RICHARD G. ANDREWS, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is the issue of claim construction of multiple terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 8,441,438 ("the '438 patent") and 8,552,978 ("the '978 patent"). The Court has considered the Parties' Joint Claim Construction Brief. (D.I. 51). The Court heard oral argument on December 14, 2018. (Hr'g Trans.).
On June 16, 2017, CyWee Group, Ltd. ("Plaintiff") filed a patent infringement action against Motorola Mobility LLC ("Defendant"). (D.I. 1). The patents-in-suit are U.S. Patent Nos. 8,441,438 ("the '438 patent") and 8,552,978 ("the '978 patent"). The patents-in-suit concern an apparatus and methods capable of detecting, measuring, and calculating the movements and rotations of the axis using either a six-axis (the '438 patent) or nine-axis (the '978 patent) sensor module.
The parties dispute terms in claims 1, 3-5, and 14-19 of the '438 patent. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
('438 patent, claim 1) (disputed terms italicized).
The parties dispute terms in claims 10 and 12 of the '978 patent. Claim 10 is representative and reads as follows:
('978 patent, claim 10) (disputed terms italicized).
"It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). "`[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.' Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources `in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.'" SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 4758195, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324) (alteration in original). When construing patent claims, a court considers the literal language of the claim, the patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Of these sources, "the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. . . . [Which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Id. at 1312-13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to [an] ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words." Id. at 1314.
When a court relies solely upon the intrinsic evidence—the patent claims, the specification, and the prosecution history—the court's construction is a determination of law. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015). The court may also make factual findings based upon consideration of extrinsic evidence, which "consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Extrinsic evidence may assist the court in understanding the underlying technology, the meaning of terms to one skilled in the art, and how the invention works. Id. Extrinsic evidence, however, is less reliable and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its prosecution history. Id.
"A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows that "a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor's device is rarely the correct interpretation." Osram GMBH v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. "utilizing a comparison to compare the first signal set with the second signal set" ('438 patent, cl. 1)
This term has been construed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. I agree with the Texas court that the term is not indefinite and that no construction is necessary. I therefore adopt the Texas court's opinion as set out. (DJ. 52, Ex.Cat 14-17; Id., Ex D. at 7-11).
2. "generating the orientation output based on the first signal set, the second signal set and the rotation output or based on the first signal set and the second signal set" ('978 patent, cl. 10)
This term has been construed by the Texas court. I agree with the Texas court that the term is not indefinite and that the term shall be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. I therefore adopt the Texas court's opinion as set out. (D.I. 52, Ex. Cat 14-17; Id., Ex D. at 7-11).
3. "using the orientation output and the rotation output to generate a transformed output associated with a fixed reference frame associated with a display device" ('978 patent, cl. 10)
This term has previously been construed by the Texas Court. I agree with the Texas court's construction and rationale. Therefore, I adopt the Texas court's opinion as set out. (D.I. 52, Ex. Cat 12-14; Id., Ex D. at 6-7).
4. "three-dimensional (3D) pointing device"/ "3D pointing device" ('438 patent, cls. 1, 3-5, 14-19; '978 patent, cls. 10, 12)
This term has previously been construed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. I agree with the Texas Court "that the 3D pointing device recited in the claims is not required to control a `cursor or pointer on a display." (D.I. 52, Ex. D at 2). The patent clearly contemplates that the device may indicate the movement on the display in a variety of ways including "some video effect" or "a movement pattern" in addition to the traditional cursor or pointer. ('438 patent, col. 17:36-37; '978 patent col. 21:61-65). A construction that does not require a cursor or pointer does not read "pointing" out of the disputed term. Moreover, where the intrinsic evidence provides instruction, it is inappropriate to rely on an extrinsic dictionary definition. The intrinsic evidence suggests that "pointing" is intended to reference that the device controls or directs something on the display screen. ('438 patent, col. 1:32-34; '978 patent col. 1:36-37 (describing pointing device as a computer mouse or pad
In contrast, Plaintiffs' construction does read out the term "pointing" entirely and is therefore inappropriate. Finally, as the parties dispute the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed term, I find that construction will be helpful to both the parties and the jury. Here, the patent specification describes only embodiments where the device is handheld and refers to prior art that was "portable." ('978 col. 1:29-30; Fig. 3, 5, 6; '438 col. 1:28-30, Fig. 3, 5, 6). Therefore, the Court construes "three-dimensional pointing device"/ "3D pointing device" to mean "a handheld device that detects the motion of said device in three-dimensions and is capable of translating the detected motions to control an output on a display."
Within five days the parties shall submit a proposed order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion suitable for submission to the jury.