CHRISTOPHER J. BURKE, Magistrate Judge.
In these two related actions filed by Plaintiff Guardant Health, Inc. ("Guardant" or "Plaintiff") against Defendants Foundation Medicine, Inc. ("FMI") and Personal Genome Diagnostics, Inc. ("PGDx" and collectively with FMI, "Defendants"), Guardant alleges infringement of United States Patent Nos. 9,598,731 (the "'731 patent"), 9,834,822 (the "'822 patent"), 9,840,743 (the "'743 patent") and 9,902,992 (the "'992 patent" and collectively with the other patents, "the asserted patents"). Presently before the Court is the matter of claim construction. The Court recommends that the District Court adopt the constructions as set forth below.
Guardant commenced these actions on November 9, 2017. (Civil Action No. 17-1616-LPS-CJB, D.I. 1; Civil Action No. 17-1623-LPS-CJB, D.I. 1) The cases were thereafter referred to the Court to hear and resolve all pretrial matters, up to and including case-dispositive motions. (Civil Action No. 17-1616-LPS-CJB, D.I. 5; Civil Action No. 17-1623-LPS-CJB, D.I. 4)
In the currently-operative Third Amended Complaints, Guardant alleges that Defendants' liquid biopsy tests infringe claims of the asserted patents. (Civil Action No. 17-1616-LPS-CJB, D.I. 149 at ¶¶ 4, 14-24; Civil Action No. 17-1623-LPS-CJB, D.I. 280 at ¶¶ 6, 17-28) The asserted patents relate to methods for identifying genetic material harboring cancer-causing mutations from a patient's blood. (See D.I. 59 at 1)
The parties completed initial briefing on claim construction on November 16, 2018. (D.I. 59; D.I. 68; D.I. 72; D.I. 74)
It is well-understood that "[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention." Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Claim construction is a generally a question of law, although subsidiary fact finding is sometimes necessary. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 837-38 (2015).
The Court should typically assign claim terms their "ordinary and customary meaning[,]" which is "the meaning that the term[s] would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art [`POSITA'] in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, when determining the ordinary meaning of claim terms, the Court should not extract and isolate those terms from the context of the patent; rather it should endeavor to reflect their "meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321; see also Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In proceeding with claim construction, the Court should look first and foremost to the language of the claims themselves, because "[i]t is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, the context in which a term is used in a claim may be "highly instructive." Id. at 1314. In addition, "[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can ... be valuable" in discerning the meaning of a particular claim term. Id. This is "[b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, [and so] the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims." Id. Moreover, "[d]ifferences among claims can also be a useful guide[,]" as when "the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim." Id. at 1314-15.
In addition to the words of the claims, the Court should look to other intrinsic evidence. For example, the Court should analyze the patent specification, which "may reveal a special definition given to a claim term ... that differs from the meaning [that term] would otherwise possess" or may reveal an intentional disclaimer of claim scope. Id. at 1316. Even if the specification does not contain such revelations, it "is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." Id. at 1315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That said, however, the specification "is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language." SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And a court should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence, because it "can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution[.]" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
Extrinsic evidence, "including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises[,]" can also "shed useful light on the relevant art[.]" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Overall, while extrinsic evidence may be useful, it is "less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
In utilizing these resources during claim construction, courts should keep in mind that "[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The parties currently have disputes regarding 13 terms or sets of terms (hereinafter, "terms"). This Report and Recommendation addresses three such terms. The other terms will be addressed in one or more forthcoming Report and Recommendations.
The claim term "sequence read" appears in certain claims of all four asserted patents. (D.I. 53, ex. B at 4-5) The use of the disputed term in claim 1 of the '731 patent and claim 1 of the '743 patent is representative. (See Defendants' Markman Presentation, Slide 3; Guardant's Markman Presentation, Slide 7) Accordingly, these claims are reproduced below, with the disputed term highlighted:
('731 patent, col. 62:8-54 (emphasis added))
('743 patent, col. 62:43-65 (emphasis added))
The parties' competing proposed constructions for "sequence read" are set out in the chart below:
(D.I. 59 at 6) As reflected by the proposals, the parties' dispute is a narrow one. Both parties agree that: (1) a "sequence read" is obtained from a sequencer; (2) a "sequence read" reflects the order of bases of a polynucleotide; and (3) an accuracy, quality or mapping score threshold can be assigned to a "sequence read." (D.I. 74 at 5; Tr. at 6, 12)
Guardant asserts that the claim language supports its view that the term "sequence read" encompasses information beyond merely the order of the bases. (D.I. 59 at 6; D.I. 72 at 5; Tr. at 7, 15) To that end, Guardant points to the limitation of claim 1 of the '743 patent that recites "filtering out [sequence] reads that fail to meet a set accuracy, quality score, or mapping score threshold[.]" (D.I. 59 at 6 (quoting '743 patent, col. 62:49-50)) Guardant also points to dependent claim 5 of the '731 patent, which recites "[t]he method of claim
The specification underscores this conclusion. It first conveys that a "sequence read" is "[t]he output of a sequencer[.]" ('731 patent, col. 31:21) The specification then explains that "[a]fter sequencing, reads are assigned a quality score" and that such a score "may be a representation of reads that indicates whether those reads may be useful in subsequent analysis based on a threshold." (Id., col. 44:37-40 (emphasis added); see also id., col. 44:50-51 ("After mapping alignment, sequence reads are assigned a mapping score.") (emphasis added)) Furthermore, the specification explains that "[s]equencing reads with a quality score at least 90%, 95%, 99%, 99.9%, 99.99% or 99.999% may be filtered out of the data. In other cases, sequencing reads assigned a quality score less than 90%, 95%, 99%, 99.9%, 99.99% or 99.999% may be filtered out of the data set." (Id., col. 44:42-47 (emphasis added)) Thus, the specification consistently demonstrates that a quality score is not part of the sequence read itself, but instead is something that is assigned to the sequence read, after the sequence read itself has already been generated. (See D.I. 68 at 5; D.I. 74 at 5; Tr. at 12 ("The sequence read is the sequence. In addition to that, the sequencer may assign a quality score. That is information about the quality of the sequence read. But that is not the sequence read."))
For the above reasons, the Court recommends that "sequence read" be construed to mean "the order of the bases of a polynucleotide determined by a sequencer."
The claim term "barcode(s)" appears in certain claims of all four asserted patents. (D.I. 53, ex. B at 1) The use of the disputed term in claim 1 of the '731 patent, reproduced above, is representative. (See Defendants' Markman Presentation, Slide 8) That claim recites, inter alia, "attaching tags comprising barcodes having from 5 to 1000 distinct barcode sequences to said cell-free DNA obtained from said bodily sample of the subject, to generate non-uniquely tagged parent polynucleotides, wherein each barcode sequence is at least 5 nucleotides in length[.]" ('731 patent, col. 62:12-17 (emphasis added))
The parties' competing proposed constructions for "barcode(s)" are set out in the chart below:
(D.I. 59 at 3) The parties agree that a "barcode" is something used to identify unique molecules. (Id.; D.I. 68 at 2-3; Tr. at 19) The crux of the dispute with respect to this term is whether a "barcode" must be made out of a "nucleotide or a sequence of nucleotides[,]" (Defendants' position), or whether a "barcode" may be made up of things other than nucleotides, such as a dye or metal isotope (Guardant's position). (D.I. 59 at 3-4; D.I. 68 at 3; Tr. at 18) Here, the Court again concludes that Defendants' position is best supported by the intrinsic evidence.
According to Guardant, one particular portion of the specification clearly conveys that a "barcode" may be composed of things other than nucleotides:
('731 patent, col. 38:8-25 (emphasis added)) Guardant asserts that this specification excerpt demonstrates that the patentee used the terms "identifier" and "barcode" interchangeably. (D.I. 72 at 3; Tr. at 20) In other words, Guardant reads the above-quoted phrase "unique or non-unique identifiers, or molecular barcodes" to mean "unique or non-unique identifiers, which is another way of saying molecular barcodes." Thus, according to Guardant, when this portion of the specification goes on to teach that a "dye" or "hybridization probe" could be utilized as a unique identifier, that means that a dye or hybridization probe could be utilized as a barcode (and that it would thus be improper to construe "barcode" as being limited to a nucleotide or a sequence of nucleotides). And the Court acknowledges that, when read in isolation, the above excerpt could seem helpful to Guardant's position. (See Tr. at 28 (Defendants' counsel noting that that this excerpt "is unclear, because there is nothing else that equates barcodes with a unique identifier"))
However, when the specification is viewed as a whole, it very clearly teaches that a "barcode" is a particular type of identifier that is made up of a single nucleotide or a sequence of nucleotides.
The intrinsic record, then, is consistent with Defendants' position that a "barcode" is made up of a nucleotide or sequence of nucleotides (while things such as dyes and isotopes are different types of unique identifiers). Accordingly, the Court recommends that "barcode(s)" be construed to mean "a nucleotide or a sequence of nucleotides used as a tag or identifier."
The non-uniquely tagged terms appear in certain claims of all four asserted patents. (D.I. 53, ex. B at 6-9) The use of the disputed term in claim 1 of the '822 patent is representative. (See Defendants' Markman Presentation, Slide 15) Accordingly, this claim is reproduced below, with the disputed term highlighted:
('822 patent, col. 62:18-48 (emphasis added))
The parties' competing proposed constructions for the "non-uniquely tagged" terms are set out in the chart below:
(D.I. 59 at 7) The parties' dispute with respect to the non-uniquely tagged terms "is whether the number of `non-unique' barcodes can approach the total number of polynucleotides." (Id.) In other words, Defendants' proposed construction would cover a situation where 1,000,000 polynucleotides were tagged with 999,999 barcodes. (Id.; see also D.I. 68 at 7-8 (Defendants explaining that "when the number of different identifiers is the same as the number of polynucleotides, the set is uniquely tagged, and when the number of identifiers is fewer than the number of polynucleotides, the set is non-uniquely tagged")) For its part, Guardant contends such a construction cannot be correct "[a]s a matter of pure commonsense[.]" (D.I. 59 at 7) In Guardant's view, non-unique tagging encompasses circumstances where "neither every polynucleotide nor nearly every polynucleotide receives a unique identifier." (D.I. 72 at 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))
The non-uniquely tagged terms should be construed as Defendants propose. After all, the patents expressly define the term "non-uniquely tagged," and Defendants' proposal tracks this express definition. (D.I. 68 at 5; D.I. 74 at 5; Tr. at 40, 43, 47-48; Defendants' Markman Presentation, Slide 16) To that end, the specification of the '731 patent explains that:
('731 patent, col. 41:45-52 (emphasis added)) The patentee's use of "that is" here clearly signals an intent to define what it means to be "non-uniquely tagged." See, e.g., Edwards Lifescis. LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[T]he specification's use of `i.e.' signals an intent to define the word to which it refers, `malleable[.]'"); Vitamix Corp. v. Blentec, Inc., CASE NO. 1:15 CV 1118, 2016 WL 2944150, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 20, 2016) ("By using the phrase `that is' the patentee demonstrated his intent to define the term `not centered relative to the bottom surface.'").
Guardant nevertheless contends that the use of "that is" here "does not signal a definition where additional context makes clear that a particular definition is not intended." (D.I. 72 at 6) Yet, as Defendants note, "Guardant fails to point to any language in the specification or prosecution history suggesting that the express definition was not intended or was limited to a single embodiment." (D.I. 74 at 5-6)
Guardant claims that, in the excerpt that follows, the specification actually describes Defendants' interpretation of non-unique tagging as unique tagging (and that the specification then goes on to criticize such form of tagging):
('731 patent, cols. 40:64-41:11 (emphasis added)) Accordingly, Guardant argues, "Defendants' construction should be rejected because it encompasses the very approaches that the specification describes as `unique' barcoding, which are described as being `cumbersome and expensive.'" (D.I. 59 at 7) To be sure, this passage does suggest that tagging nearly every molecule with a different tag (i.e., the reference to "uniquely tag[ing] ... nearly every ... parent molecule"—a form of non-unique tagging) would be cumbersome and expensive. But the fact that the patentee stated a criticism of this particular form of non-unique tagging does not necessarily wipe away the patentee's express definition of the term—a definition that could, at its extreme, allow for a situation where 1,000,000 polynucleotides are tagged with 999,999 barcodes.
Guardant also asserts that the embodiments using "non-unique" barcoding described in the specification "do[] not contemplate that virtually every polynucleotide will be given its own barcode" and that this further demonstrates that Defendants' proposal is wrong. (D.I. 59 at 8-9) In support, Guardant points to the specification's statement that a typical "sample comprising about 10,000 haploid human genome equivalents of cfDNA can be tagged with about 36 unique identifiers." ('731 patent, col. 41:36-38 (emphasis added) (cited in D.I. 59 at 8-9)) But as Defendants retort: (1) it is improper to limit claims to an embodiment; and (2) just because a non-uniquely tagged set of polynucleotides may have substantially fewer barcodes than polynucleotides does not mean that the patents require this as to all forms of non-unique tagging. (D.I. 68 at 6)
In sum, the specification clearly defines "non-unique tagging," and Guardant's arguments to the contrary fail to overcome the patentee's express definition. For these reasons, the Court recommends that "non-uniquely tagged"/"non-uniquely tagging"/"barcode attached ... is not unique" be construed to mean "the number of different identifiers is at least 2 and fewer than the number of polynucleotides."
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the District Court adopt the following constructions:
1. "sequence read" should be construed to mean "the order of the bases of a polynucleotide determined by a sequencer"
2. "barcode(s)" should be construed to mean "a nucleotide or a sequence of nucleotides used as a tag or identifier"
3. "non-uniquely tagged"/"non-uniquely tagging"/"barcode attached ... is not unique" should be construed to mean "the number of different identifiers is at least 2 and fewer than the number of polynucleotides"
This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D. Del. LR 72.1. The parties may serve and file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo review in the district court. See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987); Sincavage v. Barnhart, 171 F.App'x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).
The parties are directed to the Court's Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, dated October 9, 2013, a copy of which is available on the District Court's website, located at http://www.ded.uscourts.gov.