HILLMAN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income ("Social Security benefits") under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. The issue before the Court is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding that there was "substantial evidence" that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time since his alleged onset date of disability, July 1, 2006. For the reasons stated below, this Court will affirm that decision.
Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits, claiming that as of July 1, 2006 his degenerative joint disease and osteoarthritis in his back, neck and left knee have left him completely disabled and unable to work.
After a hearing before an ALJ, it was determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff appealed the decision, and the Appeals Council denied review rendering the ALJ's decision final. Plaintiff now seeks this Court's review.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny a complainant's
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in its totality. See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.1984). "[A] court must `take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F.Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J.1997) (quoting Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951))).
The Commissioner "must adequately explain in the record his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence." Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F.Supp. 273, 278 (M.D.Pa.1987) (citing Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.1986)). The Third Circuit has held that an "ALJ must review all pertinent medical evidence and explain his conciliations and rejections." Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir.2000). Similarly, an ALJ must also consider and weigh all of the non-medical evidence before him. Id. (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir.1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir.1981).
The Third Circuit has held that access to the Commissioner's reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful court review:
Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir.1978). Although an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, "[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record," Hur v. Barnhart, 94 Fed.Appx. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004). In terms of judicial review, a district court is not "empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder." Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. However, apart from the substantial evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to satisfy itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision by application of the proper legal standards. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir.1983); Curtin v. Harris, 508 F.Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J.1981).
The Social Security Act defines "disability" for purposes of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations for determining disability that require application of a five-step sequential analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This five-step process is summarized as follows:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f). Entitlement to benefits is therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of proof. See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir.1983). In the first four steps of the analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. In the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that work is available for the Plaintiff: "Once a claimant has proved that he is unable to perform his former job, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is some other kind of substantial gainful employment he is able to perform." Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir.1987); see Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir.1983).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability. (Step One). The ALJ next found that Plaintiff's osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, status post left knee arthroscopy, and cervical spondylosis and stenosis were severe (Step Two). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet the medical equivalence criteria (Step Three). At Step Four, the ALJ found that even though Plaintiff was not capable of
Plaintiff presents three arguments for review: (1) the ALJ improperly found he was capable of performing his previous job as a payroll clerk because that job does not qualify as "substantial gainful activity"; (2) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity because he improperly rejected Plaintiff's treating doctors' opinions and improperly credited the non-treating physicians' opinions; and (3) the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment of Plaintiff's testimony, which Plaintiff argues is supported by the medical evidence.
The Court finds that even if Plaintiff's first argument is credited,
In making his decision, the ALJ detailed Plaintiff's medical evidence, which dates back to 1999. Plaintiff was seen by his treating physician, Dr. Kim, from that time until April 2007, when he moved from Maryland to Delaware and began seeing Dr. Robinson in January 2008. Once Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, he was then seen by Dr. Kheterpal in March 2007 for an agency consultative evaluation. The ALJ considered the records and reports from these doctors, as well as a September 30, 2008 "Medical Source Statement of Ability" by Dr. Kim and a March 2007 residual functional capacity medical record review by Dr. Najar.
The ALJ found that the medical evidence as to Plaintiff's impairments supported Plaintiff's symptoms such that he would be unable to perform his past work as a corrections officer, but he determined that Plaintiff's statements "concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent" with the ALJ's finding as to Plaintiff's RFC to perform sedentary work. (R. at 21.) To reach that conclusion, the ALJ noted the following:
Based on these considerations, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform sedentary work,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in this determination because he did not give Dr. Kim's entire opinion as Plaintiff's treating source "controlling" weight, and because the ALJ afforded the state consultant's opinion "great" weight. In his decision, after listing the evidence that supported his finding, the ALJ explained the medical evidence that he did not credit. With regard to Dr. Kim, aside from Dr. Kim's findings noted above, the ALJ discounted Dr. Kim's other findings on his
With regard to Dr. Kheterpal, the state agency consultant who examined Plaintiff on March 14, 2007, the ALJ found that his opinion was consistent with the record as a whole. In addition to noting Plaintiff's degenerative joint disease, hypertension, dysplipidemia, and gout, Dr. Kheterpal reported that Plaintiff stated that he could sit in a chair for several hours and climb stairs, squat with assistance and walk for 10 minutes. Dr. Kheterpal observed that Plaintiff walked without a limp, was able to sit in a chair and rise without assistance, sit on the examination table and turn himself fairly well. (R. at 16-17.) The ALJ found that Dr. Kheterpal's findings, which were based on a personal examination, supported Plaintiff's ability to perform sedentary work.
Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, treating physicians are not automatically entitled to controlling weight. Social Security regulations provide that a treating physician will be afforded controlling weight as to the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment, but only if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); SSR 96-2p. Here, other than arguing that the ALJ erred in affording Dr. Kim's report "some" weight, Plaintiff has not pointed out medical evidence in the record that would support Dr. Kim's other findings, would be consistent with the other medical evidence and Plaintiff's testimony, or show that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for sedentary work. Moreover, even if Dr. Kim's report did show that Plaintiff was not capable of sedentary work, his report was based on his treatment history with Plaintiff that ended in April 2007. Although Dr. Kim prepared the report on September 30, 2008, it was not based on any treating physician evaluation contemporaneous with that date. It is Plaintiff's burden to show he was unable to work from at least July 1, 2006 through July 1, 2007, Kangas, 823 F.2d at 777; 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A), and Dr. Kim's report does not fulfill that burden.
Correspondingly, the ALJ did not err in affording "great" weight to the state agency consultative physician's findings. "In evaluating medical reports, the ALJ is free to choose the medical opinion of one doctor over that of another." Diaz v. Commissioner, 577 F.3d 500, 505-06 (3d Cir.2009) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir.1981)). When "a conflict in the evidence exists, the ALJ may choose whom to credit," but the ALJ "cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason." Id. (citation omitted). The ALJ here properly supported his decision to credit more of Dr. Kheterpal's report than Dr. Kim's.
Plaintiff does not point out what testimony of his contradicts the medical evidence, outlined above, which supports the finding that Plaintiff was capable of sedentary work. It is clear that the ALJ credited Plaintiff's testimony regarding his abilities, contrasted his testimony with the medical evidence, and agreed that Plaintiff could no longer perform his previous job as a corrections officer. Nonetheless, after considering plaintiff's testimony in combination with the medical evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was still capable of performing sedentary work. See Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.1999). Although a person, such as Plaintiff, who has worked continuously in the same field for a substantial duration of time may be afforded enhanced credibility, see Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir.1979), simply disagreeing with the ALJ's assessment of that credibility is not sufficient to establish that his decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Perkins v. Barnhart, 79 Fed.Appx. 512, 515 (3d Cir. 2003).
For the reasons expressed above, the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not totally disabled is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. An accompanying Order will be issued.
For the reasons expressed in the Court's Opinion filed even date,