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JIMMY D. ADAMS vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, DIVISION OF STATE FIRE MARSHALL, 84-002781 (1984)

Court: Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002781 Visitors: 21
Judges: CHARLES C. ADAMS
Agency: Department of Financial Services
Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990
Summary: The principal issue in this cause concerns the question of whether the petitioner is presently certified as a firefighter in the State of Florida in accordance with provisions of Chapter 633, Florida Statutes. In addition, there are a number of subordinate issues to be resolved through the hearing process. First, does recognition pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, referred to as the savings clause or grandfather provision continue in perpetuity such that firefighters who are granted t
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84-2781

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS


JIMMY D. ADAMS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 84-2781

) STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ) INSURANCE AND TREASURY, OFFICE ) OF THE STATE FIRE MARSHAL )

)

Respondent. )

)


RECOMMENDED ORDER


Notice was given and on December 14, 1984, a formal Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing was held before Charles C. Adams, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The location of the hearing was the offices of the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Oakland Building, 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida. The Recommended Order is being entered following the receipt and review of the transcript of proceedings and upon consideration of proposed recommended orders offered by the parties in the person of their counsel. Petitioner's memorandum in argument made through counsel has also been considered. To the extent that the proposals are consistent with the Recommended Order they have been utilized. Otherwise, they are rejected as being irrelevant, immaterial, cumulative or subordinate or for reason that the facts urged are determined to be lacking in credibility.


APPEARANCES


For the Petitioner: Thomas W. Lager, Esquire

Lager, Woodward, O'Steen and Kearney

320 West Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301


For the Respondent: Ruth L. Gokel, Esquire

Assistant General Counsel Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ISSUES

The principal issue in this cause concerns the question of whether the petitioner is presently certified as a firefighter in the State of Florida in accordance with provisions of Chapter 633, Florida Statutes. In addition, there are a number of subordinate issues to be resolved through the hearing process.

First, does recognition pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, referred to as the savings clause or grandfather provision continue in perpetuity such that firefighters who are granted this certificate of tenure need not undergo further certification In the event of a lapse in service. Second, there is

raised the related question whether Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), in effect at relevant times within 1981, has application to firefighters who were initially certified through the aforementioned savings clause, and by that certification were granted certificates of tenure. The next issues concern the question of the effective date of Petitioner's resignation or termination from the Tallahassee Fire Department in 1979, and the date of his reemployment with the Tallahassee Fire Department in 1981. Issue number five concerns the question of whether the actions of the State Fire Marshal in dealing with the Petitioner on the question of the petitioner's certification rights constituted a recognition that Petitioner is entitled to certification following his reemployment in 1981, and in view of the nature of those actions and Petitioner's reliance on those actions, Respondent is estopped from denying Petitioner's claim of certification without the necessity to attend school or stand examination. Finally, the issue is raised on the subject of whether actions of the State Fire Marshal in dealing with other cases pertaining to the certification rights of firefighters, by recognizing those other persons for purposes of certification has acted inconsistently when compared to the present circumstance in which the Petitioner's certification has been called to question.


FINDINGS OF FACT


  1. Petitioner was employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Tallahassee, Florida, on September 23, 1963, and continued in employment until May 5, 1979. (The suggestion by Petitioner that he had 24 to

    27 days of leave accrued upon the last day of his employment is not utilized in determining the official termination date of employment. Beyond May 5, 1979, Petitioner was entitled to be paid for leave time, but was no longer obligated to perform as a firefighter, having been terminated effective May 5, 1979.) During his service as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Petitioner received a certificate of tenure in 1974, pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes. This provision has been referred to as the savings clause or grandfather clause and allows firefighters who were employed upon the effective date of that section to be certified without the necessity of complying with provisions of law related to certification through training and examination. Section 633.41, Florida Statutes became effective in 1969, thus Petitioner was certified by the terms and conditions of that provision.


  2. Petitioner left his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department to pursue private business and for reason of family obligations. Having terminated his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department on a voluntary basis, there was no prohibition against reapplying for employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department at some future date. That eventuality occurred when the petitioner contacted the Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department in April, 1981 to discuss the possibility of reemployment. The Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department then and now is one Edwin C. Ragans. Shortly after this discussion with Chief Ragans, and in the same month, April, 1981, Ragans hired Petitioner with the effective date of Petitioner's reemployment being July 21, 1901. The delay between April and July was caused by the petitioner's need to conclude certain business undertakings before assuming his duties as a firefighter. The State of Florida, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, had been informed of the date of original employment for the Petitioner, September 23, 1963, and the date of termination, May 5, 1979, based upon a notice of termination which was submitted by Chief Ragans in behalf of the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 1 admitted into evidence. Likewise, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training was made aware of the reemployment of the Petitioner through the filing of a form known as

    Qualification of New Employee. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 2 admitted into evidence. That exhibit reflects the date of reemployment or rehiring as being July 21, 1981, and further notes that the initial employment was September 23, 1963. That form does not allude to the date of original termination of employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department which was May 5, 1979.


  3. When Petitioner returned to employment in July, 1981, Chief Ragans made mention of the "two year rule", which is a reference to Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), dealing with the idea that firefighters who had been employed with an employing agency, such as the Tallahassee Fire Department, would not have to reapply for certification in this same fashion as the person seeking initial employment as a firefighter, if that former individual resumed full time paid employment with the employing agency within a period of two years immediately subsequent to termination of the initial employment. In this connection Ragans told the Petitioner at the point of reemploying the Petitioner in 1981, that Petitioner had two options. First, he could challenge the examination related to firefighters and gain certification or if that choice was not made it would be necessary for the Petitioner to go through a minimum standards class before recertification. At the commencement of reemployment, Petitioner was mindful of the existence of the two year provision pertaining to continuing certification for those persons who had not been away from employment as a firefighter for more than two years. Furthermore, this topic had been discussed between Petitioner and some other individuals of the fire department on one occasion. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contacted an official within the training division of the Tallahassee Fire Department and obtained books necessary to study in preparation for standing the examination for certification as a firefighter. Petitioner had commenced preparation for the examination when he happened to see Bobby Presnell a lieutenant within the Tallahassee Fire Department and president of the local firefighters union. In the course of this conversation with Presnell, Petitioner mentioned that he was going to have to be examined through a test before receiving certification. Presnell indicated that he would check into the situation and find out exactly what would be necessary to obtain certification. A couple of weeks after that conversation, Presnell called the Petitioner and told him that he had spoken with Olin Greene the then Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal in the state of Florida. Presnell reported to the Petitioner that in the course of the conversation between Greene and Presnell, Greene had stated that the Petitioner was a certified fireman.


  4. These conversations between Petitioner and Presnell occurred some time in August or September, 1981. Presnell testified that the discussion between Presnell and Greene concerned the problem which Petitioner had with the two year requirement for continuing certification without the necessity of testing or schooling. In testimony, Presnell indicated that he told Greene that the Petitioner had been reemployed and everything was "supposed to be okay, and then a month or two or three later the problem arose", meaning a certification problem. Greene, according to Presnell, stated that he would get back in contact with Presnell on this subject. Again, per the testimony of Presnell, some ten days to two weeks later, beyond the initial discussion between Greene and Presnell, Greene called Presnell and told him that as far as he, Greene, was concerned, and the Fire Marshal's office was concerned, that "They didn't have any problem with Mr. Adams' recertification or certification." Greene has no recollection of any conversation with Presnell on the subject of the certification situation related to the Petitioner. Having considered the testimony of Presnell and Greene, the Presnell testimony is accepted as factually correct.

  5. Following the occurrence wherein Presnell related remarks attributed to Greene as described before, a few days after those events, Petitioner had a discussion with District Fire Chief Raymond Love of the Tallahassee Fire Department. In this conversation Love describes a discussion which he claims to have taken place between himself and Buddy Dewar, whose actual name is Dennis Dewar, in which Dewar is reported to have said that Petitioner was certified.

    At that time Dewar was the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. At present he is the Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal, having been promoted to that position in April 1982. In testimony, Love's account of the Dewar conversation concerning certification of the Petitioner, was that in the course of a fireman's convention in October 1981, Dewar asked Love if he knew Jimmy Adams, and Love replied in the affirmative. Given this opening, Love then related that he was impressed with Adams as a person and in terms of his capabilities as a firefighter. Love then recounts that he began to tell Dewar that there was a problem related to the Adams certification and if there was any help that Dewar could give, it would be most appreciated. To which, according to Love, Dewar replied that "he didn't see any problem with the recertification." Dewar, per Love's comments, did not state that he considered the Petitioner to be certified at the time of that conversation, nor was the

    two-year requirement pertaining to the return to the employment roles, to remain in a certified position without reapplication for certification mentioned in the Dewar conversation with Love, according to Love. Dewar, in his testimony, denied that the conversation between Love and Dewar concerned the Petitioner.

    His recollection is that Love asked Dewar how long the retention of certification would be valid for, to which he responded two years. Having considered the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, a decision cannot be reached on which of the witnesses Love or Dewar should be believed pertaining to the conversation which took place between them in October, 1981.


  6. Following discussion with Chief Love, and particularly on the next morning after that discussion, Petitioner talked to another fire chief within the Tallahassee Fire Department, whose name is Revel. This conversation was instituted by Revel in his inquiry of the petitioner on the subject of whether Petitioner was studying for the examination for certification. In response Petitioner stated that he had been but that he had found out the night before that he was certified. Revel in turn told Chief Ragans of this conversation and Ragans summoned the Petitioner to his office and the conversation between Love and Petitioner on the question of certification was recounted for the benefit of Chief Ragans. Petitioner and Love indicate that in the course of the meeting with Ragans, Ragans made a phone call and having concluded that phone call, stated that Petitioner did not have any problem with certification, or something to that effect, as Love recalls Ragans comments. Petitioner's recollection of the comment after the phone call was that Chief Ragans said, "You are a certified fireman."


  7. Ragans, in his testimony, does not relate having phoned someone on the topic of certification of the Petitioner in the presence of Petitioner and Love as previously described. His recollection is to the effect that some time prior to Love having stated in the fleeting between Ragans, Love and the Petitioner, that Dewar had confirmed Petitioner's status as a certified firefighter, he, Ragans, had talked to a Mr. Schaffner, Standards Coordinator, at the State of Florida, Fire College, and Schaffner had indicated that the time which Petitioner had been out of employment as a firefighter in a Florida department, was so close to being within the two years allowed, that Petitioner would not be required to go back through the certification process. At the time this case was placed at issue Schaffner had died. Having considered Ragans comments in

    the context of the other proof, it is determined that Ragans was sufficiently acquainted with Schaffner's voice to identify Schaffner in the course of the telephone conversation on the topic of the Petitioners certification. It is also concluded that this was the only conversation which Ragans had with officials within the State of Florida, Office of the State Fire Marshal, during 1981. Whether this conversation between Ragans and Schaffner occurred while Petitioner and Love were in Ragans office is uncertain.


  8. Benjamin E. Mclin, inspector with the Fire Department, speaks in terms of a conversation which he had with Olin Greene in October 1981, in the course of a seminar. Mclin introduced himself to Greene and, Greene is reputed, according to Mclin, to have asked Mclin if he knew Jimmy Adams, the Petitioner, and to have asked what kind of person Adams was. Mclin reports that he replied that he thought that Petitioner was an outstanding person as well as an impressive fireman, to which Mclin says that Greene stated, "Well, I know I did the right thing." Greene has no recollection of this conversation. Having considered the comment, even if it can be attributable to Greene, it is sufficiently ambiguous that it has no value in resolving the certification issue related to the Petitioner.


  9. After the conversation with Chief Ragans and Chief Love, which took place in Ragans office, Petitioner assumed that he was certified without the necessity of standing examination to receive certification. He had received no written indication from Respondent confirming or denying this understanding and had never personally spoken to anyone in the employ of the Respondent, on this subject. Petitioner continued his duties throughout 1981, into the beginning of 1984, serving in the capacity as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department. At that point, Petitioner had been promoted to Lieutenant within the Fire Department, and in the face of that action, a grievance was filed by another firefighter employed by the Tallahassee Fire Department indicating that Petitioner was not a certified firefighter. Ragans, in response to the grievance contacted Paul R. Steckle who was employed with the Office of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as a Field Representative Supervisor. Steckle had been asked by Dewar to check the Petitioner's file to determine the period of time between the termination of initial employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department and reemployment with that employer. Having made this check Steckle believed that the period was beyond the two years and reported this finding to Dewar. In conversation with Ragans, Steckle had asked Ragans when Petitioner had been employed and Ragans had indicated that Petitioner had been rehired in April but did not report to work until July, 1981. Steckle told Ragans that if Petitioner had been hired in April, 1981, and had been granted a leave of absence, allowing Petitioner to start work in July, 1981, that the reemployment would have been within the two year limit. Ragans indicated that the City of Tallahassee had no policy of allowing a leave of absence such as inquired about by Steckle. Nonetheless, Ragans got the impression that petitioner was duly certified based upon remarks made by Steckle.


  10. On January 30, 1984, Ragans wrote Steckle verifying that Petitioner had not returned to work in April, in view of commitments which would not allow him to be actually at work until July. (Mention is made of 1979, but it is determined that Ragans is referring to 1981.) This correspondence also mentions the conversation between Ragans and Schaffner. A copy of the correspondence is Respondent's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence.


  11. On February 22, 1984, Steckle wrote to the Petitioner and advised the Petitioner that a review of the records of the Bureau of Fire Standards and

    Training revealed that the Petitioner had been out of fire service for over two years before reemployment. This correspondence refers to May 5, 1979, as the date of termination and July 21, 1981, as the date of reemployment. It alludes to the fact that Petitioner must regain certification through provisions of Rule 4A-37.52, Florida Administrative Code, (1981) 1/ related to an equivalency examination and encloses a copy of the package related to that examination process. It requests that the examination be taken in April, 1984. Otherwise, it is indicated in the correspondence, the Petitioner would be terminated from employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department upon request from the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training to the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 14, admitted into evidence.


  12. On April 10, 1984, through correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel for the petitioner, the case is discussed and the Petitioner is requested to stand the equivalency examination and it alludes to the fact that in view of the error of the Respondent in failing to note at the time of reemployment that Petitioner had been away from fire fighting for more than two years, Petitioner is given until February 22, 1985, to undergo an equivalency examination for purposes of recertification. In lieu of this disposition, Petitioner is afforded the opportunity for a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes hearing, which he availed himself of, leading to the present Recommended Order. A copy of the April 10, 1984 correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 15 admitted into evidence.


  13. Luther Richter had been employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department and was dismissed from that employment after being arrested on a federal drug smuggling charge. He subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to the charge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1976 and was given a three year probation. In April of 1979 he applied to the Tallahassee Fire Department to be reemployed. Through the reemployment paperwork, Chief Ragans recommended that Richter not be accepted based upon an alleged lack of good character. In response, Dewar, the then Bureau Chief of the Fire College, wrote Ragans on May 22, 1979 stating that Richter was not eligible for employment because of his drug conviction. Another letter was sent on June 15, 1979, from Dewar to Ragans to the same effect. On July 17, 1979, Dewar requested a legal interpretation of the Richter situation from the point of view of the Respondent's duties in considering the question of Richter's certification as a firefighter in Florida.


  14. On September 10, 1979, the City of Tallahassee and Richter entered into an agreement for Richter's reinstatement as an employee with the City of Tallahassee. In the face of the action of the City of Tallahassee, the Respondent accepted Richter for purposes of certification as if he had never been dismissed. As stated in the October 16, 1979 correspondence from Olin Greene to Daniel E. A. Kleman, City Manager of the City of Tallahassee, with Richter's reinstatement as an employee of the City of Tallahassee the Respondent would ". . . have no alternative but to accept the reinstatement order and allow his certification that was in effect prior to September 1, 1975, to come back into effect." The agreement for reinstatement can be found as part of the composite exhibit number 6 of the Petitioner, admitted into evidence. The October 16, 1979 correspondence may also be found within that document. Those items are copies of the originals. In furtherance of Greene's perception, Richter having been reinstated by the City of Tallahassee was deemed by the Respondent never to have left employment. Richter's certification continues from September 1, 1975, the dismissal date, and his initial certification remains valid to this date as established in the correspondence of Olin Greene

    to Kleman dated January 9, 1980, a copy of which is found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit number 6. In essence, Respondent felt that in view of the reinstatement it could not refuse to recognize Richter's certification as if it had never lapsed between the interim period of his dismissal in 1975 and the agreement for reinstatement in 1979.


  15. In early 1984 a minimum standards training course for firefighters in Florida was taught at Indian River Community College. An unusually high failure rate was experienced by those students who took that course and this led to an investigation by the State Fire College. Through the investigation it was learned that one of the instructors in the minimum standards course had not been properly certified. To resolve this problem, all students who attended that course were required to take further training with a certified instructor. Following that additional training session, another examination was given and those persons who passed the second examination, in addition to those persons who had passed the initial examination, were certified. Those who failed the second examination were not accepted for certification.


  16. On other occasions where tenured firefighters, as recognized by Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, have gone beyond the two year time period for reemployment and continuing certification without examination, those firefighters have had to stand the examination, without exception.


    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


  17. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action in keeping with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.


  18. Pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, which was in effect at all times relevant to this cause, firefighters employed upon the effective date of that provision, the year 1969, are not required to meet provisions of Sections 633.33 and 34, Florida Statutes as a condition of tenure or continued employment as a firefighter. Those later provisions pertain to certification through training and testing and evidencing minimal requirements to be employed as a firefighter. Petitioner, as established by the facts in this cause, was the beneficiary of this provision, having been employed as a firefighter by the Tallahassee Fire Department in 1963. As a consequence he was "grandfathered in" and received a certificate of tenure through this savings clause. Counsel for the Petitioner argues that once certified through tenure, Petitioner may not lose certification by leaving his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department. Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, is not read to promote that result. This provision of law establishes a means for recognizing the prior experience of firefighters who served before the effective date of the 1969 version of Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, but is not interpreted to mean that a firefighter so recognized may leave his employment as a firefighter and resume his duties as a firefighter at some future date without regard for requirements of recertification which are incumbent upon firefighters that were not recipients of the grandfather clause who leave the fire service and following a lapse in time return to employment as firefighter. This savings clause may not be read to obtain this result. It stands for the proposition that holders of certification of tenure who continue in employment without a lapse in service may do so without regard for requirements for certification related to non- tenured firefighters; however, when that tenure is abandoned by the termination of employment on the part of a tenured firefighter, recertification must be gained in keeping with provisions which are common to persons who formerly had tenure and those who have never been extended that recognition.

  19. In this instance, when the petitioner left his employment on May 5, 1979, he was no longer a tenured firefighter and no longer entitled to the exempt status afforded him by Section 633.41, Florida Statutes. In his reentry into the fire service, he was held to the terms of Rules 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), which states:


    Retention of certification upon reentry into fire service.

    1. Any individual who is, or has been, employed as a firefighter with an employing agency,

      and who has been certified as being in compliance with the prescribed standards and qualifications for such employment and who terminates such employment for cause(s) which would not have been a cause for failure to qualify for initial employment as a firefighter under the provisions of Section 633.34,

      Florida Statutes, shall retain such certification provided that:

      1. The individual had not less than three

        (3) years continuous full-time paid service as a firefighter with the employing agency immediately preceding the termination or has satisfactorily completed the minimum standards course for the firefighter recruit or firefighter training program, and

      2. The individual resumes full-time, paid employment with an employing agency within

      the purview of the Division within a period of two (2) years immediately subsequent

      to such termination.

      (2) Unless both conditions (a) and (b) in 4A-37.14(1), above, are met, the individual shall be required to meet the standards and qualifications applying to initial employment as a firefighter in effect at the time of

      his reentry into the fire service or, when the factual situation permits, comply with the provision of Rule 4A-37.11 in successfully passing the Equivalency Examination.


  20. The rule makes no distinction between tenured and non- tenured firefighters, it speaks of individuals and their employment as firefighters. Petitioner having left the fire service in good standing and having served more than three years of continuous full-time paid service, could have been reemployed and retained his certification held at the termination of service on May 5, 1979, assuming that he complied with the additional requirement of resuming full-time, paid employment with an employing agency within two years immediately subsequent to his termination. Although Petitioner arranged for his paid employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department in April 1981, he did not resume full-time paid employment until July 21, 1981, more than two years beyond his termination date of May 5, 1979. Therefore, absent the establishment of a reason for not applying the terms of Rule 4A-37.14 Florida Administrative Code,

    (1976), in this case, for reasons of estoppel or the inconsistent actions of the Respondent, Petitioner must be recertified as contemplated by Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code (1976), as carried forward in the present Rule 4A- 37.52, Florida Administrative Code (1981).


  21. Petitioner's claims of estoppel and inconsistent treatment as a basis for continued recognition of his certification as a firefighter are not compelling.


  22. On the issue of estoppel, Petitioner must show that a representation of some material fact has been made to him by the Respondent, which he relied upon and in turn changed his position in view of, and by such change in position acted to his detriment. Petitioner came back to his employment and upon accepting that employment was made aware of the necessity to stand an examination to gain recertification. Through the good offices of his superiors and fellow firefighters, he was subsequently caused to believe that he would not need to stand the examination, based upon representations made to his superiors and fellow firefighters on the part of employees of the Respondent.

    Nonetheless, those representations were not made directly to the Petitioner. Even in those instances where it has been found that employees of the Respondent suggested in some manner that petitioner could be excepted from the requirement of reemployment within two years of the date of his termination as a firefighter, there is a vagueness in the quality of those remarks and those remarks are contrary to the clear statement in law requiring reemployment within two years in order to avoid the need to be further examined on his understanding of the responsibilities pertaining to professional firefighters in the state of Florida. On the subject of detrimental reliance, the Petitioner ceased to study for the examination and has continued in his employment as a firefighter between 1981 and early 1984. This cannot be described as detrimental reliance, provided the Petitioner is given a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the examination required by Chapter 633, Florida Statutes (1984). Moreover, estoppel is a remedy which will only be applied against the state on the occasions where exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated. This case does not rise to that level. Petitioner has been allowed to proceed with his duties and should not be penalized by any form of administrative prosecution, given the facts of this case. On the other hand, it is acceptable for the Respondent to rectify any claim by the Petitioner to entitlement of certification by requiring the Petitioner to undergo necessary preparation and testing to regain recertification. See Rule 4A- 37.53, Florida Administrative Code (1981).


  23. By its actions in recognizing Luther Richter for certification in the face of Richter's reinstatement as an employee of the Tallahassee Fire Department, Respondent was not acting in an inconsistent fashion when compared to the present case. Whether it was appropriate for the Respondent to accent the Richter certification dating from his point of dismissal as an employee of the Tallahassee Fire Department, in view of his reinstatement as an employee of that department, is not a matter which needs to be resolved on this occasion. It need only be decided that the Richter situation was significantly dissimilar to that of Petitioner, and as a consequence the Richter case does not portend

    the determination in law related to Petitioner's claim. This same conclusion is reached on the topic of the Indian River College retesting. That situation was dramatically different in that it did not involve attempts at recertification for a firefighter who had a lapse in service and who did not wish to undergo the examination process. That matter involved the Respondent's correction of a flawed training process to assist those candidates for certification in that training cycle.

  24. Finally, contrary to Petitioner's assertions, it would not be inconsistent to cause the Petitioner to stand the examination as all other formerly tenured firefighters have done in the past when they have failed to return to the firefighting service within two years of their initial date of termination as a firefighter employee.


Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is,


RECOMMENDED:


That a final order be entered which finds that the Petitioner is not presently certified as a firefighter in the State of Florida, and which allows the Petitioner one year from the date of the final order to obtain a firefighters certificate through participation in the firefighter training program or passage of an equivalency examination.


DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida.


CHARLES C. ADAMS

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675


FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1985.


ENDNOTE


1/ This rule provision is the successor provision to Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code (1976).


COPIES FURNISHED:


Ruth L. Gokel, Esquire 413-B Larson Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32301


Thomas W. Lager, Esquire

Lager, Woodward, O'Steen and Kearney

320 West Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301


Honorable William Gunter

State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer

The Capitol - Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Barbara K. Hobbs, Esquire

118 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301


Docket for Case No: 84-002781
Issue Date Proceedings
Oct. 30, 1990 Final Order filed.
Apr. 02, 1985 Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED.

Orders for Case No: 84-002781
Issue Date Document Summary
May 13, 1985 Agency Final Order
Apr. 02, 1985 Recommended Order Once firefighter left employment, he is no longer entitled to claim exemption from certification requirements when he was rehired by his employer.
Source:  Florida - Division of Administrative Hearings

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