M. JANE BRADY, J.
The Defendant, Rashid Roy, ("Roy" or "Defendant") was convicted, following a jury trial that began on March 24, 2011 and lasted nine days, of the charges of Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, Assault in the Third Degree, and Terroristic Threatening. On September 9, 2011, this Court sentenced Roy to Life Imprisonment on the Murder charge, and an aggregate of 12 years of Level V incarceration, suspended after 11 years for decreasing levels of supervision.
Roy filed a timely appeal of the sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction and sentence on December 12, 2012.
Counsel was appointed for the Defendant upon request, and an initial Motion for Postconviction Relief was filed on November 18, 2013. Subsequently, and, with the Court's consent, counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw and supporting memorandum indicating that counsel had reviewed the record and could find no meritorious postconviction claims that could be ethically advocated.
Roy makes two claims, both related to the testimony of Paul Kish, who testified regarding the nature of how certain blood located on the Defendant's clothing came to be there in his opinion, and described the blood as spatter evidence: that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to make timely objection to testimony, which the Defendant contends was presented without proper foundation; and that the Court erred in allowing the jury to hear unreliable expert testimony, which deprived him of a fair trial and due process.
The Defendant, wearing tan pants and covered in blood, was taken into custody minutes after a call to 911 regarding an assault and a short distance from the location where Davelle Neal, the victim, was found lying in a snow bank, bleeding to death from nearly 50 stab wounds, several to the neck. The Defendant had a knife in his possession when he was taken into custody. Video surveillance from a nearby building captured the assault of the victim by a man wearing tan pants. Witnesses put the Defendant and victim together, and established that the Defendant was angry because he thought the victim had stolen his drugs. DNA testing of spots from various locations on the Defendant's person and clothing matched that of the victim's blood. The Defendant's explanation was that the pair were attacked by two men, who caused the victim's injuries, and that he got the victim's blood on him either in helping to fight off the attackers or helping the victim.
Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
Rule 61 (i) imposes four procedural criteria: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in a prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2), and (3), however, do not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington.
Defendant's first claim is not procedurally barred. It was brought within one year, and addresses an issue appropriate for postconviction review — that defense counsel was ineffective at trial. The specific claim is that trial counsel failed to make a timely objection during voir dire to the admissibility of the testimony of the expert regarding blood spatter evidence. It further appears the Defendant claims that serological testing was inadequate to support the expert's testimony or that, because the expert did not do the testing or examine the items directly, that his testimony should have been excluded. The claim is without merit. In fact, defense counsel did make timely objection to the expert's opinion evidence, by filing a motion and requesting voir dire before the expert was permitted to testify before the jury.
Next, Defendant asserts that the Court erred in permitted the jury to hear the testimony of the expert, which Defendant contends was unreliable and that the Court's ruling, therefore, deprived him of a fair trial and due process.
As noted previously, Rule 61 does not permit a Defendant to bring a claim in a postconviction proceeding which has been previously adjudicated.
Since Defendant's claim is procedurally barred, Defendant must meet one of the exceptions to overcome the bars to relief. In this case, Defendant has failed to overcome any of the procedural bars "by presenting a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
The Defendant has failed to provide any basis to find, and the record is devoid of any evidence of, manifest injustice. It is clear from Defendant's motion that Defendant's claim does not meet the high standard that the fundamental fairness exception requires. The Court does not find that the interests of justice require it to consider this otherwise procedurally barred claim for relief.