MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARY PAT THYNGE, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises from the denial of plaintiff's claim for Social Security Disability benefits. On November 14, 2012, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act").1 In his application, plaintiff alleged he was disabled, as of September 5, 1986, due to mental retardation, anxiety, nervousness, speech problems, and poor communication.2 His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration.3 Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held on March 25, 2015.4 On November 13, 2015, ALJ William Kurlander issued a decision denying plaintiff's claims.5 Subsequently, on December 12, 2015, Plaintiff requested a review of the hearing decision.6 The Appeals Council denied the review on April 13, 2017.7 He then filed a timely appeal with this court. Presently before the court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in Puerto Rico on September 5, 1986, which plaintiff alleges as the onset of his disability.8 He is a Spanish speaking United States citizen.9 He attended high school in Ponce, Puerto Rico, where he completed an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") in 2004.10 Plaintiff alleges he was placed in a pre-vocational program because he was unable to meet the requirements for regular curriculum participation.11 He claims due to mental retardation, severe paranoia, and schizoaffective disorder, he is unable to work.12 He has no past relevant work.13

A. Evidence Presented

From 2006 to 2012, plaintiff was under the care of Dr. Migueline Grant Gonzales.14 Dr. Gonzales diagnosed plaintiff with mild mental retardation, finding his condition as permanent.15 Dr. Gonzales believed plaintiff was completely limited in his daily routine and incapable of physical and/or mental effort.16 From 2012-2014, plaintiff saw Ms. Gloria Diaz, his primary care provider, for his impairments.17 In November 2012, Ms. Diaz noted plaintiff was fast paced, used loud speech, had an anxious and euphoric mood, and his behavior was agitated and compulsive.18

On January 29, 2013, Dr. Frederick Kurz, a psychologist, performed a one-time evaluation by administering the Test of Non-verbal Intelligence-Fourth Edition, a fifteen-minute test.19 Plaintiff attained a raw score of 17 placing his nonverbal cognitive skills at an IQ of 76, borderline range.20 Dr. Kurz diagnosed him with borderline intelligence.21 Dr. Kurz believed plaintiff would have "moderate" limitations relating to other people, daily activities, carrying out instructions under ordinary supervision, sustaining work performance, and coping with pressures of ordinary work.22 In February 2013, plaintiff had the same persisting symptoms as noted in November 2012, and Ms. Diaz recommended psychological counseling. Later, she referred him to a psychiatrist and neurologist.23

From March 2013 to August 2013, plaintiff treated with Mr. Kurt Rodriguez of Christiana Counseling.24 On March 7, 2013, Mr. Rodriguez conducted an initial exam and noted plaintiff was withdrawn, picked at his fingers, and minimally verbal.25 Mr. Rodriguez diagnosed plaintiff with moderate mental retardation and anxiety disorder.26 On March 16, 2013, Mr. Rodriguez tried to administer a mini mental exam, but plaintiff was unfocused and unable to answer any questions.27 On April 15, 2013, Dr. Gloria Crespo performed an initial exam and observed plaintiff had poor eye contact, smelled his fingers, and played with his hands.28 Dr. Crespo recommended cognitive behavioral therapy.29 After this exam, plaintiff attended multiple cognitive behavioral therapy sessions with Dr. Crespo.30 Based upon her observations, Dr. Crespo opined plaintiff was mentally retarded.31 After various visits, she concluded that plaintiff's mental and intellectual deficits were severe and limiting.32

In June 2014, plaintiff started treatment with Dr. Patricia Lifrak, a psychiatrist.33 During her exam, Dr. Lifrak noted that plaintiff's judgment and insight was limited, and he evidenced cognitive delays.34 Dr. Lifrak subsequently diagnosed plaintiff with a mood disorder.35 On June 25, 2014, Dr. Crespo completed a mental impairment questionnaire, finding him disabled from competitive employment.36 Subsequently, Dr. Crespo diagnosed him with adjustment disorder with mixed features and mental retardation.37 Dr. Crespo stated plaintiff was unable to meet competitive standards for even unskilled work due to his intellectual, cognitive, and psychological impairments.38 She also determined that plaintiff would have severe difficulties interacting with the public and maintaining socially appropriate behavior because he is highly suspicious of others or displayed inappropriate behaviors that are child-like.39

Plaintiff was admitted to the Rockford Center from August 7, 2014 to August 18, 2014.40 He was transferred from Wilmington Hospital after a 24-hour commitment due to paranoia and positive homicidal ideation towards many people.41 Upon admission, Dr. Afzal, a psychiatrist at Rockford, diagnosed plaintiff with bipolar disorder and chronic mental illness.42 Plaintiff was treated for ten days, placed on mental health medications, and his symptoms improved.43 Upon discharge, Dr. Afzal diagnosed him with schizophrenia.44 Plaintiff was discharged to follow up with Dr. Lifrak for care.45

On September 6, 2014, plaintiff was seen at Wilmington Hospital for altered mental state and suicidal ideations.46 There was concern about physical aggression, cognitive disability, and medication compliance.47 Thereafter, plaintiff was discharged to follow up with his psychiatrist.48 On September 24, 2014, plaintiff saw Dr. Lifrak.49 After an exam, plaintiff remained non-verbal, passively cooperated, had poor eye contact and flat effect.50 Dr. Lifrak diagnosed plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder.51

In 2013, plaintiff's claim for benefits was evaluated by state agency consultants, Carlene Tucker-Okine, Ph.D. and Christopher King, Psy. D.52 Dr. Tucker-Okine believed plaintiff was moderately limited in multiple areas, including the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration, complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and set realistic goals.53 She believed he was limited to simple tasks for work. Dr. King affirmed the opinion of Dr. Tucker-Okine.54

B. Hearing Testimony

1. Plaintiff's Testimony

At the hearing on March 25, 2015, plaintiff provided no testimony.55 When questioned, he did not cooperate or provide any verbal responses.56 Plaintiff stated, during the hearing, that he did not understand.57 Plaintiff would not consent to the ALJ's use of a Spanish language interpreter.58 Counsel expressed concern over plaintiff's ability to testify.59 In lieu of plaintiff, his mother, Carolina Virola Ruiz, testified.60 She testified plaintiff attended special education classes, entered the first grade at the age of ten, remained in fifth grade until the age of fifteen, and did not graduate high school.61 Ms. Ruiz explained she and plaintiff had lived in the United States for two and a half years.62 She further testified that her son never worked and could not work because he was depressed and thought everybody was ready to attack him.63 Ms. Ruiz stated her son did not carry his own wallet or handle money.64

She explained plaintiff suffered from depression, anxiety, and phobia and has no friends nor socializes with family members.65 She testified he is unable to communicate properly with a group of people, as well as his psychiatrist.66 He has problems with anger and hears voices.67 Ms. Ruiz testified during the day, he spends his time watching basketball on television, staying in his room, and listening to music.68 He does not want to leave his room.69 Ms. Ruiz further noted that her son does not have a driver's license, is unable to use a computer, and cannot perform any chores.70 She noted that he takes prolonged showers and must be prompted to stop.71

2. Vocational Expert's Testimony

Testimony was provided at the hearing by vocational expert, Christina Cody.72 The ALJ proposed hypothetical question limiting plaintiff to unskilled work, reasoning level at one or two, no ability to speak and read or write in English, no more than occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors, no interaction with the general public, and no exposure to moving machinery. Ms. Cody identified several occupations existed for such an individual including hand packager at the medium exertional level, laborer, and kitchen helper.73 In another hypothetical, the ALJ included an individual who was unable to leave his home unaccompanied because of mental defect or mental impairments. In response, Ms. Cody explained there was no competitive employment.74

Plaintiff's counsel asked Ms. Cody several questions, specifically if an individual had difficulty making independent judgment and remembering work-like procedures, the impact these conditions would have on the person's ability to work.75 Ms. Cody responded it would be work preclusive.76 She further explained that the absence of one day per month from work on a reoccurring basis would be considered excessive by employers.77 Plaintiff's counsel also asked if an individual had difficulty in all abilities and aptitudes needed to do unskilled work, whether it would preclude him from doing any type of unskilled work.78 Ms. Cody responded that it would preclude work.79

3. The ALJ's Findings

Based on the medical evidence and testimony provided in the 2015 hearing, the ALJ determined plaintiff was not disabled, and therefore, ineligible for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The ALJ's findings from the 2015 hearing, the disability decision at issue, are summarized as follows:

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Each party moved for summary judgment.81 In determining the appropriateness of summary judgment, the court must "review the record as a whole, `draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party[,]' but [refraining from] weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations."82 If there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.83

This standard does not change merely because there are cross-motions for summary judgment.84 Cross-motions for summary judgment:

"The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not require the court to grant summary judgment for either party."86

B. Court's Review of the ALJ's Findings

Section 405(g) sets forth the standard of review of the ALJ's decision by the district court. The court may reverse the Commissioner's final determination only if the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards, or the record did not include substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. The Commissioner's factual decisions are upheld if supported by substantial evidence.87 Substantial evidence means less than a preponderance of the evidence, but more than a mere scintilla of evidence.88 As the United States Supreme Court has found, substantial evidence "does not mean a large or significant amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."89

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, the court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision and may not re-weigh the evidence of record.90 The court's review is limited to the evidence that was actually presented to the ALJ.91 The Third Circuit has explained that a:

Thus, the inquiry is not whether the court would have made the same determination, but rather, whether the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable.93 Even if the court would have decided the case differently, it must defer to the ALJ and affirm the Commissioner's decision so long as that decision is supported by substantial evidence.94

Where "review of an administrative determination is sought, the agency's decision cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the agency in making its decision."95 In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., the Supreme Court found that a "reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis."96 The Third Circuit has recognized the applicability of this finding in the Social Security disability context.97 Thus, this court's review is limited to the four corners of the ALJ's decision.98

C. ALJ's Disability Determination Standard

The Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI) program was enacted in 1972 to assist "individuals who have attained the age of 65 or are blind or disabled" by setting a minimum income level for qualified individuals.99 A claimant — in order to establish SSI eligibility — bears the burden of proving that he is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of or not less than twelve months."100 Moreover, "the physical or mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy."101 Furthermore, a "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are evidenced by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.102

1. Five-Step Test.

The Social Security Administration uses a five-step sequential claim evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled.103

If the ALJ determines that a claimant is disabled at any step in the sequence, the analysis ends.105

2. Weight Afforded Treating Physicians

"A cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ accord treating physicians' reports great weight."106 Moreover, such reports will be given controlling weight where a treating source's opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence on record.107

The ALJ must consider medical findings supporting the treating physician's opinion that the claimant is disabled.108 If the ALJ rejects the treating physician's assessment, he may not make "speculative inferences from medical reports" and may reject "a treating physician's opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence."109 If an opinion is rejected, then the ALJ must provide an explanation for the rejection. However, the explanation need not be exhaustive, but rather "in most cases, a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice."110

However, a statement by a treating source that a claimant is "disabled" is not a medical opinion; rather, it is an opinion on an issue reserved to the ALJ because it is a finding that is dispositive of the case.111 Therefore, only the ALJ can make a disability determination.

3. Evaluation of Subjective Accounts of Pain112

Statements about the symptoms alone never establish the existence of any impairment or disability.113 The Social Security Administration uses a two-step process to evaluate existence and severity of symptoms.

a. Existence of Pain

First, the ALJ must find a medically determinable impairment — proven with medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic data — that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms. Otherwise, the ALJ cannot find the applicant disabled, no matter how genuine the symptoms appear to be.

This step does not consider the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the claimant: it only verifies whether a medical condition exists that could objectively cause the existence of the symptom.

Analysis stops at this step where the objectively determinable impairment meets or medically equals one listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, because the claimant is considered disabled per se.

b. Severity of Pain

At step two, the ALJ must determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant's ability to do basic work activities. At this step, the ALJ must consider the entire record, including medical signs, laboratory findings, the claimant's statements about symptoms, any other information provided by treating or examining physicians and psychologists, and any other relevant evidence in the record, such as the claimant's account of how the symptoms affect his activities of daily living and ability to work.114

Where more information is needed to assess a claimant's credibility, the ALJ must make every reasonable effort to obtain available information that would shed light on this issue. Therefore, the ALJ must consider the following factors relevant to symptoms, only when such additional information is needed:

4. Factors in Evaluating Credibility116

A claimant's statements and reports from medical sources and other persons with regard to the seven factors, noted above, along with any other relevant information in the record, provide the ALJ with an overview of the subjective complaints, and are elements to the determination of credibility.

Consistency with the record, particularly medical findings, supports a claimant's credibility. Since the effects of symptoms can often be clinically observed, when present, they tend to lend credibility to a claimant's allegations. Therefore, the adjudicator should review and consider any available objective medical evidence concerning the intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms in evaluating the claimant's statements.

Persistent attempts to obtain pain relief, increasing medications, trials of different types of treatment, referrals to specialists, or changing treatment sources may indicate that the symptoms are a source of distress and generally support a claimant's allegations. An applicant's claims, however, may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints, or if the medical reports or records show noncompliance with prescribed treatment.

Findings of fact by state agency medical and psychological consultants and other physicians and psychologists regarding the existence and severity of impairments and symptoms, and opinions of non-examining physicians and psychologist are also part of the analysis. Such opinions are not given controlling weight. However, the ALJ, although not bound by such findings, may not ignore them and must explain the weight afforded those opinions in his decision.

Credibility is one element in determining disability. The ALJ must apply his finding on credibility in step two of the five-step disability determination process, and may use it at each subsequent step.

The decision must clearly explain — provide sufficiently specific reasons based on the record — to the claimant and any subsequent reviewers, the weight afforded to the claimant's statements and the reasons therefore.

The law recognizes that the claimant's work history should be considered when evaluating the credibility of his testimony or statements.117 A claimant's testimony is accorded substantial credibility when he has a long work history, which demonstrates it is unlikely that, absent pain, he would have ended employment.118

5. Medical Expert Testimony

The onset date of disability is determined from the medical records and reports and other similar evidence, which requires the ALJ to apply informed judgment.119 "At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) should call on the services of a medical advisor when onset must be inferred."120

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Parties' Contentions

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his analysis of whether plaintiff's mental health impairments met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments by ignoring relevant medical evidence and failing to provide an adequate explanation for some of his findings.121 Plaintiff maintains, in making his assessment, the ALJ ignored relevant evidence that supported the severity of plaintiff's schizoaffective disorder and cognitive dysfunction.122 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ disregarded substantial amounts of evidence that supported the marked severity of his mental impairments.123

The ALJ found plaintiff had moderate restrictions in his activities of daily living ("ADLs"), but the plaintiff argues he had significant restrictions in his ability to perform ADLs.124 Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored significant portions of the evidence, which revealed severe deficits in social functioning.125 Plaintiff further maintains there was evidence in the record demonstrating he has significant concentration problems that were marked in nature, and a significant portion of the evidence was not addressed by the ALJ.126 Plaintiff argues the ALJ summarily concluded he did not have a current history of one or more years of an inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement, with a continued need for such arrangement, and the ALJ failed to provide an explanation for this finding.127

Further, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred as a matter of law in failing to accord adequate weight to the opinions and assessments of plaintiff's treating psychologist, Dr. Gloria Crespo.128 Plaintiff argues the ALJ disregarded repeated references of disabling symptoms.129 Plaintiff contends Dr. Crespo's opinion is consistent with three other treating medical providers including Gloria Diaz, Kurt Rodriguez, LCSW, and Dr. Migueline Grant Gonzalez, and the ALJ discredited their opinions based upon the one-time exam done by Mr. Kurz, who was not a treating provider.130

Alternatively, defendant contends substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.131 Defendant argues the ALJ properly evaluated the competing medical opinion evidence.132 Defendant asserts the ALJ provided legitimate reasons to grant little weight to Dr. Crespo's opinions and substantial evidence supported his determination.133 Defendant argues the reasons cited by the ALJ fully conformed to the governing regulations, which provide more weight will be given to medical opinions depending on the nature and length of the treatment relationship, the opinion's supportability, and its consistency with the record as a whole.134

Defendant further contends the ALJ did not err in concluding plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal in severity the clinical requirements of listings.135 Defendant asserts based on the evidence showing the effectiveness of plaintiff's treatment, the ALJ did not find plaintiff had marked or extreme difficulties in this domain.136 Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of the paragraph C criteria of Listings because the ALJ cited this criteria and found the evidence failed to establish its presence.137 Defendant further argues the ALJ was required to consider, and entitled to rely upon, the opinions of Drs. Tucker Okine and King in formulating his RFC finding because such state agency consultants are highly qualified psychologists who are experts in Social Security disability evaluation.138

Defendant contends the ALJ was not mandated by SSR 06-3p to explicitly weigh the statements of the claimant's mother, and does not require that ALJs explain weight given to sources other than "acceptable medical sources" and "non-medical sources" evaluating a claimant in their professional capacity.139 Defendant contends a review of the entirety of the ALJ's decision illustrates that the record supports his finding that plaintiff's impairments did not equal Listings 12.02, 12.03, 12.04, 12.05, or 12.06.140 Defendant argues the ALJ's decision meets the test for meaningful judicial review and substantive evidence supports the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's impairments were not severe enough to equal the clinical requirements of any Listed Impairment.141

B. Disability Analysis

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(I)(D), "provides for the payment of insurance benefits" to those who contributed to the program and suffer from a physical or mental disability.142 In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must establish he was disabled prior to the date he was last insured.143 A "disability" is defined as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity because of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which either could result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.144 To be disabled, the severity of the impairment must prevent return to previous work, and considering age, education, and work experience, restrict "any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."145

As explained previously herein, in determining whether a person is disabled, the Commissioner is required to perform a five-step sequential analysis.146 If a finding of disability or non-disability can be made at any point in the sequential process, the Commissioner does not review the claim further.147 Initially, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in any substantial gainful activity, and if the claimant is so engaged, a finding of non-disabled is required.148 If the claimant is not so engaged, step two requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe. If the claimant is not suffering from either, a finding of non-disabled is required.149

If the claimant's impairments are severe, the Commissioner, at the third step. compares the claimant's impairments to a list of impairments (the "listings") that are presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful work.150 When a claimant's impairment or its equivalent matches an impairment in the listing, the claimant is presumed disabled.151 If a claimant's impairments, either singularly or in combination, fail to meet or medically equal any listing, the analysis continues to step four and five.152 At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant retains the RFC to perform his past relevant work.153 A claimant's RFC is "that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by [his] impairment(s)."154 "The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] past relevant work."155

If the claimant is unable to return to his past relevant work, step five requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant's impairments preclude adjusting to any other available work.156 At this final step, the burden is on the Commissioner to show the claimant is capable of performing other available work existing in significant national numbers and consistent with the claimant's medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and RFC before denying disability benefits.157 In making this determination, the ALJ must analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant's impairments and often seeks the assistance of a vocational expert.

1. Weight Accorded to Medical Opinion Evidence

It is the exclusive responsibility of the ALJ to weigh the evidence in the record as a whole in making a disability decision.158 The evidence presented to the ALJ may contain differing medical opinions from both treating and non-treating physicians, as well as other testimony.159 Normally, the evidence presented by the treating physician is given controlling weight as that individual may be most acquainted with the medical history of the claimant. However, in circumstances where the treating physician's opinion is not consistent with the record as a whole or is not well supported by "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques", an ALJ may reasonably accord little weight to the treating physician's opinion.160 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion from treating psychologist Dr. Gloria Crespo. This court finds that the proper weight was given to Dr. Crespo's medical opinion, and the evidence supports this decision.

a. Dr. Gloria Crespo and Dr. Migueline M. Grant Gonzalez

The ALJ assigned little weight to the opinion of treating psychologist Dr. Crespo.161 Dr. Crespo concluded that plaintiff had "marked" limitations with respect to ADLs, social functioning, and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.162 In her medical judgment, plaintiff is unable to function outside of his home and/or a highly supportive living environment.163 Plaintiff argues Dr. Crespo's opinion is supported by her treatment notes and the records of Dr. Lifrak and Gloria Diaz.164 The ALJ also considered the opinion of the plaintiff's previous treating physician, Dr. Migueline M. Grant Gonzalez.165 Dr. Gonzalez stated that plaintiff is totally disabled to carry out ADLs and completely limited in his daily routine.166 The ALJ also assigned little weight to Dr. Gonzalez's statements.167 Ultimately, the ALJ found that claimant had moderate restrictions in ADLs.168

The ALJ noted that the claimant's mother, Carolina Virola-Ruiz, completed a function report in connection with his claim.169 In the report, his mother stated that she helps claimant with grooming and prepares his meals.170 She also reported that the claimant was "lazy."171 During the day, she indicated that he watches television and plays video games.172 While the claimant's mother reported supervising all major ADLs including transportation, finances, and health, the record reflects that he retains the "[a]bility to manage checkbook."173 The claimant also felt helpless about not being able to help his mother obtain housing and wanted to "move to another state to see if he can get better services."174

In addition, the ALJ found that claimant had moderate difficulties in social functioning.175 Although the ALJ considered claimant's documented paranoia and agitation, the medical evidence reveals improvement with medication176 Further, the claimant was passively cooperative, had fair impulse control, and displayed no evidence of agitation or manic symptoms upon examination.177 Other treatment providers described the claimant as calm, cooperative, pleasant, friendly, and verbal.178

The ALJ also found that claimant had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace.179 The claimant's mother reported that he can pay attention for five minutes.180 However, the medical evidence reveals improvement with medication with his memory intact and fair insight and judgement.181 Further, mental status examination findings repeatedly describe the claimant as alert, oriented, and cooperative.182

Accordingly, the ALJ noted Dr. Crespo's conclusions are inconsistent with the evidence in the record and plaintiff's level of activity, and assigned little weight to Dr. Gonzalez's findings because they are conclusory, and unsupported by the medical records.183

b. Carlene Tucker-Okine, Ph. D., and Christopher King, Psy.D.,

Plaintiff's records were reviewed by state agency psychological consultants, Carlene Tucker-Okine, Ph. D., and Christopher King, Psy.D.184 Dr. Tucker-Okine opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in multiple areas, including his ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration, complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and set realistic goals.185 Ultimately, Dr. Tucker-Okine concluded that plaintiff has only mild limitations in ADLs and maintaining social function, and moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace.186 Thereafter, Dr. King reviewed plaintiff's records and affirmed Dr. Tucker-Okine's findings.187

The ALJ considered both consultants' opinions and assigned some weight to their opinions.188 The ALJ assigned partial weight to the opinions of the consultants because their conclusions as to the claimant's ability to answer questions, follow directions, handle simple tasks, and handle one to two step commands are consistent with the medical evidence in the record.189 This includes examination findings, documented improvement with medication, and the results of intelligence testing.190 However, as discussed above, the record reflects that the claimant does have some social limitations that have been appropriately accommodated for in the residual functional capacity below.191 Accordingly, the consultants' assessments were propoerly assigned partial weight.192

2. RFC Assessment

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ failed to properly assess his residual functional capacity.193 An RFC is an individual's ability to perform in a work setting despite impairments and limitations.194 In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant's impairments, including those that are non-severe. Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, he must indicate the evidence which he rejects and his reason(s) for discounting such evidence.195

In the current matter, the ALJ found that plaintiff possessed the residual functioning capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels.196 The ALJ, however, noted the following nonexertional limitations: unskilled work, no more than reasoning level two; no requirement to read, speak, or understand English to perform the work; no work at exposed heights; no working around moving machinery; no interaction with the general public; and no more than occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.197 Furthermore, the ALJ specifically found plaintiff retains the ability to perform work within the parameters of the above residual functional capacity, which considered and accounted for his medically determinable impairments.198

V. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the findings contained herein:

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.I. 15) is denied; and

2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.I. 20) is granted.

A Judgement Order shall follow.

JUDGMENT ORDER

At Wilmington this 10th day of December, 2018.

IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.I. 15 is DENIED.

2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.I. 20) is GRANTED.