CHRISTOPHER J. BURKE, Magistrate Judge.
In these consolidated Hatch-Waxman actions filed by Plaintiffs Astellas Pharma Inc., Astellas Ireland Co., Ltd. ("AICL") and Astellas Pharma Global Development, Inc. ("APGD" and collectively with other Plaintiffs, "Astellas" or "Plaintiffs") against Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Lupin Ltd. and Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Zydus Pharmaceuticals (USA), Inc. and Cadila Healthcare Ltd., Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc. and Aurolife Pharma LLC (collectively, "Aurobindo"), Prinston Pharmaceutical Inc., Sandoz Inc., Sawai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Sawai USA, Inc. (collectively, "Sawai" and together with Aurobindo, "SA Defendants"), and Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp., Plaintiffs allege infringement by all Defendants ("Defendants") of, inter alia, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,342,117 (the "'117 patent") and 7,982,049 (the "'049 patent"). Presently before the Court is the matter of claim construction. The Court recommends that the District Court adopt the constructions as set forth below.
Astellas Pharma Inc. is the record owner and assignee of the '117 patent and the '049 patent, and AICL is the exclusive licensee of the patents. (D.I. 1 at ¶¶ 42-43) APGD has contracted with Astellas Pharma U.S., Inc., a subsidiary of Astellas Pharma Inc., to market and sell the drug mirabegron under the trade name Myrbetriq®. (Id. at ¶¶ 39, 44) Myrbetriq tablets are indicated for the treatment of overactive bladder with symptoms of urge urinary incontinence, urgency, and urinary frequency. (Id. at ¶ 41)
Defendants are in the business of developing, manufacturing and distributing generic versions of branded drug products throughout the United States. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 4)
The '117 patent and the '049 patent are both entitled "α-Form or β-Form Crystal of Acetanilide Derivative." (D.I. 1, exs. B, C (hereinafter, the "'117 patent" and the "'049 patent")) The '049 patent is a continuation of the U.S. patent application that led to the '117 patent, and the patents therefore share a specification. (See '049 patent; D.I. 77 at 2) Both patents claim priority to PTC Application No. PCT/JP02/11217, filed on October 29, 2002, and to Japanese Patent No. JP2001-332914, filed on October 30, 2001. ('117 patent; '049 patent; D.I. 77 at 2) The '117 patent issued on March 11, 2008, ('117 patent), and the '049 patent issued on July 19, 2011, ('049 patent). The '117 patent claims crystal forms of mirabegron, and the '049 patent claims pharmaceutical compositions comprising crystal forms of mirabegron and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier, as well as methods of treating diabetes utilizing the claimed pharmaceutical compositions. ('117 patent, col. 12:18-30; '049 patent, cols. 11:5-12:33; D.I. 1 at ¶¶ 27, 30)
Solids can exist in crystalline form, meaning the atoms (or molecules) are arranged in a repeating and ordered pattern that extends in three dimensions to form the crystal. (D.I. 78 at ¶ 29; D.I. 97 at ¶ 25)
Powder x-ray diffraction (known as "XRPD") is a common method that has been used for many years in the pharmaceutical industry to help characterize and distinguish different crystalline forms. (D.I. 78 at ¶ 31; D.I. 97 at ¶ 30) This method tests a small amount of crystalline powder (instead of a single crystal) by exposing the sample to x-rays. (D.I. 78 at ¶ 31) X-ray diffraction results when x-rays of particular wavelengths are directed at a sample; the diffraction angles are measured, and an observable pattern of peaks is created that serves as a fingerprint for each unique crystal structure. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32; D.I. 97 at ¶¶ 30-31, 35) These patterns of peaks can be placed on a chart, known as an "x-ray diffraction diagram" or "x-ray diffractogram," so that all of these peaks (including those peaks that stand out as being the most intense) can be viewed at one time. (See, e.g., '049 patent at FIGS. 1, 3-4; D.I. 97 at ¶ 32)
Another well-established analytical technique that can be used to characterize crystal forms is differential scanning calorimetry ("DSC"). (D.I. 78 at ¶ 40; D.I. 97 at ¶ 40) One property of a polymorph is its melting point and associated endotherm, which measures the temperature at which the compound turns from solid to liquid as well as the heat absorbed during the process. (D.I. 97 at ¶ 40) DSC measures the melting point of a sample by analyzing the difference in the amount of heat flowing between two pans sitting on top of two separate heaters—a sample pan and a reference pan left empty. (D.I. 78 at ¶ 41; D.I. 97 at ¶ 40) When a sample melts, energy is required, and this event is reflected by a peak in the DSC profile representing the energy required to melt the crystal. (D.I. 78 at ¶ 42; D.I. 97 at ¶ 40)
This litigation arises from each of Defendants' submissions of Abbreviated New Drug Applications ("ANDAs") to the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), which seek approval to market generic versions of Myrbetriq. (See, e.g., D.I. 1 at ¶ 45; D.I. 77 at 1) APGD is the holder of New Drug Application No. 202611, which covers Myrbetriq. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 39) Plaintiffs filed the instant cases in October 2016, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants' ANDA products and the use thereof would infringe at least claim 1 of the '117 patent and certain claims of the '049 patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and that Defendants' submission of their ANDAs constituted acts of infringement of certain claims of the '049 patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). (See, e.g., D.I. 1 at ¶¶ 57, 60-61)
On August 10, 2017, Judge Joseph F. Bataillon referred "all dispositive and nondispositive matters on all issues, including claim construction, except for summary judgments, Daubert motions and pretrial motions in limine[]" to the Court. (D.I. 67) The parties completed lengthy briefing on claim construction on March 21, 2018. (D.1. 77, 93, 95, 112, 146, 148, 155, 156) The Court held a Markman hearing on March 23, 2018. (D.I. 163 (hereinafter, "Tr.")) The Scheduling Order states that the Court "shall issue its decision on claim construction on or before June 20, 2018." (D.I. 25 at 9 (emphasis omitted))
It is well-understood that "[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention." Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. US.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Claim construction is a generally a question of law, although subsidiary fact finding is sometimes necessary. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 837-38 (2015).
The Court should typically assign claim terms their "`ordinary and customary meaning[,]'" which is "the meaning that the term[s] would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art [`POSA'] in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). However, when determining the ordinary meaning of claim terms, the Court should not extract and isolate those terms from the context of the patent, but rather should endeavor to reflect their "meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321; see also Eon Corp. IP. Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In proceeding with claim construction, the Court should look first and foremost to the language of the claims themselves, because "[i]t is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, the context in which a term is used in a claim may be "highly instructive." Id. at 1314. In addition, "[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can . . . be valuable" in discerning the meaning of a particular claim term. Id. This is "[b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, [and so] the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims." Id. Moreover, "[d]ifferences among claims can also be a useful guide[,]" as when "the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim." Id. at 1314-15.
In addition to the words of the claims, the Court should look to other intrinsic evidence. For example, the Court should analyze the patent specification, which "may reveal a special definition given to a claim term . . . that differs from the meaning [that term] would otherwise possess" or may reveal an intentional disclaimer of claim scope. Id. at 1316. Even if the specification does not contain such revelations, it "is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." Id. at 1315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That said, however, the specification "is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language." Super Guide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And a court should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence, because it "can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution[.]" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
Extrinsic evidence, "including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises[,]" can also "shed useful light on the relevant art[.]" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Overall, while extrinsic evidence may be useful, it is "less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
In utilizing these resources during claim construction, courts should keep in mind that "[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
35 U.S.C. § 112 ("Section 112") requires that a patent claim "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.
Like claim construction, definiteness is a question of law for the court. H-W Tech., L.C. v. Overstock.com, Inc., 758 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Pi-Net Int'l Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 42 F.Supp.3d 579, 586 (D. Del. 2014). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that "[a]ny fact critical to a holding on indefiniteness . . . must be proven by the challenger by clear and convincing evidence." Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F:3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that patent claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of what is claimed, thus enabling interested members of the public (e.g., competitors of the patent owner) to determine whether they infringe. All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Put another way, "[a] patent holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not." Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). Even so, the Supreme Court has recognized that "absolute precision is unattainable" and not required. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
The Court takes up the three sets of disputed terms in the order in which the parties addressed them at the Markman hearing.
The claim term "α-form crystal" appears in claim 1 of the '049 patent, and the claim term "α-form crystal" appears in claim 3 of that patent. Claims 1 and 3 are reproduced below:
('049 patent, col. 11:5-8 (emphasis added))
(Id. col. 11: 14-17 (emphasis added))
Plaintiffs explain that the terms "α-form crystal" and "α-form crystal" are "the names of the two novel crystal forms of mirabegron that are described in the specification" of the '049 patent. (D.1. 77 at 10) Defendants agree on this point, characterizing the terms as "arbitrary identifiers given to polymorphs of a given compound." (D.I. 93 at 12) With respect to the proper constructions of these claim terms, Plaintiffs propose that "α-from crystal" be construed to mean "α-form crystal which is a term of reference for a polymorphic crystal form of (R) 2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2 hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide that can be distinguished from other forms." (D.I. 77 at 10) Likewise, as to "α-form crystal," Plaintiffs propose that the term be construed to mean "α-form crystal which is a term of reference for a polymorphic crystal form of (R) 2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2 hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide that can be distinguished from other forms." (Id.)
For their part, Defendants assert that the terms are indefinite. (D.I. 93 at 12) Defendants contend that since these terms do not have ordinary or customary meanings, the specification of the '049 patent must provide sufficient data that would allow the POSA to actually identify each form. (Id. at 12-13) According to Defendants, the specification fails to do so. (Id.) Instead, Defendants contend that the "minimal descriptions" of each form of crystal in the specification "are often inconsistent and contradictory" and thus cannot be used to determine whether a sample falls within the scope of the α-form or β-form crystal. (Idat 13; see also D.I. 146 at 4; Defendants' Claim Construction Arguments Presentation, Slides A9-A10) As for Plaintiffs' proposed constructions, Defendants point out that Plaintiffs' proposals fail to actually identify any further characteristics of the α-form and β-form crystals, and therefore just "[c]onfirm [that] the [t]erms [a]re [i]ndefinite[.]" (D.1. 93 at 15; Tr. at 30 (Defendants' counsel explaining that Plaintiffs' proposed construction for "α-form crystal[,]" for example, essentially states that the "alpha form means alpha form"))
Below, the Court addresses the key issues raised by the parties' respective positions.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' proposed constructions for the terms "α-form crystal" and "β-form crystal" are problematic. This is because, as Defendants point out, the constructions do not provide any further clarification as to how the two terms can be distinguished from each other. (D.I. 93 at 15)
Plaintiffs argue that their proposed constructions are sufficient because: (1) once a new crystalline form has been identified and described, it will have a "chemical structure and a host of physical characteristics that can be used to identify it"; but (2) a POSA would find it unnecessary to recite all of these characteristics in order to identify the forms, since the POSA could make that identification simply by hearing the name for the form. (D.I. 77 at 13; Tr. at 61 (Plaintiffs' counsel contending that, if the claims used the word "mirabegron," for instance, that is just a name, but the name "tells you exactly what the thing is, because from the patent or from other sources, there's lots of identifying information that tells you what mirabegron is")) The problem with Plaintiffs position, however, is that we have a fundamental dispute here about the terms—i.e., whether there is sufficient guidance in the intrinsic record to allow the POSA to distinguish the α-form crystal and β-form crystal from each other (and if so, what is that guidance)? Were the Court to simply adopt Plaintiffs' proposed constructions, this would not resolve the dispute.
Having concluded that Plaintiffs' proposed constructions will not be helpful here, the Court next examines whether the intrinsic record contains sufficient evidence that can be used to teach a POSA, with reasonable certainty, how to distinguish these two different crystal forms from each other?
The '049 patent's specification does expressly discuss observed properties of the α-form crystal and β-form crystal. Plaintiffs point to the following supporting data described in the specification of the '049 patent for each crystal form:
(D.I. 77 at 12; see also D.I. 112 at 3)
More specifically, the specification explains that the patentees discovered the claimed novel α-form and β-form crystals, "[b]oth of [which] are of a free base and are distinguished from each other by powder X-ray diffraction spectrum and DSC analysis." ('049 patent, col. 1:56-66) The patent then goes on to explain that the α-form crystal has a moisture-holding amount of not more than 0.2% over the entire range of relative humidity from 5% to 95%, whereas the β-form crystal holds moisture of about 3%. (Id, col. 2:4-10) Next, the specification notes that "[e]ach of the α-form crystal and the β-form crystal is characterized by the following crystal lattice spacings [20(°)] of powder X-ray diffraction spectrum and heat absorption peak of DSC analysis." (Id. at 2:16-19) The patent then provides two Tables, one for each form of crystal. (Id, col. 2:29-50) Table 1, which relates to the "α-form [c]rystal[,]" references 8 characteristic XRPD peaks (5.32, 8.08, 15.28, 17.88, 19.04, 20.20, 23.16 and 24.34) of that crystal form. (Id, col. 2:29-40) Table 2, which relates to the "β-form [c]rystal[,]" references 5 characteristic XRPD peaks (9.68, 19.76, 20.72, 22.10 and 23.52) for that crystal form. (Id, col. 2:42-52) These Tables are depicted as follows:
(Id., col. 2:29-50) With respect to DSC analysis, the specification then explains that "the α-form crystal had a heat absorption peak at 142 to 146° C., and the β-form crystal had heat absorption peaks at 90 to 110° C. and at 142 to 146° C., respectively." (Id., col. 2:53-56)
In the Court's view, this intrinsic evidence relating to exemplar XRPD spectrums and DSC heat absorption peaks is evidence that will allow a POSA to sufficiently distinguish the two relevant crystal forms.
With regard to Defendants' criticism that the record does not allow a POSA to distinguish between the claimed crystalline forms and any other crystalline forms, Plaintiffs responded by stating that the α-form crystal and the β-form crystal are the only known crystalline polymorphs of mirabegron. (D.I. 155 at 7-8; D.I. 146, ex. J at 12-13, 46; Tr. at 40-41) In their briefing, Defendants retorted that even if this were so, the terms would still be indefinite because, inter alia, the specification does not allow the POSA to distinguish either the α-form and β-form crystals from "unknown or undiscovered polymorphs[.]" (D.I. 146 at 4) This would not make the claims indefinite, however. As Plaintiffs explain, for the purpose of definiteness, it is not necessary for a claim to distinguish the invention from products that do not exist and are not yet known. (D.I. 155 at 7-8; Tr. at 41) The Supreme Court has explained that, pursuant to the first Patent Act enacted by Congress in 1790, patentees were required to "file a written specification `containing a description . . . of the thing or things . . . invented or discovered,' which `shall be so particular' as to `distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used'" and that "[t]he patent laws have retained this requirement of definiteness[.]" Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (emphasis added). Defendants have not pointed the Court to any case law that indicates otherwise. Therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the claims must "distinguish from what is already known, and what is already known [at least on the current, pre-Markman hearing record] are two crystalline forms of mirabegron[.]" (Tr. at 41)
Turning then to Defendants' remaining criticism—that the record does not allow a POSA to distinguish the α-form and β-form crystals from each other—the Court reverts back to the specification. As was noted above, the written description specifically states that the two forms of crystals "are distinguished from each other by powder X-ray diffraction spectrum and DSC analysis"—that is, that the two forms of crystals are "characterized by [certain] crystal lattice spacings[] of powder X-ray diffraction spectrum and heat absorption peak of DSC analysis." ('049 patent, cols. 1:64-2:19) Thus, it follows that a POSA would understand that "α-form crystal" and "β-form crystal" refers to particular, unique forms of crystals that are, in fact, distinguished "from each other" by certain specific XRPD and DSC peaks disclosed in the patent. (See D.I. 78 at ¶¶ 68-69; Tr. at 38 (Plaintiffs' counsel pointing out that the specification tells the POSA what the characteristics of each crystal form are)); see also Celgene Corp., 2014 WL 2196941, at *4-5 (explaining that a POSA would understand "Form A" to mean a particular polymorph with the observed attributes discussed in the specification as being distinguishable from the other disclosed forms, and construing "Form A" to mean the particular "crystal form describe[d] in the specification as Form A, having all of the characteristics assigned to Form A in the specification").
From there, the parties seem to dispute exactly how one must utilize the above-referenced evidence regarding characteristic XRPD peaks and DSC heat absorption peaks, in order to sufficiently determine whether a sample is the α-form or β-form crystal. This leads to a set of further questions that the Court must answer.
The first of these is whether, in order to confirm the presence of the α-form or β-form crystal, would a POSA rely on DSC measurements alone (i.e, not using XRPD testing at all)? (See D.I. 77 at 14; D.I. 78 at ¶¶ 74-75 (Dr. Myerson noting that a POSA would understand that "any or all of these various techniques and methodologies [including DSC] may be employed to identify, characterize and distinguish the two crystal forms of mirabegron")) The Court concludes that a POSA would not do so. The specification seems to teach that the POSA would use both methodologies (XRPD and DSC), when it explains that these forms are characterized by certain XRPD peaks "and" by DSC peaks. Defendants' expert Dr. Craig J. Eckhardt agrees, opining that while DSC is a "well-established technique, in order to conclusively identify a crystal form, DSC should be used in conjunction with another analytical method [here, XRPD testing]." (D.I. ¶ 97 at ¶ 71; id. at ¶ 11 (Dr. Eckhardt explaining that "[t]he specification . . . teaches that the `crystal lattice spacings[] of Tables 1 and 2 and heat absorption peak[s] of DSC analysis' should be used together when trying to distinguish the a and β crystal forms from one another") (emphasis in original); see also id. at ¶ 57) Even Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Allan S. Myerson, seemed to agree that a POSA would not (or, at least, that a POSA probably should not) rely on DSC testing alone. Dr. Myerson testified during his deposition that for these crystalline forms, one could distinguish between the two forms using only DSC; however, he then quickly added that "more likely you would want to also do X-ray." (D.I. 146, ex. J at 71) At another point in his deposition, when asked how someone carrying out the examples described in the specification would confirm whether his result `Yas the α-form or β-form crystal, Dr. Myerson explained that the POSA "would check using DSC and X-ray." (Id. at 57 (emphasis added)) Additionally, when asked whether the POSA would use XRPD, DSC and hydroscopic analyses independently or in some combination, in order to distinguish the two crystal forms of mirabegron, Dr. Myerson responded that the POSA"could use X-ray independently or you could use X-ray and DSC together or you could use all of them together." (Id. at 68-69)
The second question to be addressed is "How would a POSA use XRPD testing in order to establish that a sample constitutes the α-form or β-form crystal?" Here, the parties argue about how many peaks shown in the x-ray diffractograms for the two crystal forms must be present, in order for a POSA to determine that the sample at issue is either the α-form or β-form crystal.
Dr. Myerson explains that Table 1 (α-form) and Table 2 (β-form) of the patents recite a subset of the peaks that appear in the full XRPD spectra for the two crystal forms. (D.I. 78 at ¶ 58) The full x-ray diffractograms for the two forms are found in Figure 1 (β-form) and Figures 3 and 4 (α-form) of the patents. (Id.) Dr. Myerson then focuses on the subsets of peaks that appear in Tables 1 and 2, and asserts that each of these peaks in the respective tables do not overlap with each other. (Id.) In other words, each of the peaks for the α-form subset differs from each of the peaks for the β-form subset, and thus "each of those peaks alone is characteristic of the α-form crystal or the β-form crystal for purposes of distinguishing those crystal forms. (Id.)
The Court's view is that with regard to the claims at issue in the '049 patent, it is sufficient for a POSA to rely on any number of this subset of "characteristic" XRPD peaks that are unique and distinctive, in order to help characterize a sample of mirabegron crystal as either the α-form or β-form crystal. (Tr. at 40, 42-43)
In arguing against this conclusion, Defendants contend that the above-referenced ANDA documents are irrelevant because: (1) claim terms must be construed based on their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSA at the time of invention; and (2) the ANDA documents in question were prepared in or around June 2016, 15 years after the alleged priority date of the patents (October 30, 2001). (D.I. 146 at 1-2 (citing cases); Tr. at 13)
The Court does not find the ANDA documents completely irrelevant to the issue, however. Plaintiffs' position (offered via their expert, Dr. Myerson) is clearly that—just as these ANDA filers did 15 years later-a POSA back in 2001 would have been able to utilize a subset of peaks to distinguish one of these crystal samples. (See D.I. 78 at ¶ 24 (Dr. Myerson recognizing that patent claim terms are construed from the perspective of a POSA as of the effective filing date of the patent application); id. at ¶ 76 (Dr. Myerson citing to these ANDA documents in support of Plaintiffs' construction of these terms)) And Defendants have not sufficiently explained how or why Plaintiffs are wrong-i.e., why a POSA would be able to utilize these peaks for identification purposes in 2016, but would not have been able to do so in 2001. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire Pharms, Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting defendant's argument that district court improperly relied on dictionaries from the present day in construing a claim term and finding the term to be definite where "Shire does not explain how . . . dictionaries contemporaneous to the patents' filing date would define the term any differently"); St. Lawrence Commc'ns LLC v. ZTE Corp., CASE NOS. 2: 15-CV-349-JRG Lead Case, 2016 WL 6275390, at *66 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016) (relying a technical specification identified as "extrinsic evidence" because even though it was not "contemporaneous with the filing of the '521 Patent application, it is nonetheless noteworthy that this technical specification uses the very phrase that Defendants contend is not reasonably certain to a person of ordinary skill in the art"); Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Cause No. 6:11-cv-441, 2013 WL 1314188, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013) (explaining that while the literal scope of a claim term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of filing, "documents or data arising after the filing of an application can still be probative to assess the scope of a term at the time of filing").
The Court, taking into account all that it has said above, recommends that the term "α-form crystal" be construed to mean "α-form crystal which is a term of reference for a polymorphic crystal form of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide that can be distinguished from other forms by its characteristic peak(s) and DSC analysis as identified in the specification." The Court recommends that the term "β-form crystal" be construed to mean "β-form crystal which is a term of reference for a polymorphic crystal form of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide that can be distinguished from other forms by its characteristic peak(s) and DSC analysis as identified in the specification."
The term "main peaks" appears in claims 1 and 2 of the '117 patent, which are the only two claims in the patent. These claims are reproduced below:
('117 patent, col. 12:19-24 (emphasis added) & Certificate of Correction)
(Id., col. 12:25-30 (emphasis added))
Plaintiffs propose that the term "main peaks" be construed to mean "peaks that are characteristic of the particular crystal form as distinguished from other crystal forms." (D.I. 77 at 3) Defendants argue that the term is indefinite. (D.I. 93 at 3) Alternatively, the ASA Defendants propose that if the Court finds that the term is not indefinite, that the term be construed to mean "peaks with the largest relative intensities in the XRPD spectrum of a sample." (D.I. 95 at 1)
The Court will first address whether the term is indefinite, along with the propriety of Plaintiffs' proposed construction. Thereafter, it will assess the ASA Defendants' proposed construction-in-the-alternative.
It is undisputed that the term "main peaks" is not a term of art applied by POSAs in this field. (D.I. 97 at ¶ 45; D.I. 155 at 5) Thus, to discern the meaning of the term, the POSA would need to turn to the intrinsic evidence. (See D.I. 155 at 5 (Plaintiffs explaining that there is not "some art-established meaning" for the term and thus "its meaning is derived from the claim language and the patent specification")); see also, e.g., Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 222 F.Supp.2d 423,451 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that, with respect to a term that the "patentees created for use" in the asserted patents, such term "must be defined in the context of those patents" and accordingly the "court must rely on the intrinsic evidence, particularly the specification, to determine the meaning of the [term]").
The specification of the '117 patent (which is identical to that of the '049 patent) explains that:
('117 patent, col. 2:6-15 (emphasis added)) The patent then provides Table 1 and Table 2, which are depicted above, supra at 15. As was previously noted above, the peaks listed in each table (8 for α-form crystal and 5 for the β-form crystal) constitute only a selected subset of XRPD peaks that appear in the full X-ray diffractograms for the α-form crystal (found in Figures 3 and 4 of the patent) and the β-form crystal (found in Figure 1 of the patent), respectively. (See id, FIGS. 1, 3, 4; D.I. 78 at ¶ 58; D.I. 77 at 6)
Importantly, as Plaintiffs explain, these subsets of peaks in Tables 1 and 2—those listed in the Tables as being characteristic of the "α-form Crystal" and the "β-form Crystal"—are the same peaks that are listed in claims 1 and 2 of the '117 patent and that are described in those claims as "main peaks." Plaintiffs' proposed construction, then, is gleaned directly from the intrinsic record—Plaintiffs emphasize that the "main peaks" listed in the claims are the very "peaks that are characteristic of the particular crystal form as distinguished from other crystal forms." (See D.I. 77 at 6; D.I. 155 at 5 ("Defendants do not dispute that Tables 1 and 2 of the '117 Patent specification list the same eight peaks that appear in Claim 1, and the same five peaks that appear in Claim 2, or that the accompanying text describes them as the ones that `characterize' the two novel crystalline forms.")) Plaintiffs explain that the word "main" in the claim is simply meant to emphasize that while there are other peaks in the full x-ray diffractograms for both of the crystalline forms, the listed peaks are the ones the patentee took care to identify as those characterizing the two crystalline forms that are the invention. (D.I. 112 at 5 ("[T]he claim term `main' informs the POSA that the peaks recited in the claims are peaks that appear within an XRPD diffractogram that may also contain additional peaks for the claimed crystal forms" and that the identified peaks "can be used to `characterize' the two crystalline forms"); Tr. at 105-08; see also D.I. 146, ex. J at 62 (Dr. Myerson testifying that "[c]haracteristic peaks are the set of peaks you pick to characterize your sample, which in the case of the '117 [patent] are the peaks listed. . . . You can pick any set of peaks that allows you to characterize"); id. at 11 (Dr. Myerson explaining that "[c]haracteristic peaks are normally listed as peaks that can be used to characterize a form. . . . You can pick any set that allows you to characterize the compound"))
In coming to this conclusion, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that the term "main peaks" is indefinite. In Defendants' view, "[t]he intrinsic record provides no guidance as to whether `main peaks' refers to XRPD peaks that are unique to each mirabegron crystal form." (D.I. 93 at 4) This argument, however, rests on the flawed premise that there is no connection between the claimed "main peaks" and the α-form crystal and the β-form crystals of mirabegron. According to Defendants, because (1) the claims of the '117 patent do not use the words "α-form crystal" and "β-form crystal" and (2) the specification does not explicitly state that there is any relationship between the claims, Tables 1 and 2 or Figures 1, 3 and 4, then (3) the POSA would understand that "the recited `main peaks' do not refer to and are not constrained by the particular XRPD diffractograms [of the α-form crystal and β-form crystal] illustrated in the Figures or Tables." (Id. at 5 (emphasis added)); see also Tr. at 88)
The assertion that claims 1 and 2 relate to something other than the α-form crystal and β-form crystal is puzzling. There is a clear relationship between Table 1 (which states that it relates to the "α-form crystal") and Table 2 (which states that it relates to the "β-form crystal") on the one hand, and the peaks recited in claims 1 and 2 on the other. The Tables and the claims both list out the very same peaks. Moreover, claims 1 and 2 are the only two claims in a patent that is entitled "α-Form or β-Form Crystal of Acetanilide Derivative." Indeed, the specification explains that "[t]he present invention relates to an α-form crystal or β-form crystal of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino ]ethy1]-acetanilide[.]" ('117 patent, col. 1:6-10 (emphasis added); see also Tr. at 110)
Defendants' related assertion that "the specification never explains the relationship, if any, between the Figures and the Tables[,]" (D.I. 93 at 5), is also a head-scratcher. The specification clearly explains that Figures 1, 3 and 4 depict powder X-ray diffraction diagrams for the α-form crystal (Figures 3 and 4) and the β-form crystal (Figure 1). ('117 patent, col. 11:9-12, 16-23) And Tables 1 (α-form crystal) and 2 (β-form crystal) set out a subset of peaks found in these full diffractograms-the peaks that are said to "characterize[]" the α-form crystal and the β-form crystals, respectively. These are the exact same peaks that are described as "main peaks" for the crystals claimed in claims 1 and 2 of the '117 patent.
Therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that "main peaks" is not indefinite, and that a POSA "would easily be able to ascertain whether a mirabegron crystal form conforms to the claims of the '117 patent by, for example, testing it by XRPD and then determining whether peaks are present at the recited locations." (D.I. 112 at 5) If they are, and if the form also displays the heat absorption peaks recited in the claims, "then the claim limitations are met, irrespective of any relative intensities or whether additional peaks are also present in the XRPD diffractogram." (Id.)
Before concluding, the Court pauses to address the ASA Defendants' alternative request that, if the Court were to find that "main peaks" should be construed, the correct construction is "peaks with the largest relative intensities in the XRPD spectrum of a sample." (D.I. 95 at 1) The ASA Defendants explain that the term "main" must "add something to the claims-it must modify what types of peaks are found at the" recited locations. (Id. (emphasis in original)) Construing "main" as they propose would be consistent with the intrinsic record, the ASA Defendants argue, because Tables 1 and 2 list both the characteristic peaks' locations and their "[r]elative intensity." (Id. at 2; see also '117 patent, col. 2: 16-37) Lastly, the ASA Defendants contend that this proposal is consistent with the extrinsic evidence, such as other patents filed at the relevant time that use "main peaks" to refer to intensity of peaks in a given spectrum. (D.I. 95 at 2-3 & n.4; Tr. at 96-97, 99) The Court, however, is not persuaded.
Taking up the latter argument (regarding extrinsic evidence) first, the Court reiterates what the parties have all agreed on-that the term "main peaks" is not a term of art typically used by POSAs when analyzing X-ray diffraction patterns. (D.I. 97 at ¶ 45; D.I. 155 at 5) If that is so, then the term's meaning must be gleaned from the intrinsic record. How the term may have been defined in other patents is not of great relevance to the correct construction here. (See Tr. at 113-14)
Additionally, the Court disagrees with the ASA Defendants' assertion that their proposal is consistent with the intrinsic record. Indeed, for at least two reasons, the '117 patent's specification does not support a construction of "main peaks" that links those peaks with the "largest relative intensities."
First, while it is true that Tables 1 and 2 include columns relating to relative intensities (as well as columns listing crystal lattice spacings), the specification states that the crystal forms are "characterized by the following crystal lattice spacings" and "heat absorption peak of DSC analysis." ('117 patent, col. 2:6-9 (emphasis added)) It does not state that the crystal forms are "characterized by the following crystal lattice spacings, relative intensities, and DSC heat absorption peaks." And the specification informs the POSA that:
(Id., col. 2:9-15 (emphasis added)) Thus, the import of the specification, in the Court's view, is that relative intensity is not what allows a POSA to distinguish crystalline forms from one another. Rather, it is a set of distinguishing peaks that allows a POSA to do so. (D.I. 112 at 7-9; Tr. at 108-10)
Second, one of the XRPD peaks in the full diffractogram in Figure 1 (which corresponds to the β-form crystal) is not listed in claim 2 (which claims the same peaks and DSC peaks as those that distinguish the β-form crystal)-and yet that peak is more intense than one of the "main peaks" recited in the claim. (D.I. 77 at 8; D.I. 112 at 8; D.I. 78 at ¶ 63) Figure 1 shows an intense peak at approximately 22.5, which is not recited in Claim 2, whereas Claim 2 recites a peak at 9.68 that is less intense than the peak at 22.5. ('117 patent, FIG. 1 & col. 12:25-30) Therefore; as Plaintiffs summarize, "[f]or the ASA Defendants' construction to make sense, claim 2 would have to have recited the peak at 22.5 because this peak is more intense than at least one other peak that is recited in claim 2 (9.68). Its absence confirms that `main peaks' cannot mean most intense peaks." (D.I. 77 at 8)
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the term "main peaks" be construed to mean "peaks that are characteristic of the particular crystal form as distinguished from other crystal forms."
The disputed term "contains less than 0.2% of moisture" appears in dependent claim 9 of the '049 patent, which depends from claim 1. The disputed term "contains less than 3% of moisture" appears in dependent claim 11 of the '049 patent, which depends from claim 3. Claims 9 and 11 are reproduced below (claims 1 and 3 were already reproduced above in connection with the discussion of the "α-form crystal" and "β-form crystal" terms):
('049 patent, col. 12:8-11 (emphasis added))
(Id., col. 12:16-19 (emphasis added))
Plaintiffs propose that the term "contains less than 0.2% of moisture" be construed to mean "the α-form crystal of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide used to prepare the pharmaceutical composition contains less than 0.2% moisture." (D.I. 77 at 16) Similarly, Plaintiffs propose that the term "contains less than 3% of moisture" be construed to mean "the B-form crystal of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide used to prepare the pharmaceutical composition contains less than 3% moisture." (Id.) Meanwhile, Defendants assert that these terms are indefinite. (Id.)
The crux of the dispute relates to when the moisture content measurement called for in these claim terms is measured. Independent claims 1 and 3, on which claims 9 and 11 depend, claim a "solid pharmaceutical composition" that is made of 2 components (mirabegron and a "pharmaceutically acceptable carrier"). ('049 patent, col. 11:5-8, 14-17) The disagreement here is over whether the moisture content of the crystal mirabegron is to be measured before the crystal mirabegron is formulated into a final solid composition, or whether the moisture content of the crystal mirabegron is to be measured after the crystal mirabegron is part of the final solid composition (i.e., combined with the pharmaceutically acceptable carrier)?
Defendants assert that the answer is the latter, which, they further argue, renders the claims indefinite. This is so, they assert, in light of claims 9 and 11's dependence on claims 1 and 3, respectively. Claims 1 and 3 make it clear that claims 9 and 11 are directed to final, "solid pharmaceutical composition[s]" (comprising mirabegron crystals and one or more excipients). Therefore, Defendants' argument goes, the claimed moisture content of mirabegron refers to a moisture content measurement taken of mirabegron when it is part of the pharmaceutical composition. (D.I. 93 at 17; D.I. 146 at 10; Tr. at 117-19) Yet Defendants assert that the intrinsic record does not teach (and a POSA would not know) how to determine the moisture content of the mirabegron portion of the final dosage form as claimed by claims 9 and 11. (D.I. 93 at 17; D.I. 146 at 10; Tr. at 117-19)
In support, Defendants rely on their expert, Dr. Eckhardt, who opines that while there are methods for determining the overall moisture content of a final, solid composition, there would be no way for the POSA to determine whether that measurement is attributable to the mirabegron component of the composition, or instead to some other excipient within the composition. (D.I. 97 at ¶ 82)
Plaintiffs, meanwhile, argue that the moisture content measurements are made on the crystal form itself, which is then used to produce the claimed pharmaceutical composition. (D.I. 77 at 16) For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs.
Turning first to the claim language, the Court concludes that it is not unreasonable to read claims 9 and 11 as Plaintiffs suggest. (See Tr. at 128; D.I. 77 at 18 ("In dependent claims 9 and 11, the moisture content is defined for just the crystal form of the active ingredient, not the entire pharmaceutical composition[.]"); D.I. 78 at ¶ 83) In other words, the Court has not been persuaded that a reading of claims 1 and 9 as follows, for example, is wrong:
Such a reading conveys that two components go into making up the solid pharmaceutical composition: (1) an α-form crystal that contains less than 0.2 % of moisture; and (2) a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.
Importantly, Plaintiffs' interpretation of these claims terms (as relating to the moisture content of the crystal mirabegron before it is combined with a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier to formulate a "solid pharmaceutical composition") is wholly consistent with the '049 patent specification. (D.I. 77 at 17-18) As even Defendants' expert recognized, the specification discusses moisture content testing carried out on the crystal mirabegron itself-mirabegron that is then used to formulate the pharmaceutical composition. (D.I. 97 at ¶ 82; see also D.I. 77 at 16-17; D.I. 112 at 10) With respect to the α-form crystal of mirabegron (at issue in claims 1 and 9), the specification explains that the hygroscopicity of the α-form crystal of the invention was measured "using VTI SGA-100" under particular conditions, and "[a]s a result. . . . the α-form crystal of the invention had a moisture-holding amount of not more than 0.2% over the entire range of relative humidity from 5% to 95% and did not exhibit hygroscopicity (see FIG.
Lastly, such a reading of the claims is also consistent with the undisputed fact there is and was no way to reliably test the final, solid composition in order to obtain the moisture content of the crystal component alone. Any attempt to do so would result in a measurement of the moisture present in both the crystal form and in the excipients. (D.I. 77 at 19; D.I. 78 at ¶ 86; D.I. 97 at ¶ 83) It does not make sense that the patentee would write the claims in such a way so as to require that a measurement (i.e., that of the moisture content of the crystal form alone) be taken at a point in time (i.e., when the crystal form is combined with excipients) when obtaining that very measurement would be nearly impossible. (Tr. at 122 (Defendants' counsel acknowledging that interpreting these claim terms as Defendants propose would render the claims "[n]onsensical[,]" in that the claims would require measurements that are unobtainable, but arguing that this is what the claim language literally requires))
For these reasons, the Court finds that the claim language and specification is consistent with Plaintiffs' proposed construction.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the District Court adopt the following constructions:
1. "α-form crystal" should be construed to mean "α-form crystal which is a term of reference for a polymorphic crystal form of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide that can be distinguished from other forms by its characteristic peak(s) and DSC analysis as identified in the specification" and "β-form crystal" should be construed to mean "β-form crystal which is a term of reference for a polymorphic crystal form of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide that can be distinguished from other forms by its characteristic peak(s) and DSC analysis as identified in the specification"
2. "main peaks" should be construed to mean "peaks that are characteristic of the particular crystal form as distinguished from other crystal forms"
3. "contains less than 0.2% of moisture" should be construed to mean "the α-form crystal of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide used to prepare the pharmaceutical composition contains less than 0.2% moisture before it has been introduced into the pharmaceutical composition" and "contains less than 3% of moisture" should be construed to mean "the β-form crystal of (R)-2-(2-aminothiazol-4-y1)-4'-[2-[(2-hydroxy-2-pheny1ethy1)amino]ethy1]acetanilide used to prepare the pharmaceutical composition contains less than 3% moisture before it has been introduced into the pharmaceutical composition"
This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D. Del. LR 72.1. The parties may serve and file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review in the district court. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987); Sincavage v. Barnhart, 171 F. App'x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).
The parties are directed to the Court's Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, dated October 9, 2013, a copy of which is available on the District Court's website, located at http://www.ded.uscourts.gov.
Because this Report and Recommendation may contain confidential information, it has been released under seal, pending review by the parties to allow them to submit a single, jointly proposed, redacted version (if necessary) of the Report and Recommendation. Any such redacted version shall be submitted no later than
The Court finds the instant scenario to be distinguishable from Chef America. Here, the claim language, standing alone, could be reasonably interpreted as both parties posit. And so the Court's decision does not amount to re-writing the claim language. Instead, the Court's decision was driven by a determination of which construction makes the most sense, in light of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record. See, e.g., Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that Chef America was distinguishable where the Federal Circuit's affirmance of the district court's claim construction did not amount to re-drafting the claims, but rather "construing the claims to require the heightened temperature range to apply to the elevated temperature phases in accordance with the specification"); Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Determining how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the limitation, however, is different from rewriting the limitation.").