LEONARD P. STARK, District Judge.
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's motion to certify a class (D.I. 49) and Defendants' motion for reargument (D.I. 54) and motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (D.I. 59). Having reviewed the parties' briefing (D.I. 49, 54, 57, 59, 61, 62), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion to certify a class (D.I. 49) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to refile the motion at a time consistent with the parties' stipulation. (See D.I. 55) (stipulating to extend briefing "until such time as agreed by the parties and/or ordered by the Court")
2. Defendants' motion for reargument (D.I. 54) is DENIED as moot; the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") is no longer the operative pleading.
3. Defendants' motion to dismiss (D.I. 59) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
a. Defendants' motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical care claim.
The Court provided an extensive discussion
To address the deficiencies of the TAC, Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (D.I. 56) The FAC includes new allegations, including: (1) "numerous medical personnel have confirmed that they were ordered not to provide medical or mental health treatment to the Building C inmates," (2) "[m]ultiple mental health workers [and medical staff employees] told Parkell that Pierce ordered that mental health care must be withheld," (3) that, "[a]s a result of these orders, Parkell's [separated ribs] were never treated [and his] mental health deteriorated to the critical state requiring intervention in order to likely save his life," and (4) once Parker was appointed interim warden, "his action was to permit the denials to continue." (D.I. 56 at ¶¶ 91-95) In addition, Plaintiff replaces general recitations of "Defendants" or "DOC" in the TAC with "Pierce and Parker" in the FAC. (See, e.g., D.I. 56-1 at ¶¶ 100, 103)
Defendants contend that these amendments are insufficient to overcome the Court's prior Order (D.I. 59 at 3-4), and the Court agrees. Naming Pierce and Parker may obviate the Court's first conclusion — that Plaintiff failed to "`identify an individual who allegedly committed the wrongful act or who failed to take action,'" (D.I. 50 at 11) (quoting Restrepo v. Phelps, 2018 WL 1664972, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 6, 2018)) However, Plaintiff did not adequately address the Court's second conclusion — that "there are no specific factual allegations in the [Complaint] regarding any of those Defendants to support that assertion or to suggest that Defendants were aware of the denials of care yet did nothing to address them." (Id.) (citing Stones v. McDonald, 7 F.Supp.3d 422, 436 (D. Del.), aff'd, 573 F. App'x 236 (3d Cir. 2014) (requiring "allegations of
Plaintiff's new allegations are too conclusory to be presumed true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009) (noting that bare allegations that defendant was "principal architect" of a policy are "conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true"). Plaintiff, for instance, does not plead any
b. Defendants' motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.
Plaintiff's allegations remain substantively similar and his FAC addresses some deficiencies noted in the Court's prior Opinion. (Compare D.I. 50 at 16, n.6 (refusing to consider 2005 task force report and CLASI Order because they were not integral to TAC) with D.I. 56 at ¶¶ 33, 47-49 (discussing with specificity 2005 task force report and CLASI Order)) Plaintiff's amendments do not require reconsideration of the Court's prior decision. The FAC claim is at least as well-pled as the analogous TAC claim.
Defendants also incorporate their motion for reargument regarding the TAC into their motion to dismiss the FAC. (D.I. 59 at 5) In particular, Defendants assert that the Court
District courts are strongly encouraged to resolve the question of qualified immunity as early as possible. See Barkes v. First Correctional Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 330 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). Often, the issue may be resolved on a motion to dismiss, to best serve the policy considerations underlying qualified immunity, see generally Thomas v. Independence Tp., 463 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2006), but this is not always required or possible. While Defendants rely on the Third Circuit's statement in Barkes that "`the determination of qualified immunity