CHRISTOPHER J. BURKE, Magistrate Judge.
In this action filed by Plaintiff Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P ("Sunoco" or "Plaintiff") against Powder Springs Logistics, LLC ("Powder Springs") and Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P. ("Magellan" and collectively with Powder Springs, "Defendants"), Sunoco alleges infringement of United States Patent Nos. 6,679,302 (the "'302 patent"), 7,032,629 (the "'629 patent"), 9,207,686 (the "'686 patent"), 9,494,948 (the "'948 patent) and 9,606,548 (the "'548 patent" and collectively with the other patents, "the asserted patents").
The Court hereby incorporates by reference the summary of the background of this matter set out in its July 26, 2019 Report and Recommendation ("July 26 R&R"). (D.I. 321 at 1-2) It additionally incorporates by reference the legal principles regarding claim construction set out in the July 26, 2019 R&R. (Id. at 2-5) Because Defendants contend that certain of the disputed claim terms addressed herein are indefinite, (see, e.g., D.I. 171 at 17-20), the Court further includes below the applicable standard for definiteness.
The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that patent claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of what is claimed, thus enabling interested members of the public (e.g., competitors of the patent owner) to determine whether they infringe. All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Put another way, "[a] patent holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). Even so, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that "absolute precision is unattainable" and not required. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014).
"[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention." Id. at 901. Definiteness is to be evaluated from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the patent was filed. Id. at 908.
Like claim construction, definiteness is a question of law for the court. H-W Tech., L.C. v. Overstock.com, Inc., 758 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Pi-Net Int'l Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 42 F.Supp.3d 579, 586 (D. Del. 2014). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that "[a]ny fact critical to a holding on indefiniteness ... must be proven by the challenger by clear and convincing evidence." Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The parties had claim construction disputes regarding five terms or sets of terms (hereinafter, "terms"). The Court has addressed one of these terms in a previously-issued Report and Recommendation. (D.I. 321) The Court addresses three of the four remaining terms herein; the final term ("gasoline") will be addressed in a separate Report and Recommendation.
The claim term "vapor pressure" appears in claims of all five asserted patents. (D.I. 166, ex. A at 3-4) The parties' competing proposed constructions for "vapor pressure" are set out in the chart below:
(D.I. 171 at 13) The parties have two main disputes with respect to this term: (1) whether "vapor pressure" means the same thing as "volatility" (and relatedly, whether measuring vapor/liquid ratio qualifies as a way to measure vapor pressure); and (2) whether the construction should require a measurement. (See, e.g., Tr. at 95-96, 109-10; D.I. 188 at 8, 10) Defendants believe that the answer to both questions is "yes," as is reflected in their proposal. The Court will first explain why it does not agree, and will then consider the appropriate construction for the term.
Is "vapor pressure" the exact same thing as "volatility," as Defendants' construction suggests? In the Court's view, the answer (pursuant to the intrinsic record) is "no."
Rather, the specification of the '302 patent explains with respect to volatility that "[a] significant physical property of gasoline is its volatility, or its ability to combust[,]" and that measuring the vapor pressure of gasoline is a way to assess the volatility of the gasoline. ('302 patent, col. 1:28-34) To that end, the specification states that:
(Id., col. 1:29-37 (emphasis added)) With respect to the relationship between vapor pressure and volatility, this portion of the specification conveys that "[t]he Reid vapor pressure of gasoline affects the ease with which gasoline is combusted[,]" (id., col. 1:38-40 (emphasis added)), and that gasoline marketers blend agents including butane into gasoline "to increase the Reid vapor pressure and volatility of the gasoline[,]" (id., col. 1:44-48 (emphasis added)). This all suggests that, according to the patents, while vapor pressure is something that, when measured, can help one assess the volatility of gasoline, vapor pressure and volatility are not the same thing. (D.I. 315 ("Tr.") at 100-01, 123 (Defendants' counsel acknowledging that measuring vapor pressure is a "method[] of measuring volatility"))
Relatedly, does measuring "vapor/liquid ratio" qualify as a way to measure "vapor pressure" and are "vapor/liquid ratio" and "vapor pressure" the same thing (as Defendants suggest)? Again, in the Court's view, the answer is "no."
In support of their position to the contrary, Defendants point to a portion of the '302 patent specification that they contend "[e]xpressly define[s]" the term vapor pressure as reflected in their proposal. (D.I. 171 at 13 (emphasis omitted); see also D.I. 188 at 8; Tr. at 104-05) That portion of the specification states that:
('302 patent, col. 5:47-53) Defendants' counsel asserts that this description tells us that when the patentee uses "vapor pressure" in the claims, the patentee is "referring to all three of those volatility measurements [i.e., vapor/liquid ratio, Reid vapor pressure, and true vapor pressure]." (Tr. at 102; see also id. at 103 ("I think generally [with respect to the term] vapor pressure, [the patentee] equate[s] it to volatility and volatility can be measured [in these three ways].")) And the Court acknowledges that this portion of the specification, read in isolation, is helpful to Defendants' position. Indeed, even Sunoco concedes that the above sentence "is perhaps confusing" with respect to the definition of vapor pressure. (Id. at 117)
But ultimately, the Court agrees with Sunoco that when the entire intrinsic record is considered, that record demonstrates that "vapor pressure" and "vapor/liquid ratio" do not mean the same thing. This is seen by examining other portions of the patent specifications as well as certain of the patents' claims.
With regard to the patent specifications, it is for example notable that in the very next sentences following the '302 patent excerpt referenced above, the patentee explains that:
('302 patent, col. 5:53-58 (emphasis added))
The '302 patent's claims also indicate that "vapor pressure" and "vapor/liquid ratio" are not the same thing. (D.I. 176 at 9-10; D.I. 191 at 7) For example, independent claim 27 of the '302 patent recites, inter alia, "[a] method for blending butane and gasoline using a processor" that includes "receiving a gasoline volatility measurement at the processor." ('302 patent, col. 15:54-65 (emphasis added)) Claim 33 then recites "[t]he method of claim
Therefore, in the Court's view, the patents as a whole convey that: (1) vapor pressure and vapor/liquid ratio are two physical characteristics of gasoline; and (2) measuring these physical characteristics constitutes two separate, principle methods of assessing the volatility of gasoline.
Lastly, the Court further agrees with Sunoco that Defendants' proposal wrongly includes a limitation that the "vapor pressure" must be "measured." Defendants fail to show that the term "vapor pressure" alone imposes a requirement that an actual measurement be performed; rather, the term, standing alone, appears to simply describe a particular physical property of volatile liquids. (D.I. 176 at 9 & ex. A at ¶ 5.1) Of course, the intrinsic record makes clear that "vapor pressure" is something that can be measured. For example, the specification of the '302 patent explains that one of the principle methods for assessing the volatility of gasoline is "measuring the vapor pressure." ('302 patent, col. 1:29-31) It is just that the use of the term "vapor pressure" itself does not inherently require a measurement.
Certain claims of the asserted patents also bear this out. For instance, claim 14 of the '302 patent recites a method for blending gasoline and butane at a tank farm "wherein the blend ratio is determined from a vapor pressure of the gasoline stream and a vapor pressure of the butane stream." (Id., col. 14:19-21 (emphasis added)) This claim does not expressly recite a requirement that the vapor pressure actually be measured. (See D.I. 191 at 9) Meanwhile, in contrast, claim 15 of the '302 patent recites a method for blending gasoline and butane at a tank farm wherein a vapor pressure of the gasoline stream and a vapor pressure of the butane are "determined" by "drawing a sample of gasoline [and] measuring the vapor pressure of the sample of gasoline" (and doing the same for the sample of butane). ('302 patent, col. 14:22-31) When the claims require an actual measurement of vapor pressure, they make that clear through the use of express measurement limitations. (See D.I. 176 at 11)
With all of the above established, the Court must now consider the proper construction for "vapor pressure." Sunoco's proposal, "a physical property of volatile liquids," addresses the meaning of vapor pressure at a very high level, but fails to explain what vapor pressure actually is—i.e., what physical property of such liquids is vapor pressure describing? (See D.I. 188 at 10) It would be helpful to a factfinder to have some substantive explanation on that front.
Defendants have described vapor pressure as constituting "the pressure exerted by vapor as it evaporates." (D.I. 179, Slide 110) And the American Society for Testing and Materials ("ASTM") Standard Test Method for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products, cited by Sunoco in its brief, defines vapor pressure as "`pressure exerted by the vapor of a liquid when in equilibrium with the liquid.'" (D.I. 176 at 9 (quoting id., ex. A at ¶ 3.1.5))
Therefore, the Court recommends that "vapor pressure" be construed to mean "pressure exerted by the vapor of a liquid when in equilibrium with the liquid."
The other disputed vapor pressure-related terms are found in asserted claims of the '302 patent, '629 patent and '686 patent. (D.I. 166, ex. A at 4-7) The use of some of the disputed terms in claim 27 of the '302 patent, claim 1 of the '686 patent, and claim 31 of the '629 patent are exemplary. (See, e.g., D.I. 171 at 15) These claims are reproduced below, with the disputed terms highlighted:
('302 patent, col. 15:54-65 (emphasis added))
('686 patent, cols. 15:62-16:13 (emphasis added))
('629 patent, col. 16:8-20 (emphasis added))
The parties' competing proposed constructions for these other terms related to "vapor pressure" are set out in the chart below:
(D.I. 176 at 11-12) The crux of the parties' dispute with respect to these terms relates to whether, "every time a `vapor pressure' or `volatility' is referenced, the claims require actively sampling and measuring the vapor pressure" or volatility of the individual gasoline and butane streams (as Defendants assert), or not (as Sunoco asserts). (D.I. 191 at 10; see also D.I. 188 at 11)
Here, the Court again sides with Sunoco. It does so for a few reasons.
First, looking to the claims themselves, certain of the claims expressly specify how, when, and whether vapor pressure or volatility measurements must be taken. (D.I. 176 at 13-14; D.I. 191 at 10-12; Sunoco's Markman Presentation, Slide 43; Tr. at 150) For example, looking at claim 1 of the '686 patent reproduced above, it recites providing "a continuously flowing gasoline stream that comprises[,]" inter alia, "a plurality of gasoline vapor pressures" and "providing a stream of said [volatility modifying] agent that comprises an agent vapor pressure." ('686 patent, cols. 15:62-16:4) The claim then expressly recites "periodically determining said gasoline vapor pressure" but does not contain a limitation requiring that the vapor pressure of the volatility modifying agent be periodically determined. (Id., col. 16:5) The blend ratio is then calculated "based upon said agent vapor pressure, said gasoline vapor pressure, and said allowable vapor pressure[.]" (Id., col. 16:7-9) Thus, as Sunoco points out, for this claim "[w]hile gasoline vapor pressure must be periodically determined, agent vapor pressure does not[.]" (Sunoco's Markman Presentation, Slide 43; see also D.I. 191 at 10) Claims such as this one, then, appear to reflect the inventors' recognition that "a vapor pressure or volatility exists for respective volatile liquids (whether that property be already known or measured)[.]" (D.I. 176 at 14)
An examination of claims 27 and 28 of the '302 patent provides another example of why Defendants' position is problematic. Claim 27, reproduced above, only requires "receiving a gasoline volatility measurement" and "a butane volatility measurement" at the processor; the claim does not specify how, when or whether such measurements are calculated. ('302 patent, col. 15:56-59; see also D.I. 191 at 11; Sunoco's Markman Presentation, Slide 45)
The specification of the '302 patent also counsels against reading in limitations requiring an actual measurement of the streams to be blended. The specification explains that:
(Id., col. 7:15-26 (emphasis added)) These statements, taken together, first make clear that a person of ordinary skill in the art must have knowledge of the respective vapor pressures of the gasoline and butane streams, and then describe a preferred embodiment in which the vapor pressures of the gasoline and butane streams to be blended are directly measured. (D.I. 191 at 13; Tr. at 141-42) But, of course, claims are generally not limited in scope to a preferred embodiment. See, e.g., Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also (Tr. at 142 (Sunoco's counsel explaining that this portion of the specification demonstrates that "you can carry out a measurement in a number of ways, nothing in the specification is forcing you to limit it to taking an actual measurement right before you[ are] blending those streams")). And as Sunoco asserts, the "corollary" to the vapor pressure "preferably [being] measured directly" may be that "if one already knows the gasoline vapor pressure (e.g., from a recent measurement) or whether the butane is `n-butane' or `isobutane,' then there is no need to directly measure the vapor pressure prior to blending." (D.I. 191 at 14; see also Tr. at 142)
The intrinsic record, then, counsels against adoption of Defendants' proposals for these vapor pressure-related terms. The Court will thus decline to construe these terms, as its rejection of Defendants' proposal appears to resolve the dispute between the parties.
The term "optimizing" is found in the preamble of claim 18 of the '302 patent, and the term "simplifying" is found in the preamble of claim 23 of the '302 patent. (D.I. 166, ex. A at 8-9) These claims are reproduced below, with the disputed terms highlighted.
('302 patent, col. 14:51-67 (emphasis added))
(Id., col. 15:31-46 (emphasis added))
The parties' competing proposed constructions for "optimizing" and "simplifying" are set out in the chart below:
(D.I. 171 at 17) Defendants contend that these terms are indefinite because: (1) the concepts of "optimizing" purchasing decisions and "simplifying" record keeping are subjective; and (2) the patent specification provides no guidance on how to determine whether something has been sufficiently optimized or simplified. (Id.) For its part, Sunoco retorts that these preamble terms are not limiting and therefore need not be construed (and that, accordingly, Defendants' indefiniteness argument fails). (D.I. 176 at 16; D.I. 191 at 15) Even if these terms are deemed limiting, however, Sunoco further argues that their plain and ordinary meanings (i.e., "more accurately forecasting" and "reducing the complexity of") should be adopted. (D.I. 191 at 15)
The question of whether language in a preamble constitutes a claim limitation is a question of law. Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 567 F.App'x 941, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2014). "While it is true that preamble language is often treated as nonlimiting in nature, it is not unusual for [the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] to treat preamble language as limiting[.]" Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Generally, "a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the claim." Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, C.A. No. 12-193-LPS, 2015 WL 1393386, at *24 (D. Del. Mar. 24, 2015). A preamble may also be construed as limiting when: (1) the claim limitations in the body of the claim "rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble[,]" Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003), or (2) when the patent applicants clearly relied on the benefits or features recited therein as patentably significant, Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808-09. On the other hand, when the claim body recites a structurally complete invention and the preamble language is used merely to state the purpose or intended use of the invention, the preamble is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim. Id. at 808.
As to this issue, Defendants do not assert that claim limitations in the body of the claim derive antecedent basis from the preamble terms "optimizing" and "simplifying." (See D.I. 191 at 15) Nor do Defendants argue that the patent applicants relied on these terms as patentably significant during prosecution of the '302 patent. (Id.) Instead, Defendants' sole argument as to why these preamble terms should be deemed limiting is that they are "essential to understand the claim terms and are `necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claims.'" (D.I. 171 at 18 (citing Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock Labs. Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d 445, 460-61 (D. Del. 2012)); D.I. 188 at 18; see also Tr. at 160) To that end, Defendants assert that the limitations in the bodies of claims 18 and 23 set forth ways to measure butane consumption over time and record and generate a report of volatility during a blend, respectively, and that the preamble terms explain the purposes for doing so—to optimize butane purchase decisions and to simplify record keeping requirements, including those imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency. (D.I. 171 at 18; D.I. 188 at 18 ("[O]nly after reading the preambles does it become clear what the claims are directed to."))
The Court is not persuaded that the preamble terms are necessary to give life and meaning to these claims. Defendants do not explain how or where the patentee made it clear that the concepts of "optimizing butane purchase decisions" or "simplifying record keeping requirements" was so essential to the claimed inventions that excluding them from the claims' requirements would amount to losing the "essence of the invention[.]" Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Instead, the preambles of claims 18 and 23 appear to simply "stat[e] a purpose or intended use and employ[] the standard pattern of such language: the words `a method for a purpose or intended use comprising,' followed by the body of the claim, in which the claim limitations describing the invention are recited." TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, the bodies of the claims recite structurally complete methods; the preambles simply provide context, indicating a use that one could put those fully-articulated, linguistically-complete methods to. (D.I. 191 at 17; Tr. at 163-64)
For example, the body of claim 18 recites a method for blending butane in which one is monitoring the consumption of butane blended, transmitting that data to an information processing unit and transforming that data to an output of data. That you could utilize this output to optimize butane purchase decisions merely states an intended use of the invention. (Tr. at 163-64) Likewise, the body of claim 23 recites a method of blending butane and gasoline, monitoring the volatility and rate at which the butane is blended into the gasoline, inputting this data into an information processing unit and generating a report summarizing this data. (Id. at 165) That such a method could simplify record keeping requirements for butane use at a tank farm merely recites an intended use for this method.
In light of the Court's conclusion that these preamble terms are not limiting, no further construction (or consideration of Defendants' indefiniteness argument) is required. See Alcohol Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Actsoft, Inc., 414 F.App'x 294, 298 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that the preamble of a method claim was not limiting where it merely gave a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim that set forth a structurally complete invention, and therefore did not further limit the scope of the claims); Warner Chilcott Co. v. Mylan Inc., Civil Action No. 11-3262 (JAP), 2013 WL 1410005, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2013) (finding that the method claim's preamble did not constitute a limitation (and thus did not require construction) where the claim body itself described a complete invention and where the prosecution history did not demonstrate clear reliance on the preamble as rendering the invention patentably significant).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the District Court adopt the following constructions:
1. "vapor pressure" should be construed to mean "a pressure exerted by the vapor of a liquid when in equilibrium with the liquid"
2. No constructions are necessary for the other terms related to "vapor pressure." These terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.
3. The preamble terms "optimizing" and "simplifying" are not limiting and therefore no construction is required.
This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D. Del. LR 72.1. The parties may serve and file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review in the district court. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987); Sincavage v. Barnhart, 171 F.App'x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).
The parties are directed to the Court's Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, dated October 9, 2013, a copy of which is available on the District Court's website, located at http://www.ded.uscourts.gov.
In Boehringer, the claim at issue recited a "method of growing and isolating swine infertility and respiratory syndrome virus" which comprised "inoculating the virus on a full or partial sheet of simian cells in the presence of serum in a suitable grown medium and incubating the inoculated cell sheet at about 34 C. to 37 C. until CPE is observed." Boehringer, 320 F.3d at 1344-45. In finding the preamble to be limiting, the Federal Circuit explained that "growing" and "isolating" were not "merely circumstances in which the method may be useful" but instead were the "raison d'être of the claimed method itself." Id. at 1345 (emphasis in original). In other words, without the preamble, the process recited in the body of the claim conveyed no "fathomable utility" and suggested merely an "academic exercise." Id.; (see also Tr. at 166 (Sunoco's counsel noting that in Boehringer, "you actually have to grow and isolate this virus"—without the preamble language, "you just really are left not knowing what the essence of the invention is. Why are you inoculating the virus on a full or a partial sheet, why do you incubate a cell sheet at about 35 degrees Celsius")) Here, however, while the preambles provide context for how to use the methods recited in the claim bodies, they do not constitute the "essence" of the invention in this way. Put differently, even without the preamble language, the claims themselves convey processes that have understandable utility. It is not hard to see how, even in the absence of the guidance provided by the preamble, the utilization of the claimed methods goes beyond an "academic exercise"; the claim bodies clearly articulate what the point of these claimed inventions are (blending butane and gasoline in certain ways, monitoring aspects of that process and generating data regarding that process so that it can be evaluated).
In Griffin, the claim at issue recited a "method for diagnosing an increased risk for thrombosis or a genetic defect causing thrombosis" comprising steps of obtaining "from a test subject" test nucleic acid and "assaying for the presence of a point mutation[,]" the presence of which "indicates an increased risk for thrombosis or a genetic defect causing thrombosis." Griffin, 285 F.3d at 1031. In concluding that the preamble was limiting, the Federal Circuit observed that the aspect of the invention recited in the preamble (diagnosing an increased risk for thrombosis or a genetic defect causing thrombosis) "is again stated in the body of the count" and that "[d]iagnosis is thus the essence of this invention[.]" Id. at 1033. Furthermore, the Griffin Court explained that in the absence of the preamble's stated objective to diagnose thrombosis, certain terms in the body of the claim such as "test subject" and "assaying for the presence of point mutation" constituted "empty language" with no purpose. Id. Here, the "optimizing" and "simplifying" terms are not repeated in the body of the claim. And Defendants have pointed to no language in the claims that would amount to "empty language" were the preamble not limiting.