STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF FLORIDA, ) DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, ) DIVISION OF SECURITIES, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 75-2020
)
GREGORY STEVENS, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
A hearing was held pursuant to notice in Room 245, County Courthouse, 201
E. Sixth Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, at 5:30 a.m. on January 13, 1976, before Stephen F. Dean, assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
This matter arose upon the administrative complaint and notice filed by the Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, against the Respondent, Gregory Stevens, alleging that the Respondent had violated Section 517.07 and Section 5l7.16(1)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes, by selling unregistered securities which were not secured by a first mortgage as had been represented to the purchasers by Stevens.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: FRED O. DRAKE, III, ESQUIRE
Assistant General Counsel Office of Comptroller
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
For Respondent: CHARLES W. MUSGROVE, ESQUIRE
810 Comeau Building
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The administratively complaint alleges that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 517,16(1)(a), F.S. by having sold notes, which were securities as defined by Section 517.02(1), F.S., which were unregistored in violation of Section 517.07, F.S., and having represented that said notes were secured by first mortgages when in fact they were not so secured in violation of Section 517.16(1)(d), F.S., on two occasions to Joseph M. and Patricia Barton. The first sale is alleged to have occurred on June 14, 1974, in the amount of
$15,000, and the other sale is alleged to hake occurred on September 29, 1973 in the amount of $5,000.
The Petitioner introduced Exhibit 1 which was received and which indicates that only the common stock of Equitable Development Corporation was registered with the State of Florida, Division of Securities.
The Petitioner presented no evidence relative to the alleged sale occurring on June 14, 1974. It is therefore not proven.
The Petitioner called Gregory Stevens who was the sole witness at the hearing and who was a license securities salesman and licensed mortgage broker. In September 1973 Stevens was self employed doing business for Gregory Stevens, Investment Incorporated. Stevens stated that he dealt in first mortgages.
Respondent testified that he obtained the mortgage documents through Financial Resources Corp., the president of which was Mr. Rinehart. Respondent was assured by Mr. Rinehart before he began handling these mortgages that they were not required to be registered as securities because they ware exempt, and that the State had so indicated for this type of transaction.
Respondent testified that he sold a note and mortgage to his clients, Joseph and Patricia Barton, in his capacity as a licensed mortgage broker on behalf of Gregory Stevens Investments, Inc., of which he is president. Exhibit
10 is a sample order form for another contract which shows that such transactions were in the corporate entity. Respondent's uncontroverted testimony was that only he individually is licensed to sell securities, and that no mortgages were sold as securities.
The evidence is that on September 29, 1973, a promissory note of the Equitable Development Corporation was issued to Joseph and/or Patricia Barton, secured by a Mortgage Deed issued by Equitable Development Corporation. The face amount was $5,000. The Bartons also received a quitclaim deed. The mortgage deed specifically covenants that the underlying property is free and clear of all encumbrances except current and future real estate taxes.
Respondent testified that he physically examined the property which secured the mortgages and it looked good. He saw appraisals at double the face amount of the mortgages he sold. Those clients who requested title insurance or opinions of title from a lawyer could obtain same, and when they were requested he saw then and they never showed any defects or other encumbrances. This was the procedure followed with the Bartons, although neither title insurance nor a title search and opinion were obtained requested by the Bartons.
The Respondent indicated that at the time of said sale to the Bartons that he believed, and had no reason not to believe, that said mortgage was a first mortgage as it recites on its face.
The Hearing Officer notes that Section 517.06(7), F.S., 1973, was amended effective October 1, 1973, and the Barton transaction took place on September 29, 1973. Therefore, the applicable provision is the unamended law found at Section 517.06(7), F.S.A. Regarding the law existing at the time and its interpretation, the Respondent also introduced Exhibit 2, 4, and 5 which letters indicate that the sale of notes secured by mortgages would be exempt from registration as exempt transactions pursuant to Section 517.06(7), F.S.A., and setting forth guidelines for exempt transactions. Without dealing with the question of estoppel, these exhibits state the agency's interpretations of the then existing law. The Hearing Officer finds the agency's interpretation as set out in Exhibits 2, 4, and 5 is an accurate interpretation of the statute.
The Hearing Officer finds that a note is a security as defined in Section 517.02(1), F.S. Regarding the allegation that the note sold to the Bartons was an unregistered security, it is admitted that it was not registered, however, the Respondent asserts that the sale was a transaction exempted under the provisions of Section 517.06(7), F.S.A.
Having examined the note and mortgage in question, the Hearing Officer finds that the note and entire mortgage securing it were sold in a single sale to one purchaser. The note and mortgage do not indicate any expressed recourse agreement or guarantee as to repayment of interest, principal, or both offered in connection with the sale. While the Respondent could not specifically recall the Barton transaction, he testified that purchasers were generally shown the property, an assessment of the property prepared by an appraiser indicating each lot's value, and it was represented that they would receive a first mortgage securing the note on lots worth two times the value of the note. There was no showing that the Respondent knew or should have known the mortgage to the Bartons was not a first mortgage and title to the property not clear. The transaction of September 29, 1973, was exempt under the law existing at that time. The Petitioner therefore has failed to show any violation of Section 517.16(1)(d), F.S.
The agency having failed to show a violation of Section 517.16(1)(d), F.S., by the Respondent and the Hearing Officer having found that the September 29, 1973 transaction was exempt recommends that the charges be dismissed.
DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of February, 1976.
STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
(904) 488-9675
COPIES FURNISHED:
Fred O. Drake, III, Esquire Counsel for Petitioner
Charles W. Musgrove, Esquire Counsel for Respondent
Issue Date | Proceedings |
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Jun. 10, 1976 | Final Order filed. |
Feb. 27, 1976 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
---|---|---|
May 26, 1976 | Agency Final Order | |
Feb. 27, 1976 | Recommended Order | Dismiss charges of selling unregistered securities in case where the note and mortgage were part of same transaction and exempt under the current law. |
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