RICHARD R. COOCH, J.

Dear Counsel:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment presents a discrete issue of statutory and rule interpretation. Plaintiff contends that that Defendant exceeded its statutorily defined discretion when it determined that only the historically unrepresented employees (i.e., employees who were never part of any existing collective bargaining agreements) were eligible to vote for a collective bargaining representative. As a result, of 1,636 merit employees, only 313 unrepresented employees would be eligible to vote. In turn, Plaintiff filed the instant Writ of Mandamus and a Writ of Prohibition in this Court to compel Defendant to allow all merit employees in the relevant unit to vote.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

There is no genuine dispute of material fact in this case. Indeed, the parties filed a Stipulated Statement of Facts, which has defined the scope of the material facts of this case. The parties agree that the operative statute is 19 Del. C. § 1311A, which signed into law in 2007.1 Likewise, the parties agree that Plaintiff duly petitioned for a Bargaining Unit Determination and Certification for Exclusive Compensation Bargaining Representation.2 Defendant's Executive Director ordered an election for Collective Bargaining Unit #1 ("CBU #1").3

Most significantly, it is stipulated by the parties that Defendant limited the electorate to the 313 unrepresented employees of CBU #1, and that CBU # 1 is comprised of 1,636 merit employees.4 Though not enumerated in the Stipulated Statement of Facts, it is undisputed that the election was stayed by Defendant at Plaintiff's request, pending resolution of the instant issue.5 Elections which included only the unrepresented as voters were completed for Collective Bargaining Unit Nos. 2 and 6.6

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant exceeded its jurisdiction when it limited the electorate to the 313 unrepresented employees of CBU #1, and that the proper remedy is a Writ of Mandamus compelling Defendant to include the entire employee population of CBU #1 in the electorate. The statute applicable to the instant election is 19 Del. C. § 1311A, which in turn cross-references 19 Del. C. § 1311; under § 1311(c):

However, the term "eligible employees" is not statutorily defined. Thus, Defendant must promulgate the criteria for those employees eligible to vote; Plaintiff asserts that this is a non-discretionary, ministerial determination that was incorrectly made by Defendant, thereby entitling Plaintiff to a Writ of Mandamus requiring Defendant to redefine "eligible employee" based on what Plaintiff believes to be the appropriate criteria.7 Plaintiff likewise seeks a Writ of Prohibition to preclude Defendant from conducting the instant election pursuant to the current definition of "eligible employees."8

Conversely, Defendant argues "a determination of voter eligibility necessarily implicates discretion."9 According to Defendant, the inherently discretionary nature of the instant determination renders it inappropriate for Mandamus relief by this Court. Likewise, though not expressly stated in Defendant's Answering Brief, Defendant's contention that the instant determination is properly within its jurisdiction and discretion necessarily implies Defendant's view that a Writ of Prohibition is not available to Plaintiff.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Though captioned as a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff effectively seeks the award of a Writ of Mandamus, pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 10143;10 in this Court, "a writ of mandamus issues to require of an inferior court or administrative body the performance of a clear legal duty."11 Such a writ is appropriate "only when a plaintiff is able to establish a clear legal right to the performance of a non-discretionary duty."12 For purposes of a writ of mandamus, a "non-discretionary" or "ministerial" duty is one which is "prescribed with such precision and certainty that nothing is left to discretion or judgment."13 Put another way, a ministerial act "is one that must be performed in a prescribed manner without regard to the actor's judgment as to its propriety or impropriety."14

With respect to the Writ of Prohibition sought by Plaintiff, such writs are "designed primarily to keep the administration of justice in orderly channels" by "prevent[ing] the unwarranted assumption of power over persons or matters which are not within the legitimate cognizance of a particular tribunal, or it prevent[ing] a tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which it admittedly has cognizance."15 This Court holds exclusive jurisdiction over Writs of Prohibition directed to administrative entities.16

This Court exercises de novo review of an agency's interpretation and application the relevant statutes.17 Issues of statutory interpretation are "ultimately the responsibility of the courts;" consequently, this Court "may accord due weight, but not defer, to an agency interpretation of a statute administered by it."18

However, the instant dispute also implicates Defendant's application of its own "regulation[s];" as relevant herein, an agency's "regulation" is "any statement of law, procedure, policy, right, requirement or prohibition formulated and promulgated by an agency as a rule or standard. . . ."19 This Court's review of an "agency action"20 regarding its own regulations is more circumscribed; as provided by 29 Del. C. § 10141(e):

Thus, notwithstanding this Court's de novo review of an agency's interpretation of a statute, this Court nonetheless applies a deferential standard of review to an agency's construction of its own regulations.21

DISCUSSION

In this case, Defendant acknowledges that, by the literal terms of its current rule defining eligibility to vote, all 1,636 merit employees in CBU #1, including those already represented by an affiliate of Plaintiff, would be eligible to vote in the instant election.22 Under Public Employment Relations Board Rule 4.3(b), "[a]ll public employees who are included within the designated bargaining unit and who were employed as of the end of the pay period which immediately precedes an election or who were on approved leave of absence shall be eligible to vote."

At the same time, Defendant is "empowered to administer [the Public Employment Relations Act] under the rules and regulation which it shall adopt and publish."23 To this end, Defendant notes that it is vested with the discretion to suspend the application of the rules in the pursuit of "the orderly administration of [the statute]."24 Indeed, the very rules themselves confer this authority on Defendant; Rule 1.9 states:

Thus, assuming that Defendant's deviation from Rule 4.3(b) was for the "efficient operation" and "orderly administration" of the statute, the instant determination of voter eligibility was properly within its discretionary powers under Rule 1.9. It would follow that, given the discretionary nature of the grant of authority found in Rule 1.9, mandamus relief would be inappropriate; rather than being a command "prescribed with such precision and certainty that nothing is left to discretion or judgment"25 Rule 4.3(b) is inherently susceptible to Defendant's discretion and judgment as to how to best provide for the "efficient operation" and "orderly administration" of the statute.

Rule 1.9 is limited only by the requirement that Defendant may not waive or suspend the rules if such action deprives a party of "substantial rights." If Defendant's determination on voter eligibility did result in such a deprivation, then Rule 1.9 does not apply to Defendant's instant determination of voter eligibility, and the literal terms of Rule 4.3(b) would in fact be "prescribed with such precision and certainty that nothing is left to discretion or judgment."26

This analysis is complicated by the obvious reality that, under either Defendant or Plaintiff's differing views of the correct electorate for CBU #1, parties' rights will be affected. Given Defendant's determination that 313 unrepresented employees, from a total of 1,636 merit employees, are eligible to vote, it is indisputable that the remaining 1,323 merit employees have been deprived of the right to vote. On the other hand, Defendant notes that, if those employees who are already represented by Plaintiff's affiliates are deemed eligible to vote, an election to determine whether CBU #1 is represented by Plaintiff or not represented at all is effectively a fait accompli because those employees represented by Plaintiff's affiliates would comprise an allied supermajority of the electorate; thus, the 313 unrepresented individuals would be deprived of the right to have a meaningful influence on the election.27

Nonetheless, this Court concludes that, on balance, Defendant's determination of the bargaining unit's electorate was discretionary, rather than ministerial. Although this particular issue has not been decided under Delaware law, the principles underlying Delaware's Public Employment Relations Act, together with the statutory prescribed presumption of validity that accompanies Defendant's construction of its own regulations,28 confirm the discretionary nature of the instant determination. In turn, mandamus relief is inappropriate, and Plaintiff's motion must be denied.

Defendant constructed its own rules in such a way as to exclude historically represented employees from eligibility to vote in the instant election. Given the literal terms of Rule 4.3(b), this decision was necessarily predicated on Defendant's discretionary authority to waive or suspend the application of any other Rule, as provided by Rule 1.9, supra. It follows that, in reaching the instant decision, Defendant considered how best to accomplish the purposes of the Public Employment Relations Act and weighed the "substantial rights" at issue.29 This alone confirms that the Board's actions herein were not those that "must be performed in a prescribed manner without regard to the actor's judgment as to its propriety or impropriety."30

Finally, to the extent that Rule 1.9 limits Defendant's discretion to those decisions which do not impair any party's "substantial rights," Defendant's instant determination of voter eligibility necessarily implies that Defendant weighed the competing considerations of the unrepresented employees' interests and the historically represented employees' interests, and Defendant concluded that the "efficient operation" and "orderly administration" of the Public Employment Relations Act were best served by limiting the electorate to the 313 unrepresented employees. Although Defendant's assertion that "a determination of voter eligibility necessarily implicates discretion"31 is not consistent with the formulaic terms of Rule 4.3(b), from a broader perspective, Defendant maintains significant discretion in interpreting and applying its own rules and may "liberally construe[] [the rules] for the accomplishment of [the Public Employment Relations Act's] purposes."32

In this case, Defendant considered that employees who were historically represented by Plaintiff's affiliates were already represented by an exclusive bargaining representative and juxtaposed this with the inherent dynamics of the electorate; the 313 employees who did not have exclusive bargaining representatives would have their votes diluted to an effective nullity, thereby assuring that, after the election, those 313 employees were also represented by Plaintiff's affiliates. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff did not have cognizable "substantial rights" affected by the Board's determination; to the extent that this determination adversely affected the rights of the 1,636 represented employees, as provided by Rule 4.3(b), such rights were susceptible to Defendant's discretion to invoke Rule 1.9 and "liberal[ly] construe[]" the rules to suspend Rule 4.3(b). While statutory interpretation is exclusively for the Courts, this Court may nonetheless assign "due weight" to Defendant's labor expertise in the construction and application of Rules 4.3(b) and 1.9.33 Further, pursuant to statute, Defendant's determination is presumed valid and Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Defendant's action was "taken in a substantially unlawful manner and that [Plaintiff] suffered prejudice thereby, or that the regulation, where required, was adopted without a reasonable basis on the record or is otherwise unlawful."34 This Court finds that Defendant's utilization of Rule 1.9 to invoke its discretion to "suspend" the terms of Rule 4.3(b) when defining voter eligibility for CBU #1 was a proper interpretation; as stated, there was nothing unlawful or otherwise untoward about the Board's determination of voter eligibility.

Given this Court's determination that Defendant's application of the rules was correct and that Defendant appropriately exercised its discretion in reaching the instant determination of voter eligibility, its actions cannot be classified as "ministerial."35 In turn, mandamus relief is not appropriate.36 Similarly, given this Court's holding that Defendant was acting within its discretion, it necessarily follows that Defendant did not exceed the scope of its jurisdiction or otherwise misuse its jurisdiction; consequently, a Writ of Prohibition is not appropriate.37

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is not entitled to a Writ of Mandamus. Consequently, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in this action is DENIED.38 Although Defendant did not move for summary judgment, it necessarily follows that, on this undisputed factual record, Summary Judgment should be awarded to Defendant.39

IT IS SO ORDERED.