RONALD L. BUCKWALTER, Senior District Judge.
Table of Contents
I. Factual Background and Procedural History ..................................... 110
A. The Personal Injury Asbestos Litigation .................................... 110
B. The State of Montana Duty to Warn Litigation ............................... 111
C. BNSF Railway Company Litigation ............................................ 112
D. The Property Damage Litigation ............................................. 112
E. The Canadian Class Action Litigation ....................................... 113
F. Estate Asset and Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation with Grace Subsidiaries .. 113
G. Garlock Sealing Technologies Litigation .................................... 114
H. Insurance Coverage Litigation .............................................. 114
1. The Grace—CNA Settlement Agreement ...................................... 114
2. AXA Belgium, GEICO, and Republic Excess General Liability
Insurance Policies with Grace .......................................... 115
I. Bank Lender Pre-Petition Litigation ........................................ 116
J. Grace's Bankruptcy Petition and The Joint Plan of Reorganization............ 116
K. Bank Lender Post-Petition Litigation ....................................... 118 L. The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings ........................................... 120 II. Standard of Review ........................................................... 120 A. Standard of Review Regarding Approval of the Settlement Agreement .......... 120 B. Standard of Review Regarding Confirmation of the Joint Plan ................ 121 III. The Grace and CNA Companies' Settlement Agreement ........................... 121 A. Application of the Martin Factors .......................................... 123 B. Fairness of the Settlement Agreement Related to Appellants' Purported Rights to the Disputed Insurance Policies ................................. 125 1. BNSF's Objections ....................................................... 125 2. The Libby Claimants' Objections ......................................... 127 IV. Confirmation of the Joint Plan ............................................... 133 A. The Good Faith Requirement ................................................. 133 B. Asbestos Liability Trusts Under Section 524(g) ............................. 136 1. The Two Trust Structure of the Joint Plan ............................... 137 2. Requirements of a Proper Trust Under Section 524(g) ..................... 139 C. The Section 524(g) Channeling Injunction ................................... 139 1. The Scope of the Channeling Injunction .................................. 140 a. Extension of the Channeling Injunction to Independent Insurer Wrongdoing Claims .................................................. 140 b. Extension of the Channeling Injunction to BNSF ...................... 144 c. AMH's Objections to the Scope of the Channeling Injunction .......... 146 2. The Fairness and Equality of the Channeling Injunction .................. 146 a. Application of the Channeling Injunction to MCC ..................... 146 b. Application of the Channeling Injunction to CNA ..................... 148 i. BNSF's Objections .............................................. 148 ii. The Libby Claimants' Objections ................................ 150 3. The Effect of the Channeling Injunction on Release s from Liability Under the Joint Plan ................................................... 152 D. Classification of Creditor Claims .......................................... 154 1. The Section 1122(a) Classification Requirement .......................... 154 2. Circumvention of the Section 524(g) Injunction .......................... 156 3. Definitional Requirements of "Claims" and "Demands" Under the Bankruptcy Code ........................................................ 157 a. Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code .................................... 157 b. Demands Under the Bankruptcy Code ................................... 159 E. Feasibility of the Joint Plan .............................................. 159 1. AMH's Feasibility Claims ................................................ 161 2. Montana's Feasibility Claims ............................................ 165 F. Equality of Treatment Among Creditors ...................................... 166 1. The Libby Claimants' Discrimination Claims .............................. 167 a. The TDP Criteria for Category IV-B .................................. 167 b. Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements .......................................... 170 c. Grace's Non-Products Insurance Coverage ............................. 171 2. BNSF's Discrimination Claims ............................................ 173 a. Equal Treatment Under Section 1123(a)(4) ............................ 173 b. Administrative Costs ................................................ 180 3. Montana and the Crown's Discrimination Claims ........................... 181 a. Failure to Warn Liability ........................................... 181 b. The Effect of Timing on Treatment of Creditor Claims ................ 182 c. Equality of Payment and Treatment of Claims in Different Classes Under the Joint Plan ....................................... 184 4. AMH's Discrimination Claims ............................................. 185 G. The Best Interest of the Creditors Test .................................... 186 1. The Level of Specificity Required ....................................... 187 2. The Consideration of Evidence Concerning Tort System Values ............. 189
3. Recovery from Grace's Insurers in a Hypothetical Chapter 7 Case ......... 191 H. Impairment of Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plans .................... 196 1. The Bank Lenders' Claims ................................................ 196 a. Entitlement to the Post-Petition Default Interest Rate .............. 197 b. Section 1124(1) and Alleged Impairment Under the Joint Plan ......... 206 c. Solvency and Impairment ............................................. 207 2. AMH's Claims ............................................................ 210 a. Entitlement to Post-Petition Interest ............................... 210 b. The Effect of Impairment on Voting Rights ........................... 211 I. The Libby Claimants Right to Trial by Jury Claims .......................... 212 1. Rights Under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution .......................................................... 213 2. Statutory Rights Pursuant to Section 1411(a) ............................ 217 J. The Fair and Equitable Test and The Absolute Priority Rule ................. 218 K. Garlock's Bankruptcy Standing .............................................. 222 L. The Anti-Assignment Provisions in Insurance Policies Litigation ............ 226 M. Residual Bank Lenders Issues ............................................... 229 1. The Best Interests of the Creditors Test and Legal Rate of Interest Objections ............................................................. 229 2. The Absolute Priority Rule Objections ................................... 230 3. The Fair and Equitable Test and the Authority of the Unsecured Creditors Committee to Bind the Bank Lenders ........................... 231 4. Dissolution of the Unsecured Creditors Committee ........................ 233 V. Conclusion .................................................................... 234
This Memorandum Opinion now addresses the appeals of final judgments of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ("the Bankruptcy Court") related to the United States Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 reorganization of Appellee W.R. Grace & Co., et al. ("Grace").
Presently before the Court are two separate but related matters: (1) approval of the aforementioned Settlement Agreement; and (2) confirmation of the Joint Plan. The Court has carefully and fully considered the parties' objections and has completed an extensive review of nine separate court dockets, approximately 2,000 pages of party briefing, 460 pages of oral argument testimony before this Court, and several thousand pages of the supporting record. The Court now finds that the parties' Objections are denied, and (1) the Settlement Agreement between Grace and the CNA Companies is approved; and (2) the Joint Plan is confirmed in its entirety.
Appellee Grace is an expansive corporation engaged in the manufacture of chemicals and construction materials. Grace operates in both the domestic and global markets, and has diversified and extensive business activities. One component of its business involves the physical extraction of natural resources from the earth. Grace also refines these natural resources, and converts them through a process known as "expansion" into manufactured materials utilized for building construction and insulation. Despite its vast size and multifarious business activities, Grace has experienced serious financial difficulty as a result of its involvement in multiple tracks of extensive and expensive protracted litigation over the years, which cumulatively lead to Grace filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001.
From 1963 until 1990, Grace owned and operated a mine in Montana. The mine was located seven miles northeast of Libby, a small town situated in a narrow valley enclosed by tall mountains. Miners at the Libby mine extracted vermiculite, a natural mineral composed of shiny flakes that has since been linked to an especially carcinogenic form of asbestos. Following extraction, the vermiculite was processed using a procedure that generated a substantial degree of airborne dust. It was subsequently determined that the milling process used at the Libby mine emitted up to 5,000 pounds of asbestos per day into the atmosphere. The Libby residents were significantly exposed to asbestos due to the town's close proximity to the mine and its geographic location in a valley, which had the effect of concentrating vermiculite particles in the atmosphere. As a result, a significant number of both Libby residents and former Grace miners developed a plethora of pleural abnormalities.
Beginning in the 1970s, persons alleging injuries from exposure to asbestos in Libby (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Libby Claimants") filed suit against Grace. The volume and amount demanded on such claims drastically surged between 1999 and 2000, due to a series of events in
The State of Montana ("Montana") conducted various state inspections over the course of the mine's operation to monitor the site's safety and health conditions. The Libby mine failed every state inspection between 1956 and 1974, and state inspectors found that the mine exhibited unsafe and unsanitary conditions. During these failed inspections, Montana allegedly informed Grace of the dangers of asbestos and its connection to pleural disease. A majority of Libby residents and Grace employees, however, remained unaware of the potential danger. As a result, Montana has been named as a defendant in over 180 cases filed in various Montana state courts, alleging that the State undertook affirmative duties when it performed the inspections and failed to warn former Grace employees and Libby residents of the asbestos risks associated with the nearby mine. More than fifty of these lawsuits allege that Montana "aided and abetted" Grace in its operation of the mine.
On or about March 25, 2003, Montana began to file Proofs of Claims against Grace's bankruptcy estate before the Bankruptcy Court for contribution and indemnification related to the pending state court actions. On December 14, 2004, the Montana Supreme Court held that under state law, Montana had a duty to provide Libby residents with public health-related information, and remanded the case to the state trial court to determine whether Montana had in fact breached that duty. See Orr v. State, 324 Mont. 391, 401, 106. P.3d 100, 107 (2004). Not wanting to be the sole bearer of asbestos liability, on June 9, 2005, Montana requested the Bankruptcy Court to exempt it from the automatic stay of litigation against Grace so that it could implead Grace as a third-party defendant in the Montana state court actions.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway ("BNSF") is a railroad company that entered into leases and agreements with Grace over the years related to operation of the Libby mine and shipment of Grace's asbestos-contaminated products. Specifically, BNSF leased property to Grace that was adjacent to the railroad. On this BNSF property, Grace built a suspension bridge and loading dock, which it used to transport vermiculite from the mine to railroad cars. Once the vermiculite was loaded onto the cars, it was shipped throughout the country on tracks owned by BNSF. Moreover, under the terms of several of the aforementioned leases and agreements, Grace agreed to indemnify BNSF for any asbestos-related personal injury claims that could be asserted against BNSF.
After the harmful effects of the vermiculite were discovered in Libby, personal injury claims were filed against BNSF, claiming that it should be held strictly liable for Grace's handling of asbestos-contaminated materials on BNSF property, or, in the alternative, that BNSF negligently allowed Grace to handle hazardous materials on its property. BNSF now contends that it has the right to be fully indemnified for the claims and defense costs stemming from this litigation.
Grace has also been involved in numerous property damage class action disputes related to asbestos. This litigation is of two different types: (1) "traditional" property damage claims; and (2) Zonolite Attic Insulation ("ZAI") property damage claims.
Traditional property damage claimants allege that building and insulation materials manufactured by Grace contained asbestos and were used in the foundational structure of many public and private buildings. Over 4,000 such traditional property damage claims were filed against Grace alleging damages for costs incurred in the removal and replacement of asbestos products from buildings. Over a period of many years, Grace attempted to settle the
The second type of asbestos property damage litigation is ZAI property damage claims. The basis of these claims is that Grace manufactured a loose-fill insulation product containing traces of asbestos, ZAI, that was subsequently used in the attics of many private homes. The affected class of plaintiffs claim damages for allegedly reduced property values and costs associated with the removal of ZAI from their homes. The ZAI property damage litigation has proven to be extremely time-consuming and expensive, including a separate "science trial" to determine certain highly-technical scientific claims.
Grace's ZAI insulation products were also used in buildings in Canada. There are currently ten class action suits pending in Canada that relate to: (1) the cost of removal of asbestos from homes and buildings, diminutions of property values, and economic loss caused by ZAI products; and (2) personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to ZAI. Additionally, the Canadian Province of Manitoba has brought suit for healthcare costs incurred or to be incurred in relation to the treatment of class members that were exposed to ZAI products. Both Grace and Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada (hereinafter "the Crown" or "Canada") have been named as defendants in these class actions. The proposed representative class action plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the Crown breached its duty to warn them of the dangers associated with ZAI products and asbestos.
Recognizing their similar interests in the case at hand, Montana and the Crown have jointly presented a majority of their arguments to this Court. Several sections of both parties' appellate briefs mirror each other, and the two appellants chose to argue together at Oral Argument before this Court on June 28-29, 2011. As such, the Court will address their claims together below.
In the 1990s, Grace spun off various of its business activities to two of its subsidiary corporations, Sealed Air Corporation and Cryovac, Inc. ("Sealed Air") and Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. ("Fresenius"). Both companies were involved in litigation alongside Grace alleging successor liability and fraudulent transfer of estate assets from Grace to its subsidiaries. Specifically, it was alleged that Grace had
Grace and its subsidiaries entered into settlements shortly after Grace filed its bankruptcy petition in 2001. Under the terms of the settlements, Sealed Air and Fresenius agreed to contribute over $1.1 billion to Grace's bankruptcy estate in exchange for their release from any future liability related to Grace's asbestos litigation.
Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC ("Garlock") is a manufacturer of engineered industrial products. Some products that Garlock previously manufactured contained asbestos. These products were utilized by several large corporations, including Grace.
When the harmful effects of asbestos were discovered, Garlock was named as a defendant alongside Grace in thousands of personal injury lawsuits claiming liability for asbestos-related injuries. Garlock has expended millions of dollars in defense costs and settlement agreements, paid approximately $1.37 billion in indemnity payments, and exhausted over $1 billion in insurance coverage. To date, approximately 100,000 asbestos personal injury claims remain pending against Garlock.
Garlock is seeking indemnity and contribution from Grace for many of these claims in which both corporations serve as co-defendants. When Grace filed for bankruptcy in 2001, Garlock's attempts to recover these funds were stayed pending Grace's corporate reorganization. Unable to satisfy its massive liabilities, Garlock filed its own Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2010.
Grace has also experienced a multitude of other ongoing business and financial litigation, including disputes with its insurers: the CNA Companies, Government Employees Insurance Company ("GEICO"), Republic Insurance Company n/k/a Starr Indemnity & Liability Company ("Republic"), AXA Belgium, as Successor to Royale Belge SA ("AXA Belgium"), Maryland Casualty Company ("MCC"), Arrowood Indemnity Company ("Arrowood"), and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company ("Travelers"). Grace previously claimed that these insurers owed it coverage for its asbestos-related liability under its various insurance policies. This resulted in extensive litigation during which the extent and timing of the insurers' obligations under the policies were vehemently contested. Finally, after years of intensive negotiations and litigation, Grace and its insurers entered into various settlement agreements after Grace filed for bankruptcy. Under these settlements, Grace relinquished its claims for coverage in return for its insurers furnishing substantial consideration, including the contribution of millions of dollars to Grace's bankruptcy estate to be used to settle claims with asbestos personal injury claimants. Moreover, the settlements provided that the insurers would be categorized as "Settled Asbestos Insurance Companies" under the Joint Plan, meaning that they would receive injunctive protection.
Particularly relevant to the present litigation is the Settlement Agreement entered
For nearly three decades, both before and after Grace's bankruptcy petition, Grace and the CNA Companies have been engaged in various disputes regarding CNA's coverage under its insurance policies related to asbestos liability. Over the course of the years, the two companies entered into several agreements to settle these disputes. Prior to Grace's 2001 bankruptcy petition, Grace and CNA settled their disputes related to coverage for products claims under the primary policies. The parties had not, however, resolved their differences regarding coverage for non-products claims prior to Grace filing for bankruptcy. As a result of Grace's bankruptcy declaration, all litigation regarding non-products coverage was stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. During its corporate reorganization, Grace
Grace moved for approval of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 9019 in November 2010. The Libby Claimants and BNSF objected to entry of the Settlement Agreement. The disputes were fully briefed and litigated before the Bankruptcy Court in January 2011. On January 22, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court issued an Approval Order in conjunction with findings of fact and conclusions of law approving the Settlement Agreement. Nevertheless, the Libby Claimants and BNSF retain objections to entry of the Settlement Agreement.
Over the course of several years prior to Grace's bankruptcy petition, insurance companies AXA Belgium, GEICO, and Republic
In 1998 and 1999, Grace entered into two Credit Agreements with a consortium of bank credit facilities (collectively referred to hereinafter as the "Bank Lenders"). Under these Credit Agreements, Grace owed the Bank Lenders an aggregate principal of $500 million, plus interest accruing thereon.
As a result of all these legal disputes and its massive liabilities, Grace's financial stability as a corporation was seriously impaired. No longer able to satisfy the claims asserted against it, Grace ultimately filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on April 2, 2001. In filing the bankruptcy petition, Grace sought to reorganize its basic corporate structure so that it could better handle its outstanding liabilities, as well as its ongoing and future litigation, while moving forward as a "going concern."
Shortly after Grace filed its bankruptcy petition, it began to negotiate the basic structure of its reorganization plan. Grace therefore requested that the Bankruptcy Court grant it injunctive relief from its ongoing and future asbestos litigation
The Joint Plan went through several preliminary versions and revisions over the years. Notably, proposed Plans were initially filed in 2004 and 2005, but neither proposed Plan was confirmed. After several years of extensive discovery, complex litigation, and negotiations, the parties filed the present Joint Plan of Reorganization on September 19, 2008. The Plan was thereafter again modified, and its finalized version was filed on February 27, 2009. The final version of the Joint Plan, which is now on appeal before this Court, was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on January 31, 2011.
The Joint Plan sets forth detailed procedures for how and when claims are to be submitted, valued, and paid, and includes mechanisms that allow for future claimant recovery. The central tenants of the Joint Plan are two trusts, the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (hereinafter "PI Trust" or "personal injury trust") and the Asbestos Property Damage Trust (hereinafter "PD Trust" or "property damage trust"), and corresponding channeling injunctions that enjoin all present and future asbestos-related claims against Grace and its protected third parties. It has been agreed that injunctive relief should extend to all parties that made contributions to the trust.
Under the Joint Plan, claimants are divided into nine classes (one of which, Class 7, is comprised of two subclasses). Each of these nine classes is further delineated as either an "impaired" or "unimpaired" class.
At the time of Grace's bankruptcy petition, Grace still owed the Bank Lenders the $500 million principal of its loans, as well as several million dollars in accrued pre-petition interest, an amount which remains in dispute between the parties.
The Bank Lenders are general unsecured creditors of Grace. Under the Joint Plan, the Bank Lenders are classified in Class 9—the General Unsecured Creditors class—along with all other generally unsecured creditors of Grace. As part of Grace's reorganization, the United States Trustee created and appointed The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("the Committee") to represent the interests and negotiate on behalf of Grace's general unsecured creditors. Mr. Thomas Maher was appointed as Chairperson of the Committee. Mr. Maher also served as the Bank Lenders' Administrative Agent.
In 2004, Grace began to focus its reorganization efforts on garnering the full support of its general unsecured creditors and equity holders for the Joint Plan. In January of 2005, Grace began to negotiate with the Committee in an attempt to reach an agreement on the rate and computation of interest that Grace would pay its general unsecured creditors under the Plan. After several years of negotiations, an agreement was ultimately reached in 2005, and was memorialized in a Letter Agreement ("the 2005 Letter Agreement"). Under the 2005 Letter Agreement, Grace agreed to pay post-petition interest to the Bank Lenders at a rate of 6.09%, compounded quarterly, and at a rate of 4.19%, or their contracted-for non-default rate, to all other general unsecured creditors. The 6.09% Bank Lender rate was higher than the non-default rate set under the Credit Agreements and the federal judgment rate
In late 2005, Mr. Maher contacted Grace requesting an amendment to the Letter Agreement based on a national upward trend in short-term interest rates. Following a new round of negotiations, a modified agreement was reached in 2006, and was also memorialized in a Letter Agreement ("the 2006 Letter Agreement"). Under the 2006 Letter Agreement, Grace modified the post-petition interest rate for the Bank Lenders so that the 6.09% rate would convert to a floating Prime Rate of interest on January 1, 2006. The previously-negotiated interest rates for the other general unsecured creditors were unaffected by the 2006 Letter Agreement. It remains in dispute whether the terms of the 2005 and 2006 Letter Agreements were meant to bind the Bank Lenders. The Bank Lenders contend that they do not. Grace, on the other hand, claims that the Bank Lenders were bound by the Agreements, and that it therefore repeatedly and publicly relied upon the Letter Agreements, including adjusting its internal books and records, SEC filings, monthly operating reports submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, and settlements, to reflect the terms of the Letter Agreements.
Throughout 2007 and 2008, Grace focused its reorganization efforts on resolving its asbestos liabilities. This required negotiations with major constituencies
Entitlement to the default interest rate was litigated before the Bankruptcy Court in September of 2008. On May 19, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued its decision on the issue, finding that the Bank Lenders had no legal right to the post-petition default rate under the Credit Agreements. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139, 2009 WL 1469831, at *1 (Bankr. D.Del. May 19, 2009). In addition to the Bank Lenders' plan confirmation objections, the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached in the May 2009 decision are also presently on appeal before this Court.
After five hearings and the resolution of numerous objections, the Bankruptcy Court initially approved the Joint Plan on March 9, 2009. The Bankruptcy Court then held a Confirmation Hearing so that all parties could have the opportunity to be heard and raise any additional objections. Forty-three objections were filed by thirty-nine parties at this time. After a sixteen-day hearing and the review of over 1,100 pages of objections, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order confirming the Joint Plan on January 31, 2011. In issuing its confirmation order and accompanying memorandum, the Bankruptcy Court resolved a substantial majority of the original forty-three objections to the Joint Plan. Presently before the Court are the remaining unresolved objections to the Joint Plan.
Bankruptcy Rule 8013 provides that a district court "may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings." Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. "An abuse of discretion standard applies where the Bankruptcy Court has exercised discretion in making its determination, such as in approving a proposed settlement." In re Hudson's Coffee, Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-cv-5133, 2009 WL 1795833, at *2 (D.N.J. June 22, 2009) (internal citations omitted); see also Myers v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir.1996); Hopkins v. McDonnell, No. Civ. A. 06-683, 2006 WL 2241646, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2006). Under this standard, the bankruptcy court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (3d Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted); In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted); Hudson's Coffee, 2009 WL 1795833, at *2 (internal citations omitted). In bankruptcy appellate litigation, the abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential to the judgment of the bankruptcy court, and the reviewing court should not disturb the findings of the bankruptcy court absent a "definite and firm conviction" that the bankruptcy court committed a clear error. Hudson's Coffee, 2009 WL
The Bankruptcy Court's order approving the Settlement Agreement between Grace and the CNA Companies constitutes a final order, and thus will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. All parties to the Settlement Agreement and those objecting to its entry agree that this is the applicable standard of review here. Accordingly, this Court will review the Bankruptcy Court's findings and determine whether it abused its discretion based on "a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact." Id. The Court will examine the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo.
The parties dispute the proper standard of review to be applied by this Court in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation of the Joint Plan. Grace contends that this Court should apply the clear error test to the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact, but should review its conclusions of law de novo. Four of the twelve Appellants disagree, claiming that the proper standard of review is de novo review of both the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law because entry of a channeling injunction is a non-core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157.
Section 157 of the United States Code provides that "[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine ... all core proceedings arising under title 11[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The Third Circuit has held that "[i]n core matters, the District Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo." In re Anes, 195 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir.1992)). A matter is considered "core" if it "involves a right created by the federal bankruptcy law" or involves a proceeding "that would only arise in bankruptcy[.]" In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir.1987)). The Third Circuit has found that "[c]onfirmation of a proposed bankruptcy plan is a core bankruptcy matter" under the United States Code. Anes, 195 F.3d at 180 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L)).
In line with this Third Circuit precedent, the Court finds that appellate analysis of Grace's proposed Joint Plan is a core matter under Title 11. Review of the Joint Plan is the type of proceeding "that would only arise in bankruptcy." Guild & Gallery, 72 F.3d at 1178. As such, the Court will review the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.
The Court first considers the objections filed in response to the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement reached between Grace and the CNA Companies. The Court considers this matter first because certain provisions of the Joint Plan rely on terms and conditions reached in the aforementioned Settlement Agreement. Thus, confirmation of the Joint Plan cannot be accomplished absent
As previously mentioned, Grace and the CNA Companies entered into a Settlement Agreement in November 2010.
Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides that, after appropriate notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019(a).
See id. (internal citations omitted).
In applying the four Martin factors to the instant dispute, it is evident to the Court that the Bankruptcy Court properly applied and analyzed the Settlement
The second Martin factor requires the Court to consider the likely difficulties surrounding the collection of any recovery. Grace is no longer a highly solvent company, but rather has only limited assets available to satisfy all of its outstanding liabilities. If the Settlement Agreement was not in place, the parties would continue to litigate and Grace would need to overcome significant roadblocks to recover any proceeds of the insurance policies. It is uncertain when, if ever, Grace would see the proceeds from this collection. The
Finally, under the fourth and final Martin factor, the Court must consider the effect that the Settlement would have on the creditors of Grace's bankruptcy estate. On this particular point, BNSF claims that the Settlement does not treat it fairly, and thus is not in its best interest, because the injunction that would be called for upon approval of the Settlement may enjoin claims against CNA that BNSF could assert. On this point, the Court first notes that the reach of the channeling injunction is an issue that relates to confirmation of the Joint Plan, not approval of the Settlement. Even with this fact aside, however, BNSF's argument still fails because "[w]hile the objectors' status as creditors is to be taken into consideration, it is not, by itself, determinative of the fairness of the proposed settlement." Jasmine, 258 B.R. at 128. Rather, this point should be balanced against the other three Martin factors, as well as the benefit being awarded to all creditors—not just the objecting parties—by the Settlement. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 628 (9th Cir.1982) (providing that in analyzing the fairness of a settlement, "[i]t is the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness"). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Grace stands to gain substantial monetary and non-monetary benefits. In particular, the PI Trust will be infused with millions of dollars, and CNA will relinquish its rights to pursue Proofs of Claims against Grace, confirmation objections, claims regarding retrospective premiums, asbestos-related claims for indemnity and contribution, and any pending legal actions regarding coverage disputes. A resolution of all these issues is highly valuable to Grace because it injects its bankruptcy estate with much-needed funding and "abstract" non-monetary value, which consequently help Grace to reorganize itself under Chapter 11. This infusion of tangible and abstract value into Grace's bankruptcy estate, in turn, is in the paramount interest of Grace's creditors because it enlarges the pool of funds available to all creditors and ensures greater guaranteed recovery. Thus, while BNSF may individually disagree, the Court sees no basis to find that the Settlement as a whole is not in the paramount interest of all of Grace's creditors.
Based on the above reasoning, it is evident to the Court that the Bankruptcy Court exercised good judgment—far from an abuse of discretion—in its analysis of the Martin factors regarding approval of the Settlement Agreement, and was correct in determining that all four factors were satisfied.
Despite the fact that all four Martin factors are satisfied, the Libby Claimants and BNSF maintain that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in approving the Settlement Agreement based on their purported rights as "additional insureds" under Grace's insurance policies.
Over the years, BNSF and Grace entered into several contracts and leases by which Grace agreed to fully indemnify BNSF for any asbestos-related liability it may incur due to exposure to Grace Asbestos.
The Court, however, disagrees with BNSF's assertion that it is an "additional insured" under Grace's insurance policies with CNA. The Grace—CNA insurance agreements make no mention of BNSF as a named recipient of insurance proceeds under the policies. BNSF was not a subsidiary or employee of Grace. Nor did it ever own a financial interest in Grace or engage in any type of transaction in which Grace would have owed it some type of legal duty. While BNSF did have contractual indemnification agreements in place with Grace, these contracts make no mention of BNSF as an intended beneficiary of Grace's insurance coverage. Rather, it appears that Grace's insurance was merely intended to benefit Grace, not unnamed third parties, in the event it incurred any liabilities for which it would be responsible. Thus, the Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court's assessment that BNSF is not an "additional insured" to any of the insurances policies between Grace and CNA.
Moreover, the Court notes that Grace previously purchased entirely separate insurance policies awarding insurance to BNSF under which BNSF was explicitly named as a recipient of insurance proceeds. BNSF has provided no explanation to the Court as to why Grace would provide it with duplicative coverage in its own insurance policies with CNA, or why it would directly name BNSF as a named insured under one policy but not the other. The record is devoid of any evidence that Grace intended to do so.
The Libby Claimants allege that under Montana state law they have rights to Grace's insurance coverage that "vested" at the time of their injuries, and that such "vested rights" cannot be terminated by the Settlement reached between Grace and CNA. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees with this assertion.
"It has long been the rule in th[e] [Third] Circuit that insurance policies are considered part of the property of a bankruptcy estate." ACandS, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 260 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Estate of Lellock v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.1987); Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553, 560 (1st Cir. 1986)). Therefore, when Grace filed for bankruptcy in 2001, its insurance policies with CNA became part of its bankruptcy estate, subject to distribution under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
The Libby Claimants assert that, while the Grace—CNA insurance policies became part of Grace's estate upon filing for bankruptcy, the proceeds of these policies are not property of the estate, and the Libby Claimants are entitled to collect a portion of these insurance proceeds. This assertion, however, directly contradicts the general rule followed by most jurisdictions, including the Third Circuit, that the proceeds of a debtor's liability insurance policies are considered property of its bankruptcy estate. See In re Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 647 n. 4 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Maness, 101 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir.1996); St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Ins. Co. of N.Am., 934 F.2d 15, 18-19 (2d Cir.1991); Tringali, 796 F.2d at 560); see also Maertin v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 434, 447 (D.N.J.2002) ("[T]his Court must follow the general rule and find that the debtor's liability insurance policies and their proceeds are property of [the debtor's] estate."); In re Salem Baptist Church of Jenkintown, 455 B.R. 857, 867-68 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2011); In re World Health Alt., Inc., 369 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. D.Del.2007) ("When an insurance policy provides coverage only to the debtor, courts will generally rule that the proceeds are property of the estate.") (internal citations omitted). The Court finds no unique circumstances present in the instant case that indicate why the general rule should not apply.
In the present case, the proceeds of the Grace—CNA insurance policies are payable to Grace, not the Libby Claimants. The Libby Claimants are not listed as named insureds under any of these policies. Moreover, the Libby Claimants were in no way involved in the contract negotiations, purchasing of, or decisions to continue this insurance coverage. All such decisions were solely made between Grace and CNA. Thus, the Libby Claimants' citation to these cases actually undermines its argument, and its reliance on them to establish its rights to the insurance proceeds of the Settlement Agreement is summarily incorrect.
Alternatively, the Libby Claimants maintain that, regardless of whether the proceeds of the Grace—CNA insurance policies are included in the bankruptcy estate, they have a "vested right" under Montana state law to collect a portion of these proceeds,
The Libby Claimants primarily rely on the Montana Supreme Court's forty-four-year-old decision in McLane v. Farmers, 150 Mont. 116, 432 P.2d 98 (1967) to establish that they have state-law rights to the insurance proceeds that vested at the time of their injuries, i.e., at the time when they were exposed to Grace Asbestos. McLane involved an automobile liability insurer's right to void an insurance policy that it had issued. Id. at 118, 432 P.2d 98. On May 22, 1964, Gerald Roberts purchased an automobile liability insurance policy from the defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange. Id. at 117, 432 P.2d 98. Shortly thereafter, on June 7, 1964, Roberts was involved in an automobile collision with Dennis McLane. Id. By June 17 of that same year, Farmers had reason to believe that Roberts made certain misrepresentations on the insurance policy he purchased, but nonetheless continued to accept premium payments from him and paid certain claims arising from his accident with McLane. Id. Then, on July 10, 1964, Farmers rescinded its insurance policy and declared it void due to Robert's misrepresentations. Id. at 117-18, 432 P.2d 98.
Meanwhile, McLane had filed suit against Roberts on June 24, 1964 seeking compensation for liability related to the collision. Id. at 117, 432 P.2d 98. On July 22, McLane was granted a judgment against Roberts, and sought to recover the amount of the judgment from Farmers. Id. at 118, 432 P.2d 98. Farmers counterclaimed against Roberts, asserting that he was liable based on the misrepresentations. Id. Two years later, on February 4, 1966, Farmers received a default judgment against Roberts, which effectively terminated the policy between both parties. Id. On appeal, the issue before the Montana Supreme Court was whether Farmers' actions after it first had notice of Roberts' misrepresentations amounted to an implied waiver of its right to rescind the insurance policy. Id. The court found that Farmers' actions did constitute an implied waiver, and, as a result, McLane could recover the insurance proceeds from Farmers. Id. at 119-20, 432 P.2d 98. Specifically, the court held that McLane's right to these insurance proceeds vested prior to the attempted rescission. Id. at 119, 432 P.2d 98. However, the court refrained from finding when exactly McLane's rights vested, but rather stated that the vesting could have occurred "at either the time of the accident or at the time of the implied waiver of the right to rescind. Exactly which of the two possible times th[e] court need not decide." Id. at 119-20, 432 P.2d 98.
The findings in McLane, however, substantially differ from the present scenario for three primary reasons. First, it is important to note that the Montana Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that a third party's rights to insurance proceeds vest at the time of injury, but rather merely stated that the rights vested before
Second, and more importantly, in McLane, the injured party claiming against the insurance company had obtained a judgment entitling him to the insurance proceeds. It is a well-recognized principle that "[i]n the liability insurance context ... a tort plaintiff must first establish the liability of the debtor before the insurer becomes [ ] obligated to make any payment." Edgeworth, 993 F.2d at 53-54; see also Salem Baptist Church, 455 B.R. at 868 (finding that a party's lack of a judgment to enforce its malpractice claims indicated that it had no right to the insurance proceeds).
The Court instead finds guidance on this point from the language of the court in In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1996). Dow Corning also involved a mass tort bankruptcy related to allegedly defective breast implants. The court in that case considered whether an injured party's rights to insurance are independent from those of the insured, and, if so, whether those rights can interfere with the debtor's rights to finalize settlement agreements post-bankruptcy. Id. at 240. The court found that while an injured party's claim against an insured is a vested property interest entitled to constitutional protection, the injured party has no more than an expectation that he/she will be able to collect from the insured prior to obtaining a judgment. Id. In analyzing this issue in the context of mass tort bankruptcies, the court opined that:
Id. at 242. The Court finds this language to be highly persuasive. Just like in Dow Corning, there are hundreds of claims that may be asserted against Grace in the future but that are not yet known or able to be ascertained. Meanwhile, there is only a limited amount of funds available to satisfy both present and future claims. Prior to the entry of this Settlement Agreement, Grace and CNA were involved in expensive and time-consuming litigation for over three decades. Rather than expending more funds on this litigation that could be included in the pool of recovery for personal injury claimants, the Settlement Agreement would put an end to these disputes and infuse the trust with over $84 million. Thus, not only can the Libby Claimants not cite to any judgment upon which entitlement to the insurance proceeds could be premised, but they also cannot argue that the Settlement Agreement would not be in their best interests as personal injury claimants.
A third critical difference between the holding of McLane and the circumstances present in this case is the fact that McLane was based upon a motor vehicle liability policy, while the Libby Claimants' argument is based upon general liability insurance policies. The two are not the same. Party liability under motor vehicle insurance policies in Montana is codified in a state statute, Montana State Code Annotated ("MCA") § 61-6-103, which provides that the liability of the insurer becomes absolute when the injury or damage covered by the motor vehicle liability policy takes place.
Finally, given that the Libby Claimants' alleged rights to the insurance proceeds cannot be premised on a state statutory provision or a judicial opinion, the Court considers whether Montana has a public policy that would favor such a finding. Montana has no public policy in place that protects individuals claiming third-party rights to insurance proceeds under a general liability policy prior to obtaining a judgment or settlement upon which liability may be premised. Montana does, however, have a long-established public policy favoring settlements. See Miller v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 337 Mont. 67, 71-72, 155 P.2d 1278, 1281-82 (2007) ("The declared public policy of this State is to encourage settlement and avoid unnecessary litigation."); see also Durden v. Hydro Flame Corp., 295 Mont. 318, 324, 983 P.2d 943, 946-47 (1999); Augustine v. Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 266, 940 P.2d 116 (1997) (internal citations omitted); Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 269-70, 292 P. 577, 581 (1930). The benefits of settlement are numerous, including reducing litigation costs, stress, the risk of an extreme jury verdict, and conservation of judicial time and resources. See Durden, 295 Mont. at 324, 983 P.2d 943. As aptly noted by the court in Dow Corning, in the context of a mass tort bankruptcy:
Id. at 242. Nothing in the record indicates that Grace's Settlement Agreement with CNA was entered into in bad faith or for deceptive purposes. In fact, as discussed extensively above, the record highlights the numerous benefits, both monetary and non-monetary, that the Settlement will confer upon not only Grace and CNA, but also third parties such as personal injury claimants.
The Court therefore finds that the Libby Claimants are not entitled to the proceeds of Grace's insurance policies with CNA. They are not named insureds or intended beneficiaries under the policies. There is no Montana statute conferring a third-party right to the insurance proceeds upon them. The Libby Claimants have not cited to any judicial opinion that establishes their "vested rights" to the insurance. Moreover, there is no public policy in place in Montana that favors their position. Therefore, given that the Libby Claimants have no rights to the insurance proceeds in the first place, it follows that the Grace—CNA Settlement Agreement in no way impairs their rights.
Based on all the above, the Court denies the appeals of BNSF and the Libby Claimants to the Grace—CNA Settlement Agreement, and finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in entering its Approval Order affirming the Settlement.
Various Appellants raise numerous objections to the Joint Plan's confirmation. The Court considers each challenge separately below.
Appellants AMH and Montana challenge the Joint Plan on the grounds that it was not proposed in good faith. Under § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court may only confirm a reorganization plan if it finds that the plan was "proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). While the Bankruptcy Code does not define "good faith," it has been established that a determination of good faith associated with a Chapter 11 reorganization plan requires a factual inquiry into a totality of the circumstances surrounding the plan's proposal. Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir.1985). However, such inquiries must be done on a case-by-case basis because good faith determinations are factually specific. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 39 (Bankr.D.Colo.1999); see also W. Homer Drake, Jr. & Christopher S. Strickland, Commencing a Reorganization Case, available at CH11 REORG. § 3:2. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, a court has "considerable discretion in finding good faith." In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 271 B.R. 228, 234 (Bankr.D.Del. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the bankruptcy courts are in the best position to ascertain the good faith of the parties' proposals. Matter of Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 853 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 B.R. 521 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. June 26, 1990). Thus, district and circuit courts should carefully consider any recommendations from the bankruptcy courts on appeal.
The Third Circuit has stated that the "touchstone" of the good faith inquiry is "the plan itself and whether it will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code." In re Frascella Enter., Inc., 360 B.R. 435, 446 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (quoting In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 242 (3d Cir.2000)). In its assessment, the Court should "keep[] in mind [that] the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to give debtors a reasonable opportunity to make a fresh start." In re T-H New Orleans L.P., 116 F.3d 790, 802 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Sun Country). The factors which a court should consider in determining a debtor's good faith include if the plan:
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 609 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (citations omitted). In applying these three factors to the present case, it is apparent to the Court that the Joint Plan was proposed in good faith.
An analysis of the totality of the circumstances shows that the first factor— whether the reorganization plan is consistent with the general objectives of the Bankruptcy Code—has been satisfied. The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically identified two purposes of Chapter 11 as: (1) preserving going concerns; and (2) maximizing property available
The second factor requires that the plan have been proposed with honesty and good intentions, and that it have "a reasonable hope of success." Sun Country, 764 F.2d at 408. The Third Circuit provides the Court with guidance on this point, stating that, "[a]t its most fundamental level, the good faith requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy Code's careful balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy[.]" Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F.3d at 119. In analyzing whether a plan has been proposed for honest and good reasons, courts routinely consider whether the debtor intended to abuse the judicial process, whether the plan was proposed for ulterior motives, or if no realistic probability for effective reorganization exists. See Sound Radio, 93 B.R. at 853 ("To find a lack of `good faith' courts have examined whether the debtor intended to abuse the judicial process and the purposes of reorganization provisions."). AMH questions Grace's honesty and good intentions in its proposal of the Joint Plan. Specifically, AMH avers a lack of good faith because Grace chose not to present any evidence at the Confirmation Hearing regarding its good faith.
In stark contrast to the debtor's actions in Frascella, however, nothing in the present record indicates that Grace has engaged in any such comparable behavior. There is no evidence that Grace was dishonest or had ulterior motives when it proposed the Joint Plan. Nor is there any indication that Grace intended to abuse the judicial process. Rather, the record shows that the Joint Plan was the result of years of litigation and extensive arms-length negotiations. See In re U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., Bankr.No. 01-2471, 2005 WL 5898300, at *6, *20 (Bankr.D.Del. Nov. 29, 2005) (noting that the parties' arm's-length negotiations were a significant factor in finding that a plan was proposed in good faith); Mount Carbon Metro., 242 B.R. at 41 (same). Moreover, as noted in Sound Radio, the Bankruptcy Court was in the best position to assess Grace's good faith. 93 B.R. at 853. It oversaw the management of this case for over ten years, and completed an extensive and exhaustive review of the voluminous record before it. After careful consideration of all issues, the Bankruptcy Court found that Grace proposed the Joint Plan with honesty and good intentions. The Court sees no reason to dispute this finding.
The third and final factor courts should consider when considering a debtor's good faith is if the debtor exhibited a fundamental unfairness when dealing with its creditors. In order to satisfy this requirement, the plan must treat all parties fairly and ensure that its confirmation comports with due process. See Mount Carbon Metro., 242 B.R. at 39.
First, AMH asserts a lack of good faith and unfairness because it was allegedly singled out for disparate treatment by Grace in comparison to other property damage claimants. A lack of good faith is evident when "the debtor seeks to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of creditors to enforce their rights." Sound Radio, 93 B.R. at 853 (quoting In re Pikes Peak Water Co., 779 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1985)). AMH has presented no evidence suggesting Grace intended to delay or frustrate its rights. In fact, it is apparent from the voluminous record that Grace proposed the Joint Plan with the legitimate purpose of restructuring itself so that it could emerge from bankruptcy able to operate as a going concern.
Moreover, courts have found that different treatment of a creditor, by itself, does not necessarily run afoul of the good faith standard. See Mount Carbon Metro., 242 B.R. at 42 (noting that favorable treatment of one particular creditor does not automatically indicate bad faith). In order to constitute bad faith, the differing treatment of the creditors would need to have a serious disparate effect on the parties.
The Court next addresses Appellant Montana's claim that Grace did not act in good faith because the asbestos personal injury claims were settled without Montana's participation in settlement negotiations.
Therefore, after a consideration of all three "good faith factors," the Court concludes that the Joint Plan was proposed in good faith. The plan exhibits honesty, good intentions, and a reasonable expectation that reorganization can be achieved, and is fundamentally fair to all creditors. Most importantly, its structure and purpose is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.
The second issue addressed by the Court regards objections raised by AMH as a challenge to the two trust structure of Grace's Joint Plan. For purposes of clarity and completeness, the Court first generally reviews the basic structure of the trusts
Section 524(g)
The central pillars of Grace's Joint Plan are two trusts—the Asbestos PI Trust (hereinafter "personal injury trust" or "PI Trust") and the Asbestos PD Trust (hereinafter "property damage trust" or "PD Trust"). The personal injury trust assumes all of Grace's liabilities related to personal injury claims. It is funded by Grace's own cash and stock, as well as third party cash settlements and reimbursement agreements.
The PI Trust operates according to criteria established in a claims matrix. The matrix attempts to organize the personal injury claims brought against Grace by creating separate, delineated categories of pleural diseases related to asbestos, and assigning a set amount of recovery— known as a "Scheduled Value"—to each level. In this sense, the matrix is similar to a chart in which each claimant will receive a predetermined set value for his claim if the severity of his disease matches defined medical criteria in a category under the matrix. In addition to the Scheduled Value, the matrix also provides a "Maximum Value" for each claim within a particular category. To obtain the Maximum Value of a claim under the PI Trust, claimants need to meet certain individualized criteria (such as having numerous dependents or being a higher-wage earner) that would entitle them to more recovery. The intent in creating the Scheduled Value and Maximum Value scheme is to ensure that all personal injury claimants will receive an award under the trust roughly equal to the amount they would have received outside of bankruptcy.
The property damage trust is vastly similar to the personal injury trust. This second trust assumes Grace's liabilities related to property damage claims. It is funded by the assets of Reorganized Grace, as well as the proceeds of the settlement agreements reached between Grace and its subsidiaries, Sealed Air and Fresenius.
Under the structure of the PD Trust, traditional property damage claims in Class 7A are distributed in accordance with the Case Management Order ("CMO") put forth by the Bankruptcy Court in 2009, as amended in 2010. (Case Management Order for Class 7A Asbestos PD Claims ("CMO"), Ex. 25, Joint Appendix ("JA") 000804.) The CMO provides a centralized procedure for the resolution of all traditional property damage claims in Class 7A that were not previously resolved by settlements, as well as governing rules and timelines. American ZAI property damage claims in Class 7B follow a separate distribution procedure under the Plan. The Payment of American ZAI claims is governed by the Asbestos PD Trust Agreement and the ZAI TDP for Claims Agreement.
Through the procedures associated with these two trusts, the Joint Plan attempts to resolve Grace's current and future personal injury and property damage liabilities related to asbestos. With the two trusts assuming its liabilities, Grace is given some breathing room to reorganize itself and implement the terms of the Joint Plan so that it can emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The Bankruptcy Court oversaw the creation and implementation of both trusts under the Joint Plan. It approved the Joint Plan's structure, including both trusts, in its order confirming
AMH, however, objects to the structure of the Joint Plan on the grounds that the property damage trust is not a "genuine" trust. AMH claims that the PD Trust lacks specific procedures for determining and valuing claims, and instead merely "operates as nothing other than a check-writing facility for Class 7A Claimants." (AMH Br. 49.) The Court disagrees.
Section 524(g) provides, in relevant part, that a trust created pursuant to a plan of reorganization must:
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i). Only if a trust satisfies all four of these requirements will it be considered proper under the statute.
In the instant case, the Court finds that Grace's PD Trust satisfies all four requirements set forth under § 524(g). The first element is met because Grace is a corporate defendant involved in personal injury and property damage lawsuits related to asbestos exposure. Moreover, upon the Plan's execution, the trusts will assume Grace's liabilities for these legal actions. The second element is satisfied because the PD Trust is funded in part by its own securities. Specifically, the PD Trust is largely funded by the Class 7A Deferred Payment Agreement,
The next set of objections that the Court considers involves the injunction within Grace's Joint Plan that will channel all
In conjunction with the creation of a trust under § 524(g), the bankruptcy court issues an injunction that acts as a nationwide stay against both current and future litigation in federal and state court related to the debtor's asbestos liability. During the period of corporate reorganization, creditors of the corporation can file proofs of claims in the bankruptcy court within the time frame specified by court order or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (giving creditors authority to file proofs of claims); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3003 (listing requirements for filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 11 reorganization case). Rather than asserting claims against the debtor corporation itself, however, the injunction "channels" all claimants to pursue any remedies that they may have against the trust, which will be resolved in accordance with the debtor's plan of reorganization. In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir.2005); In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 328 B.R. 691, 694-95 (D.N.J. 2005). Under certain limited circumstances, the channeling injunction can extend to enjoin claims against third parties that are directly or indirectly involved in the asbestos litigation. See 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4)(A)(ii); see also Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 234-35 (stating that § 524(g) injunctions can bar actions directed at identifiable third parties that are directly or indirectly liable for the conduct, claims against, or demands of the debtor); G-I Holdings, 328 B.R. at 695 ("[T]he debtor, its predecessors and successors in interest, and any affiliates [can] receive broad protection from any asbestos-related claims through the bankruptcy court's issuance of a `channeling injunction[.]'") (internal citation omitted). When exercised concurrently with administration of the trust, "the rehabilitation process served by the channeling injunction supports the equitable resolution of asbestos-related claims" and "makes it possible for future asbestos claimants to obtain substantially similar recoveries as current claimants in a manner consistent with due process." Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 234.
In the instant case, several Appellants raise objections to the channeling injunction within the Joint Plan, including: (1) the scope of the channeling injunction; (2) the fairness and equality of the channeling injunction; and (3) the effect of the channeling injunction on releases from liability under the Plan. The Court considers each objection in turn.
The Libby Claimants allege that the scope of § 524(g) channeling injunction is improper because it is too ambiguous to be enforced. While they acknowledge that the injunction clearly enjoins them from pursuing Grace's insurers on claims related to insurer derivative liability, they contend that the injunction is vague as to whether they may assert claims against insurers for their alleged independent tortious "insurer wrongdoing."
The Court first considers the alleged ambiguity of the injunction. According to the Libby Claimants, the channeling injunction runs afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Rule 65(d) provides that "[e]very order granting an injunction ... must state the reasons why it is issued; state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required." Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(1). The basic purpose of Rule 65(d) is to ensure that enjoined individuals are on notice of what conduct is precisely outlawed or permitted by the injunction. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974); see also Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 444, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974) (stating that enjoined individuals are entitled to "fair and precisely-drawn notice" of what injunctions prohibit). The Third Circuit has recognized that injunctions designed to bar future violations may receive a somewhat relaxed interpretation, Louis W. Epstein Family P'Ship v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 771 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir.1985)), because "[a]ll that is required under Rule 65(d) is for the language of the injunction to be as specific as possible under the totality of the circumstances, such that a reasonable person could understand what conduct is proscribed." Prosser v. Springel, Nos. Civ. A.2008-16, 2008-18, 2008 WL 2368898, at *7 (D.Vi. June 6, 2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Benda, 689 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir.1982)). However, "[b]road, non-specific language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law or comply with an agreement" will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 65(d). Epstein, 13 F.3d at 771 (internal citation omitted); Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967).
The channeling injunction in the instant case meets the specification requirements of Rule 65(d). The terms of the Joint Plan specify that the injunction and its corresponding trust are issued pursuant to § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 524(g), in turn, provides that channeling injunctions can extend to "identifiable" third parties who are "directly or indirectly liable" for the debtor's conduct, including alleged liability "aris[ing] by reason of ... the third party's provision of insurance to the debtor[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III). As the record makes abundantly clear, Grace's channeling injunction incorporates the statutory requirements of § 524(g). The injunction precludes the assertion of "Asbestos PI Claims" against Grace and any "Asbestos Protected Party." Asbestos PI Claims are defined in Section 1.1(34) of the Joint Plan as any:
(Joint Plan § 1.1(34).) Those parties covered by the injunction—"Asbestos Protected Parties"—are likewise clearly listed in Section 1.1(51) of the Joint Plan. (Id. at § 1.1(51).) Subsection (d) of this Section directly states that insurers with whom Grace has reached settlements and who have agreed to contribute funds to the asbestos trust—referred to as "Settled Asbestos Insurance Companies"—are encompassed within the Asbestos Protected Party definition. (Id. § 1.1(51)(d).) Thus, Grace's channeling injunction is not ambiguous.
Quite to the contrary and consistent with Rule 65(d), the channeling injunction provides enough specificity and reasonable detail, without any reference to a complaint or other documents, that is sufficient to put all involved parties on notice of what is prohibited—the pursuit of an Asbestos PI Claim against Grace or any Asbestos Protected Party for its derivative liability, including those insurers with whom Grace previously settled. By necessity, the injunction uses sufficiently broad language because it was crafted to encompass the hundreds of potential asbestos claims that may be filed in the future. Such a "sweeping injunction" is permissible if it is "clearly necessary to protect the assets of the bankrupt's estate." Kremen v. Blank, 55 B.R. 1018, 1022-23 (D.Md. 1985); see also United States v. An Article of Drug, 661 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir.1981) ("[A]n injunction may be framed to bar future violations that are likely to occur.") (internal citation omitted). Given the complexity of the Joint Plan, the various provisions of the several settlements at play, the massive number of parties involved, and the still unknown number of potential future claimants, the Bankruptcy Court could not have realistically framed a more specific order. Prosser, 2008 WL 2368898, at *8. Therefore, in accordance with the circumstances at hand, the channeling injunction is sufficiently specific.
Finally, if the Bankruptcy Court had addressed these claims, it may have unintentionally crossed into the unconstitutional territory of advisory opinions. It is firmly established in our judicial system that federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 408, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792) (finding that the issuance of nonbinding opinions on the amount of benefits available to Revolutionary War veterans was "not of a judicial nature"); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 363, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911) (holding that a lawsuit between the government and Native Americans over an allotment of land was not justiciable); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) ("[T]he implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions[.]") (internal citations omitted). In order for a case to be justiciable and not an advisory opinion, there must be an actual dispute between adverse litigants. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) (stating that a justiciable dispute involves "real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F.Supp.2d 290, 294 (D.N.J.1998) ("[F]or a case to be justiciable... there must be an actual dispute between adverse litigants[.]") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Herein lies the flaw in the Libby Claimants' argument—there is no actual dispute, nor are the claims presented with "clear concreteness ... precisely framed and necessary for decision[.]" Flast, 392 U.S. at 96-97, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (internal citations omitted). There is no dispute between the parties that Grace's injunction bars claims against insurers for their derivative liability. Having established above that the channeling injunction is not ambiguous, there also is no dispute that the Libby Claimants can independently pursue claims against Grace's insurers for their own alleged wrongdoing. The Libby Claimants have not, however, articulated to the Court what specific conduct or actions
As set forth above, § 524(g) authorizes extension of the channeling injunction to certain third parties in limited situations. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I-IV). BNSF now asks this Court to extend to it the protections afforded by the § 524(g) injunction. In its briefing presented to the Court, however, its rationale for making this request is unclear.
In its brief, BNSF asserts that "[c]laims by personal injury plaintiffs against non-debtors such as BNSF asserting derivative liability are `indirect' claims against the Debtors that seek to recover damages caused by the presence of asbestos, and fall within the claims authorized to be channeled ... In essence, claims asserted against BNSF constitute indirect claims against the Debtor's Estate[.]" (BNSF Br. 32.) This statement mischaracterizes the definition of an "indirect claim" under Grace's Joint Plan. Under the Plan, an "Indirect PI Trust Claim" is a claim made against Grace by an indirect claimant for indemnification, contribution, or subrogation for damages it paid to a personal injury plaintiff exposed to asbestos for which Grace is liable. (Joint Plan § 1.1(144).) In another Section, the Joint Plan provides that such claims shall be enjoined pursuant to the § 524(g) injunction. (Id. at § 8.2.1.) In this scenario, the indirect claim under the Plan that could be enjoined would be any claim for indemnity and/or contribution that BNSF could seek from Grace. It would not be, as BNSF categorizes it, a claim by a personal injury claimant asserted directly against BNSF. Only the indirect claim brought by BNSF against Grace could be enjoined and channeled to the trust under the Plan; not the direct claim by the personal injury plaintiff against BNSF. To allow the injunction to issue in the latter situation would have the effect of not only precluding actions against BNSF for its liability derivative of Grace's conduct, but also its own independent liability. This result is expressly prohibited by Third Circuit precedent. See Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d 190, 233 (3d
The Court now considers extension of the channeling injunction to enjoin claims against BNSF for actions brought against it that are allegedly derivative of Grace's conduct. On this point, the Court must consider the holding of Combustion Engineering, as it is directly relevant here. In that case, the Third Circuit clarified the scope of a § 524(g) channeling injunction, holding that:
Id. at 234, 236. In so holding, the Third Circuit recognized the four instances under which third-party liability could arise under the Code in a Chapter 11 reorganization case: (1) a third party's ownership of a financial interest in the debtor; (2) a third party's involvement in management of the debtor; (3) a third party's provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party; or (4) a third party's involvement in a transaction changing the debtor's corporate structure, or in a loan or other financial transaction affecting the financial condition of the debtor. Id. at 235; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I-IV). If the third party does not fall into one of these four categories, then its claims will not be considered derivative of the debtor's liability, and thus are not eligible to be enjoined. Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 236-37 ("[Section] 524(g) expressly contemplates the inclusion of third parties' liability within the scope of the channeling injunction [ ] and sets out the specific requirements that must be met in order to permit inclusion[.]"); In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 411 B.R. 148, 165-66 (Bankr. D.Del.2008) (finding that a third party whose alleged liability arose from its contractual agreements with the debtor, but not as a result of any of the four conditions listed in § 524(g), could not have its claims enjoined); In re Pittsburgh Corning, Corp., 453 B.R. 570, 590 n. 25 (Bankr. W.D.Pa.2011) (noting that it is "clear that the asbestos channeling injunction protection is available only to nondebtor affiliates that meet the § 524(g) requirements").
In the instant case, BNSF's alleged liability did not arise by any of the four circumstances provided by § 524(g): BNSF never owned a financial interest in Grace, provided insurance to it, engaged in its management, or entered into a transaction with it that altered Grace's corporate structure. Rather, BNSF's contractual indemnity agreements serve as the crux of its relationship with Grace. It has been explicitly recognized, however, that contractual indemnity agreements that do not otherwise meet the definitional requirements of § 524(g) cannot serve as the link in the chain connecting a third party's liability to the debtor for purposes of extending the channeling injunction to non-debtors. See Federal-Mogul, 411 B.R. at 166. Thus, because BNSF's claims against Grace do not meet the Code's definitional requirements of derivative liability, § 524(g) explicitly precludes the Court from extending injunctive relief to BNSF under these circumstances.
AMH alleges that the scope of the channeling injunction sweeps too broadly in violation of § 524(g) in regards to property damage claims. AMH claims that there is no need to channel property damage claims at all because such claims are unimpaired and fully paid under the TDP. (AMH Br. 50.) In making its argument, AMH asks this Court: "If P[roperty] D[amage] Claims are unimpaired and are to be paid 100% ... what is the purpose of channeling such claims to a trust?" (Id.)
The answer, of course, is that the purpose of channeling these claims is ensure the payment of both current and future property damage claims. Section 524(g) requires debtors seeking its protection to show that there is a substantial likelihood that they will be subject to future property damage or personal injury claims related to asbestos exposure before they can take advantage of the benefits provided by the statute's trust and channeling injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I). Despite the fact that many property damage claims have been resolved in the instant case, a cloud of uncertainty still hangs over the Debtor. Grace began shipping insulation products containing traces of asbestos across the country and internationally as early as the 1920s. It still remains unknown (and may never be ascertained) how many entities and individuals were affected by these products, the precise quantity of asbestos-laden products that were sold, which buildings the products were used in and how much was used per building, or the percentage of these entities that have successfully removed the asbestos products from their buildings. Thus, there remains a significant chance that future property damage claims will be asserted against Grace by property damage claimants. Numerous expert witnesses testified to this fact before the Bankruptcy Court.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Grace had reached a settlement agreement
Section 524(g) provides, in relevant part, that a channeling injunction protecting debtors and identifiable third parties must be "fair and equitable" to those "persons that might subsequently assert [asbestos-related claims against the debtor], in light of the benefits provided ... to [the] trust on behalf of such ... debtors or such third part[ies]." 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). "A review of the case law suggests that finding that an injunction is fair and equitable is closely tied to the value being contributed to the plan." In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 180 (Bankr.D.N.J.2007). Federal courts within the Third Circuit have repeatedly recognized that such contributions to the trust can be made by the debtor or third parties themselves, or, alternatively, on behalf of the parties protected by the injunction. See In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., Bankr. No. 02-10429, 2006 WL 616243, at *17 (Bankr.D.Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (finding that settlements reached between Kaiser and its insurers at various points in time were fair and equitable because they constituted "substantial contributions" to the asbestos trust "on behalf of the Protected Parties"); In re Burns & Roe Enter.'s, Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-4191, 2009 WL 438694, at *9, *35 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2009) (finding that the § 524(g) injunction at issue was fair and equitable to future claimants based on the benefits provided to the trust by or on behalf of the protected parties and settling insurers); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 156 (D.Del.2006) (same); In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., Bankr.No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, at *33 (Bankr.D.Del. Nov. 16, 2007) (holding that substantial contributions made to the trust, either directly or by "the consensual resolution of claims against the Debtors," were fair and equitable). As such, as long as a party has contributed reasonable value to the reorganization plan, whether through its own direct contribution or by those made indirectly on its behalf by another party, then it is fair and equitable to future claimants for that party to receive the injunctive protection afforded by § 524(g).
As previously mentioned, the trust in this case is funded by both Grace's own contributions and the contributions of several third parties. MCC and Grace entered into their settlement agreement at a time when Grace was already experiencing financial difficulty as a result of the increased number of asbestos claims filed against it. The settlement payments made by MCC substantially increased Grace's available funds. After the bankruptcy filing,
For these reasons, the requirements of § 524(g) are satisfied, and the findings of the Bankruptcy Court on this matter are therefore affirmed.
In separate but related arguments, both BNSF and the Libby Claimants object to Grace's aforementioned Settlement Agreement with CNA, which categorizes CNA as a Settled Asbestos Insurance Company entitled to § 524(g) injunctive relief, because it allegedly violates the "fair and equitable" requirement of the statute.
According to BNSF, the Bankruptcy Court erred because it did not make a specific finding as to whether the Libby Claimants' aforementioned post-bankruptcy, independent insurer wrongdoing tort claims against CNA would be covered by the channeling injunction, and that therefore entry of the injunction was not "fair and equitable" to those parties, i.e., the Libby Claimants, whose future claims might be enjoined. BNSF further asserts that the Grace—CNA Settlement Agreement is unfair because the entire value of CNA's contribution under the Agreement would be included in the trust's overall pool—an amount set to be distributed among all asbestos personal injury claimants—without regard as to whether or not the claimant has a direct claim against CNA. Thus, BNSF claims that the current structure of the Joint Plan cannot be affirmed because it fails to account for the fact that the Libby Claimants are the only Class 6 claimants that could arguably bring direct claims against CNA for the insurer's alleged independent tort liability (assuming they could do so under applicable state law), and that allowing other Class 6 claimants who cannot assert such independent claims against CNA to recover the same amount is unfair and inequitable.
At the outset, BNSF lacks the standing to raise these claims.
BNSF does not meet the requirements of appellate standing here because it has failed to show the Court how it would be directly adversely affected by the extension of the channeling injunction to CNA. Rather, BNSF appears to be raising concerns that properly belong to the Libby Claimants.
The Libby Claimants also object to the channeling injunction on the grounds that it does not satisfy the fair and equitable requirement of § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
Section 524(g) requires a court, prior to issuing injunctive relief, to first find that the reorganization plan is fair and equitable to persons who might later assert asbestos-related claims in light of the benefits the debtor or third parties provide to the trust. See 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). In crafting this statutory provision, Congress did not explicitly define the meaning of "fair and equitable." As a result, most courts interpreting the section have "looked at all the elements of a plan and then made a generalized determination of what is fair and equitable." In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 179-180 (Bankr. D.N.J.2007); see also In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., Bankr.No. 02-10429, 2006 WL 616243, at *17, *22 (Bankr.D.Del. Feb. 6, 2006); In re J.T. Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 791 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2003). This determination does not require mathematical certainty nor precision, but should identify a clear relationship between the benefits received and the contributions made by a third party that receives injunctive protection. In re Quigley Co., Inc., 437 B.R. 102, 133, 134 n. 42 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2010).
An analysis of the record indicates that the fair and equitable requirement is clearly satisfied here. At trial, an expert witness estimated that claims against the PI Trust will have a total value ranging between $6.3 and $7.4 billion. As discussed at length above, Grace's Settlement Agreement with CNA injects significant monetary and non-monetary value into Grace's bankruptcy estate. Under that Agreement,
The Libby Claimants argue against confirmation of the Joint Plan on the grounds that it impermissibly releases Grace's subsidiaries, Sealed Air and Fresenius, from future claims related to Grace's asbestos liabilities by extending injunctive protection to them. They claim that third parties cannot be released from liability without the affirmative agreement of all creditors involved in the debtor's reorganization, and that because the Libby Claimants did not vote in favor of the Joint Plan, it was erroneous for the Bankruptcy Court to allow the release of Sealed Air and Fresenius from liability.
In order for a reorganization plan that includes an injunction barring third-party claims against non-debtors to be approved, the injunction must be "both necessary to the reorganization and fair" under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
Second, the injunction in this case is also fair to Grace's creditors. As detailed above in regards to the injunction's necessity, as well as continuously throughout this Opinion, there are only a narrow range of claims barred by the injunction for the distinct purpose of effectuating settlements to fund the Joint Plan and Grace's reorganization. All other creditor claims will be assumed and paid by Grace after it has completed reorganization. Moreover, both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court have previously considered the fairness of the Fresenius and Sealed Air Settlement Agreements. The District Court previously approved the settlements, finding that the releases were fair to Grace's bankruptcy estate and its creditors. The Bankruptcy Court expressly adopted these findings in its 2011 Confirmation Order. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 138-40 (Bankr.D.Del. 2011) (summarizing District Court and Bankruptcy Court proceedings). Therefore, if the Libby Claimants were concerned with the fairness of the injunction, they could have raised this issue at a point in time prior to entry of the injunction in 2011. As such, the Court finds that the channeling injunction in Grace's Joint Plan is both necessary to Grace's reorganization
Section 1129(a)(1) of the Code provides that a Chapter 11 reorganization plan may only be confirmed if "[t]he plan complies with the applicable provisions of [Title 11]." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1). Montana and the Crown
Section 3.1.6(a) of the Joint Plan classifies all personal injury claims resulting from exposure to Grace Asbestos in Class 6, Asbestos PI Claims.
Montana and the Crown, however, object to the classification of their claims in Class 6 on the basis that their claims are of a different nature. Specifically, they argue that claims for indemnity and contribution do not belong in Class 6 because they are not personal injury claims. Furthermore, they allege that their claims are rooted in a failure to warn theory, rather than liability based on asbestos production, and therefore are different than the remainder of the claims in Class 6. Thus, they believe that § 1122(a) is violated on these grounds.
Section 1122(a) of the Code governs the classification of claims, providing that "a plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class." 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In analyzing whether claims within a given class are substantially similar, "the focus of the classification [should be on] the legal character of the claim as it relates to the assets of the debtor." In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C.Cir.1986) (quoting J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 85 F.2d 351, 352 (8th Cir.1936)) (emphasis in original). Therefore, in determining claim placement, plan proponents should attempt to group together those claims that exhibit a similar effect on the debtor's bankruptcy estate, rather than merely grouping together claims that are otherwise similar in character. See id. at 1150-51 (citing In re Martin's Point Ltd. P'ship, 12 B.R. 721, 727 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1981)). Plan proponents and bankruptcy courts have considerably broad discretion in deciding how to classify claims. See In re Jersey City Med. Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[I]t remains clear that Congress intended to afford bankruptcy judges broad discretion to decide the propriety of plans in light of the facts of each case."); see also In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir.1986) (same). However, plan proponents' classification schemes are not without limits. See In re Dow Corning, 244 B.R. 634, 644 (Bankr. E.D.Mich.1999) ("[T]here are limits on a plan proponent's classification freedom.") (internal citations omitted). It is a well-recognized principle that the classification of claims or interests must be "reasonable," and cannot be grouped together for arbitrary or fraudulent purposes. See Jersey City Med. Ctr., 817 F.2d at 1061; John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assoc., 987 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir.1993); In re Curtis Ctr. Ltd. P'ship, 195 B.R. 631, 639 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1996); In re Fairfield Exec. Assoc., 161 B.R. 595, 600 (D.N.J.1993). "In short, . . . substantially similar claims may not be classified separately when it is done for an illegitimate reason." Dow Corning, 244 B.R. at 644 (internal citations omitted).
It is clear to the Court that, in exercising their broad discretion under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court and the Plan Proponents properly classified Montana and the Crown's indirect claims in Class 6. Both direct and indirect claims under the Plan exhibit a similar effect on Grace's bankruptcy estate—they seek recovery from the trust for actions related to Grace's asbestos liability. It makes no difference whether this recovery is sought directly by an individual plaintiff or indirectly through indemnity and/or contribution, or what the applicable legal theory is that underlies the claim, because, after all is said and done, all these claims "relate to the assets of the debtor" in substantially the same way. AOV Indus.,
It is also evident that the classification of Montana and the Crown's claims in Class 6 is reasonable. Both direct claims brought by injured plaintiffs and indirect claims brought by Montana arise out of exposure to Grace Asbestos in Libby, Montana. Similarly, both the direct claims of injured plaintiffs and indirect claims brought by the Crown arise out of exposure to Grace Asbestos from ZAI products sold in Canada. Nothing in the record indicates that Montana or the Crown's claims were placed in Class 6 for arbitrary or fraudulent purposes. As such, the Code—and common sense—indicate that the indirect claims of Montana and the Crown are "substantially similar to the other claims or interests" in Class 6, and that therefore § 1122(a) has not been violated.
The § 524(g) channeling injunction in the instant litigation enjoins both the direct and indirect claims brought against Grace, and channels all such claims within Class 6 to the Grace trust. Montana and the Crown contend that their claims against Grace should not enjoined because their indemnity and contribution claims are based on a failure to warn theory that is different than all other claims in Class 6. Having already decided that Montana and the Crown's claims are not substantially different from other indirect claims within Class 6, the Court likewise declines to pull back the curtain of injunctive protection and expose Grace to liability for these claims.
Section 524(g) provides that an injunction may "enjoin entities from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or indirectly collecting . . . [on] any claim or demand that . . . is to be paid in whole or in part by [the] trust[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The primary purpose of § 524(g) is to "facilitat[e] the reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor" while simultaneously promoting "the equitable resolution of asbestos-related claims." In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir.2005). In order to achieve this purpose, reorganization plans under Chapter 11 must resolve both direct and indirect claims brought against a debtor. If both types of claims arise out of the same nucleus of conduct, this purpose can only be achieved if both are enjoined.
Grace's Joint Plan, established pursuant to the requirements of § 524(g), properly categorizes the claims of Montana and the Crown as Indirect PI Trust Claims. As such, they are properly enjoined and channeled to the trust. To hold otherwise would be a fallacy. If the channeling injunction only plugged the hole in Grace's bankruptcy estate left open as a result of direct personal injury claims, then Grace would still sink from the flood of indirect claims that could permissibly be brought against it. This is not the result that was contemplated by Congress in its creation
Montana and the Crown further allege that their claims do not fall within the definitions of "claims" and "demands" under the Code, and that therefore they should not be subject to the § 524(g) channeling injunction.
Montana and the Crown allege that their requests for contribution and indemnity against Grace are not "claims" because they arose after Grace's 2001 bankruptcy petition, and that therefore they should not be channeled to the trust. In response, Grace contends that Montana and the Crown's claims fall precisely within the definition of a "claim" as recently interpreted by the Third Circuit, and that, as a result, Appellants' contribution and indemnity claims are properly channeled to Grace's trust to await payment.
The Court begins its analysis with the Bankruptcy Code's definition of a "claim":
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (emphasis added). In adopting this definition, Congress intended the term to have an expansive and all-encompassing definition so as to "permit[] the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court." H.R.REP. NO. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266, at 21; see also In re Jadczak, Bankr.No. 10-11804, 2011 WL 13612, at *5 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (acknowledging the statute's broad scope). Partially due to the expansive scope of the statutory section, federal courts over the years have differed as to when exactly a claim arises under § 101(5)(A).
The Third Circuit put an end to this debate in its recent precedential opinion of Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman's, Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir.2010) ("Grossman's"). In that case, a plaintiff purchased asbestos-containing products for her home from Grossman's, a home improvement and lumber retailer, in 1977. Id. at 117. More than twenty years later, Grossman's filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, at which time it had actual knowledge that it had engaged in the sale of asbestos-laden products. Id. Grossman's Chapter 11 reorganization plan was confirmed in December of 1997. Id. Subsequently, in 2006, the plaintiff developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos, and filed suit against Grossman's. Id. Applying prior caselaw, the bankruptcy court found, and the district court affirmed, that the plaintiff did not have a claim against Grossman's bankruptcy estate because her symptoms did not manifest until nearly ten years after Grossman's had filed its petition for bankruptcy. Id. at 118.
The Court finds that, despite Appellants' statements to the contrary, Grossman's is directly applicable to this case and that Montana and the Crown's indirect claims for contribution and indemnity constitute "claims" under its holding. It is undisputed that the Libby Claimants and the Canadian plaintiffs in the ZAI class action suits were exposed to Grace Asbestos long before Grace's filing of its bankruptcy petition in 2001. Grace owned and operated the mine in Libby, Montana between 1963 and 1990.
Finally, the Court is unconvinced by Montana and the Crown's arguments that their requests for indemnity and contribution are still too contingent to be deemed "claims" because their rights to assert those claims have not yet accrued. This makes no difference under the Bankruptcy Code because § 101(5)(A) expressly encompasses requests that may still be "contingent," "unmatured," and "unliquidated." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). In fact, the Third Circuit has previously found that "the contingent nature of the right to payment does not change the fact that the right to payment exists, even if it is remote, and thereby constitutes a `claim' for purposes of § 101(5)." Rodriguez, 629 F.3d at 142. Thus, Appellants' argument is without merit.
In the alternative, Montana and the Crown also allege that their requests for indemnity and/or contribution do not constitute "demands" under the Bankruptcy Code because their requests for payment have not yet become due, and that therefore their claims should be exempt from the § 524(g) channeling injunction.
Section 524(g) defines the term "demand" in the context of Chapter 11 reorganization plans related to asbestos liability as a "demand for payment" that is either "present or future" and that "arises out of the same or similar conduct or events that give rise to the claims addressed by the injunction." 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(5)(B). Thus, the straightforward reading of the statute would appear to be that a demand is a claim that is either already present or may arise at some point in the future. Montana and the Crown's requests for indemnity and/or contribution fit neatly within the parameters of this definition—they are claims against Grace seeking reimbursement for personal injury lawsuits related to Grace Asbestos that Appellants defended or will defend in the future. Thus, the Court finds that Appellants' indemnity and/or contribution requests also satisfy the definitional requirements of "demands" under the Bankruptcy Code.
For all the aforementioned reasons, the claims made by Montana and the Crown fall within the definitions of "claims" and "demands" under the Code. Therefore, these claims and demands are properly subjected to the § 524(g) injunction and are properly channeled to the trust to await payment.
Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). The debtor bears the burden of proof on this inquiry, and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a reorganization plan is feasible. Corestates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs. Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 45 (E.D.Pa.1996) (Padova, J.) (internal citations omitted); In re S. Canaan Cellular Invs., Inc., 427 B.R. 44, 61 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2010).
The purpose of the feasibility requirement is to prevent court confirmation of "visionary schemes." In re Solange D. Chadda, Bankr.No. 07-12665, 2007 WL 3407375, at *4 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Nov. 9, 2007) (internal citations omitted). In order to find a reorganization plan worthy of confirmation, the bankruptcy court must make a specific finding as to the plan's feasibility. S. Canaan Cellular, 427 B.R. at 61; see also Chadda, at *4. In making this finding, the bankruptcy court need not require a guarantee of success, but rather only must find that "the plan present[s] a workable scheme of organization and operation from which there may be reasonable expectation of success." Corestates Bank, 202 B.R. at 45 (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.02[11] (15th ed. 1991)). However, the debtor's own unsupported sincerity and belief that its plan is feasible is insufficient to satisfy the inquiry. S. Canaan Cellular, 427 B.R. at 61. Rather, "[t]he test is whether the things which are to be done after confirmation can be done as a practical matter under the facts." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The bankruptcy court can consider a wide array of factors in determining a plan's feasibility, including assessment of the debtor's capital structure, the earning power of the business, economic conditions, and the ability of the corporation's management. See In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 B.R. 653, 659 (Bankr. D.N.J.1980). Most importantly, the debtor must provide the bankruptcy court with an estimate of its future earning capacity. See In re Phila. & W. Ry. Co., 51 F.Supp. 129, 131 (E.D.Pa.1943).
In the instant case, the record clearly reflects that the Bankruptcy Court considered evidence concerning estimates of Grace's future earning capacity, capital structure, earning power, and current economic conditions. The Bankruptcy Court particularly credited the two-day expert testimony of Ms. Pamela Zilly, a vastly experienced investment banker and financial adviser that has previously been retained to work on other mass tort bankruptcy cases. The record also indicates that the Bankruptcy Court considered several financial reports and exhibits that were entered into evidence, as well as additional witness testimony. After careful consideration of all the evidence before it, the Bankruptcy Court found that "[i]n light of Grace's past performance, its ability to obtain exit financing, and its reasonable and conservative projections, we find that Reorganized Grace will be able to pay its debts as they come due." In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 142 (Bankr. D.Del.2011).
This Court finds ample evidence in the voluminous record before it to support the Bankruptcy Court's finding. Given her extensive prior experience and expertise in mass tort bankruptcies, Ms. Zilly was more than qualified to testify as to Grace's future earning capacity, capital structure, and earning power. Ms. Zilly testified that, in her expert opinion, Grace
Therefore, based on the extensive evidence before it, the Court believes that there is more than a "reasonable probability" that the Joint Plan would be successful. The evidence is credible, well supported, reasonable, and appropriately provides the Court with an accurate depiction of Grace's current and future financial status. Following confirmation, it is likely that "the things which are to be done . . . can be done as a practical matter under the facts." South Canaan Cellular, 427 B.R. at 61 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, the Court finds that Grace satisfied its burden of proving that the Joint Plan is feasible and that liquidation or further financial reorganization will not be likely.
Nevertheless, two Appellants, AMH and Montana, object on the grounds that the feasibility requirement is not satisfied under the present structure of the Plan. For the sake of clarity and finality, the Court considers each Appellant's arguments in turn.
AMH contends that Grace failed to meet its burden of proving the Joint Plan's feasibility because it did not present sufficient evidence to establish how its anticipated liabilities would be dealt with under the Plan's provisions. To support its argument, AMH points to a number of alleged deficiencies on Grace's part, including the fact that a formal loan commitment document was not introduced as evidence of Grace's ability to obtain exit financing, Grace's alleged failure to introduce sufficient evidence that the trust could pay its outstanding property damage liabilities in
The Court first considers AMH's allegation that Grace's introduction of evidence indicating that it could receive exit financing was deficient because it was based on "the confidence of its own investment advisor" and was not supported by any "concrete evidence" such as a formal loan commitment document. (AMH Br. 62.) Both parts of this argument lack merit. Ms. Zilly's testimony regarding Grace's ability to obtain exit financing is not unreliable merely because she was Grace's own financial advisor. In fact, her familiarity with Grace makes her even more qualified to accurately inform the Court about Grace's financial stability. Absent a lack of foundation to testify about the matter in question or a ground for impeachment, the Federal Rules of Evidence make clear that Ms. Zilly's testimony was proper.
Additionally, AMH's argument also fails because neither the Code nor federal caselaw require Grace to submit any specific documents proving the Plan's feasibility. All that is required is that the debtor satisfy its burden of proof by showing that "a reasonable assurance of commercial viability" is possible. Chadda, 2007 WL 3407375, at *4 (internal citation omitted). Grace more than satisfied this requirement through the presentation of its expert witnesses and demonstrative exhibits. Ms. Zilly specifically testified that Grace could have obtained formal commitment letters from lenders, but chose not to in order to maintain flexibility in its capital structure. Similar approaches have been taken by other courts that have confirmed reorganization plans based upon a reasonable probability that a debtor would be able to obtain financing. See In re Global Ocean Carriers, Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 46 (Bankr.D.Del.2000); In re 222 Liberty Assoc., 108 B.R. 971, 986 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1990); In re Reading Broad. Inc., 386 B.R. 562, 574 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2008). As such, the Court finds that AMH's first argument is without merit.
The Court next considers AMH's allegation that Grace allegedly failed to substantiate its belief that it could satisfy its outstanding
The Court, however, finds ample evidence in the record before it to find that Grace would be able to satisfy its outstanding property damage liabilities over this twenty-five year period. In reaching her conclusion on this point, Ms. Zilly testified that, after an extensive analysis of Grace's financial records and corporate structure, she estimated Grace's unresolved and future property damage claims to be approximately $37 million. In account of this estimate, Grace established a $37.3 million reserve for the purpose of satisfying both its current unresolved and future property damage claims. Moreover, Ms. Zilly approximated that Grace would be able to obtain up to $1.6 billion over the next twenty-five years to pay these outstanding claims. She arrived at this conclusion after extensive review of Grace's financial history, current profitability, and estimated future earning capacity. Her reliance on this information properly supported her expert opinion and was entirely appropriate because experts in this field "would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject." Fed.R.Evid. 703. Most importantly, her testimony indicates a reasonable probability that Grace would be able to meet its debt obligations. Section 1129(a)(11) of the Code requires nothing more.
Finally, AMH also argues that the Plan is not feasible, and thus cannot be confirmed, because it fails to take into account the possibility that AMH's putative class action claims may be allowed at some point in the future. This argument fails for several reasons. First, both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court have previously ruled that AMH's class action claim has little or no value. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. Civ. A. 08-118, 2008 WL 4234339, at *2 (D.Del. Sept. 4, 2008); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 389 B.R. 373, 380 (Bankr. D.Del.2008). These decisions suggest that it is unlikely that AMH's class claims will ever be allowed, and the foundational structure of AMH's argument is therefore significantly weakened.
Moreover, AMH premises its argument on In re Harbin, 486 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2007), which held that "a bankruptcy court cannot adequately determine a plan's feasibility for purposes of section 1129(a)(11) without evaluating whether a potential future judgment may affect the debtor's ability to implement its plan." Id. at 518 (internal citations omitted). However, Harbin is distinguishable from the instant litigation. In that case, a creditor sued a debtor on a breach of contract claim. Id. at 514. The jury returned a verdict in the creditor's favor, but the court set aside the jury verdict and ruled in the debtor's favor. Id. The creditor appealed. Id. While the appeal was pending, the debtor sought to confirm its Chapter 11 plan. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the plan could not be confirmed because the pending appeal "could significantly affect the plan's feasibility in the future." Id. at 518. Specifically, the potential claim at issue—reinstatement of a jury verdict—was certainly possible. This is not the case here. Given that both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court have previously found that AMH's class action claims lack value, there is no reasonably certain possibility that this claim "could significantly affect the plan's feasibility in the future." Id. As such,
In conclusion, the Court also notes that while AMH challenges the feasibility of the Joint Plan on numerous grounds before this Court, it failed to present any concrete evidence of its own on this point before the Bankruptcy Court. While Grace bears the burden of proving that its plan is feasible under § 1129(a)(11), an objecting party "bear[s] the burden of producing evidence to support their objection." In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 122 (Bankr.D.Del.2006) (citing In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods., N.V., 301 B.R. 651, 656 (Bankr.D.Del.2003)); see also In re Stratford Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 145 B.R. 689, 696 (Bankr.D.Kan.1992) (internal citations omitted). The record indicates that during the Confirmation Hearing proceedings, AMH offered no expert witness of its own to contradict the evidence entered by Grace regarding the Plan's feasibility, despite having ample opportunity to do so. AMH participated in all of the depositions of Grace witnesses, and therefore was provided with sufficient notice and information to form its own credible objection at the Hearing. The only testimony put forth by AMH related to this point was a report prepared by a former Grace analyst in 1995. However, the report was not formally admitted into evidence. Moreover, it was significantly outdated, and the Bankruptcy Court properly found that it did not therefore accurately depict the amount of Grace's current property damage claims, especially "when actual figures are available and when Grace has settled nearly all of its known PD Claims during the course of its bankruptcy." In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 144 n. 82 (Bankr.D.Del.2011); see also Corestates Bank, 202 B.R. at 46 (overruling an objection to the feasibility of a reorganization plan, even when objecting party put forth its own contrary witnesses testimony). As such, if AMH took issue with the feasibility of the Joint Plan, it should have presented credible contradictory evidence and
Montana
The Court first considers Montana's hypothetical $850 million
Additionally, this hypothetical claim remains mere conjecture at this point. Montana has provided no evidence indicating a "reasonable likelihood" that such a claim could actually be asserted against Grace's bankruptcy estate or when this would occur. South Canaan Cellular, 427 B.R. at 61. The mere "`possibility of failure is not fatal' to confirmation." Id. at 62 (quoting 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.02[11] (16th ed. 2009)). The Court refuses to grant such a speculative and unsupported request.
"`Equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code.'" In re Combustion Eng'g., Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 239 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990)). This emphasis on the equality of distribution among creditors is highlighted within the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) of the Code.
Section 524(g) explicitly requires that an asbestos trust value and pay all "present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner." 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(B)(2)(ii)(V). The Third Circuit has expressly recognized the importance of equality of treatment among creditors under Chapter 11, stating that "a plan of reorganization [must] provide similar treatment to similarly situated claims." Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 239; see also Grossman's, 607 F.3d at 126 n. 12 (citing relevant provisions of Section 524(g)).
Similarly, a Chapter 11 reorganization plan must also meet the requirements of § 1123(a)(4) of the Code. Section 1123(a)(4) requires a plan to "provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class." 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). Federal caselaw construing this provision of the Code has interpreted equal treatment to mean that: (1) all class members must be subject to the same process for claim satisfaction, In re Cent. Med. Ctr., 122 B.R. 568, 575 (Bankr. E.D.Mo.1990); (2) all class members' claims must be of "equal value" through the application of the same pro rata distribution or payment percentage procedures to all claims, In re Quigley Co., Inc., 377 B.R. 110, 116 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2007) ("[A]ll members of the class must receive equal value. In addition, each member of the class must pay the same consideration for its distribution."); In re Adelphia Commc'ns, Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 362, 363 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2007); and (3) all class members must give up the same degree of consideration for their distribution under the plan. Quigley, 377 B.R. at 116-17. However, perfect or precise equality is not required—only approximate equality. Id. at 116; In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 447 (Bankr.D.N.J.1990) ("This is not to be interpreted as requiring precise equality of treatment, but rather, some approximate measure since there is no statutory obligation . . . to quantify exactly what each class member is relinquishing[.]") (internal citation omitted).
The Third Circuit has instructed courts analyzing a reorganization plan's equality of distribution to "consider the bankruptcy scheme as an integrated whole in order to evaluate whether Plan confirmation is warranted." Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 241. In doing so, the structure of the reorganization plan must comply with the literal terms of the Code and should not "impermissibly discriminate" against certain claimants. Id. at 239. The
The Libby Claimants allege that the Joint Plan impermissibly discriminates against them in violation of §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) in three ways: (1) the proposed trust distribution procedures ("TDP") set the bar too high for many Libby Claimants to qualify for more severe Disease Levels, and therefore obtain greater recovery; (2) the Joint Plan pays the Libby Claimants less than their pre-bankruptcy settlements; and (3) the structure of the Joint Plan discriminates against those claims covered by Grace's non-products insurance.
Personal injury claims under the Joint Plan are categorized according to their nature (i.e., the specific type of pleural disease suffered) and level of severity. These categorizations establish the amount of payment a claimant may obtain under Expedited Review—an accelerated form of claims-processing designed to encourage settlement and conserve resources through the establishment of different levels of pleural disease. The Joint Plan currently has eight asbestos-related "Disease Levels." Each Disease Level is defined by specific medical and compensation criteria derived from medical research and applicable tort system considerations. If a claimant meets the criteria for a specific Disease Level, he can obtain an automatic settlement offer—referred to in the Plan as a "Scheduled Value"—representing a set value associated with that particular level, multiplied by a payment percentage. Those suffering from "severe disabling pleural disease" are assigned Category IV-B under the Plan. The Libby Claimants assert that Category IV-B's criteria is discriminatory because it includes "add-ons" (i.e., additional criteria to the standard diagnostic criteria) that make it very difficult for otherwise-eligible Libby residents to qualify for Category IV-B severe disabling pleural disease (and consequently greater compensation payments under the TDP). Thus, they allege that this disparate treatment violates §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) because it does not provide the same treatment for each claim or interest among the asbestos personal injury claimants within Class 6.
In support of their argument, the Libby Claimants provide the Court with a myriad of statistics from a mortality study conducted by the Center for Asbestos-Related Disease ("CARD") in Libby, Montana. The CARD study attempts to show that the current categorizations under the Joint Plan would exclude significant percentages of Libby residents because they would not meet the heightened criteria of the add-ons. However, the Bankruptcy Court already addressed this evidence at the Confirmation Hearing, and found that the study was not reliable and did not follow accepted methodology.
Additionally, the Court is not convinced that the Category IV-B criteria discriminates against the Libby Claimants because they have failed to establish that similar asbestos claims in Class 6 are not treated "in substantially the same manner" as required by § 524(g), or that the Joint Plan does not "provide the same treatment for each claim" as required by § 1123(a)(4). The different Disease Levels of the Joint Plan are designed to group similar claims together to ensure that claimants with similar profiles are treated uniformly. Here, individuals within Category IV-B are grouped together on the premise that they all suffer from "severe disabling pleural disease." This category is not exclusive to any geographic location, but rather includes all claims that qualify as severe disabling pleural disease. Appellants have not established that they will be treated differently under the plan (i.e., discriminated against) from claimants in other geographic areas. Instead, their argument is that the specific criteria defining Category IV-B is discriminatory because fewer Libby residents are able to meet these standards. This argument fails, however, because it does not show how the criteria would be applied in a discriminatory manner under the Plan. Merely because fewer Libby Claimants qualify for inclusion within this heightened Disease Level does not mean that the Libby Claimants themselves will be treated differently from other claimants within Class 6. The Libby Claimants will have the same opportunity as all other asbestos claimants to establish the nature and severity of their diseases, and the TDP affords all claimants the equal opportunity to increase their amount of recovery if they can prove that they were exposed to Grace Asbestos more than any other asbestos type.
Finally, the Libby Claimants' discrimination argument also fails because of the Individual Review safeguard put in place by the Joint Plan. Under the Individual Review process, a personal injury claimant may still be able to recover up to the Maximum Value of his claim, even if he otherwise failed to meet the criteria to qualify for a specific Disease Level under Expedited Review. Individual Review was established to safeguard claims that are viable, but that may have otherwise slipped between the cracks of the eight Expedited Review categories. The Individual Review process allows claimants that are displeased with their recovery or categorization under Expedited Review to present their claims and any supporting evidence to a panel of trustees representing the asbestos trust. The panel may award such claimants liquidated settlements if it finds they are entitled to greater recovery or a higher categorization than they were given in Expedited Review.
The Libby Claimants allege that the Individual Review process itself is discriminatory because a significant percentage of Libby residents would not qualify for Category IV-B under Expedited Review, and would therefore be "shunted" to the as-of-yet undeveloped process of Individual Review "by reason of discriminatory medical criteria." (Libby Br. 20.) Again, this argument fails on the same grounds—Appellants have failed to show how exactly they would be treated differently than other similarly situated claimants. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the Libby Claimants in particular would be afforded different treatment during the Individual Review process. In fact, Individual Review would actually allow the displeased Libby Claimants the possibility to recover even more than they otherwise could under the structure of the Joint Plan. Merely because the process of Individual Review has not yet been fully developed does not mean that the trustees will make their review decisions in a discriminatory fashion. Therefore, the Court finds that Individual Review would cure any discrepancies that could possibly occur under Expedited Review, and that all similarly-situated claimants would be treated in substantially the same manner under the Joint Plan.
In viewing the Joint Plan as an "integrated whole," the record shows that equality of distribution among creditors is satisfied here. The Court therefore affirms
The Libby Claimants also allege that the Joint Plan discriminates against them by paying them at a rate less than what Libby residents received in pre-bankruptcy settlements with Grace. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the average asbestos-related lawsuit against Grace in Libby settled for approximately $268,000. The Libby Claimants allege that under the current structure of the Joint Plan, they stand to receive substantially less compensation. Grace counters that the personal injury claim values utilized by the Joint Plan reflect Grace's pre-bankruptcy settlement history, adjusted to bring them current. Under the Plan's structure, each of the eight designated Disease Levels has a Scheduled Value assigned to it that reflects nationwide settlement values obtained in the tort system. Appellants argue, however, that in order for the TDP to actually yield a Scheduled Value equivalent to the pre-bankruptcy settlement amounts in Libby, they would need to qualify for inclusion within Disease Level Category IV-B. As mentioned above, many Libby Claimants do not qualify for Category IV-B based upon the nature and severity of their pleural diseases. Thus, the Libby Claimants allege that Grace's valuations under the Joint Plan were "designed" to discriminate against them by having assigned Scheduled Values "far less than the [actual] tort system value of their claims." (Libby Br. 22.)
Sections 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) only require that an asbestos trust value and pay "present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner," 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(B)(2)(ii)(V), and that a reorganization plan "provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class." 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). Although "procedures may vary somewhat between classes," all that is required by these provisions of the Code is that "the primary treatment is unquestionably the same for each claimant" within each class. In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 669 (Bank.E.D.Mich.1999). Thus, in order to constitute discrimination, a reorganization plan would have to single out specific claimants within a class for disparate treatment.
The TDP values for asbestos personal injury claims under Grace's Joint Plan were set using national averages that reflected claimants' exposure to Grace Asbestos in all states, not just Montana. This was done to ensure uniform treatment among claimants nationwide and to conserve trust resources. Thus, the Joint Plan purports to lump together claimants that share similar diagnoses and levels of pleural disease severity so that similarly situated individuals receive the same treatment. Nothing in the record indicates that the Libby Claimants would be singled out for disparate treatment from others within Class 6. In fact, all the claimants within Class 6—including those from Libby and elsewhere—will have an equal opportunity to present their claims for categorization purposes under the Joint Plan. Each of these claimants will be analyzed under the same categorization criteria. Dependent upon the nature and severity of their disease, each will be assigned to a specific Disease Level associated with a specific dollar amount. Once liquidated, every payment within Class 6 will then be multiplied by the same payment percentage. Nothing in this process indicates that the Libby Claimants are earmarked
As previously discussed, Grace's insurance provides it with both "products" and "non-products" coverage. Products coverage covers Grace's liability for injuries from manufactured asbestos-containing products, while non-products coverage applies to liabilities resulting from exposure to Grace Asbestos in particle form. The Libby Claimants hold non-product claims because their exposure to Grace Asbestos was primarily due to inhaling vermiculite from the Libby mine. Grace's products insurance includes aggregate limits on the total amount insurance companies are required to pay per claim. On the other hand, Grace's non-products coverage has no limit, but rather permits payment of an unlimited amounts of claims, provided that such claims do not exceed the per occurrence limit on the policy. According to Appellants, Grace's insurance covers 100% of its non-products claims, while only covering approximately 7% of its products claims as a result of the aggregate limitations. Appellants argue that, as non-products
In order for the Libby Claimants to receive any additional compensation under Grace's insurance policy, they would first need to prove that they possess a right to the non-products insurance proceeds. As explained in detail above, the general rule of the Third Circuit is that insurance policies which provide liability coverage become part of the debtor's estate upon filing for bankruptcy. See ACandS, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 260 (3d Cir.2006); First Fid. Bank v. McAteer, 985 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir.1993). Thus, rights to Grace's insurance policies became property of Grace's bankruptcy estate when it filed for bankruptcy in April of 2001. Since the Libby Claimants were not named insureds under the policies, the Third Circuit rule makes clear that they did not hold rights to the non-products insurance.
Due to the fact that the Libby Claimants hold no direct rights to the insurance proceeds, the only other way that they could receive any additional insurance proceeds would be to show that they hold a particular interest in the policy. "While federal law defines the limits of what is property of the estate, it is state law which determines a debtor's interest in particular property." In re Warrington, 424 B.R. 186, 189 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2010); accord., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979). Therefore, any insurance interests the Libby Claimants may hold must be analyzed under state law. Under Montana law, "the long-established rule" has been that "a direct action against an insurer does not lie until the liability of the insured has been established[.]" Ulrigg v. Jones, 274 Mont. 215, 224, 907 P.2d 937, 943 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
The Libby Claimants, however, have failed to show this Court how Grace is liable to them. Instead, they merely repeat their blanket statement that "[u]nder state law the Libby Claimants have the right to collect from Grace's insurers," (Libby Br. 28), without providing any direct evidence or legal citation as to why such liability is warranted. There has been no underlying judgment or settlement with Grace post-bankruptcy upon which liability may be premised. See Lough v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 242 Mont. 171, 173, 789 P.2d 576, 577 (1990) (indicating that liability may be established by an underlying settlement or judgment). Nor have the Libby Claimants asserted that Grace is liable to them based on a cause of action rooted in a Montana statute. See Ulrigg, 907 P.2d at 944 (providing that liability may be established if the Montana state legislature expressly creates a cause of action by statute). As a result, Appellants have not established Grace's liability under Montana state law, and thus do not have a right to any additional insurance proceeds.
In sum, the Libby Claimants have not established that the Joint Plan impermissibly discriminates against them. Rather, the Court is satisfied that the Joint Plan "provide[s] reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner." 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court's determination that the Joint Plan is not discriminatory toward the Libby Claimants is affirmed.
BNSF also argues that some of its claims are treated substantially differently than other claims within the same class. Thus, BNSF asserts that the Joint Plan cannot be confirmed because it contravenes § 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and its established procedure unfairly increases BNSF's administrative costs. Each argument is considered separately below.
The current structure of the Joint Plan accounts for both direct and indirect claims against Grace. For all intents and purposes, direct claimants under the TDP are those individuals that directly suffered injuries from exposure to Grace Asbestos. Indirect claims against Grace are those claims that are derivative of Grace's liability, such as common-law indemnity and contribution claims, brought by co-defendants of Grace in the tort system. BNSF is an indirect claimant of Grace because it seeks indemnification and contribution from Grace for personal injury lawsuits it previously defended or will defend related to the Grace Asbestos that it transported by railroad from the Libby mine site.
Grace's PI Trust has established procedures to handle the payment of both direct and indirect claims. The matrix put forth by the TDP authorizes all direct claimants within Class 6 to receive Scheduled Values (or, if they meet the necessary prerequisites, Maximum Values) that purport to
As previously mentioned, the Joint Plan takes into account that several direct claimants may have been exposed to more than just one type of asbestos or may be unable to adequately trace their exposure to one specific type. In such instances, the Joint Plan reduces the amount of recovery such claimants can obtain from Grace because they can potentially recover from multiple asbestos manufacturers. Similarly, the Joint Plan also accounts for claimants that may be able to prove that they were predominantly exposed to Grace Asbestos. In this scenario, the individual would be entitled to receive "Extraordinary Claims Value" treatment, meaning that his actual award could be up to eight times its Scheduled Value. However, if an Extraordinary Claims Value claimant can additionally obtain recovery from a non-debtor, then the overall award is reduced to the Scheduled Value amount (or, in qualifying circumstances, the Maximum Value) on the premise that claimants should not be able to recover "more than once" for their injuries. The amount of indemnification and contribution that the non-debtor could receive from Debtor Grace in such instances, however, would be limited to the amount the direct claimant could have received directly from Grace.
BNSF alleges that essentially all claims brought against it could be valued at the Extraordinary Claims Value level because
At the outset, the Court notes BNSF appears to be solely challenging the Joint Plan on the grounds of disparate treatment based on its alleged common law indemnity and contribution rights.
In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139, 2011 WL 832940, at *1-2, n. 5 (Bankr.D.Del. Mar. 4, 2011). The Bankruptcy Court was in the best position to analyze the evidence before it, and appears to have resolved this issue with its aforementioned Memorandum Opinion and Order. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity and to ensure comprehensive resolution of this issue, the Court will proceed to consider the merits of BNSF's disparate treatment claim.
As set forth above, in bankruptcy, equality of treatment among creditors in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan has two aspects: (1) all members of the class must receive equal value for their claims; and (2) each member of the class must pay the same consideration for distributions under the plan. Quigley, 377 B.R. 110, 116 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2007). Equal value has been interpreted by the federal courts to mean that all class members' claims must be subject to the same process for claim satisfaction through the application of the same pro rata distribution and payment percentage procedures. See In re Cent. Med. Ctr., 122 B.R. 568, 575 (Bankr. E.D.Mo.1990); In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 447 (Bankr.D.N.J.1990). The Court finds that this requirement has been satisfied in the instant case. Pursuant to the TDP, all indirect claimants must first successfully establish that they have "paid in full the liability and obligation of the PI Trust to the individual claimant to whom the PI Trust would otherwise have had a liability or obligation," and that this payment would "forever and fully release[] the PI trust from all liability to the Direct Claimant." (Plan Ex. 4, § 5.6, JA 000305-307.) Under the Plan's outlined procedure, all indirect claimants will then step into the shoes of the direct claimant when bringing their indemnity and/or contribution claims against the trust. All indirect claimants' indemnity and/or contribution claims will be distributed in the amount that the direct claimant would have received had it made the demand against the trust itself. No indirect claimant under Grace's Joint Plan will take a different route—all claimants will follow the same track to recovery.
Nevertheless, BNSF contends that equal value is not being accorded to its claims because most Class 6 claimants will receive the full non-bankruptcy value of their claims under the TDP, while BNSF is precluded from receiving the full value of its claims because the Joint Plan does not include the Extraordinary Claims Value when assigning a value to BNSF's claims.
Finally, BNSF also claims that it is not receiving equal value for its claims under the Joint Plan because it might, at some uncertain point in the future, suffer a judgment or enter into a settlement with a direct claimant by which it would be required to pay a direct claimant more than the amount it could recover from the trust. This argument, however, fails to take into account that all indirect claimants in Class 6 run this risk, and that therefore they are all being treated the same. For example, suppose a Libby plaintiff suffering from severe disabling pleural disease brings a claim against the State of Montana on a failure to warn theory, and receives a $100,000 jury verdict in his favor. When seeking indemnity and/or contribution from Grace, Montana would recover from Grace's trust the exact amount the Libby resident could have recovered himself directly from the trust. Since the plaintiff suffered from severe disabling pleural disease, his claim under Category IV-B would be valued at $50,000. Moreover, being from Libby, the plaintiff could likely qualify for the Extraordinary Claims Value, thereby multiplying his Scheduled Value eight times its set amount—netting a $400,000 award. Given that the plaintiff could recover from both Grace and Montana, however, the Plan would limit his recovery to $50,000. Thus, Montana would only be indemnified by Grace for $50,000, and would remain responsible for the remainder of the plaintiff's jury verdict amount entered against it.
In addition to ensuring that all class members receive equal value for their claims, "each member of the class must pay the same consideration for its distribution [under the plan]." Id.; see also In re AOV Indus. Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1151-52 (D.C.Cir.1986) ("It is disparate treatment when members of a common class are required to tender more valuable consideration—be it their claim against specific property of the debtor or some other cognizable chose in action—in exchange for the same percentage of recovery."); In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 447 (Bankr.D.N.J.1990) (citing AOV Indus.). In extremely limited circumstances, federal courts have found that when a creditor has given up some unique claim in order to participate in a Chapter 11 plan, it has paid more consideration for its distribution and therefore suffered disparate treatment. See AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1986) (finding that a creditor received unequal treatment under a plan because it held "a unique, guaranteed claim," while all other creditors within the class merely held derivative, non-guaranteed claims). BNSF attempts to portray itself as having such a unique claim based on the premise that it is the only creditor in Class 6 that would not be independently liable to the direct claimant, but would still be held derivatively liable for Grace's sole tortious conduct in which it played no part.
This argument does not make legal sense, however, because for an action to proceed against BNSF, BNSF would have to bear at least some independent liability. If liability were solely based on Grace's actions alone and BNSF was not at least minimally independently liable to the plaintiff, then BNSF would be dismissed from the lawsuit altogether, and would never need to seek indemnity and/or contribution from Grace in the first place.
Based on the above reasons, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the Joint Plan treats BNSF equally in comparison to other creditors within Class 6, and does not unfairly discriminate against it.
Under the current structure of the Joint Plan, an indirect claimant asserting a claim against the trust must prove that it has paid in full Grace's liability and obligation to a direct claimant for which the trust would otherwise have had to provide payment. Additionally, the indirect claimant must obtain the direct claimant's agreement to forever and fully release Grace from related liability. If an indirect claimant cannot meet these requirements, Section 5.6 of the TDP provides that the indirect claimant may:
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000306.) BNSF asserts that in the event that it may not be able to satisfy these requirements and must instead pursue Individualized Review, it will unfairly face increased administrative costs that would not be imposed on other indirect claimants, thereby violating § 1123(a)(4).
BNSF has not, however, demonstrated how it would be burdened by more administrative costs than any other indirect claimant within Class 6. Rather, it is apparent that all indirect claimants within Class 6 would be required to prove the validity of their claim subject to the requirements of Section 5.6, and, if unable to meet these requirements, would be able to pursue their claim under Individualized Review.
Moreover, the Court notes that there is nothing discriminatory or unfair about requiring a claimant against the trust to prove the validity of its claim, or to seek release of the debtor—the one paying the indirect claimant—from future liability. Given Grace's financially precarious situation as a bankrupt debtor with limited funds, it must seek to protect itself from future liability and to conserve as many resources as it possibly can in order to meet its current and future obligations. The Court gently reminds BNSF not to bite the hand that feeds it, particularly in light of the fact that BNSF has not made a contribution to the trust like other indirect claimants, and will still be entitled to full indemnity per its contractual agreements with Grace.
The Court declines to deem the Joint Plan unfairly discriminatory based on the mere possibility of increased administrative costs. Administrative costs are a hurdle faced by corporations, law firms, and courts across the nation on a daily basis, and the Court has not been provided with any information that BNSF would be unable to handle this administrative inconvenience. As such, BNSF's challenge to the Joint Plan on these grounds is denied.
Montana and the Crown allege, inter alia, that the Joint Plan discriminates against them on account of: (1) the legal theory upon which their liability in this lawsuit is based; (2) the timing associated with the receipt of their payments from the trust; and (3) an apparent lack of equality of payment among creditors. Each argument is considered separately below.
In order to have an indirect claim paid by the trust, the indirect claimant must first prove that it paid in full a liability or obligation to an individual or entity to whom Grace otherwise would have been liable.
As noted by the Third Circuit, Appellants' potential liability here is based on a legal duty independent from Grace's liability. See W.R. Grace & Co., 591 F.3d 164, 173 (3d Cir.2009) ("Montana's potential liability is based on an independent legal duty that Montana's Supreme Court has decided that the State, as sovereign, owes to its people, namely, a governmental duty to warn about hazards at Grace's site."). Thus, if the Court were to grant Montana and the Crown's request to amend the Plan, then Grace could be liable for the independent wrongdoing of third parties. Neither Montana nor the Crown point the Court to any legal authority that requires a debtor to reimburse third parties for wrongs for which the debtor is not responsible.
Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence indicating disparate treatment. Neither Appellant has convincingly shown how it would be disparately impacted by the Joint Plan's requirements for indirect claimants. Rather, it is evident that the same procedures are applied to and the same things are required of all indirect claimants within Class 6. The Court finds that both Montana and the Crown are required to give up equal degrees of consideration in order to benefit from the TDP and will be receiving equal value for their claims under the Plan. The TDP, therefore, does not impermissibly discriminate against either Montana or the Crown in violation of § 1123(a)(4).
Finally, if Appellants were to prevail on this request, the entire central purpose of § 524(g) would be destroyed. As detailed at length above, § 524(g) "helps achieve the purpose of Chapter 11 by facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity." In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir.2004). If the Court were to grant Montana and the Crown's request for an amendment, then Grace would never be able to successfully reorganize and resolve its asbestos liabilities. Moreover, due to the fact that Grace would have to make additional payments for these indirect claims, there would be less money available in the trust for future claimants. The Court will not grant an unfounded request that would have such a disadvantageous effect on the trust as a whole.
Montana and the Crown further allege that the Joint Plan discriminates against them on the basis of the timing of the payment of claims under the TDP. Under the terms of the Joint Plan, all finalized claims
Once again, however, Appellants fail to show how this process would treat them differently than the other creditors within Class 6. Instead, it is evident that all claimants in Class 6—both direct and indirect—will be subjected to this same "first-in, first-out" process. The TDP also provides various protective mechanisms, such as the Payment Percentage requirement, that ensure that all Class 6 claims receive similar treatment, regardless of where they fall in the payment queue.
Having found that treatment of Montana and the Crown under the Joint Plan does not run afoul of § 1123(a)(4), the Court likewise declines to adopt Appellants' suggestion that the TDP should wait until all underlying direct claims have been asserted and settled against indirect claimants before making payments from the trust. It would be entirely unreasonable, unfair, and unprecedented to require all claimants to await payment from the trust until all claims have been filed. Grace initially filed for bankruptcy in 2001. Its various creditors have been awaiting payment for their claims since at least that time. If the Plan was so amended, then litigation of this case could continue indefinitely. This is especially true when considering that many future personal injury claimants have not yet developed symptoms and therefore have not even begun the process of filing a claim against the trust. Moreover, litigation here may involve complex conflict of law issues related to interaction with Canada's international legal system that may take years to resolve. As noted by Judge Posner, then Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "[t]hese bankruptcy appeals have a tangled history, an unbelievable present, and no future." Matter of New Era, 135 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, Chief J.). There comes a time when finality of litigation is needed. Having already been pending for twelve years, the time for finality has arrived in this case. Allowing otherwise would have detrimental effects for both Grace and its creditors, most especially the significant number of claimants suffering from deadly pleural disease.
Finally, the Crown alleges that it is a victim of disparate treatment because, under the Joint Plan, American and Canadian ZAI property damage claims will not be treated equally since American claimants allegedly will receive greater payment for their claims. For present purposes, it is important to remember that property damage claims are afforded a different classification under the Joint Plan than the personal injury claims related to exposure to Grace Asbestos in Class 6. American Property Damage ("PD") ZAI claims are categorized in Class 7B, and Canadian ZAI PD claims are classified in Class 8.
The bankruptcy court in In re Dow Corning, 244 B.R. 634, 666 (Bankr. E.D.Mich.1999) faced a similar situation. In that case, several claimants affected or injured by purportedly defective breast implants sought recovery from a Chapter 11 debtor that was responsible for the manufacture and sale of the implants. Id. at 641-43. Under the debtor's reorganization plan, claimants were classified largely based on their country of citizenship. Id. at 641-42. Several foreign claimants asserted that they were unfairly discriminated against because the plan treated them differently from domestic claimants. Id. at 666. The court, however, declined to find disparate treatment on the premise that § 1123(a)(4) only pertains to the treatment of claims within the same class. Id. ("[T]hese objections misconstrue the import of § 1123(a)(4). . . . It does not require that claims legitimately classified in separate classes receive the same treatment.").
The holding of Dow Corning is directly applicable here. American ZAI PD claims are categorized in a completely different class than Canadian ZAI PD claims. As such, equal treatment of these claims is not required.
AMH claims that the Joint Plan does not treat it equally compared to other creditors in Class 7A. Under the Plan's terms, all creditors must resolve their claims against the PD Trust in federal bankruptcy court. By filing a proof of claim against the PD Trust, creditors agree to submit to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over their claims. AMH claims it is treated inequitably under the Plan because it is the only claimant in Class 7A that has been denied the right to pursue its claims in the forum of its choice—South Carolina state court.
As previously mentioned, in order to satisfy the equality of treatment requirements of § 1123(a)(4), all creditors in a given class must receive equal value for their claims and must pay the same degree of consideration for their distribution under the trust. In re Quigley Co., Inc., 377 B.R. 110, 116 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2007). The Court finds that both prongs of the equal treatment test are satisfied here. All Class 7A claimants will receive equal value for their claims because they will all be subject to the procedure outlined in the 2009 Case Management Order ("CMO") for Class 7A Asbestos PD Claims. The CMO is a three-step process: (1) all creditors must first file a Proof of Claim against the trust; (2) within forty-five days, the Claim will either be discharged by the Bankruptcy Court or allowed to proceed forward in litigation; and (3) if allowed, the Claim will proceed to litigation. (See CMO, Ex. 25, JA 000804.) Nowhere in the CMO is there any mention that AMH would be the only claimant subject to this process. Rather, the opening line of the CMO is particularly telling here—it states that the purpose of the CMO is to "provide[ ] procedures for the resolution of all Class 7A Asbestos PD Claims[.]" (See id.) (emphasis added) Thus, the process put forth by the CMO ensures that all Class 7A claimants will receive equal value for their claims.
The second prong of the equal treatment test requires equal consideration. AMH essentially argues that the Joint Plan requires
Moreover, even if AMH were somehow disadvantaged by the bankruptcy court forum, its argument would still fail because it does not consider the second clause of § 1123(a)(4)—that disparate treatment cannot occur when a claimant agrees to the less favorable treatment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) ("[A] plan shall . . . provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest[.]"). Here, AMH agreed to the federal bankruptcy court forum when it initially filed three Proofs of Claims against the PD Trust and chose to extensively litigate its class action claims before the Bankruptcy Court. This procedure in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases is entirely legally permissible. See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44, 111 S.Ct. 330, 112 L.Ed.2d 343 (1990) ("[B]y filing a claim against a bankruptcy estate the creditor triggers the process of allowance and disallowance of claims, thereby subjecting himself to the bankruptcy court's equitable power.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also In re Winstar Commc'ns, Inc., 554 F.3d 382, 406 (3d Cir.2009) (citing Langenkamp). As such, AMH's claim doubly fails on these grounds.
Finally, the Court also finds that § 524(g) is satisfied under these circumstances because the trust utilizes mechanisms that will value and pay present and future claims in substantially the same manner. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). As previously mentioned, all claims that have not already been settled will be subject to the requirements put forth in the 2009 CMO, which apply to both present and future property damage claims. As such, all property damage claims in Class 7A will be treated in substantially the same manner.
Thus, for all the aforementioned reasons, and after careful consideration of the Plan as an integrated whole, the Court finds no disparate treatment in regards to the claims of the Libby Claimants, BNSF, Montana, the Crown, or AMH.
In an effort to protect creditor interests in bankruptcy proceedings,
The Libby Claimants allege that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that the Joint Plan satisfied the test by: (1) failing to make a specific finding regarding the recovery amount the Libby Claimants would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding; (2) disregarding the evidence of the Libby Claimants' expected settlements and jury verdicts; and (3) failing to consider the Libby Claimants' right to recover from Grace's insurance policies in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case. The Court considers each argument individually below.
The Libby Claimants allege that the Joint Plan fails to meet the best interests of the creditors test because the Bankruptcy Court did not identify the specific amount of their expected recovery under Chapter 7. Specifically, they claim that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it did not identify an exact percentage dividend that general unsecured creditors would receive in Chapter 7 liquidation.
Under the best interest of the creditors test, the plan proponent bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its plan is within the creditors' best interests. In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd. II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir.1993). As mentioned above, in analyzing whether a plan is within the creditors' best interest, the court ascertains the liquidation value of creditors' claims by creating a hypothetical Chapter
At the Confirmation Hearing, Grace presented several witnesses that testified about the liquidation value of creditor claims under Chapter 7 in comparison to their recovery under the Chapter 11 Joint Plan. An expert witness in mass tort bankruptcy liquidation testified that Grace's creditors stand to recover substantially more under the Joint Plan than through liquidation.
The Libby Claimants allege that the Joint Plan also fails the best interest of the creditors test because they stand to recover more through jury trials and settlements in the tort system in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation than under the Chapter 11 reorganization plan. They argue that the Bankruptcy Court should have considered the estimated amount that the Libby Claimants would be awarded through the tort system, as well as the estimated dividend percentage that would be paid to general unsecured creditors in Chapter 7. The Libby Claimants thus ask this Court to remand to the Bankruptcy Court to hold a hearing on this issue. For the reasons that follow, the Court declines to do so.
First, the Libby Claimants' claims are untimely. "Where a party had ample opportunity to produce evidence at trial, and failed to do so, a court should not permit that party to relitigate the case by presenting evidence previously ignored by the party." Matter of Nelson Co., 959 F.2d 1260, 1267 (3d Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261-62 (3d Cir.2009) (stating that, absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal). The Libby Claimants had ample opportunity to produce evidence on this issue at the Confirmation Hearing, yet failed to do so. The only evidence presented at this time that addressed tort system values was the testimony of Grace's expert witness. Consideration of this issue is now untimely, and a remand to hold a hearing would be improper and a waste of judicial resources.
Moreover, even if this argument were timely, remand is still unwarranted because the Libby Claimants fail to take into account the practical implications of what Chapter 7 liquidation would entail in
Finally, the Libby Claimants contend that the best interest of the creditors test was violated because they stand to recover more through either settlements with a Chapter 7 trustee or jury verdicts against Grace outside the context of the asbestos trust. In making this argument, the Libby Claimants relied on previous pre-bankruptcy settlement amounts between Grace and Libby residents as a benchmark for their present estimated recovery in a jury trial or settlement. Their argument, however, suffers from a fundamental flaw—it compares settlement amounts obtained by non-creditors in the tort system years prior to Grace's bankruptcy petition to the claims of current creditors after Grace filed for bankruptcy. As its name implies, the best interests of the creditors test only applies to creditors. Thus, the Libby Claimants' reliance on pre-bankruptcy settlements with non-creditors is inapposite. Additionally, the Libby Claimants cannot prove that they would even be able to obtain settlements or jury verdicts equal in amount to those made pre-bankruptcy. These prior settlements and verdicts were
For the above reasons, the Court declines to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for the purpose of obtaining a hearing on this issue.
The Libby Claimants next contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to consider their alleged rights to recover compensation under Grace's insurance policies in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case. They allege that while they would be enjoined from pursuing insurance proceeds under Chapter 11, they could proceed directly against Grace's insurers under Chapter 7. Thus, they claim they would receive more recovery through Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings than under the Joint Plan, and that therefore Grace's proposed reorganization plan is not within the creditors' best interest. For the following reasons, the Court respectfully disagrees with the Libby Claimants' position.
As already established above, the Libby Claimants have no direct right to Grace's insurance proceeds and thus can only prevail on their argument if Grace's liability to them is established. However, the Libby Claimants have failed to establish such liability in their briefing submitted to the Court, and "appellate courts should generally not address legal issues that the parties have not developed through proper briefing." Sw. Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 122 (3d Cir.1997); see also Conchatta, Inc. v. Evanko, 83 Fed.Appx. 437, 441 (3d.Cir.2003); Coastal Outdoor Adver. Grp., LLC v. Twp. of Union, N.J., 676 F.Supp.2d. 337, 350 n. 16 (D.N.J.2009) ("It is not this Court's job to make arguments on behalf of the Plaintiff[.]"). There has been no underlying judgment or settlement with the present Libby Claimants that occurred post-bankruptcy upon which liability may be premised. Nor have they provided any legal authority to explain how liability is established under these circumstances. Finally, there is no citation to or explanation provided of any provisions in Grace's insurance policies that indicate how and when insurance coverage would be applicable. Instead, the Libby Claimants merely outline a process for pursuing Grace's insurance, without actually showing this Court why they have a claim to it in the first
The Libby Claimants spend the remainder of their argument attempting to show that they stand to recover more under Chapter 7 liquidation than under the Joint Plan. To properly address these assertions, a brief digression is needed to provide some background on the operation of Chapter 7 liquidation cases versus Chapter 11 reorganization plans in the context of the best interests of the creditors test. As already stated, the best interest of the creditors test requires a comparison of a creditor's Chapter 11 recovery amount to its hypothetical recovery under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 of the Code addresses the liquidation process of an insolvent debtor, in which the property of the bankruptcy estate is reduced to cash value in an attempt to satisfy the debtor's outstanding liabilities to its creditors. See Susan Power Johnston, Ivor Charles Wolk, & Anne-Louise Williams, Basic Business Bankruptcy: Jurisdiction, Venue, Chapter 1 & Chapter 3 of the Bankruptcy Code, 614 PLI/COMM. 43, 88 (1992). The purpose of Chapter 7 is to fairly distribute the debtor's assets among its creditors, and to give the debtor a fresh start through discharge in bankruptcy. Id. In comparison, Chapter 11 addresses debtor reorganization, a process that attempts to rehabilitate a business as a going concern rather than to liquidate it. Id. at 89. In Chapter 11 cases, the filing of a bankruptcy petition awards the debtor injunctive relief from current and future litigation so that the debtor has time to reorganize itself and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Id.
Injunctive relief under Chapter 7 would operate slightly differently in the instant case. After the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, an automatic
The Libby Claimants allege that they would be able to circumvent the injunction in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation because "[i]t is routine for claimants to obtain relief from the automatic stay to pursue the debtor's insurance coverage." (Libby Br. 36.)
In fact, it appears to be settled law that, in appropriate circumstances, § 362(a) gives courts the power to enjoin parties from proceeding against non-debtors. See Piccinin, 788 F.2d at 1001-07. Subsection (a)(3) of the statute directs a stay of any action against an entity from obtaining possession of or exercising control over the property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Insurance contracts and products liability policies are recognized to be within the statutory definition of "property" under § 362. See id. at 1001 (citing In re Davis, 730 F.2d at 184); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 229 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1984). It has been held that insurance policies related to the bankruptcy estate constitute "valuable property of a debtor, particularly if the debtor is confronted with substantial liability claims within the coverage of the policy in which case the policy may well be . . . the most important asset of the debtor's estate," and that therefore "[a]ny action in which the judgment may diminish this `important asset' is unquestionably subject to [the § 362(a)] stay[.]" Piccinin, 788 F.2d at 1001 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Finally, even if the Libby Claimants could somehow circumvent the § 362 injunction under Chapter 7, their argument still fails because they have not successfully shown the Court that the amount they would recover under Chapter 7 would indeed be higher than that under Chapter 11. Under the best interests of the creditors test, courts should only consider "the dividend the creditor would receive from the [C]hapter 7 trustee—and only that amount—for comparison with the dividend available under the [Chapter 11] plan." In re Dow Corning, Corp., 237 B.R. 380, 411 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1999) (citing 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03[7][b]). This means that in a liquidation proceeding, the Libby Claimants would be limited to the pro rata amount awarded to them by the Chapter 7 trustee.
For all the above reasons, the Court declines to find that the best interest of the creditors has been violated under the present circumstances. The Chapter 11 Joint Plan would clearly provide the Libby Claimants with the same, and likely even greater, amount of recovery than would be available in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation of Grace. Moreover, the certainty and guaranty of at least some amount of recovery under the Joint Plan is of tremendous value, both monetarily and procedurally, to the Libby Claimants. Therefore, the Libby Claimants' objections are overruled and the findings of the Bankruptcy Court on this point are affirmed.
The Bankruptcy Code requires a reorganization plan to specify which classes of claims and interests are "impaired" and "unimpaired." See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(2-3); In re Aleris Int'l, Inc., Bankr.No. 09-10478, 2010 WL 3492664, at *13-14 (Bankr.D.Del. May 13, 2010). Impairment of claims is governed by § 1124 of the Code, which provides that "a class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such class, the plan . . . leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest." 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1); see also In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 216 n. 24 (3d Cir.2004); In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 828 (D.C.Wis.1983) ("Whether a class is impaired is determined by applying the tests prescribed in § 1124, which are designed to identify the classes of claims that are impaired; that is, materially and adversely altered by the plan."). The Third Circuit addressed the issue of impairment in Chapter 11 reorganization plans in In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197 (3d Cir.2003). The creditor in PPI Enterprises argued that his unsecured claim was impaired by the debtor's reorganization plan because his potential recovery was limited by § 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 202. In its discussion, the court stated that:
Id. The court recognized that the Bankruptcy Code creates a presumption of impairment in favor of creditors, which can only be overcome if the reorganization plan leaves the creditor's nonbankruptcy rights completely unaltered. Id. at 203. The Third Circuit nonetheless found that the creditor's rights in PPI Enterprises were not impaired because § 1124(1) is only violated if the impairment results from the terms of the reorganization plan, and not from the application of provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 204. Thus, courts should not use the Bankruptcy Code as "the relevant barometer for [determining] impairment," but rather should look to the terms of the reorganization plan itself as a potential source of limitation upon the legal, equitable, or contractual rights of a creditor. Id.
In the instant case, both the Bank Lenders and AMH allege that their claims are impaired by the terms of the Joint Plan. The Court considers each Appellant's claims separately below.
The Bank Lenders hold unsecured claims against Grace. As described in detail above, under the Joint Plan, the Bank Lenders will receive 100% payment of their $500 million principal, as well as payment of post-petition interest set at a 6.09% rate that converted into a floating Prime Rate in 2006. The Bank Lenders'
Before the Court can properly determine whether or not the Bank Lenders are impaired by the Joint Plan, it must initially determine whether they are entitled to the post-petition default interest rate under the Credit Agreements in the first place.
The general prohibition against ipso facto clauses has its roots in two specific sections of the Bankruptcy Code: §§ 541(c) and 365(e)(1). Section 541(c) provides that, despite a contractual provision between the parties to the contrary, a debtor's interest becomes property of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition and the debtor does not lose the property due to its bankruptcy petition.
The Court next considers the Bank Lenders' assertion that Grace's alleged failure to comply with certain reporting requirements under the Credit Agreements constituted an event of default. Specifically, the Bank Lenders allege that Grace failed to furnish each bank with certificates and other financial information as required by Section 8.2(a)-(c) of the Agreements, did not promptly give notice to appropriate parties as required by Section 8.7, and did not remedy these breaches within thirty days as required under the contract. Section 10 the Credit Agreements defines the events that would give rise to a default. Nowhere in this Section is there any mention of a requirement to furnish the aforementioned information to the banks or else risk defaulting under the contract. Section 10 is also devoid of any cross-reference to Sections 8.2 and 8.7, nor is there any mention of a thirty-day time window to remedy a breach. While Sections 8.2 and 8.7 may refer to such reporting requirements, they cannot be considered events of default unless they are explicitly mentioned in Section 10. In fact, the Credit Agreements themselves require this interpretation, as an "event of default" is specifically defined under the Agreements as "any of the events specified in Section 10." (See 1999 Credit Agreement, Section 1 Definitions, at D.I. 19322.) The failure to adhere to these reporting requirements therefore does not constitute a grounds for default under the Credit Agreements.
The Court now turns to the question as to whether or not Grace's failure to pay the post-petition interest and its failure to repay the principal when the loans matured constituted events of default entitling the Bank Lenders to the default interest rate. The Bank Lenders contend that this constituted an event of default under the Credit Agreements, and that they therefore have a state law contractual right to the default rate. Grace responds that by virtue of its bankruptcy, it was precluded from paying the interest post-petition or from repaying the principal when it became due.
The record indicates that prior to its bankruptcy petition, Grace was current with its payment obligations to the Bank Lenders.
When Grace filed for bankruptcy in 2001, its debtor—creditor relationship with the Bank Lenders was significantly altered. At this point, the Bankruptcy Code intervened and became applicable law which had to be considered by both parties to the contract moving forward. Section 363 of the Code "requires, as an element of basic fairness and due process, notice, a hearing and court approval before actions impacting vital interests [of the bankruptcy estate] may be taken." In re NextWave Pers. Commc'ns, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 264 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2000).
Nonetheless, the Bank Lenders assert that Supreme Court precedent mandates that a debtor's "happenstance of bankruptcy" should not impair a creditor's state law rights. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (internal citation omitted). However, in Butner, the Supreme Court was careful to clarify the scope of its holding, narrowing its reach by stating that state law rights should not be impacted "[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result[.]" Id. In the context of bankruptcy, "Congress made a determination that an eligible debtor should have the opportunity to avail itself of a number of Code provisions which [may] adversely alter creditors' contractual and nonbankruptcy law rights." In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 228 B.R. 339, 344-45 (Bankr.D.Del.1998) (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 735-37 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984)). Courts have routinely recognized various sections of the Bankruptcy Code as countervailing federal interests that can lawfully alter state law contract rights. See PPI Enters., 228 B.R. at 345 (providing examples of several Bankruptcy Code provisions that lawfully alter debtor-creditor contracts); In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc., 794 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir.1986) (finding that federal bankruptcy law could override state contract law in the context of determining reasonableness of attorney's fees). Here, there are several such important federal interests: (1) the overarching bankruptcy principle rooted in § 362(a) that a debtor's bankruptcy filing should afford it a fresh start and grant it some temporary breathing room from its liabilities, based on state law or otherwise, until it can effectively reorganize; (2) the Bankruptcy Code's central objective of facilitating a debtor's reorganization, as evidenced by § 1123(a)(5)(G); and (3) the limits placed upon unsecured creditors in bankruptcy due to their unsecured status, found in § 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, even if by some chance there was an event of default under the Credit Agreements, the interests of federal bankruptcy
Under § 362(a) of the Code, a party filing for bankruptcy is automatically granted temporary relief from the assertion of any legal actions against it. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see also In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 327 (3d Cir.1990). There is no question that the impact of this federal bankruptcy law can factually and legally alter prior contractual agreements between parties. See NextWave, 244 B.R. at 266 (stating that § 362 "ensures that contractual and State or Federal law rights and remedies . . . will be precluded [or] held in abeyance" in order for the "ultimate objectives" of Chapter 11 reorganization to be realized). However, as evidenced by the legislative history of this statutory provision:
See H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1978 at pp. 6296-97. The statements in the statute's legislative history amplify the underlying public policy in federal bankruptcy law that a debtor's bankruptcy estate should be maximized for the benefit of both the debtor and all of its creditors. This policy is particularly important in reorganization cases, where the automatic stay is utilized to maintain the status quo and avoid piecemeal liquidation while the debtor formulates a reorganization plan. See NextWave, 244 B.R. at 266. If the Court were to give effect to the Bank Lenders' claim that Grace's failure to make the post-petition payments constituted an event of default, then it would encroach upon these fundamental principles rooted in § 362(a).
A second federal interest at play here is the Bankruptcy Code's central objective of facilitating a debtor's reorganization. The whole point of filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition is to loosen the financial noose that has been placed around the debtor's neck so that it can reassess its available assets and liabilities and proceed forward as a viable entity able to properly satisfy all of its creditors and outstanding obligations. Section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Code facilitates this central objective of reorganization, providing that a debtor's reorganization plan shall "provide adequate means for the plan's implementation, such as . . . curing or waiving any default." 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(G). Although not explicitly defined, curing a default has been interpreted to mean the reversal of an event triggering the alleged default so as to return to pre-default conditions during the reorganization period. See NextWave, 244 B.R. at 268 ("The `cure,' although not defined, is `reversal' of the event that triggered the default and a return to a pre-default status quo.") (internal citations omitted); In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26-27 (2d Cir.1982) (stating that "[c]uring a default commonly means taking care of the triggering event[.]"); In re Charter Commc'ns, 409 B.R. 649, 653 n. 3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2009) (same). Thus, even if a contractual default occurred here, it would have to be cured or waived in order for the Joint Plan to be properly implemented. This means that the triggering event of default—for example, Grace's failure to pay post-petition interest—would be reversed and a return to the pre-default status quo would be required. This statutory section therefore serves as another example of an important federal interest— the facilitation of a debtor's reorganization—that could mandate a different result here and lawfully alter any state law contractual rights that the Bank Lenders may have.
Finally, § 502(b)(2) prohibits the allowance of unmatured interest as part of an allowed unsecured claim. It is well-established that when a debtor files
Based on all the above, the Court finds that the Bank Lenders are not entitled to the default post-petition interest rate because: (1) no event of default giving way to the default rate has actually lawfully occurred here,
Under § 1124(1), the presumption of creditor impairment is only overcome if the debtor's reorganization plan does not adversely alter any of the creditor's legal, equitable, or contractual rights. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1); PPI Enters., 324 F.3d at 203; In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, 452 B.R. 156, 164 (D.N.J.2011). Having determined that the Bank Lenders
Additionally, the Third Circuit in PPI Enterprises specifically provided that once a debtor files its bankruptcy petition, a creditor is only entitled to its rights under the Bankruptcy Code. PPI Enters., 324 F.3d at 205. As such, any alleged impairment would have to "result[ ] from what the plan does, not what the [Bankruptcy Code] does." Id. at 204 (quoting In re Am. Solar King Corp., 90 B.R. 808, 819-20 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1988)) (emphasis in original). Applying this point of law to the instant case, any alleged impairment that the Bank Lenders may have experienced would have to be a consequence of the Joint Plan rather than application of various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Joint Plan itself, however, does not alter any of the Bank Lenders' alleged rights. Instead, if the Court were to find any impairment here at all (which it does not), such impairment would solely stem from operation of the Bankruptcy Code, most notably the § 502(b)(2) prohibition against payment of unmatured, post-petition interest. In fact, the Court notes that the Third Circuit in PPI Enterprises found no impairment to the creditor's claim based on the application of a different subsection of the same exact statutory provision, § 502(b). Id. at 204 ("[W]e hold that where § 502(b)(6) alters a creditor's nonbankruptcy claim, there is no . . . impairment under § 1124(1)."). It is unlikely that the Third Circuit meant to sift the statutory grains of sand here so finely—if it found no impairment on the basis of application of subsection (b)(6) to a creditor's claim, then it stands to reason that there likewise would be no impairment from the application of subsection (b)(2). Thus, the Court finds that where the Bankruptcy Code alters any alleged nonbankruptcy claims that the Bank Lenders may have, there is no alteration of legal, equitable, or contractual rights for the purposes of § 1124(1) impairment under PPI Enterprises. As such, the Bank Lenders' claims of impairment doubly fail for this reason.
A significant point of contention between the parties is Grace's solvency. The Bank Lenders contend that Grace is presumed to be solvent because equity will retain an interest under the Joint Plan since Grace's shareholders will still receive their shareholder interests. On this point, the Bankruptcy Court found that a presumption of post-petition default interest is payable to the Bank Lenders only if solvency has been established. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139, 2009 WL 1469831, at *5 (Bankr.D.Del. May 19, 2009). On appeal, the Bank Lenders now allege that the Bankruptcy Court violated Third Circuit precedent in PPI Enterprises "when it held that the Bank Lenders' unsecured claims, while not being paid the full amount of interest due on them, were nevertheless not impaired because Grace had not been established solvent as a matter of fact." (Bank Lender Br. 20.) As an initial matter, this Court has already determined that the Bank Lenders are not entitled to the default rate of interest under the Credit Agreements. It follows that they therefore are being paid the full amount of interest— 6.09% converted to floating Prime in 2006—owed on their general unsecured claims under the Joint Plan. This finding alone should end the inquiry. Nonetheless, due to the significant debate between
First, the Court will briefly comment on the issue of solvency. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately found that a determination of Grace's solvency could not be made as a matter of fact,
Moreover, the Bank Lenders claim that PPI Enterprises applies equally in solvent and insolvent debtor cases. But PPI Enterprises said nothing about insolvent debtors. Rather, the Third Circuit favorably cited to a footnote in a bankruptcy court decision which stated that "a solvent debtor must . . . pay post-petition and pre-confirmation interest on a claim to have a class considered `unimpaired.'" In re Rocha, 179 B.R. 305, 307 n. 1 (Bankr. M.D.Fla.1995). Therefore, PPI Enterprises at most stands for the proposition that a claim must receive some form of post-petition interest in a solvent debtor case to qualify as unimpaired. The Third Circuit did not provide that insolvent debtors must always pay post-petition interest, let alone at a contractual default rate, to their unsecured creditors. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court was correct to find that "[o]ur research has indicated, at best, a presumption of postpetition default interest payable to unsecured creditors only when solvency has been determined as a matter of fact[.]" In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139, 2009 WL 1469831, at *5 (Bankr. D.Del. May 19, 2009). Its holding is therefore in line with—and not contrary to—the Third Circuit's holding in PPI Enterprises. As stated above, solvency has not been conclusively established here as a matter of fact.
Even if the Court were to assume that Grace was solvent,
For all the above reasons, the Court therefore overrules the Bank Lenders' objections on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that: (1) no defaults exist under the Credit Agreements; (2) the Bank Lenders are not entitled to contractual default rate under the Credit Agreements; (3) the legal rate of interest is the federal judgment rate; (4) there was not enough evidence to find that Grace is solvent under these circumstances; and (5) the Joint Plan leaves the Bank Lenders' claims in Class 9 unimpaired under § 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court's findings on these grounds are therefore affirmed.
Under Grace's Joint Plan, claims in Class 7 either fall into the traditional property damage category in Class 7A, or the American ZAI property damage category in Class 7B. Claims in Class 7A are further delineated as "resolved" claims or "unresolved" claims. Resolved claims are those that have already been settled through a settlement agreement reached by the parties or an appropriate court order, while unresolved claims are those that still remain in dispute. Both types of claims are subject to slightly different distribution procedures for payment,
AMH contends that this categorization of its claims is incorrect. Rather, AMH believes that its claims in Class 7A should be categorized as impaired because Class 7A claimants are not entitled to recover interest on their claims, thereby affecting their legal rights. In order to be impaired by the Joint Plan on these grounds, AMH would first need to show that it was entitled to the interest in some way. The general rule in bankruptcy is that "unsecured creditors are not entitled to recover post-petition interest." In re Wash. Mut., Inc., Bankr.No. 08-12229, 461 B.R. 200, 2011 WL 4090757, at *29 (Bankr. D.Del. Sept. 13, 2011) (citing United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372-73, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988)). An unsecured creditor can only circumvent this rule if the debtor at issue is found to be solvent. Id.
In the instant case, however, the issue of solvency was never determined, despite the Bankruptcy Court's willingness to do so. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 107 (Bankr.D.Del.2011) (stating that no party chose to pursue litigation regarding debtor solvency). Thus, the Court applies the general rule here, and finds that, as an unsecured creditor, AMH has no direct right to the post-petition interest, and its claims are therefore not impaired.
Even if AMH could somehow show that it was entitled to the post-petition interest, its argument would still fail because its claims are not "materially and adversely" affected by the Joint Plan. In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 828 (Bankr. W.D.Wisc.1983). Rather, the Plan provides that all claims in Class 7A will be paid 100% of the allowed amount. Moreover, the Class 7A Deferred Payment Agreement actually provides for payment of interest for all property damage claims that have been allowed against the trust. (See Deferred Payment Agreement (Class 7A PD), Ex. 27, JA 000859.) Therefore, AMH's objection further fails on these grounds. As such, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's finding that AMH was properly categorized as a Class 7A unimpaired claimholder.
The distinction between impaired and unimpaired claims is important because only impaired classes have a right to vote to accept or reject a reorganization plan. See Polytherm, 33 B.R. at 828. Unimpaired claimholders, on the other hand, are "conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan, and [their] participation in or approval of the reorganization plan is not necessary for the plan to gain confirmation by the bankruptcy court." In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 290 (2d Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
AMH alleges that its placement in an unimpaired class negatively impacts its voting rights. This contention, however, is without merit. Sections 6.1 and 6.3 of the Joint Plan provide that all impaired classes are entitled to vote on acceptance or rejection of the Plan, while all unimpaired classes are conclusively presumed to have voted to accept the Plan. The Plan recognizes, however, that Class 7 is actually one class split into two subclasses, with Class 7A categorized as an unimpaired class and Class 7B categorized as an impaired class. Section 524(g) would be violated if the two subclasses were treated differently for voting purposes. Cognizant of this fact, the Plan Proponents crafted the Joint Plan so that the votes of all claimants in Class 7 would be solicited and tabulated as one, single class. Therefore, even though Class 7A is categorized as an impaired class, the terms of the Joint Plan provide that it is still entitled to vote on the Plan's acceptance or rejection. Having already determined above that AMH's claims are properly categorized in Class 7A, AMH would thus still be allowed to vote. As such, its voting rights have not been negatively impacted.
The Libby Claimants assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in confirming the Joint Plan because its present structure deprives them of their constitutional and statutory rights to a jury trial. As described above, the Joint Plan provides two forms of claims processing: Expedited Review and Individual Review. If a claimant is dissatisfied with the outcome of these two procedures, he can seek further review through mediation and non-binding arbitration. If the claimant is still dissatisfied after exhausting these options, he can then elect to have his claims liquidated in the tort system by jury trial. However, if a claimant elects to proceed to jury trial, his potential recovery under the Joint Plan is limited to the lesser of the amount of the jury verdict or the Maximum Value established by the TDP. The Libby Claimants allege that this "lesser-of" limitation on their recovery places an undue burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, as well as violating their statutory rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1411. The Court considers each argument separately below.
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in suits at common law.
The Libby Claimants do not object to the Joint Plan because its structure and procedure for the liquidation of personal injury claims does not allow them to pursue their constitutional right to a jury trial. In fact, they acknowledge that they ultimately can obtain a jury verdict if they are dissatisfied with their categorizations or amounts awarded under Expedited Review, Individual Review, arbitration, and mediation. The Libby Claimants instead argue that the "cap" imposed by the asbestos trust—the lesser of the jury verdict or the Maximum Value established by the TDP—serves as a constructive limitation upon their constitutional right to a jury trial because a jury might not be the ultimate determinant of their award amount. The Libby Claimants do not cite to any legal authority to support this argument.
The general view of the federal courts, however, is that the measuring of damages by a jury constitutes a matter of "practice" rather than of "right," and that there "is no violation of the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in the limitation of the amount of damages." Pierre, 152 F.Supp. at 488-89 (emphasis added.) The federal courts regularly uphold limitations on monetary relief in various analogous areas of federal litigation, primarily through the use of jury verdict caps
In the instant case, when Congress enacted § 524(g), it made a policy decision to allow debtor corporations in asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings to reorganize their corporate structure to be able to satisfy their current and future asbestos liabilities. See In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir.2004). In doing so, it acted with the dual intent of benefitting both the debtor corporations, by allowing them to proceed forward as economically-viable entities, and the claimants, by ensuring that all are entitled to receive some level of compensation. 140 CONG. REC. S. 4523 (Apr. 20, 1994). Congress then authorized the appointment of legal representatives to oversee the management of the trust and ensure that the goals of § 524(g) are achieved.
Vested with this legislative authority, the legal representatives in the Grace litigation established the current structure of the Joint Plan, which allows for the determination of claimant compensation by a jury. By the same token, however, the legal representatives also established the challenged de facto cap on an individual's compensation. They made this well-reasoned decision, no doubt, to ensure that there would be enough money available for all present and future claimants' recovery—a decision directly in accordance with the legislative goals of § 524(g). Thus, the current structure of the Joint Plan would not require a "reexamination" of a jury's verdict in contravention of the Seventh Amendment. Rather, it merely involves implementation of a legislative policy. It is accordingly constitutionally sound on Seventh Amendment grounds.
Furthermore, the Libby Claimants are not required to participate in the asbestos trust pursuant to the Joint Plan. The benefit of the Joint Plan is that participants avoid unpredictable piecemeal litigation, thereby ensuring the availability of more funds for claimant compensation. In return for receiving the benefit of ensured compensation, plan participants are restricted to the structure of the TDP. The election to participate in the Joint Plan is, however, entirely voluntary. Claimants are not restricted from instead opting to bring an individualized lawsuit against Grace. Although the lawsuit would be stayed for a period of time due to the § 524(g) injunction, this temporary delay would not result in a Seventh Amendment violation since the case would still ultimately be tried before a jury. Thus, there is nothing preventing the Libby Claimants from exercising their Seventh Amendment rights through an independent jury trial in the tort system outside the context of the asbestos trust. The Libby Claimants may not, however, reap the benefits of both the
Finally, the Libby Claimants' argument runs contra to § 524(g)'s explicit requirement to treat all "present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner." 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). One of Congress' primary intentions in creating § 524(g) was to ensure uniform treatment of all claimants. If the Libby Claimants were not subject to the de facto cap on jury verdicts and judgments under the TDP, they would actually receive preferential treatment under the Plan in comparison to other similarly situated claimants within Class 6. Moreover, § 524(g) was also designed to ensure that present claimants do not exhaust all of the debtor's assets before future claimants have even manifested injuries. H.R.REP. No. 103-835, at 41 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3349; 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (Apr. 20, 1994) (statements of Senator Brown and Graham); see also In re Grossman's, Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing legislative history of § 524). If the Libby Claimants were exempt from the cap on damages, not only would this result in non-uniform treatment among claimants, but it would also rapidly deplete available funds in the trust set aside for other current and future claimants. This treatment is exactly what § 524(g) was designed to prevent.
For all the above reasons, the Court finds that the Joint Plan does not violate the Libby Claimants' constitutional right to a trial by jury.
In conjunction with their constitutional claim, the Libby Claimants also assert that they have a statutory right to a jury trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). Section § 1411(a) states that causes of action arising under "[T]itle 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable non-bankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). As described in detail below, the Court finds that the Libby Claimants' statutory right to a jury trial has not been violated.
The Libby Claimants have three options available to them when deciding what course of action to follow regarding their recovery—none of which infringe upon their statutory rights to pursue a jury verdict. Under the first option, the Libby Claimants may elect to participate in the Joint Plan, and may choose to accept a set award established by the structure of the plan under Expedited Review, Individual Review, arbitration, or mediation. Although § 1411(a) provides that Title 11 actions should not affect the right to a jury trial in personal injury or wrongful death cases, this does not of course mean that such cases must be tried before a jury. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 215 B.R. 346, 360 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1997). For example, parties in a personal injury case may accept a settlement in lieu of going to trial, even though they have a right to pursue a jury verdict regarding their claims. Id. Similar to reaching a settlement, if a claimant under the Joint Plan in the instant litigation chooses this first option, he does so in lieu of a jury trial. Such a decision is entirely voluntary, and thus cannot be said to violate one's statutory right to a jury trial. Under the second
Finally, the Court provides some clarity on an issue raised by both parties—the apparent conflict between § 524(g) and § 1411(a). When briefing the Court on this issue, Grace argued that when two statutes such as § 524(g) and § 1411(a) conflict with one another, the statute that is later in time and more specific should control, which in the instant case is § 524(g). On the other hand, the Libby Claimants argued that § 1411(a) should control because it expressly provides for jury trial rights, whereas § 524(g) is silent on this point. At first glance, these two statutory provisions are seemingly in conflict. However, closer scrutiny reveals that the two provisions can be aligned with one another and, if possible, should be read in harmony. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) ("[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."); J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44, 122 S.Ct. 593, 151 L.Ed.2d 508 (2001) (same).
Section 1411(a) has been interpreted to be a statute that is "strictly procedural in nature" and that "come[s] into play only when a right to trial is established." Dow Corning, 215 B.R. at 360. G-I Holdings established that asbestos injury claims carry with them the guarantee of a jury trial for the purpose of claims liquidation in a bankruptcy proceeding. 323 B.R. 583, 607 (Bankr.D.N.J.2005). Thus, the Libby Claimants' right to a jury trial has been established and the requirements of § 1411(a) "come into play" at this point. Section 1411(a) provides that no part of Title 11 may affect an individual's right to a jury trial in personal injury and wrongful death claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). In the context of the instant litigation, this means that § 524(g) of Chapter 11 may not affect the jury trial right. At no point does § 524(g) explicitly mention the requirement of a jury trial. Rather, as described extensively above, § 524(g) provides authority for the creation of an asbestos personal injury trust to operate through various mechanisms to pay similar claims in substantially the same manner. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). Thus, so long as the "mechanisms" authorized by § 524(g) do not overrun the jury trial right guaranteed by § 1411(a), neither statutory provision has been violated. Therefore, both § 524(g) and § 1411(a) can be read in harmony with one another, and the requirements of both statutory provisions remain intact in the present case.
Based upon this Court's conclusions that the Libby Claimants' have not been deprived of either the constitutional or statutory rights to a jury trial, the Bankruptcy Court's holding on this point is affirmed.
Section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lists sixteen conditions that
Section 1129(b) sets forth the fair and equitable test, which requires that a reorganization plan be fair and equitable to each non-accepting class of impaired claims or interests under the plan. Section 1129(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) of the statute goes on to set forth the nonexclusive requirements for meeting the fair and equitable test. One of these requirements is that the reorganization does not violate the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule is "a judicial invention that predated the Bankruptcy Code. It arose from the concern that because a debtor proposed its own reorganization plan, the plan could be `too good a deal' for that debtor's owners." In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444, 119 S.Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed.2d 607 (1999)). In its simplest terms, the absolute priority rule requires that "creditors of a debtor in bankruptcy reorganization receive payment of their claims in their established order of priority, and that they receive payment in full before lesser interests—such as those of equity holders—may share in the assets of the reorganized entity."
It is a well-known legal rule in Chapter 11 reorganization litigation that "[u]nder § 1129(b), a finding that a plan is `fair and equitable' is required only in the context of a cramdown[.]" In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 678, 693 (Bankr. E.D.Mich.1999) (internal citation omitted). There is, however, no opportunity for a cramdown in this case. A cramdown would only be possible if the plan could not be confirmed because an entire class of impaired creditors had voted against confirmation of the plan. See In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 78 (Bankr.D.Del.2003); Corestates Bank, 202 B.R. at 47; In re Winters, 99 B.R. 658, 663 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1989). Nothing is being "crammed down the throats of the objecting creditors" here because all impaired classes entitled to vote—Class 6 (personal injury claimants), Class 7B (American ZAI claims), Class 8 (Canadian ZAI claims), and Class 10 (Equity Interests)—all voted overwhelmingly to accept the Joint Plan. Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 304. Specifically, Montana, the Crown, and BNSF all have indirect claims for indemnity and/or contribution arising from Grace's asbestos liability. It has already been established, infra, that these claims are properly classified within Class 6.
Given that § 1129(b) does not apply to this case, the absolute priority rule likewise does not come into play here. The requirements of the absolute priority rule are subsumed within the rest of the cramdown requirements set forth in § 1129(b). See Armstrong, 432 F.3d at 512 (describing the codification of the absolute priority rule as one of the requirements of 1129(b)); In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2000) (discussing the absolute priority rule as part of the many requirements set forth by § 1129(b)); Yasparro, 100 B.R. at 94 ("Section 1129(b)(2)(B) includes the absolute priority rule."). The absolute priority rule, therefore, only applies to confirmation of a plan that attempts to cram down an impaired class that voted against acceptance of the Plan. This is not an issue here.
Therefore, the Court finds that neither the fair and equitable test nor the absolute priority rule are violated under these circumstances. Accordingly, Appellants' objections on these points are overruled.
On June 5, 2010, Garlock filed its own petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As a result, it was granted an automatic stay against litigation until it could successfully reorganize pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Additionally, since its bankruptcy petition relates to outstanding asbestos liabilities, Garlock received injunctive relief pursuant to a § 524(g) channeling injunction similar to the one in the instant litigation. Having filed for bankruptcy, Garlock left the realm of tort litigation and entered the enclosed sphere of bankruptcy proceedings. As such, Garlock is presently immune from having asbestos personal injury claims filed against it. Given its current status, the Bankruptcy Court found that Garlock lacked standing to object to Grace's Joint Plan. Nevertheless, Garlock contends that it satisfies the requirements for standing in the instant litigation, and therefore is entitled to substantively challenge the Joint Plan.
Standing is a "threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). There are two types of standing in the context of bankruptcy litigation: (1) bankruptcy standing; and (2) appellate standing. In re Global Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir.2011) ("GIT"). Bankruptcy standing refers to a party's standing to object to confirmation of a plan before the bankruptcy court in the first instance, while appellate standing addresses the party's standing to challenge the substance of the bankruptcy court's decision on appeal. Id. Given that the Bankruptcy Court in the instant litigation found that Garlock lacked standing to challenge the Joint Plan in the first place, the Court need only address the implications of Garlock's bankruptcy standing in its discussion.
The Third Circuit recently clarified the scope of bankruptcy standing in GIT, providing that a party challenging a reorganization plan in bankruptcy court must meet both the constitutional requirements for standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the statutory standing requirements put forth by the Bankruptcy Code in 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Id. at 210. In so holding, the Third Circuit found that "Article III standing and standing under the Bankruptcy Code are effectively coextensive." Id. at 211 (internal citations omitted); see also In re Black, Davis, and Shue Agency, Inc., 460 B.R. 407, 414 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2011) (citing GIT); In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526, 535 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2011) ("The logical import of the Court of Appeals' statement is that a party that has constitutional standing is a party in interest under the Bankruptcy Code[.]").
In order to have constitutional standing under Article III of the Constitution, a party must first satisfy three requirements. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997); Ne. Fl. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fl., 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). Specifically, the party seeking constitutional standing must show that it has: (1) suffered an "injury in fact" that is "real and immediate" and not merely "conjectural or hypothetical," City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (citations omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995); and (3) that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the injury.
Similarly, § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the parties' standing to litigate their claims, and provides that "[a] party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). In GIT, the Third Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's definition of a "party in interest" to mean "anyone who has a legally protected interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding." GIT, 645 F.3d at 210 (adopting In re James Wilson Assoc., 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir.1992)). Since the Third Circuit's adoption of this definition, courts have found that "a party in interest in a bankruptcy case must have some legally protected interest that either has been adversely affected (thereby warranting judicial relief) or that is in actual danger of being adversely affected (if relief is not granted)." In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526, 535 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2011) (internal citations omitted).
In regards to the first element, Garlock alleges that, as a former, current, and potentially future co-defendant with Grace, it has suffered an injury in fact because its alleged rights to contribution and set-off would need to be asserted against the PI Trust rather than Grace itself, and that these claims would be less valuable under the terms of the Plan than they would be outside the context of bankruptcy. The objection is premised on the notion that Garlock would be entitled to seek contribution
The Court, however, disagrees. When Garlock filed its own bankruptcy petition in June of 2010, it removed itself from the tort system and was granted § 362 injunctive relief. Most recently, on November 28, 2011, Garlock filed its own Joint Plan of Reorganization. (See Debtor's Joint Plan of Reorganization, Bankr. No. 10-31607 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.), Doc. No. 1664 ("Garlock's Plan").) In the terms of its own Plan, Garlock, just like Grace, has adopted § 524(g) as the primary statutory vehicle for litigation relief and corporate
Moreover, if for some reason Garlock should return to the tort system and suffer a judgment for which it must pay a portion of Grace's liability, then this scenario would be accounted for under the present terms of Grace's Joint Plan. Any such claim by Garlock would fall within the definition of an Indirect PI Trust Claim
The second and third elements of constitutional standing require that the party's injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and that a favorable decision could likely redress the injury. See PA Prison Soc'y v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 228 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)). These two elements are "closely related," and therefore "often overlap." Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir.1990)). The Third Circuit has held that under these two elements, "[i]t is sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that a `substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.'" Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 143 (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000)). Garlock fails to satisfy the requirements of both of these elements as well. Not only is there no sufficient injury here caused by Grace upon which to premise standing, but "there is not even a scintilla of likelihood of injury [that such an] injury would or [even] could be relieved by [a] ruling . . . from this [C]ourt." In re Pittsburgh Corning, Corp., 453 B.R. 570, 581 n. 16 (relying on the language of GIT to show that Garlock "has not shown a specific, identifiable trifle of injury") (internal quotations omitted).
Based on the above, the Court finds that Garlock lacks bankruptcy standing to challenge the confirmation of Grace's Joint Plan. If a party has no standing to appear in a suit, then the court need not consider the merits of its claims. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). Therefore, the Court need not reach any other issues presented in Garlock's appellate briefing, and the Bankruptcy Court's finding on this point is affirmed.
At differing points in time prior to Grace's bankruptcy petition, insurance companies AXA Belgium, GEICO, and Republic
The Court notes that the recent decision of Federal-Mogul
The Bank Lenders raise various additional objections to confirmation of the Joint Plan. Most especially, they attempt to invoke two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, §§ 1129(a)(7) and 1129(b), as support for their claim for the post-petition interest set at the default rate under the parties' Credit Agreements. The Court already addressed both these statutory sections elsewhere in this Memorandum in regard to other Appellants' objections. As previously noted, § 1129(a)(7) governs the best interests of the creditors test, while § 1129(b) encompasses the fair and equitable test and the absolute priority rule. The Court need not dwell on either objection, however, since the Third Circuit has made clear that both statutory sections only require payment of post-petition interest to unsecured creditors when the debtor in question is both impaired and solvent. In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 205 n. 14 (3d Cir.2003) ("An impaired creditor in a solvent debtor case can demand post-petition interest under the `fair and equitable' test of § 1129(b)(2). `Unimpaired' creditors have no such rights."); see also Debentureholders Protective Comm. of Cont'l Inv. Corp. v. Cont'l Inv. Corp., 679 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1982). Given that the Court already found that the Bank Lenders are not impaired by the Joint Plan and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's finding regarding their failure to establish Grace's solvency, their objections based on §§ 1129(a)(7) and 1129(b) are without merit. Nevertheless, the Court will briefly discuss the Bank Lenders' objections based on these Code provisions only in so much as they correlate to other remaining issues presented on appeal.
As previously discussed, the best interests of the creditors test requires that every creditor in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan receive at least the liquidation value under Chapter 11 as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i-ii); see also In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 165-66 (D.Del.2006). In terms of the Bank Lenders' objections, if this case were to be liquidated under Chapter 7, then § 726(a)(5) of the Code would govern their post-petition interest claims. Section 725(a)(5) provides that a creditor shall receive interest on its claim "at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition."
The Bankruptcy Court here favored this approach as well. The Bank Lenders now contend that this was erroneous and that the state law approach should apply, which they claim would entitle them to the default interest rate under the Credit Agreements. This objection is overruled.
In any event, it does not matter which of the three approaches would properly apply here because none of the three approaches would award the Bank Lenders the contractual default rate of interest. As discussed at length above, the Bank Lenders are not entitled to the default interest rate since no event of default occurred here in the first place. At the time of Grace's bankruptcy petition in 2001, the federal judgment rate was 4.19%. It has been recognized that the federal judgment rate is the minimum that must be paid to unsecured creditors under a plan to satisfy the best interests of the creditors test. See In re Wash. Mut., Inc., Bankr.No. 08-12229, 2011 WL 57111, at *37 (Bankr. D.Del. Jan. 7, 2011) (citing In re Coram Healthcare, Corp., 315 B.R. 321, 346 (Bankr.D.Del.2004)). But under the Term Agreement, the Bank Lenders will actually receive a rate—6.09% converted to a floating adjusted rate tied to the Prime—that is higher than the federal judgment rate. The Bank Lenders have not shown any equitable considerations as to why they would be entitled to a higher interest rate. See Coram Healthcare, 315 B.R. at 347 (recognizing that equitable considerations may be relevant to legal rate of interest analysis). Thus, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Bankruptcy Court's decision to utilize the federal judgment rate as the appropriate measure here.
As stated above in reference to other Appellants' objections, the absolute priority rule requires a Chapter 11 reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with
The Bank Lenders contend that the absolute priority rule is violated under the present circumstances because Grace's shareholders will retain value under the Joint Plan. The Court finds no such violation for several reasons. First, the rule only applies to unsecured creditors that are impaired by the terms of the plan, and the Court already determined that the Bank Lenders are not impaired. Second, the Bank Lenders will be paid the full amount of their allowed claims. Allowed claims do not include claims for unmatured, post-petition interest. As such, the Bank Lenders' allowed claims only consist of the principal and interest that was due as of the Petition Date. The Joint Plan will pay the Bank Lenders this amount in full prior to the shareholders receiving value under the Plan. The absolute priority rule is therefore not called into question under these circumstances.
Section 1129(b) provides that a reorganization plan cannot be confirmed
The Bank Lenders contend that, regardless of whether they are impaired or not, the equities of this case lead to the conclusion that the Joint Plan is not fair and equitable to them. Upon a consideration of the equities of this particular case, the Court still finds that the rate of interest that the Bank Lenders will receive under the Joint Plan is fair and equitable. The Bank Lenders have not established Grace's solvency, nor have they shown the Court why they are entitled to anything higher than the federal judgment rate of interest. Moreover, Grace claims that it repeatedly relied on the interest rate agreed upon in the Term Sheet when it adjusted its internal books and records, filed disclosures with the SEC, submitted monthly operating reports to the Bankruptcy Court, and as a baseline when it entered into settlements with other parties. The Bank Lenders did not make their demand for the higher interest rate known until after the Term Sheet was signed by all parties and finalized. Therefore, the Court finds that the fair and equitable test has been satisfied based on the facts and circumstances of this case. The Bank Lenders will receive the rate of interest specified in the Term Sheet—fairness and equity do not entitle them to anything more.
The Bank Lenders also assert that the fair and equitable test is violated because they are not bound by the terms of the 2005 and 2006 Letter Agreements. Specifically, they claim that these Agreements were entered into by the Committee, not the Bank Lenders, and that they therefore should not be bound by contracts to which they were not parties. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, finding that Mr. Maher was authorized to act on behalf of and bind all general unsecured creditors in his capacity as Committee Chairperson and Administrative Agent for the Bank Lenders. See W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139, 2009 WL 1469831, at *6 n. 3 (Bankr.D.Del.2009). This Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court. Testimony and evidence introduced at the Confirmation Hearing indicates that Mr. Maher made it clear that he was acting on behalf of all general unsecured creditors, including the Bank Lenders, when he entered into negotiations with Grace. The record also indicates that the 2005 Letter Agreement was modified for the sole benefit of the Bank Lenders to reflect increasing short-term interest rate trends in the market. A review of the record supports the notion that Mr. Maher only sought this modification to benefit the Bank Lenders because no other general unsecured creditors in Class 9 had their post-petition rates increased at this time. Indeed, the express language of the 2006 Letter Agreement makes this crystal clear: "[T]he Debtors agree to further amend the Joint
Section 11.8 of the Joint Plan provides that the Committee may continue to exist and have the authority to participate in any appeals of an order confirming the Joint Plan that was in progress prior to the Effective Date of the Plan.
The Court disagrees. At this point, all other general secured creditors are satisfied with their distribution from the Joint Plan and the Bank Lenders remain the only creditors in Class 9 that continue to pursue objections on appeal. The Committee astutely points out that in Kensington, the Third Circuit stated that "it is established that a Creditor's Committee owes a fiduciary duty to the unsecured creditors as a whole, not to the individual members" of the class. Kensington, 368 F.3d at 315. It cites to Kensington as support for its proposition that the Committee must continue to exist. What it has failed to realize, however, is that its citation to Kensington actually has the opposite effect here: if the Court permits the Committee to exist post-Effective Date, then the Committee may actually violate its fiduciary duty since at this point in time it would only continue to serve the interests of the Bank Lenders. Moreover, the record indicates that a majority of the Bank Lenders have retained their own very capable counsel to represent their legal interests, and nothing prevents the remaining Bank Lenders from likewise doing so. The Committee has provided no evidence that this independent representation by outside counsel has been ineffective in any way. To the contrary, it seems as though the Committee's work has been duplicative as a result of the Bank Lenders' well-qualified counsel.
While the Court credits the laudable work that the Committee has performed on behalf of all general unsecured creditors to date, it agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that there is no statutory basis for its continued existence after the Joint Plan becomes effective. The Committee's objection on this ground is therefore overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, the Settlement Agreement reached between Grace and the CNA Companies, as well as the Joint Plan, are affirmed. Having made this determination, the findings of the Bankruptcy Court and its judgment are also hereby affirmed, and the Joint Plan is confirmed in its entirety.
An appropriate Order follows.
It is
It is
It is
--------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy
Petition
Date
Company
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Babcock & Wilcox February 2000
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Pittsburgh Corning April 2000
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Owens Corning October 2000
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Armstrong World Industries December 2000
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G-I Holdings January 2001
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W.R. Grace April 2001
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U.S. Gypsum June 2001
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United States Mineral Products July 2001
--------------------------------------------------
28 U.S.C. § 1961. The rate of interest used in calculating the amount of post-judgment interest is the weekly average 1-year constant maturity (nominal) Treasury yield. This rate is published every Monday by the Federal Reserve System. See http://www.uscourts. gov/FormsAnd/Fees/PostJudgement InterestRates.aspx. In a bankruptcy case, the applicable rate is the federal judgment rate reflected on the day that the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. See In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 246-47 (Bankr.D.Del. 2011); In re Chiapetta, 159 B.R. 152, 161 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993). At the time of Grace's bankruptcy petition, the federal judgment rate was 4.19%.
Nonetheless, in filing their present objections, the Libby Claimants and BNSF conflate these distinct matters and argue, inter alia, that the Settlement Agreement cannot be approved because the Bankruptcy Court erred, for various reasons, in enjoining asbestos-related claims against CNA pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). The Libby Claimants' and BNSF's objections to entry of the injunction are related to confirmation of the Joint Plan and are irrelevant to the present discussion regarding the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not alter the scope or clarity of the injunction in the Joint Plan, but rather merely provides that upon approval of the Settlement, CNA will be designated as a "Settled Asbestos Insurance Company" entitled to § 524(g) injunctive relief under the terms of the Joint Plan. Thus, to the extent that the Appellants make arguments based upon entry, extension, or clarity of the channeling injunction, those arguments are properly considered separately, infra, in this Court's analysis of confirmation of the Joint Plan.
The Settlement Agreement, however, only calls for CNA to be designated as such a party under the Joint Plan. The corresponding channeling injunction was not issued as part of the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement, but rather as part of the Bankruptcy Court's subsequent confirmation of the Joint Plan. Any challenges related to the substance of this designation or extension of injunctive relief to CNA, therefore, are relevant to the terms and conditions of the Joint Plan and are properly categorized as objections to the Confirmation Order, not the Settlement Agreement Approval Order. These objections are addressed by the Court in its discussion related to the confirmation of the Plan, infra.
Joint Plan § 8.2.2. This Section of the Joint Plan specifically precludes BNSF from asserting claims under any of the insurance policies listed in Exhibit 5. This list includes the Grace—CNA insurance policies. Thus, consideration of this provision in the Joint Plan further implies that Grace had no intention of including BNSF as an additional insured under its policies with CNA.
(Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 26106, 01/22/11, Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, 1107, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 9014, and 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Approving the Settlement Agreement Between W.R. Grace & Co. and the CNA Companies ("Approval Order"), at 8-9, ¶ 5.)
MONT.CODE ANN. § 61-6-103(5)(a); (6).
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1-2)(I).
The Court finds this language particularly instructive here. In its briefing, BNSF does not specifically identify any claims for which it presently seeks contribution or any impleader actions against CNA, let alone show the Court how the Joint Plan would inevitably increase the number of claims filed against BNSF should CNA receive injunctive protection. The Plan Proponents respond that BNSF has no such claims against CNA. (See Plan Proponents Br. Regarding Objection to Settlement Agreement, at 38 n.92, "BNSF has no claims against CNA ..."). Therefore, as noted by the Third Circuit in PWS Holding, these amorphous claims are "simply too speculative to be a basis for ... standing here." Id. at 249.
Moreover, BNSF has not explained to the Court how it would even have a contribution claim against CNA. CNA and the Plan Proponents allege that BNSF would never be able to assert such claims based on how liability is apportioned according to Montana's multiple defendant liability statute. See MONT.CODE. ANN. § 27-1-703. Rather than engaging in a lengthy choice-of-law analysis and interpretation of state law, the Court notes that a "terse reference in a complex ... case is insufficient" to establish BNSF's standing here. See Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. F.C.C., 56 F.3d 151, 202 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that a party's reference to an argument in a footnote in its brief that was neither explained nor properly developed was insufficient grounds for standing); see also S.W. Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A]ppellate courts should generally not address legal issues that the parties have not developed through proper briefing."). Finally, to the extent that BNSF asserts claims against CNA for the proceeds of its own insurance agreements with CNA, Section 8.2.2 of the Joint Plan makes explicitly clear that BNSF will not be hindered from asserting such claims and should have no difficulty in recovering these proceeds to which it is properly entitled.
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
As to the Libby Claimants' other contention, the Court finds that there is nothing unfair or inequitable about the Bankruptcy Court's non-valuation of these claims that would run afoul of § 524(g)'s requirements. Section 524(g) provides that a channeling injunction must be fair and equitable to persons that might subsequently assert demands against the debtor or derivatively-liable third party in the future. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). The statute goes on to define "demands" in this context as requests "for payment, present or future . . . [that] pursuant to the plan [are] to be paid by the trust." 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(5)(C). Thus, in accordance with the express language of the statute, the consideration being paid by CNA must be fair and equitable to claimants asserting claims against the PI Trust in the future in light of the benefits CNA has provided to such trust. The Libby Claimants have shown no reason and cited no evidence indicating that they would be unable to do so in the future. Nothing in the statutory language requires the Bankruptcy Court to independently value these alleged independent tort claims that may at some point be asserted against CNA. As such, the Libby Claimants' assertions on these grounds are based upon a flawed interpretation of the statute, and are therefore meritless.
(Joint Plan § 1.1(34)(i)(a-b).)
Prior to its holding in this case, Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Frenville") provided the governing test in the Third Circuit for when a claim arose under the Bankruptcy Code. The Frenville test dictated that a claim arose when a right to payment accrued under state law. Id. at 337.
At the time that the Joint Plan was pending before the Bankruptcy Court, Frenville was still governing law. Therefore, Montana argued both before the Bankruptcy Court and now before this Court that Montana state law should apply to its claims. (See Montana Br. 21.) On July 2, 2010, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Grossman's, whereby it expressly overruled the Frenville Test. Grossman's, 607 F.3d at 121 ("We are persuaded that the widespread criticism of Frenville's accrual test is justified, as it imposes too narrow an interpretation of a `claim' under the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the Frenville accrual test should be and now is overruled."). Thus, the holding of Grossman's remains the only applicable governing law for this Court to consider, and it therefore need not engage in an analysis of Montana state law on this point.
Fed.R.Evid. 702. In conjunction with Rule 702, Rule 703 states, in relevant part:
Fed.R.Evid. 703 (emphasis added).
In 2002, Grace attempted to organize all the property damage claims brought against it, and sought a centralized way to provide notice to all potential claimants. The result was the Summary Bar Date Notice Program ("Bar Notice"), which was published in thousands of newspapers and periodicals, and was estimated to reach 83% of adults nationwide. Over the years, AMH has repeatedly challenged the sufficiency of the Bar Notice, alleging that the notice procedures used did not reach a sufficient number of potential claimants and thereby violated due process. AMH repeats that argument here. The adequacy of the Bar Notice, however, has long been settled. In 2007, the Bankruptcy Court found that it comports with due process. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. D.Del.2007). This finding was affirmed by both this Court and the Third Circuit. See Mission Towers v. W.R. Grace, No. Civ. A. 07-287, 2007 WL 4333817, at *1 (D.Del. Dec. 6, 2007); aff'd 316 Fed.Appx. 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2009).
AMH claims that the Third Circuit's recent decision in In re Grossman's, Inc., 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir.2010), discussed more extensively, supra, has now re-opened the issue of the adequacy of the Bar Notice. Contrary to AMH's assertion, however, the holding of this case did not significantly alter the sufficiency of the Bar Notice. Rather, the Third Circuit in Grossman's merely clarified the scope of when a "claim" arises in the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan. Id. at 215. The Bar Notice does not address when a claim arises in this litigation, but is limited to the issue of providing adequate notice to potential claimants. Whether or not any given property damage claimant is now deemed to be a pre-petition or post-petition claimant under the new Grossman's test has no effect on if the claimant was given adequate notice. As such, AMH's objection on these grounds likewise fails.
(See Conf. Hearing Trans.("Zilly testimony"), 10/13/09, at 157-58, JA 004476).
The Joint Plan also accounts for the Libby Claimants' situation through the application of an "Extraordinary Claim Value" multiplier under the TDP, discussed more fully, infra. If a personal injury claimant can establish that 75% or more of his asbestos exposure was traceable to Grace Asbestos, then he is entitled to an award of up to five times the set Scheduled Value. If a claimant can establish that 95% or more of his asbestos exposure can be traced to Grace Asbestos, then he is entitled to an award of up to eight times more than the Scheduled Value. These Plan provisions were designed specifically with the Libby Claimants' personal injury claims in mind.
The Libby Claimants assert that the Extraordinary Claims Value multiplier discriminates against them because a claimant would need to show that he has "little likelihood of substantial recovery elsewhere" in order to obtain its benefit, and that the "Plan Proponents have long been aware that Libby Claimants assert claims against wrong-doers in addition to Grace." (Libby Br. 25.) Once again, the Libby Claimants have put forth a straw man argument—the requirement of proving a small likelihood of recovery from other tortfeasors applies equally to all claimants within Class 6 that wish to take advantage of the Extraordinary Claims Value multiplier. Nothing in the record indicates that the Libby Claimants would be the only members of Class 6 "disadvantaged" by this mechanism. Thus, their argument cannot stand.
As discussed in detail above, McLane dealt with an insurance policy regarding an automobile accident. The issue in that case was whether an insurance company's actions constituted an implied waiver of its right to rescind its coverage. Id. at 99. The plaintiff's liability was not at issue. Since McLane became law in 1967, no other case in Montana has cited it as legal authority for the position that a victim's rights to insurance proceeds vest at the time of the accident. In fact, subsequent Montana caselaw has established that automobile accident insurance holds a unique place in the state's legal landscape. Specifically, Montana has a "public policy" of protecting injured victims of automobile accidents by granting them payment of damages which are not in dispute without first executing a settlement agreement and final release. See Ridley v. Guar. Nat. Ins. Co., 286 Mont. 325, 336, 951 P.2d 987, 993 (Mont. 1997); see also Dubray v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 307 Mont. 134, 137, 36 P.3d 897, 900 (2001). Given the unique position of automobile insurance proceeds under Montana state law, the Court declines to apply the holding of McLane to the non-automobile accident insurance case at hand.
• Assume that the Libby Claimant prevails in the litigation and obtains an award in the amount of $400,000 (the same amount that has been established as the approximate base line for Libby Claimants suffering from severe pleural disease that can prove that they were exposed 95% or more to Grace Asbestos).
• Assume that BNSF initially pays the Libby Claimant this amount. Due to the fact that BNSF and Grace were co-defendants in the litigation, payment of this award would extinguish any subsequent claims that the Libby Claimant could have against Grace.
• BNSF would then seek indemnity and contribution from Grace in an amount representing Grace's share of the liability.
• Under the Plan, indirect claimants seeking indemnity and contribution step into the shoes of the former direct claimant to pursue their claims, and can recover the same amount the direct claimant could have recovered from the trust. In continuing with the aforementioned example, this means that BNSF would receive the same amount for its indirect claim as that which the Libby Claimant would have recovered directly from Grace's trust.
• Assume that the Libby Claimant can prove that he suffers from severe pleural disease and that the Scheduled Value of his claim would be $50,000 under the TDP. Further assume that the claimant, being from Libby, could prove that he was predominantly exposed to Grace Asbestos by more than 95%. In such a situation, the Extraordinary Claim Value would have entitled this hypothetical Libby Claimant to eight times the Scheduled Value of his claim ($400,000) had he directly pursued his claim against Grace.
• However, because the claimant could obtain additional recovery from another party (BNSF), his recovery would be limited to the Scheduled Value of the claim ($50,000) to avoid allowing double recovery.
• Thus, Grace would only indemnify BNSF for $50,000 because this is the amount that the Libby Claimant could have recovered directly from the trust.
In its briefing submitted to this Court, BNSF recognizes that its objections based on contractual indemnity were resolved by the addition of Section 5.14. (See BNSF Br. 18 n.3 ("To the extent BNSF's indirect claims falls within its contractual indemnity, it will be entitled to an award equal to its actual non-bankruptcy value. BNSF asserts that most of its indirect claims constitute contractual indemnity claims.").) In that very same footnote, BNSF also asserts that "[n]either the Debtors nor the other Plan Proponents, however, have admitted that the [contractual] indemnity agreements exist . . . or are binding[.]" (Id.) Therefore, to the extent that any part of BNSF's present argument attempts to extend to its contractual indemnity rights, the Court finds that this issue was already addressed by the Bankruptcy Court's December 2010 Plan modification.
(BNSF Br. 14.) Thus, the full non-bankruptcy amount of a direct claimant's claim is not actually being paid by the TDP, but rather only a rough estimate of this amount. This point therefore further undercuts BNSF's argument.
Id. at 497.
The Court notes, however, that BNSF's contractual indemnity agreements with Grace over the years allegedly called for Grace to fully indemnify BNSF for any asbestos-related liability, including the cost of defense and attorneys' fees. To the extent that BNSF's present argument is based on these contractual indemnity agreements, this would constitute a contract interpretation dispute that is beyond the confines of the present suit, and the Court need not opine on it any further here.
Moreover, BNSF also argues to this Court that BNSF's classification under the Joint Plan violates the Absolute Priority Rule, which provides that dissenting creditors will be paid in full, and that no creditor with a claim or interest that is junior to the claims of the dissenting creditor will get or retain anything under the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). BNSF's specific objection under the absolute priority rule is that its common law indemnity and contribution claims should have been separately classified because the Joint Plan treats them differently than the other creditors in Class 6, and that therefore, as a dissenting creditor, no creditor with a claim junior to its own should have retained anything under the Plan. However, given the Court's finding that BNSF's claims are no different than any others in Class 6, BNSF's absolute priority rule argument unravels and lacks merit.
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000305-306.) See also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 117 n. 30 (Bankr.D.Del.2011).
In In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 183-84 (Bankr.D.N.J.2007), the court stated that "the timing of a filing of a claim can bear on whether claims are similarly situated. At the same time, it [is] also emphasized that timing may not be the sole consideration and that the legal character of the claim remains the foremost consideration." Id. (discussing language in Combustion Engineering). The Court finds this passage particularly instructive in the present litigation. Even if the timing of indirect claims here was somehow discriminatory (and the Court finds that it is not), the legal character of Montana and the Crown's claims as indirect claims and their corresponding effect on Grace's bankruptcy estate should still remain the "foremost consideration" in the Court's analysis. It has already been decided that Montana and the Crown's claims are similarly situated to other claims in Class 6 on account of their effect on Grace's bankruptcy estate, and are therefore not unfairly discriminated against in any way. Having already decided this "foremost consideration," the Court likewise finds that the Plan does not unfairly discriminate against Appellants in relation to the timing of payment of their claims.
The next step in the Libby Claimants' proposed procedure is that, upon an objection by the Chapter 7 trustee, the extent of their claims would need to be determined by jury trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). Once again, however, this statutory provision makes no mention of liability, but rather only provides that Chapter 11 may not affect the right to a jury trial in personal injury and wrongful death cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a).
The final step in the Libby Claimants' proposed procedure is the assertion that the Libby Claimants could bring an independent lawsuit against Grace in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case because they would not be enjoined from doing so under the § 362 injunction. However, whether or not the Libby Claimants could actually obtain relief from the automatic stay afforded by § 362 does not establish how Grace is liable to them, but would merely allow them to proceed forward with their claim. As such, the Court rejects the Libby Claimants' proposed liability procedure.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1-2).
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B).
First, as the Bankruptcy Court made clear, Chicago is a Seventh, not Third, Circuit case and is therefore not binding upon either the Bankruptcy Court or this Court. Even more so, however, Chicago is a twenty-six year-old case based on the now defunct Bankruptcy Act, not the presently governing Bankruptcy Code. See Chicago, 791 F.2d at 525-26 ("In 1977 the railroad petitioned for reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1952 ed.) (which has since been repealed but remains applicable to this proceeding[.]")). Today, the indenture trustee's declaration of default after the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition would violate the protection afforded by the § 362 automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Optel, Inc., 60 Fed.Appx. 390, 394-95 (3d Cir.2003); In re Metro Square, Bankr. No. 4-88-2117, 1988 WL 86679, at *2 (Bankr. D.Minn. Aug. 10, 1988) ("[U]nder 11 U.S.C. § 362, the creditor is prevented from taking overt steps to accelerate the debt, including sending notices of default.") (internal citations omitted); In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 287 B.R. 482, 488 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2002). In fact, § 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code would allow the de-acceleration of the debt at issue in Chicago. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). Thus, for the above cited reasons, this Court likewise declines to follow Chicago on this point of law.
Moreover, the legislative history of § 1124(2) provides that: "The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a temporary crisis which the plan of reorganization is intended to clear away. The holder of a claim or interest who under the plan is restored to his original position, when others receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain." S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1978), U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1978 at pp. 5906. The statements in the legislative history nicely illuminate the present situation. Under Grace's Joint Plan, the Bank Lenders will be "restored to their original position"— they will receive full payment of the principal, plus interest set at a rate higher than both the federal judgment rate and non-default rate under the Credit Agreements. The rate of interest that the Bank Lenders will receive is also higher than the rate awarded to all other unsecured creditors in Class 9 under the Plan. As such, the Bank Lenders are "fortunate indeed." Id.
11 U.S.C. § 502(a), (b)(2).
The issues of solvency and plan feasibility are different, but nonetheless often interrelated. In order to confirm a reorganization plan, § 1129(a)(11) of the Code requires that the debtor establish that its plan "present[s] a workable scheme of organization and operation from which there may be reasonable expectation of success." Corestates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 45 (E.D.Pa.1996). Bankruptcy courts can consider a wide array of factors in determining whether or not a plan is feasible, including whether the reorganized debtor will emerge from bankruptcy as a solvent entity. See In re Magnatrax Corp., Bankr.No. 03-11402, 2003 WL 22807541, at *7 (Bankr. D.Del. Nov. 17, 2003); In re Duval Manor Assoc., 191 B.R. 622, 632 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1996). Plan feasibility, however, only concerns a reorganized debtor's solvency after it undergoes reorganization and is set to emerge from bankruptcy. Whether or not the debtor is solvent prior to confirmation of the plan is irrelevant to the feasibility inquiry. Thus, it is possible that Grace could emerge from bankruptcy as a solvent entity after having undergone reorganization. Indeed, that is the goal here. A determination of Grace's solvency prior to this point, however, is unnecessary to render the Plan feasible. As such, the Bankruptcy Court's decisions regarding solvency and plan feasibility are reconcilable, and the Bank Lenders' objection on this point is without merit.
In contrast, the Joint Plan in the instant litigation allows a jury to consider all disputes on appeal, not just certain issues. The jury can make its own findings de novo, rather than being limited to determining whether a committee acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its decision. Most significantly, a claimant under the Joint Plan is not restricted from having a jury determine the amount of his recovery. Thus, based on these crucial differences between the two plans, the Court finds that G-I Holdings is distinguishable from the case at hand.
The federal courts have also regularly upheld caps on jury verdict amounts directly on Seventh Amendment grounds. This is particularly evident in the capping of jury verdicts in medical malpractice actions. See Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1159-65 (3d Cir. 1989) (providing an extensive historical and legal analysis of the Seventh Amendment regarding caps on jury verdicts and ultimately finding that the cap in question did not violate the Constitution); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429 n. 9, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (recognizing that the courts of appeals regularly find that district court application of statutory caps on medical malpractice jury verdicts does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir.2005) (finding that Michigan's cap on jury verdicts in medical malpractice actions does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that Virginia's statutory cap on damages in medical malpractice actions does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment); Estate of McCall v. United States, 663 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1299 n. 37 (N.D.Fla.2009) (noting that Seventh Amendment constitutional challenges to jury verdict caps in medical malpractice cases in Florida are rejected on a regular basis by the federal courts).
Aside from medical malpractice actions, the federal courts have also routinely recognized and upheld the constitutionality of jury verdict caps and fixed rules of compensation in a wide array of federal legislation, including, inter alia, limitations on: compensation for victims of natural disasters, wrongful death awards, personal injury awards, product liability awards, civil rights violations, and violations of international air transportation laws and regulations. See, e.g., Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a cap on Title VII compensatory damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1277-78 (D.Kan. 2003) (finding that capping award amounts in wrongful death cases does not "reexamine" a jury's verdict); EEOC v. CEC Enterm't, Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-698, 2000 WL 1339288, at *21-22 (W.D.Wis. Mar. 14, 2000) (upholding jury verdict cap in employment discrimination setting); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1330-35 (D.Md.1989) (finding that a cap on personal injury damages resulting from a defective automobile does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Pierre v. E. Air Lines, 152 F.Supp. 486, 489 (D.N.J.1957) ("This court opines that there is no conflict between the provision of limitation of liability in the Warsaw Convention and the VIIth Amendment to the Constitution.").
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i-ii).
The TAC is a committee of attorneys enlisted for the purpose of protecting the rights of present personal injury claimants. It has been a feature of Chapter 11 asbestos litigation since the Johns-Manville case. The TAC is a separate entity from the PI FCR—the individual appointed by the Bankruptcy Court for the purpose of representing the interests of future personal injury claimants. The TAC is also distinct from the U.S. Trustee(s) appointed to represent the trust. In fact, given that the Trustees are not usually attorneys with vast experience in asbestos litigation, the TAC was created with the intent to advise them and to further facilitate administration of the trust.
As the Bankruptcy Court properly found, Appellants' objection on these grounds is entirely speculative. The record and the parties' appellate briefs are devoid of any evidence that the TAC has or will at some point engage in any improper conduct. Moreover, the Joint Plan has specific procedures in place to protect the parties' interests and avoid conflicts of interest. For example, the TAC and PI FCR are only involved in matters related to the general administration and implementation of the trust. The Trustees, not the TAC or PI FCR, determine whether a particular claim satisfies payment criteria and how those claims should be paid. The Trustees, in turn, hold fiduciary duties to all Trust beneficiaries. Furthermore, the TAC and PI FCR have identical consent rights, and both are limited. Neither may withhold consent unreasonably, and both must explain in written detail their objections to any course of action within thirty days. If a dispute remains as to consent rights, the issue is submitted to ADR and, in special circumstances, can proceed straight to the Bankruptcy Court. Finally, all TAC decisions are subject to oversight by the court.
Based on all the above, the Court finds that not only are the procedures associated with the TAC fair and equitable, but are also devoid of a conflict of interest. There simply is no possibility for the TAC—one of many entities representing claimants' interests here—to wield considerable control and influence over governance of the trust. As such, Appellants' argument on these grounds is unfounded.
First, by filing for § 524(g) injunctive relief, the very terms of the statute require that a trust be implemented in conjunction with the channeling injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(I) ("[T]he injunction is to be implemented in connection with a trust[.]"). The two are not divisible from one another. Thus, when Garlock sought injunctive relief from its asbestos liability under the terms set forth in § 524(g), the statute clearly required that a trust be implemented at this point in time as well. Section 7.3 of Garlock's Plan directly addresses the creation and management of Garlock's own Asbestos Trust. (Garlock's Plan 20-22.) This Section provides that claims asserted against Garlock will be processed "in accordance with this Plan, the GST Asbestos Trust Agreement, the Claims Resolution Procedures, the CMO, and the Confirmation Order[.]" (Id. at 20.) Section 7.3 is noticeably devoid of any mention of a non-consensual trust that would actually litigate claims in the tort system. Rather, the terms governing Garlock's Trust appear to be vastly similar to the terms governing Grace's PI Trust.
Second, Garlock's Plan recognizes both current and future asbestos claims. These claims have been classified in Class 4 and Class 5, respectively. Section 2.2 of the plan provides that both Classes 4 and 5 will be assumed by the trust, and will be processed and paid in accordance with the procedures set forth in Garlock's Plan. (Id. at 7, 8.) There is no mention that either current or future claims will be unresolved by Garlock's Plan and instead passed through back into the tort system.
Finally, one of the primary purposes of creating the trust and channeling injunction under § 524(g) is to "relieve[ ] the debtor of the uncertainty of future asbestos liabilities." In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir.2005). There would be no point in Garlock receiving the protections afforded by § 524(g) merely so that it could resolve its current obligations without addressing its future asbestos liability. In fact, it is unlikely that Garlock could successfully reorganize if it failed to account for its future liabilities, and it is highly doubtful that any bankruptcy court would approve a reorganization plan that runs directly contra to this underlying principle. Garlock seems to have recognized this point because in its newly-minted Plan, all future asbestos claims are classified in Class 5. (Garlock's Plan 8.)
As such, Garlock's claims are meritless, and the foundation of its argument here is undermined by the terms set forth in its new reorganization plan.
(Joint Plan § 1.1(144).) The Joint Plan outlines the procedures for payment of these Indirect PI Trust Claims in Section 5.6 of the TDP, which provides in relevant part, that:
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000305-306.) See also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 446 B.R. 96, 117 n. 30 (Bankr.D.Del.2011).
(See Asbestos Insurance Transfer Agreement ("Transfer Agreement") § 1(a), Exhibit 6, JA 025985.)
(Joint Plan § 7.15(e).)
Additionally, as recently as January 24, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized the preemption of state law contractual rights in a bankruptcy setting in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., No. Civ. A. 10-56542, 2012 WL 178998, at *14 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012). In Thorpe, the Ninth Circuit found that the anti-assignment clauses in the appellants' contracts were expressly preempted by § 541(c) of the Code. Id. The Ninth Circuit went on to find, however, that even if express preemption were not involved in this case, the anti-assignment provisions would nonetheless be impliedly preempted by § 524(g). Id. at *15. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Id. Thus, Thorpe further supports the increasing trend of the federal court system in preempting state law rights that purport to limit a debtor's rights in bankruptcy.
Id. at 678-79. Thus, given the unknown nature of Grace's solvency at this point in time, Dow Corning is not directly applicable, and does not serve as a roadblock to plan confirmation under the circumstances at hand.
(Joint Plan § 11.8.)
(Joint Plan § 11.8.)
