STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
EVELYN PINCHBACK, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 84-1925
)
ST. JOHNS COUNTY SHERIFF'S )
DEPARTMENT, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
This matter came on for hearing on October 5, 1984, in St. Augustine, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings and its duly-appointed Hearing Officer, R. T. Carpenter. The parties were represented by:
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Charlie L. Adams, Esquire
816 Broad Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
For Respondent: Gayle Smith Swedmark, Esquire
318 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
This matter arose on Petitioner's complaint of an unlawful employment practice filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner filed proposed findings of fact on December 5, 1984. Respondent filed a motion dated December 3, 1984, requesting a 15-day extension to file its proposed findings, but none have been filed by the latter party. A ruling on each finding of fact proposed by Petitioner has been made either directly or indirectly herein, except where such proposed findings have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a correction officer for the 16-month period between March, 1981 and July, 1982. She was assigned to the St. Johns County Jail, where her duties included booking and releasing both male and female inmates, taking mug shots, obtaining fingerprints, delivering food and mail, and providing general security.
Petitioner satisfactorily completed a one-year probationary period and achieved permanent status. She became aware of her pregnancy in March, 1982, and informed her supervisor of this fact. 1/
She was initially told by her supervisor to report "downtown" for reassignment. However, the officer in charge of that department knew nothing of the proposed change in assignment and sent Petitioner back to the jail.
Petitioner then resumed her correctional duties but was assigned exclusively to the booking desk based on her pregnancy. Around May, 1982, Petitioner was reassigned within the jail to the canteen, where her duties were clerical rather than correctional.
On May 28, 1982, the jail administrator wrote to Petitioner's physician inquiring as to whether Petitioner could continue to perform correctional duties based on her physical ability and safety considerations. The physician's reply established that her physical ability would permit her to continue working until the date of her confinement, which he anticipated would occur about October 14, 1982. The physician declined to evaluate her condition in terms of job safety.
In mid-July, Petitioner was told by her immediate supervisor, Sgt. Threet, that she should take maternity leave. Petitioner declined in the belief that she had a choice in the matter and that she was able to continue working. However, her unwillingness to take leave was not communicated to Captain Janson, who advised her by letter that he was placing her on leave as agreed.
A meeting was held to discuss the proposed leave, but apparently the misunderstanding continued. Petitioner reported for work on July 21, 1982 and was directed to leave by her former supervisor, who advised Petitioner that she was no longer on the payroll. Petitioner's apparent termination on July 21, 1982 was confirmed by a letter from the St. Johns County Sheriff dated July 30, 1982 (Petitioner's Exhibit 2).
The Sheriff's letter and other after-the-fact statements of subordinate officials indicated their belief that Petitioner and her fetus were in "obvious jeopardy" (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), so long as she continued to have contact with jail inmates. Additional reasons given for her removal were that she could not backup her commands to inmates because of her physical condition, and that she was becoming too large physically to work behind the booking desk (Respondent's Exhibit 1).
The lack of any policy with respect to pregnancy and the confusion in this case were evident in the two attempted reassignments of Petitioner prior to her discharge and referral of the matter, at one point, to Petitioner's physician.
Both Petitioner and her immediate supervisor, Sgt. (now Lieutenant) Threet are women of small physical stature. They are essentially unarmed while on duty and must rely on outside help if there is a major disturbance within the jail. Lieutenant Threet concedes that she would not be able to overpower a strong male prisoner if confronted by one. Therefore, the physical demands of the correctional officer position must be considered limited.
There was no medical evidence presented that indicated Petitioner was unable to perform her assigned duties at the time of her discharge. She was aware of the physical risk to herself and fetus (although the degree of such risk was not established) and accepted this responsibility as a condition of her continued employment.
The argument regarding Petitioner's alleged physical difficulty at the booking desk is rejected as pretextual and was not pursued at the hearing. Her alleged inability to backup commands to inmates due to her condition is likewise rejected in that she, as well as her female supervisor, were not at anytime capable of physically enforcing their commands with respect to the large and stronger male prisoners.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1983)2, provides in part:
It is an unlawful employment practice for employer:
To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
Petitioner relies on the above provision in her complaint that she was wrongfully discharged because of her pregnancy and that this amounts to sex discrimination. The above provision has not been construed by Florida Appellate Courts under circumstances similar to those at issue here. However, the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 is patterned after Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, and constructions thereunder should be considered here. 2/ Further, applicable Federal law is properly applied in state proceedings such as these. 3/
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended by Congress in 1978 to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as a category of sex discrimination. 4/ Therefore, Petitioner properly seeks relief under Florida, as well as Federal civil rights legislation.
Petitioner demonstrated that she was discharged because of her pregnancy. She believed that she was physically able to continue work and, therefore, refused to take maternity leave when she was six months pregnant.
Respondent did not demonstrate that Petitioner was unable to perform her assigned duties at that time because of her pregnancy, but relied essentially on an assumption that Petitioner and/or her unborn child would be subjected to unreasonable risks of injury. This conclusion was unsupported by any objective evidence and ignored Petitioner's responsibility for risks to herself and her unborn infant. 5/
In a case arising from the discharge of a female police officer because of her pregnancy, the U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, stated:
"It is clear that defendants fired Terry solely because she was pregnant. Based upon a physician's interview (and his opinion grounded upon this interview), it was presumed that she could not perform the job of police officer because she was pregnant. There was no evidence she was unable
to work . . . . [T]o apply a stereotyped presumption that a pregnant person is unable to
work and to deny a person the opportunity to prove otherwise, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus the district court erred in finding that the defendants were justified in discharging Terry.
Indeed, the only reliable evidence of Terry's fitness established that she was successfully performing her duties assigned to her at the time she was terminated, . . ." 6/
The above case is particularly significant here since both Petitioner and Appellant were involved in law enforcement at the time of their discharges for pregnancy. Based on the assumption that pregnancy per se renders a woman unfit to perform law enforcement duties is improper and a violation of the employee's Constitutional due process rights. 7/ Respondent is, therefore, guilty of an unlawful employment practice in discharging Petitioner on the basis of her pregnancy.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final
Order directing that Petitioner be reinstated by Respondent.
DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida.
R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1984.
ENDNOTES
1/ She was at this time about two months pregnant. Her anticipated delivery date was October 14, 1982.
2/ Part of the Human Rights Act of 1977.
3/ School Board of Leon County v. Hargis, 400 So.2d 103, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
4/ See, Farm Rights Org. v. Dept. of Health, 430 So.2d (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
5/ Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 103 S.Ct. 2622 (1983).
6/ See, In Re Nat. Airlines, Inc., 434 F.Supp. 249, 259 (S.D. Fla. 1977), and citations therein.
7/ The Philadelphia decision, supra., was rendered prior to the Federal Civil Rights Act Amendment on pregnancy discussed above.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Charlie L. Adams, Esquire 816 Broad Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202
Gayle Smith Swedmark, Esquire
318 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301
Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations
325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
EVELYN PINCHBACK, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 84-1925
) ST. JOHNS COUNTY SHERIFF'S ) DEPARTMENT, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice this cause came on for formal hearing before P. Michael Ruff, duly designated Hearing Officer, on September 4, 1987, in St. Augustine, Florida. The appearances were as follows:
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: William Roberts, Jr., Esquire
816 Broad Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
For Respondent: Gayle Smith Swedmark, Esquire
HABEN, PARKER, SKELDING COSTIGAN, McVOY, LABASKY
318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arose upon the filing by the Petitioner, Evelyn Pinchback, of a complaint of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations alleging that she had been unlawfully discriminated against on account of her pregnancy and thus, on the basis of her female sex, because of her discharge from employment by the St. Johns County Sheriff's Department. See Sections 760.01 through 760.10, Florida Statutes (1983). On January 5, 1984, after investigation, the Commission issued a determination of "no reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice had occurred." Thereafter, on May 17, 1984, the Petitioner filed a Petition for relief from an unlawful employment practice. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for conduct of a formal proceeding. Rule 22T-8.16(1), Florida Administrative Code. That hearing was held on October 5, 1984 before Hearing Officer, R. T. Carpenter. The Hearing Officer entered a recommended order in the cause on December 31, 1984, finding that an unlawful employment practice had occurred and recommending Petitioner's reinstatement in the employ of the St. Johns County Sheriff's Department, the Respondent herein.
The matter then came before the commission for entry of a final order. The Commission accepted the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, the Commission ordered the St. Johns County Sheriff's Department to reinstate the Petitioner, but reserved jurisdiction over the issue of the amount of back wages, benefits and attorney's fees. The Commission then remanded the cause to the Hearing Officer for the taking of evidence on those issues.
Thereafter, on August 29, 1985, Hearing Officer Carpenter entered an "Order Requesting Clarification and Refusing Remand," wherein he refused to accept the remand to consider the issues of wages, benefits or attorney's fees on the basis that the Petitioner had made no specific demand, nor proffered any evidence, regarding entitlement to wages, benefits or fees and that there was no "disputed issue of material fact" concerning that subject matter, which is necessary for a formal proceeding before a Hearing Officer.
On September 10, 1985, the Respondent served notice that it was appealing the August 15, 1985 order of the Commission which found an unlawful employment practice and ordered reinstatement. The First District Court of Appeal, by order issued July 7, 1986, dismissed the cause, reasoning that the order appealed from was a non-final order and the court was without jurisdiction to review such orders. Thereafter, pursuant to notice, further public hearing was held on December 5, 1986, by the same panel of Commissioners, concerning the affirmative relief portion of the proceeding.
The Commission, by order of December 29, 1986, directed that the Petitioner provide (1) affidavits and supporting evidence regarding the amount of earnings the Petitioner would have received as a correctional officer from the date of termination through the date of reinstatement or refusal of offer of reinstatement; (2) calculations of the amount of any lost benefits, (3) deductions for social security and federal income tax withholding, (4) the time
expended by Petitioner's counsel in prosecuting the cause and the hourly rate charged in the community by lawyers of reasonably comparative skill, experience and reputation, for similar services.
The Commission directed that copies of all documents supportive of these figures should be served upon Respondent's counsel, and allowed Respondent to file a response to Petitioner's demand within a time certain. After service of the response, the parties were allowed fifteen days in which to negotiate a settlement as to the amount of wages, benefits and attorney's fees, and, if they reached a settlement by the end of that period, to submit a joint stipulation to that effect for the Commission's consideration. If they were unable to reach a negotiated settlement, the order provided that the Petitioner should file notice of failure of settlement with the Commission and request an evidentiary hearing on the affirmative relief issues.
On April 14, 1987, the Petitioner served on the Respondent and the Commission a "Notice of Failure of Settlement," announcing that the parties had failed to come to an agreement on the issues of back pay, lost benefits, attorney's fees and affirmative relief. Accordingly, on April 27, 1987, the Commission entered its order transferring the matter back to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal proceeding "with respect to the issues of lost wages, lost benefits, attorney's fees and such other affirmative relief as the Hearing Officer deems appropriate."
The cause came on for hearing as noticed, at which the Petitioner, Evelyn Pinchback, testified. Additionally, the Petitioner adduced three exhibits, all of which were admitted into evidence. Prior to the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby it was agreed that the Petitioner's back pay, medical benefits, vacation pay, retirement and sick pay amounts claimed, represent a true and accurate computation from the documents provided Petitioner by the St. Johns County Sheriff's office, and show that those named benefits have accrued at the rate of $65.83 per day. Those documents were stipulated into evidence.
It was also stipulated that Petitioner's statement of interim earnings from July 22, 1982 through January 21, 1987, represents a true and accurate computation, as compiled from her "W-2 forms" and tax returns, as set forth in her demand for affirmative relief. Those figures were stipulated into evidence. It was also stipulated that the value of attorney time expended on Petitioner's behalf throughout this proceeding is $19,718.75 and the affidavits of attorneys Earl Johnson and Reese Marshall on the issue of attorney's fees were stipulated into evidence. Respondent's counsel reserved the right to submit affidavits or testimony at hearing on the attorney's fee issue.
The Petitioner has been determined by the previous Hearing Officer and the Commission's order to have suffered from a discriminatory employment practice, described above, and to be entitled to reinstatement in her position with the Respondent. The sole issue before the Hearing Officer, under the terms of the Commission's order by which this cause was remanded, thus concerns the amount of back salary and other benefits and attorney's fees to which the Petitioner may be entitled.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent, St. Johns County Sheriff's Department from March, 1981 to July, 1982. She was employed as a full-time corrections officer for a total of sixteen months. After she achieved permanent employment status in that position, she became pregnant. Upon confirmation of her pregnancy, she informed her superiors on or about March,
1982. Initially she was removed from her duties as a corrections officer and transferred to a job downtown, in the main office of the sheriff's department. Shortly thereafter, she was transferred back to her original duties on the floor of the St. Johns County Jail and various discussions ensued with her superiors concerning whether she should take leave from her duties until the birth of her child. The Petitioner did not feel that she should be required to take leave.
These discussions culminated in the Petitioner's termination from employment with the Respondent on July 21, 1982.
The Petitioner ultimately complained of an unlawful employment practice as a result of these facts (more specifically delineated in the Hearing Officer's order entered December 31, 1984). The Petitioner complained that she had been discriminated against, as that term is defined more particularly in Section 760.01 through 760.10, Florida Statutes (1983), in that she was unlawfully discriminated against and terminated from her job because of being pregnant and thus, was discriminated against on the basis of her female sex.
The matter was investigated by personnel of the Commission's Office of Field Services, and a report was submitted to its Executive Director. On January 5, 1984, the Executive Director issued a determination finding "no reasonable cause" to believe an unlawful employment practice had occurred.
On May 17, 1984, the Petitioner filed a petition for Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal proceeding pursuant to Rule 22T-18.16(1), Florida Administrative Code. The formal hearing was held on October 5, 1984, in St. Augustine, Florida, before the Honorable R. T. Carpenter, Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer entered a Recommended Order in this matter on December 31, 1984, finding that an unlawful employment practice had occurred and recommending that the Petitioner be reinstated. No findings were made in that Recommended Order concerning the issue of affirmative relief in the form of back salary, related benefits, and attorney's fees.
The cause came before a panel of the Human Relations Commission again on June 21, 1985. After hearing oral argument from counsel for the respective parties, the Commission ultimately accepted the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered the St. Johns County Sheriff's Department to reinstate the Petitioner. The Commission also reserved jurisdiction over the issues of the amount of back wages, benefits, and attorney's fees the Petitioner might be entitled to and remanded the matter to the Hearing Officer for the conduct of a formal proceeding to take evidence on those issues. That order was entered August 12, 1985. Thereafter, on August 29, 1985, Hearing Officer Carpenter entered an Order Requesting Clarification and Refusing Remand. In that order, the Hearing Officer found that the Petitioner had made no specific demand nor proffered any evidence on entitlement to wages, benefits or attorney's fees and therefore held that there was no "disputed issue of material fact" before the Hearing Officer to justify conduct of a formal proceeding.
On September 10, 1985, the Respondent filed its Notice of Appeal to the First District Court of Appeals. The matter thus pended before that court until its order was issued July 7, 1986, wherein it found that it was without jurisdiction to review the August 15, 1985 order of the Commission. The court reasoned that it was without jurisdiction to review that order because it was non-final, since all the issues concerning the Petitioner's termination, reinstatement to employment and entitlement to any related benefits and attorney's fees had not been resolved in the Commission's order.
Accordingly, pursuant to notice, the Commission held public deliberations in the cause on December 5, 1986, in which it announced a schedule for informal proceedings, during which the parties would have a sixty day period to negotiate a resolution of their disputes. The parties were instructed by the order of the Commission entered January 5, 1986, that, if at the end of this negotiation period, they reached a proposed settlement, they were to submit a joint stipulation of settlement for consideration by the Commission. On the other hand, if they were unable to negotiate a settlement, the, Petitioner was instructed to file a notice of failure of settlement and request an evidentiary hearing on the issue of affirmative relief and attorney's fees.
On March 9, 1987, the Petitioner filed a formal demand for affirmative relief, attorney's fees and costs which was refused by the Respondent. Thereafter on April 17, 1987, the Petitioner filed a "Notice of Failure of Settlement" and moved for an order setting an evidentiary hearing, stating that the parties had failed to come to an agreement on the issues of back pay, lost benefits, attorney's fees and other affirmative relief. In consideration of this turn of events, the Commission remanded the cause to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and ultimately to the undersigned Hearing Officer, pursuant to Rule 22T-8.016, for the conduct of a formal proceeding with respect to those issues.
The cause came on for hearing as noticed. The Petitioner was the only witness. Her testimony established when she was terminated from employment by the Respondent and at what different jobs she has worked, for various periods of time, since her termination by the Respondent, up until the present date.
She thus established that she was terminated in July, 1982 and was thereafter unemployed for approximately six months. Then she embarked on a temporary tour of duty with the Department of Military Affairs, Florida National Guard, in the position of a clerk. After that, she was employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for about six months and left that position for a better job in the real estate sales business. She practiced real estate sales for an indeterminate period of time and then went on another tour of duty with the Florida National Guard for eighteen months. Thereafter, she worked at a shoe store for approximately two weeks and then was unemployed for two and one-half months. She then went back to Century 21 Realty and reactivated her real estate license, at the same time going back to work with the National Guard. She was still employed with the National Guard, (Department of Military Affairs), and practicing real estate, at the time of the hearing.
Records of the Petitioner's earnings were submitted into evidence without objection. Prior to the hearing the parties entered into a stipulation whereby they agreed that the amounts claimed by the Petitioner for back pay, medical benefits, vacation pay, retirement and sick pay represent a true and accurate computation from documents provided Petitioner by the Respondent, all of which documents were stipulated into evidence. It was also stipulated that all those benefits, as computed based upon the underlying payroll and employee record documents stipulated into evidence, established that the aggregate benefits lost continued to accrue at the rate of $65.83 per day.
It was also stipulated that the Petitioner's interim earnings from July 22, 1982, the date of termination, through January 21, 1987, represented a true and accurate computation as compiled from her W-2 forms and tax returns, as
set forth in her demand for affirmative relief, and the parties stipulated those figures into evidence. The Petitioner's composite Exhibit two, consisting of pay records from January 24, 1987 through August 8, 1987, were also admitted into evidence without objection.
It was stipulated that the value of Petitioner's attorney services up to the subject hearing was $19,718.75 and that the affidavits of attorney's Earl
M. Johnson and Reese Marshall establishing that amount were stipulated into evidence. Additionally, Petitioner's Exhibit three, an attorney's fee affidavit, was stipulated into evidence. That document shows that a total of 21 and one-half hours were expended by Petitioner's counsel, at the rate of $125 per hour, from July 9, 1987 through September 17, 1987, generally for preparation for and conduct of the hearing herein and preparation of post- hearing exhibits and memoranda of law. Thus, the figure of $2687.50 should be added to the already established figure for attorney's fees of $19,718.75 for a total of $22,406.25 in attorney's fees.
The Petitioner's demand for affirmative relief filed March 11, 1987, was stipulated into evidence. It shows a computation of back pay, medical benefits, vacation pay, retirement and sick pay beginning July 22, 1982 through the period ending January 24, 1987; with the Petitioner's gross interim earnings, subtracted from the gross amount for back pay and benefits. The net back pay and benefits due to the Petitioner for the period July 22, 1982 through January 24, 1987, is thus $36,675.66. From January 23, 1987 through September 5, 1987, 157 work days elapsed, at the rate of $65.83 per day, which figure represents the daily amount of lost yearnings and other total benefits accruing, for a sum of $10,335.31. Earnings made at other employment of $3,456.25 should then be subtracted from this figure. Costs of $186.35 and $2,687.50 in additional attorney's fees for the same period, should be added back in so that a total amount of costs, attorney's fees, back pay and employment benefits of
$9,759.91 is due the Petitioner for the period January 23, 1987 through September 5, 1987. When this amount is added to the previously established balance for back pay, attorney's fees, costs, and other benefits in the amount of $56,752.18, it is thus shown that the Petitioner is entitled to a net sum of
$66,505.09 for back pay, lost medical benefits, vacation pay, retirement, sick pay, and attorney's fees.
The Respondent, in effect, does not dispute the amount involved, but continues to dispute its liability therefor, in that it maintains that no discriminatory event occurred and that no reinstatement is appropriate for this Petitioner. However, those issues have been the subject of a final order entered by the agency herein in Petitioner's favor, and an appeal concerning the findings on those two issues has not been perfected as yet. Therefore, the conclusions that employment discrimination occurred and that the Petitioner should be reinstated in her employment position, with full seniority rights and other benefits, must be taken to be established, for purposes of this proceeding, as "law of the case." Thus, it must be found that the Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement in the above amounts for the various fees, cost, salary and benefit items found above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes, provides:
In the event that the commission, in the case of a complaint under subsection (10) or the court, in the case of a civil action under subsection (12), finds that an unlawful employment practice has occurred, it shall issue an order prohibiting the practice and providing affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including reasonable attorney's fees. Upon such notice as the commission or the court, as appropriate, may require, such order, or any subsequent order upon the same complaint or action, may provide relief for all individuals aggrieved by any such unlawful employment practice. No liability for back pay shall accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a complaint with the commission.
As demonstrated by the evidence of record and the above findings of fact, it has already been determined that the Petitioner was a victim of employment discrimination in the above-found particulars and is entitled to reinstatement, based upon the Commission's earlier order. That being the case, it must only be determined, at this juncture, what benefits or remedies should be afforded the Petitioner because of the wrongful discharge. The parties, by stipulation, have largely determined the amount of the back salary, benefits and attorney's fees to which Petitioner is entitled and, coupled with the evidence of record adduced at the hearing herein, the total amounts of back salary and other benefits have now been established. Those amounts to which the Petitioner is entitled are thus accruing at the rate of $65.83 per day. Those benefits and back pay amounts should be reimbursed to the Petitioner from the date of her termination to the date of her reinstatement. The amounts due the Petitioner in this fashion should be reduced by the amounts of offsetting wages she has or will earn elsewhere, which have been proven in the record herein and found above.
Accordingly, it is therefore
RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding the Petitioner accrued back salary, attorney's fees and other related benefits found above as being due her through September 5, 1987, in the total amount of $66,505.09 and finding that such back pay and related benefits shall continue to accrue from September 6, 1987, through the pendency of this proceeding at the rate of $65.83 per day.
DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1988.
COPIES FURNISHED:
William Roberts, Jr., Esquire 816 Broad Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Gayle Smith Swedmark, Esquire HABEN, PARKER, SKELDING COSTIGAN, McVOY, LABASKY
318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Dana Baird
Margaret Agerton, Clerk General Counsel
Human Relations Commission Human Relations Commission
325 John Knox Road 325 John Knox Road
Building F, Suite 240 Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Dec. 31, 1984 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Aug. 06, 1988 | Agency Final Order | |
| Dec. 31, 1984 | Recommended Order | Wages earned elsewhere constitute offset against back wages due victim of employment discrimination. |
DEXTER V. THOMAS vs ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 84-001925 (1984)
FELICIA A. ALEXANDER vs DYNAIR SERVICES, INC., 84-001925 (1984)
WILLIAM SAMUEL LEE vs COMPASS RETAIL, INC., 84-001925 (1984)
MICHAEL C. BOYKIN vs. H. L. WESTBERRY PAVING AND TRUCKING COMPANY, 84-001925 (1984)
AMY B. KALMBACHER vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 84-001925 (1984)
