CHRISTOPHER J. BURKE, Magistrate Judge.
At Wilmington this
1. With regard to Defendants' request that the Court enter an order that: (1) compels IBM to search for and produce documents from 2004 pertaining to offers to sell a working embodiment of United States Patent No. 7,631,346 (the "'346 patent"); (2) grants leave to allow Defendants to take additional depositions of the IBM personnel involved with the Orange S.A. ("Orange") project; (3) grants leave for third party discovery, including of Orange; and (4) grants leave to supplement Defendants' expert report to add and support the defenses that this discovery elicits, (D.I. 272 at 2; see also D.I. 283 at 2 (requesting that the Court "compel IBM to respond to Defendants' discovery requests [regarding the conception, reduction to practice, and prior offers for sale of the invention of the '346 patent], including production of customer offers, agreements, and communications, and grant leave to take discovery from other sources if IBM claims that it no longer has same")), the Court GRANTS-IN-PART Defendants' request, as set out below.
2. As to the issue of prior offers for sale of the invention of the '346 patent, documents produced in the case demonstrate that certain versions of a product relating to the invention of the '346 patent were released to customers, including Orange, in 2004. (See, e.g., D.I. 272 at 2; D.I. 283 at 1; D.I. 284 at 2) However, though Defendant priceline.com LLC propounded an interrogatory requesting that IBM "[d]escribe in detail all discussions, disclosures, transactions, or other communications that occurred before the filing date of any Patent-in-Suit concerning any proposed or actual sale or offer to sell (regardless of whether for commercial or experimental purposes) . . . of any products, systems, or services whose use was or may have been covered by any claim of the Patents-in-Suit[,]" (D.I. 283, ex. 4 at 6),
3. As to the issue of conception and reduction to practice of the invention of the '346 patent, on May 31, 2016, IBM produced an interrogatory response in which it stated that "the inventions of the '346 Patent were conceived no later than April of 2004 and reduced to practice no later than April 1, 2005." (D.I. 284, ex. 40 at 88-89 (emphasis added)) IBM further explained in the response that, inter alia, the "inventors' conception is documented in at least design documents related to the Tivoli Federated Identity Manager (`TFIM') product[,]" that the inventors' efforts in reducing the inventions of the patent to practice led to the launch of the TFIM product, and that the team working on the development of TFIM "created PRPQ versions of the TFIM product to test its functionality, including one PRPQ version on or near July 2004 and a second PRPQ version on or near December 2004." (Id. at 89) The response then further cited to numerous documents, (id. at 89-91) "which explained that PRPQ releases were distributed to third-parties to solicit feedback[,]" including to Orange, (D.I. 284 at 2).
4. Defendants' primary complaint with respect to this issue is that on November 22, 2016 (almost one month after the October 25, 2016 fact discovery deadline in this case), IBM filed a Response in an ongoing inter partes review ("IPR") proceeding regarding the '346 patent, in which IBM further refined its position with respect to reduction to practice of the invention of the '346 patent. In that Response, IBM stated that certain claims of the '346 patent "were actually reduced to practice no later than July 2004" at which time "a pre-release version of TFIM . . . included the functionality of the challenged claims—including code for runtime account creation as claimed in the '346 patent." (D.I. 283, ex. 3 at 3 (emphasis added)) Defendants assert that this referenced source code was "first produced [by IBM] at the close of fact discovery" and "[t]his specific and new information never made it into IBM's interrogatory responses pertaining to when, how, and by whom the disclosed subject matter was allegedly conceived and reduced to practice." (Id. at 1 (emphasis in original)) This latest November 22, 2016 IPR disclosure did further crystallize IBM's position as to reduction to practice. But it is not clear how the disclosure justifies Defendants' requested relief with regard to this topic (such as Defendants' request for leave to allow Defendants to take additional depositions of IBM personnel involved with the Orange project and leave for third party discovery of Orange). This is because IBM's prior responses had similarly made clear that IBM had created (including in July 2004) pre-release versions of TFIM relating to the invention of the '346 patent, which IBM provided to Orange (among others). For this reason, Defendants' requests in this regard are DENIED.
5. Defendants make some additional broad requests with respect to the issues of conception, reduction to practice, and prior offers for sale of the invention of the '346 patent. These include Defendants' request for leave to take discovery from other sources if IBM claims that it no longer has documents relating to offers for sale, or their request that the trial be postponed if the additional discovery processes granted to them cannot be completed prior to the filing of dispositive motions. (D.I. 272 at 2; D.I. 283 at 2) These requests are either premature or not warranted at this time. Should Defendants feel there is a basis to renew these requests following their having obtained the above-permitted discovery, they may do so at that time.
6. With regard to Defendants' request with respect to United States Patent No. 5,961,601 (the "'601 patent"), for leave to assert four new invalidity theories that they did not reference in their preliminary election of prior art, (D.I. 272 at 2-3), the Court GRANTS-IN-PART that request. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this is a request to modify the Scheduling Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), (see D.I. 275 at 3), for which Defendants must make a showing of good cause.
7. Defendants focused their argument in their briefs almost exclusively on one of their new invalidity theories: their request to narrow a previously-asserted obviousness theory based on the prior art reference "HTML and CGI Unleashed" ("Unleashed") and another reference ("Danish"), to an anticipatory theory based on Unleashed alone. (D.I. 276 at 2) Defendants argue that good cause exists for this modification because IBM's Preliminary Infringement Contentions did not focus on certain limitations (the "identifying" limitation and the "recursively embedding" limitation) of the claims of the '601 patent, and that only as the case progressed were Defendants able to piece together IBM's infringement theory as to these claim limitations (based on IBM's discovery requests, IBM's claim construction positions, and IBM's discovery responses). (D.I. 283 at 2; Tr. at 39-41) This led to Defendants' decision to elevate Unleashed to an anticipatory reference, one that Defendants claim "mirror[s] IBM's apparent theory." (D.I. 283 at 2; see also Tr. at 39-41) In other words, Defendants suggest that if IBM's Preliminary Infringement Contentions had been clearer as to the infringement position IBM was taking with respect to these limitations, then Defendants would have been able to earlier assert an invalidity theory based on "Unleashed" alone.
8. The Court agrees that Defendants have established good cause to be permitted to press a theory of anticipation based solely on the Unleashed reference. In doing so, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs initial contentions were vague as to how the above-referenced limitations were met by the Accused Instrumentalities, (D.I. 283, ex. 10 at 8-11), and were only meaningfully fleshed out later during the Markman process, (see, e.g., D.I. 199 at 135-40), and thereafter. In tum, the Court can understand why Defendants, though diligent, would not have earlier been in a position to identify this particular prior art theory as potentially sufficient to render the relevant claims invalid. (D.I. 283 at 2)
9. Furthermore, although prejudice is not a factor explicitly considered in the "good cause" analysis, it is still worth noting that the Court's decision here should not prejudice IBM.
10. There is one aspect of Defendants' anticipatory theory with respect to Unleashed, however, that may be problematic. IBM asserts that "Defendants produced a source code that allegedly was related to the `Unleashed' reference on November 15, 2016, weeks after the close of discovery" and that "Defendants' expert is relying heavily on that untimely produced source code." (D.I. 271 at 3); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C). The parties dispute whether the content of this disclosure merely reflects "an electronic reproduction of what is printed on the cited pages" of the Unleashed reference, as Defendants contend, (D.I. 276 at 3; see also Tr. at 43-44), or whether "the source code Defendants produced contains more than the text in the previously produced text book[,]" as IBM argues, (IBM's Discovery Dispute Hearing Slides at 2; Tr. at 49, 55; see also D.I. 284 at 3). If what was produced amounts solely to the former, then Defendants may rely on it at trial; if what was produced (or some portion of it) amounts to the latter, then even Defendants are not suggesting that they should be permitted to later rely on it. The Court does not have enough information on this record to assess which party is right. Accordingly, by no later than
11. With regard to Defendants' request for a court order compelling IBM to produce a comprehensive privilege log, (D.I. 272 at 3-4), and with regard to IBM's request for a court order compelling Defendants to produce a privilege log of documents that were withheld or redacted on grounds of privilege relating to any analysis performed by or for Defendant priceline.com LLC concerning infringement, validity, or enforceability of the patents-in-suit, (D.I. 271 at 1-2), the Court declines to decide the matter at this time. Instead, in light of the parties' willingness to further discuss whether they could reach agreement on the exchange of privilege logs on targeted subject matters, (Tr. at 64-65, 70-71; D.I. 283 at 2-3), the Court ORDERS that by no later than
12. Because this Memorandum Order may contain confidential information, it has been released under seal, pending review by the parties to allow them to submit a single, jointly proposed, redacted version (if necessary) of the Order. Any such redacted version shall be submitted no later than
Defendants argue otherwise, first noting that Paragraph 17 of the Scheduling Order included a separate deadline for the parties to "finally supplement . . . the identification of . . . all invalidity references." (Id. at ¶ 17) Defendants assert that the inclusion of Paragraph 17 somehow muddies the waters as to what Paragraph 12's requirements really called for, and as to whether the four invalidity theories now at issue are truly "new" theories pursuant to the Scheduling Order's meaning. (D.I. 272 at 3; Tr. at 46-47) However, there can be no good argument that Paragraph 17 somehow was meant to blunt the clear meaning of and rationale behind Paragraph 12's language—language that set out a process for narrowing invalidity theories and thus "narrow[ing] the case so that the parties can focus on the most important [invalidity] issues for trial." (D.I. 271 at 2) At most (in light of the clear wording of and intent behind Paragraph 12), Paragraph 17 could be said to have allowed for Defendants to add a new invalidity theory after the preliminary election of prior art—based on a newly identified prior art reference—only in certain limited circumstances. That is, perhaps if Plaintiff had identified a new infringement argument late in the case, or if the District Court had unexpectedly issued a claim construction ruling not sought or anticipated by any of the parties, then such circumstances, pursuant to Paragraph 17, might have warranted Defendants' identification of a new relevant prior art reference after the submission of their preliminary election of prior art. But even if that were so, Paragraph 17 would not have application to this dispute, since here none of the four new invalidity theories at issue rely on "invalidity references" that were "identifi[ed]" for the first time after the submission of Defendants' preliminary election of prior art.
Defendants also argue, (D.I. 272 at 3; Tr. at 46-47), that the deadline in Paragraph 7(b) of the Scheduling Order for them to provide "final invalidity contentions[,]" (D.I. 65 at if 7(b)), supports their position here. The Court disagrees, as it is even easier to read Paragraph 7(b) in harmony with Paragraph 12. The idea behind Paragraph 7(b) was clearly that by the deadline referenced therein, Defendants would provide their final invalidity contentions—i.e., explaining how Defendants were asserting, pursuant to each of their particular, previously-identified invalidity theories, that the claims of the patents were invalid. (D.I. 275 at 3)