MARK A. KEARNEY, District Judge.
Businesses know there is no such thing as a free lunch. Yet when they ask public servants to resolve their complex disputes, the businesses often cite and attach internal documents which may not be necessary to meet their pleading burden and ask us to preclude the public access which is fundamental to federal courts. We appreciate the types of extraordinary private information or confidential and trade secret information which may preclude public access — particularly as to future plans which could impact the businesses' confidential business model. But the federal courts are not private arbitrations and the price to pay for the public trust in resolutions reached under Article III includes the public viewing of controversies.
Pleading is not evidence. A cross-claim is not a summary judgment memorandum. This internal non-privileged information partially representing private discussions between opposing parties may be sensitive. We have no basis it rises to the level necessary to preclude public access. To the extent their lawyers believe they need this level of detail to move forward under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, the businesses cannot have it both ways in a federal court.
Defendant Houston Casualty Company now seeks leave to file an indemnity cross-claim through a motion under seal. The proposed Motion and attached documents reference a series of agreements, arbitration information and settlement negotiations plead in the proposed Motion. This information may be material to their claim for indemnity for trial. But it asks us today to seal or redact significant portions of its proposed Motion for leave which describes the terms of agreements for our interpretation. Houston Casualty's stated cause is based on the parties treating the 2010 negotiations as confidential. Even assuming this information is not stale, we need more than a conclusory claim to preclude public access.
The common law right of access to judicial proceedings and judicial records" is a right which our court of appeals holds is "`beyond dispute.'"
We have "supervisory power over [our] own records and files" and may deny access "where court files [may] become a vehicle for improper purposes."
We do not preclude public access absent particularized good cause. "Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure. The injury must be shown with specificity."
Houston Casualty offers a conclusory reason to seal both its motion and exhibits 2-11: "[b]ased on the non-public and confidential nature of these documents." It seeks to redact portions of its proposed Motion for leave "relating to the [June 24, 2010 Stock Purchase Agreement] which — if disclosed to the public — would reveal confidential, sensitive information about the parties."
Possibly recognizing Houston Casualty could not adequately describe their confidentiality concerns, BB&T Corporation and the Plaintiff filed separate memoranda offering more specific grounds to seal exhibits 2, 3, 5, 10 and 11.
While BB&T Corporation and Plaintiff present more a fulsome argument, they still do not show a clearly defined and serious injury other than the risk of their business dealings being known to the public who pays for the tribunal they invoke. We cannot meet our independent burden of precluding public access to these documents. BB&T also argues we should grant the motion because all parties agree to the seal. It misses the point — our obligation is to the process and not to the parties' agreements. Parties cannot seal public records by agreement. The parties present no particularized good cause for sealing the identified redacted information other than claiming confidentiality simply because of a private agreement. Their agreement does not govern our obligation to ensure public access.
Plaintiff also claims all or parts of proposed exhibits 5-9 should be redacted or sealed as they are letters referring to and quoting the 2010 Stock Purchase Agreement. If offers no other cause. Conclusory claims are insufficient. We also found no stated particularized harm in public access to the 2010 Stock Purchase Agreement.
We need a clearly defined and serious injury with articulated reasoning to preclude public access. The parties have not met this standard of specificity first described in Pansy.
On balance, Houston Casualty, BB&T Corporation and Plaintiff have not met their burden to seal allegations or documents partially comprising a motion for leave to file an amended answer with cross-claim. The parties also have alternatives: they could consent to amendment and avoid the extensive allegations or, upon closer review of their Rule 8 pleading obligations, may omit some of the material which is not necessary for our analysis.
We do not see — at least today — particularized grounds to block public access because the parties are entities.
As the parties have not met their burden, we must deny their motion to seal the proffered materials should they elect to include them in a filing. We do not lift the redaction on the present motion to seal.