LEONARD P. STARK, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition") filed by Petitioner James G. Brown ("Petitioner"). (D.I. 1) The State filed an Answer in opposition. (D.I. 8) For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny the Petition.
Petitioner pled guilty to first degree unlawful sexual intercourse in March 1989. The Superior Court immediately sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 20 years. (D.I. 8 at 2) Since then, Petitioner has filed five unsuccessful motions for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion(s)"),
On November 26, 2014, Petitioner filed an application for authorization file a successive habeas petition with the Third Circuit. In an Order dated January 9, 2015, the Third Circuit found that Petitioner did not require leave to raise the claims in his third federal habeas petition, but it indicated that the claims might not be cognizable. See In re Brown, No. 14-4587, Order (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2015). The Third Circuit transferred Petitioner's Petition to the Court on January 9, 2015.
The Petition asserts four grounds for relief: (1) the Superior court should not have accepted the State's untimely response to Petitioner's motion for correction of an illegal sentence; (2) the Superior Court should not have denied Petitioner's motion for correction of an illegal sentence for reasons not contained in the State's untimely response; (3) the Board of Parole's failure to hold a parole hearing until approximately three years after Petitioner became eligible for parole breached the terms of Petitioner's plea agreement; and (4) the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's state habeas petitions.
A federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Claims based on errors of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review, and federal courts cannot re-examine state court determinations of state law issues. See Mullanry v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("State courts are the ultimate expositors of state law."); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that claims based on errors of state law are not cognizable on habeas review). Allegations of error in state collateral proceedings, even when couched in terms of "Due Process," are not cognizable on federal habeas review, because "the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state . . . proceeding that actually led to the petitioner's conviction." Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[Wjhat occurred in the petitioner's
Claims One, Two, and Four challenge the Superior Court's decisions in Petitioner's collateral proceedings, and do not challenge what happened in his original criminal proceeding. Therefore, the Court will deny these three Claims for failing to assert a proper basis for federal habeas relief.
In Claim Three, Petitioner asserts that the Board of Parole's failure to provide him with a parole hearing until "well beyond the 20 year term" allegedly promised in the agreement violated the terms of the plea agreement he made with the State. (D.I. at 20) The following background information is relevant to the disposition of this Claim.
Petitioner's form plea agreement, signed in March 1989, identifies his mandatory minimum penalty as being "20 years without parole." (D.I. 10 at 612; D.I. 11 at 1044) During the plea colloquy, when asked if anyone had promised him anything in return for his plea agreement, Petitioner responded, "It stated 20 years' imprisonment, possible parole at 20 years — 45 years, that's it." (D.I 10 at 816) The Superior Court clarified Petitioner's response as follows:
(D.I. 10 at 816) Petitioner replied affirmatively. Id.
In 1992, approximately four years after pleading guilty, Petitioner was convicted of escape after conviction, for which he was sentenced to 1 ½ years of imprisonment. (D.I. 8 at 7) As a result of his new conviction, Petitioner's parole eligibility date changed from June 7, 2008 to December 7, 2009. (D.I. 1 at 90)
On July 8, 2009, Petitioner filed his first parole application. (D.I. 1 at 91) It appears that the application was initially treated as a request for commutation. (D.I. 1 at 85) During a meeting with the Board of Parole on March 9, 2010, Petitioner clarified that he was requesting parole, not commutation. (D.I. 1 at 92) Thereafter, in a letter dated March 17, 2010, and without holding a hearing, the Board of Parole denied Petitioner's parole application, explaining that he had to complete a treatment program (Key or Greentree) before submitting another parole application. (D.I. 1 at 85, 92) After this first denial, Petitioner was not eligible to reapply for parole until one to three years after the denial, i.e., sometime between March 2011 and March 2013. See 11 Del. C. Ann. § 4347(a).
Petitioner filed a second application for parole on April 28, 2011. (D.I. 1 at 94) The Board of Parole held a hearing and denied the application on April 3, 2012, explaining that its decision was based upon the following factors: seriousness of the offense, inability to accept responsibility for the offense, and the Attorney General's opposition. (D.I. 1 at 96) The Board advised Petitioner that he would be eligible to reapply for parole consideration any time after the "expiration of thirty-six (36) months (4/2015)." Id.
In Claim Three, Petitioner acknowledges that he did not become eligible for parole on December 7, 2009 under the terms of the plea agreement and 11 Del. C. Ann§ 4205(a). However, he contends that "State Agencies and personnel within" delayed his parole hearing until April 3, 2012 — "nearly three (3) years beyond the terms of the guilty plea agreement." (D.I. 1 at 52) According to Petitioner, the "untimely" parole hearing breached the terms of his plea agreement. This argument is unavailing.
To begin, Petitioner unsuccessfully raised the same "breach of plea agreement" argument in his motion to vacate sentence. The Superior Court denied the motion after expressly holding that neither the plea agreement nor the plea transcript contained a guarantee about a parole hearing; the only guarantee was that Petitioner would not be eligible for parole during the first 20 years of his sentence. (D.I. 11 at 1045) The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision, opining that the
Brown, 2014 WL 1370277, at *1.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), if a state court has decided the merits of an argument raised on federal habeas review, habeas relief may only be granted if the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the state court's decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); see also Williams v. Taylor; 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). Petitioner's instant challenge falls within the purview of § 2254(d)(2) and, after reviewing the record, the Court concludes the Delaware state courts' decision was a reasonable determination of the facts. Nothing in the plea colloquy transcript or plea agreement reflects a promise about the timing of a parole hearing once Petitioner served the first 20 years of his sentence. Similarly, no guarantee was made about the terms and conditions the Board of Parole could place on Petitioner in order to succeed in his parole application process. Instead, the only assurance reflected by the agreement and the colloquy is that the first 20 years of Petitioner's sentence were mandatory, and that he would not be eligible for parole until he served those 20 years. In short, the Board of Parole's imposition of an additional prerequisite for Petitioner's parole application and resulting "untimely" hearing did not breach the terms of the plea agreement.
Additionally, the Court concludes that Claim Three is moot. "In the context of habeas challenges to parole refusals, a subsequent parole hearing generally moots claims where the proper relief is a new parole hearing." Thompson v. D'Ilio, 2016 WL 6305953, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2016). Since the failure to hold a parole hearing on a date closer to the date on which Petitioner became eligible for parole did not violate Petitioner's plea agreement, the only remedy for Claim Three would be for the Board of Parole to hold a parole hearing. See Goodman v. Kerestes, 2016 WL 7365208, at *2. The record clearly reveals, and Petitioner acknowledges, that a parole hearing was held on April 3, 2012. Thus, Claim Three is also moot, because Petitioner has already obtained the only available relief.
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Court has concluded that the Petition does not warrant relief. In the Court's view, reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
For the reasons discussed, Petitioner's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied in its entirety without a hearing. An appropriate Order will be entered.
