RICHARD G. ANDREWS, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is the issue of claim construction of multiple terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,941,822 ("the '822 patent"), 8,341,679 ("the '679 patent"), and 8,984,565 ("the '565 patent"). The Court has considered the Parties' Joint Claim Construction Brief. (Civ. Act. No. 15-842-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-843-RGA, D.I. 67; Civ. Act. No. 15-844-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-845-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-846-RGA, D.I. 70; Civ. Act. No. 15-847-RGA; D.I. 67; Civ. Act. No. 15-848-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-849-RGA, D.I. 67; Civ. Act. No. 15-850-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-851-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-852-RGA, D.I. 68; Civ. Act. No. 15-853-RGA, D.I. 69; Civ. Act. No. 15-854-RGA, D.I. 68).
Plaintiff filed these actions on September 21, 2015, alleging infringement of three patents. (D.I. 1). All three patents share a common specification. The patents claim devices and methods for distributing signals on a wideband signal distribution system. (See, e.g., '822 patent, claim 1; '679 patent, claim 1; '565 patent, claim 1).
"It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). "`T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.' Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources `in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.'" Soft View LLC v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 4758195, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324) (alteration in original). When construing patent claims, a court considers the literal language of the claim, the patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Of these sources, "the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.... [Which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Id. at 1312-13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to [an] ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words." Id. at 1314.
When a court relies solely upon the intrinsic evidence-the patent claims, the specification, and the prosecution history-the court's construction is a determination oflaw. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015). The court may also make factual findings based upon consideration of extrinsic evidence, which "consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Extrinsic evidence may assist the court in understanding the underlying technology, the meaning of terms to one skilled in the art, and how the invention works. Id. Extrinsic evidence, however, is less reliable and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its prosecution history. Id.
"A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa `per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows that "a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor's device is rarely the correct interpretation." Osram GMBH v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The '822 patent is directed to an intelligent device system and method for distribution of digital signals on a wideband signal distribution system. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
('822 patent, claim 1) (disputed terms italicized).
The '679 patent is also directed to an intelligent device system and method for distribution of digital signals on a wideband signal distribution system. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
('679 patent, claim 1) (disputed terms italicized).
The '565 patent is also directed to an intelligent device system and method for distribution of digital signals on a wideband signal distribution system. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
('565 patent, claim 1) (disputed terms italicized).
Defendants argue that because this term appears in the preamble of all independent claims, it is necessarily limiting and must be construed. Plaintiff counters that the term is simply the name given to the invention by the patentee and that the device is sufficiently described in the body of the claim. Defendants make three points in support of their argument that the preamble is limiting: first, the preamble recites essential structure; second, the use of the term in the preamble provides an antecedent basis for its use in a number of dependent claims; third, the applicant relied on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claim over prior art.
"Preamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim." Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006). "When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention." Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As to Defendants' first argument, none of the independent claims use the term "intelligent device" in the body of the claims. The preamble to each of those claims adds no limitations; it "merely gives a descriptive name to the set oflimitations in the body of the claim that completely set forth the invention." IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000). With respect to Defendants' third argument, the prosecution history does not support importing limitations beyond what is actually claimed. As Plaintiff notes, the claims in the patent as allowed are different from those in the applications and office actions cited by Defendants. (D.I. 68 at 59). In light of these differences, nothing in the prosecution history suggests that any of the limitations Defendants seek to impose were ever required in order to distinguish these allowed claims over prior art.
Defendants are correct, however, that the preambles of the independent claims are limiting in that they provide an antecedent basis for the use of the term "intelligent device" in the body of certain dependent claims. I do not agree, however, that this necessarily means the term requires construction. Each of the dependent claims at issue is quite specific as to the intelligent device to which it refers. For example, claim 8 of the '822 patent begins "The intelligent device of claim 1." In other words, the antecedent basis of the "intelligent device" claimed in the body of each dependent claims is the intelligent device of the specified independent claim, which is fully described in that independent claim. Therefore, I construe "intelligent device" in each dependent claim to mean the intelligent device as claimed in the referenced independent claim.
The parties agree that the "combiner" as claimed is a multiplexer. In briefing and at oral argument, the disagreement between the parties seemed limited to whether the combiner was required to perform a parallel to serial conversion, with Defendants arguing in favor of such limitation. (D.I. 68 at 28; D.I. 78 at 96:21-25). The primary point of disagreement, as I understood it at the time of oral argument, was that the limitation as originally proposed by Defendants did not appear to allow for the "pass-through" function of a multiplexer when only a single input is presented to it. (D.I. 78 at 94:21-24). It seems to me that Plaintiffs current proposed construction addresses this point of disagreement and is consistent with Defendants' statements at oral argument. (Id. at 97:3-5). Defendants' current proposal, on the other hand, does not provide any clarification as to the meaning of this term. Therefore, I will adopt Plaintiffs construction.
With respect to this term, Defendants have not actually proposed to construe anything beyond adding limitations that find no support in the patent. Their proposed construction uses two of the three words from the disputed phrase without providing any further clarification of their meaning. Furthermore, Defendants introduce another word, "carrier," that itself would need to be defined. It seems to me that "modulated RF signal" is a term that a person of ordinary skill would understand without further clarification. Furthermore, I see no support for limiting the modulation to a single carrier. To the contrary, the specification's description of one embodiment refers to the use of quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) which by definition requires multiple carriers.
Defendants seek to impose two limitations on the meaning of this claim term: first, that the system must be local in character; second, that the system involves distribution specifically "between a distribution unit and addressable device and outlets." The second limitation would require reading in a limitation from a preferred embodiment, which I decline to do. The specification states, "A wideband signal distribution system typically includes a distribution unit having a plurality of inputs and outputs, and a series of cables, such as twisted pair cable, running between a plurality of outlets and the inputs and outputs of the distribution unit." (Id. at 2:48-52). "Typically" does not mean "always," however, and I do not find support in the claims or specification to limit the meaning of this term.
Furthermore, the restriction to a local infrastructure is not supported by the patent. For example, the specification states, "An intelligent device system may also be, for example, an intelligent device system for local sending and receiving." ('822 patent at 3:22-23). The patent certainly contemplates that the intelligent device might be implemented in a local infrastructure, as described in this embodiment, but nothing in the patent suggests that the invention is so limited. In fact, the specification also states, "An intelligent device system may also be, for example, an intelligent device system for remote sending." (Id. at 3:3-4). I will not adopt a construction that imports a limitation from one embodiment and also reads out another embodiment. Finally, I note that the patentee chose to expressly define "wideband" in the specification to mean "a signal or signal sets having an analog or digital characteristic that can be distributed on a carrier of 5 MHz to in excess of 1 GHz, for example." ('822 patent at 7:6-9). Therefore, I will construe this term to mean "a system that distributes signals on a wide band of frequencies with wideband as defined in the specification."
The parties do not disagree on the meaning of the term "addressable device." The disagreement over construction of this term stems from Defendants' proposal that the intelligent device must communicate "directly" with the addressable device. This additional limitation only produces additional uncertainty, however. Even at oral argument, Defendants had trouble articulating what it means for the intelligent device to communicate directly with an addressable device. (D.I. 78 at 106:5-108:6). Furthermore, it seems clear that Defendants' reason for introducing this limitation is to head off infringement contentions that they see as exceeding the scope of the patent. (Id. at 108:7-9). It seems to me that Defendants are simply making a non-infringement argument rather than attempting to meaningfully construe a term that has a plain meaning to persons of ordinary skill in the art. I will not read limitations into a claim terms that are unsupported by the intrinsic evidence. Therefore, I will construe this term to have its plain meanmg.
The parties agree that that pre-assigned channels are not dynamically allocated. What the parties disagree on, however, is not clear to me. Defendants' proposed construction appears to do little more than mimic the words of the claim term and adds nothing to the meaning of this term. Therefore, I will construe this term to have its plain meaning with the understanding that pre-assigned channels are not dynamically allocated.
Within five days the parties shall submit a proposed order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion suitable for submission to the jury.