LEONARD P. STARK, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Reargument filed pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5. (D.I. 62) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., by Defendants. (D.I. 1) On October 15, 2013, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all federal law claims. (D.I. 47) On March 23, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion. (D.I. 58 ("the Opinion"); D.I. 59 ("the Order")) On April 4, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for reargument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5. (D.I. 62) On April 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response. (D.I. 64)
In the portions of the Opinion relevant here, the Court: (1) denied Defendants Abernathy, Rose, and Stoddart summary judgment on the § 1983 excessive force claims (D.I. 15 at 6-9); (2) denied Defendants Abernathy, Rose, and Stoddart summary judgment on the § 1983 medical needs claims (id. at 10-12); (3) held that Defendants Abernathy and Travis are immune from suit under title II of the ADA in their individual capacities (id. at 14); and (4) denied Defendants Abernathy and Travis, in their official capacities, summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claims. (Id. at 15)
A motion for reargument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5, which is timely filed and challenges the correctness of a previously entered order, is considered the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e). See Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, 2006 WL 155255, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 20, 2006). Motions for reargument should be granted sparingly and may not be used to rehash arguments which have already been briefed by the parties and considered and decided by the court. See Karr v. Castle, 768 F.Supp. 1087, 1090 (D. Del. 1991); Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del. 1990). Such motions are granted only if it appears that the court has patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside of the adversarial issues presented by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 293, 295 (D. Del. 1998); Brambles, 735 F.Supp. at 1240. A court may alter or amend the judgment ifthe movant demonstrates at least one of the following: (1) a change in the controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Even where one or more of these conditions is satisfied, the Court may deny the motion where it would not alter the outcome. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group LP, 2006 WL 890995, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2006).
Defendants seek relief on multiple grounds.
First, Defendants correctly identify an inconsistency between the Court's Opinion and its Order. (D.I. 62 at 2-3) In the Opinion, the Court held that Defendants Abernathy and Travis were immune from liability under the ADA in their
In all other respects, Defendants' motion is denied. Defendants argue that the Court erred in denying summary judgment on the ADA, excessive force, and medical needs claims. In particular, Defendants contend that the Court improperly placed the burden on Defendants to disprove one element of a claim, improperly weighed the evidence, and improperly relied upon Plaintiffs testimony. (Id. at 3-10) Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants on all of these issues. (See D.I. 64)
On the issue of burden, Defendants improperly seek by their motion to shift the burden on summary judgment to Plaintiff, contending that summary judgment should be granted on the ADA claims because Plaintiff did not in its summary judgment briefing prove an element that Defendants did not dispute in their opening summary judgment brief. As the Court made clear, Defendants admitted that they did not in their opening summary judgment brief contend that Plaintiff could not satisfy the "qualified individual with a disability" element of an ADA claim. (D.I. 58 at 14 n.6; see also D.I. 48 at 18-19; D.I. 52 at 8) It was, thus, no failing by Plaintiff to choose not to address this element in his answering summary judgment brief.
Defendants' remaining arguments — about the Court's purported improper weighing of evidence — are, at bottom, merely rehashes of arguments addressed previously. Essentially, Defendants ask the Court to disregard all of Plaintiff's testimony in support of his claims, as well as other evidence that conflicts with Defendants' view. Defendants' arguments go to credibility and the weight to be accorded to certain evidence, and do not provide a basis for summary judgment.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above,
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument Under Local Rule 7.1.5 (D.I. 62) is
2. Defendants' Motion for Reargument is
3. Having considered the parties' joint status report (D.I. 66), the Court hereby schedules a three-day jury trial to begin on