after filing their complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), preliminary injunction and expedited discovery seeking that the court compel defendants to withdraw the material at issue, (D.I. 4) Plaintiffs amended their complaint in June 2010 to add a breach of contract claim. (D.I. 47) The court denied plaintiffs' motion for a TRO, preliminary injunction and expedited discovery on July 27, 2010.
The court incorporates by reference the detailed background provided in its prior opinion (D.I. 60), and provides below only those facts most pertinent to the motion at bar. QVC and QHealth jointly market a line of dietary supplements under the "Nature's Code" trademark over QVC's broadcast cable television network and website. (D.I. 5 at 3) Among these are plaintiffs' "Resveratrex®" and "Hair, Skin & Nails®" supplements (hereinafter, "Nature's Code Hair"). (Id.; D.I. 30 at 4) Beginning in 1992, Lessman began marketing, on QVC's network, dietary supplements on behalf of his company, ProCaps. (D.I. 5 at 3; D.I. 30 at 2) Lessman left QVC in 1997 and began marketing his products with QVC's primary competitor, the Home Shopping Network ("HSN"). (Id.) Several years later, Lessman and ProCaps (collectively, "defendants") began marketing their "Healthy Hair Skin & Nails®" product (hereinafter, "Healthy Hair"). (D.I. 30 at 2) That product has generated more than $70 million in revenue for ProCaps. (D.I. 30 at 2) Defendants also market "Resveratrol-100®," a product which competes with Reservatrex®. (D.I. 5 at 7)
In November 2006, Lessman and QVC began negotiating Lessman's return to QVC's network. (D.I. 30 at 2-3; D.I. 34 at 11) The negotiations eventually stalled and defendant Lessman remained at HSN.
To resolve their disputes concerning Lessman's departure from QVC, defendants and QVC entered into a settlement agreement in January 1997, which forms the basis for the present dispute (hereinafter, "the Agreement"). The Agreement contains a forum selection clause, providing that "QVC and [ProCaps] each hereby consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in all matters arising out of this agreement." (D.I. 45 at § 5(c)) In their amended complaint, plaintiffs claim that Lessman's public statements, "including in particular the [unsealed] Declaration of Andrew M. Lessman" filed in this litigation, violate the substantive terms of the Agreement and have caused irreparable injury to plaintiffs. (D.I. 47 at §§ 87-91) Specifically, the Agreement provides that defendants are precluded from "making any oral or written remarks disparaging QVC or its products, or both." (D.I. 45 at 6; D.I. 54 at 4) It also provides an acknowledgment by defendants that any breach of the provision within which the foregoing falls would result in irreparable damage to plaintiffs and would justify "preliminary and injunctive relief" against them. (D.I. 45 at 7; D.I. 54 at 4)
In reviewing a motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations; however, "a plaintiffs obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. at 1964-65 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true."
The forum selection clause of the Agreement is clear and unambiguous: suits concerning the Agreement must be brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 202. To this end, plaintiffs argue that: (1) there is a strong public policy against splitting a cause of action into two suits concerning the same operative facts; and (2) defendants have waived their rights to enforce the clause by not opposing plaintiffs' filing the amended complaint. Although not particularly relevant to the factors at issue, plaintiffs also argue that defendants were first to mention the Agreement in this case (in their opposition to plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion) and that defendants' counsel indicated that defendants contemplated their own counterclaim for alleged breach of the Agreement.
Plaintiffs provide no caselaw supporting their theory that defendants' acquiescence to plaintiffs' amending their complaint constitutes a waiver of defendants' right to invoke the forum selection clause.
"The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). "A court may sua sponte cure jurisdictional and venue defects by transferring a suit under the federal transfer statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 1631, when it is in the interests of justice." See Forest Labs. Inc. v. Cobalt Labs. Inc., Civ. No. 08-21, 2009 WL 605745 at *12, n. 9 (D.Del. Mar, 9, 2009) (citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1222 (10th Cir.2006) and Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 218 n. 9 (3d Cir.2002)). Upon consideration of these interests,
The court finds, therefore, that the interests of justice are satisfied by the transfer of the instant case to Pennsylvania. Moreover, the Agreement provides that Pennsylvania law governs disputes thereunder
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss (D.I. 48) is denied as moot, and the court transfers the case at bar to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. An appropriate order shall issue.
At Wilmington this 29th day of November, 2010, consistent with the memorandum opinion issued this same date;
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' breach of contract claim (D.I. 48) is denied as moot, and the present action shall be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.