RICHARD G. ANDREWS, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff L-3 Communications Corporation's Third Motion for Entry of Judgment (D.I. 278), Sony's Renewed Motion for Entry of Final Judgment (D.I. 281), and related briefing. (D.I. 279, 282, 286, 290). This action initially involved two patents, U.S. Patent 5,452,004 and U.S. Patent 5,541,654. (D.I. 1). Due to the Court's claim construction (D.I. 78), 3 conceded that it could not prove infringement of claims 1, 3, 4, 28, 29, 34, and 37 of the `654 patent and claims 16 and 18 of the `004 patent (the "Conceded Claims"). Per the Joint Pretrial Order, filed October 1, 2013, claims 15-17, 19-21, 50, 60, 63, 70, 73, and 80 of the `654 patent (the "Asserted Claims") were the only claims that were tried. (D.I. 211 at 2). The dispute here is what to do with the Conceded Claims.
L-3 argues that the parties stipulated to judgment of non-infringement on the Conceded Claims. Sony claims that while they may have agreed in theory to enter into a stipulation, no agreement was reached. Indeed, none of the documents to which L-3 cites evidence that any agreement between the parties was reached. (See D.I. 279-1).
L-3 requests that I enter judgment against them on the Conceded Claims, and I can see no reason not to grant that request. However, the language of their proposed judgment presents problems. L-3's proposed judgment states that Sony's products do not infringe because they lack a "means for draining stored charge from said charge storage means in response to an element resetting signal," a "means for randomly accessing said image elements," a "gain control element interposed between said photoresponsive element and said storage element," or a "charge drain," as the Court construed those limitations. (D.I. 262-1). Sony objects to this language because it does not believe that a change in construction of these limitations would create a genuine issue of fact to merit remand. (D.I. 282 at p. 9). Sony is concerned that if it consents to L-3's proposed judgment it will be precluded from raising this challenge on appeal. (D.I. 282 at p. 9).
While I have no opinion on the preclusion issue, I do not approve of L-3's language on the ground that it does not find support in the record. The documents to which L-3 cited in support of this language never mentioned any claim limitations. L-3 repeatedly made statements reserving its rights. (See D.I. 279-1).
(D.I. 211 at 2 n.3). This does not support the language of L-3's proposed judgment.
The Court recognizes that the language of a stipulated judgment is important in order for the Federal Circuit to review the Court's claim construction and avoid rendering an advisory opinion. See Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[W]e would risk rendering an advisory opinion as to claim construction issues that do not actually affect the infringement controversy between the parties."). A stipulated judgment must generally (1) identify the claim construction being challenged and explain how that claim construction affects infringement and (2) provide a sufficient factual record for the Federal Circuit to assess how the disputed claim construction rulings relate to the accused products. Jang, 532 F.3d at 1336-37. Sony does not dispute that its products do not have the limitations which L-3 mentioned in its proposed judgment. (D.I. 282 at p. 9). A stipulation must be agreed to by both parties. It is not Sony's fault that L-3 waited until after trial to propose the language of the stipulation. Whether L-3 has created a sufficient record for the Federal Circuit to review the claim construction is not an issue for the district court.
However, I do not ignore the Conceded Claims. L-3 asks that they be decided in Sony's favor. I see no reason not to grant this request. I therefore enter judgment as set forth in the accompanying order.