STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FLORIDA DEPARTMETN OF LAW ) ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ) STANDARDS AND TRAINING )

COMMISSION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 85-3698

)

JOSEPH R. DeSANTIS, )

)

Respondent. )

) CITY OF CLEARWATER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 86-0889

)

JOSEPH R. DeSANTIS, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a consolidated administrative hearing was held before Diane D. Tremor, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Clearwater, Florida, on August 12, August 13 and September 9, 1986. The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether the law enforcement certification of respondent DeSantis should be revoked (Case No. 85-3698) and whether respondent DeSantis should be dismissed as a police officer with the Clearwater Police Department (Case No.

86-0889).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner Joseph S. White, Esquire Commission: Assistant General Counsel

Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Petitioner Robert G. Walker, Jr. City: Miles A. Lance

Assistant City Attorneys City of Clearwater

Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518

For Respondent Louis Kwall, Esquire DeSantis: Gross & Kwall, P.A.

133 N. Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516

and

Margot Pequignot, Esquire McMullen, Everett, Logan, Marquardt & Cline, P.A.

Post Office Box 1669 Clearwater, Florida 33517

INTRODUCTION

By an Administrative Complaint filed on September 24, 1985, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC) seeks to revoke the law enforcement certification of the respondent, Joseph R. DeSantis,on the ground that he failed to maintain the qualifications set forth in Florida Statutes, Section 943.13(7), which requires an officer to have good moral character.

Factually, the complaint alleges that on four separate occasions, the respondent unlawfully used excessive force to effect the arrest of four individuals.

The City of Clearwater, on June 10, 1985, by a Termination and Dismissal Notice, dismissed respondent from employment with the Clearwater Police Department, citing the same four incidents of alleged excessive force upon the same four individuals. The City charges that respondent's conduct during the four incidents constituted violations of numerous Civil Service Rules and Regulations; Clearwater Police Department Rules, Regulations and General Orders; and the City's Guidelines for Disciplinary Action.

Inasmuch as the charges against respondent by both governmental entities involved the same four episodes of alleged misconduct, the cases were consolidated for hearing purposes, with the CJSTC and the City presenting a cooperative case. With regard to the Anderson incident, the petitioners presented the testimony of Walter Orkiaz, Joseph Orkisz, Officer David C. Watson and Officer Charles A. Kettel. Testifying with regard to the Heywood incident were Russ Lazio, Officer Watson, Officer Tami Swain and Steve Heywood. Karen Jackson and Detective

Margaret Jewett gave testimony concerning the Truby incident. With regard to the Vonderau incident, the petitioners presented the testimony of Officer Watson, Karen Jackson, Louis Desrosiers and Officer Marvin L. Green. The petitioners also presented the testimony of Richard A. McRenna, accepted as an expert in the area of law enforcement standards. This witness was not permitted to render an opinion as to whether the testimony presented by the petitioners' other witnesses constituted violations of the statutory or regulatory provisions charged. The petitioners' Exhibits 1 through 5 were received into evidence.

Respondent DeSantis testified on his own behalf and respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4 were received into evidence.

Subsequent to the hearing, the filing of the hearing transcript and several approvals for extensions of time, all parties filed proposed findings of fact, proposed conclusions of law and proposed recommendations. To the extent that the parties' proposed factual findings are not included in this Recommended Order, they are rejected for the reasons set forth in the Appendix hereto.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses who observed and/or participated in each of the four episodes, the following facts are found:

   
   

2. At all times material to the charges herein, respondent DeSantis was an on-duty Clearwater Police Department.

   officer, holding the rank of patrol sergeant. The respondent had been employed by the Clearwater Police Department since March 14, 1977. He was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 7, 1977, and was issued Certificate Number 02-18239.

   
   

   THE ANDERSON INCIDENT

   
   

3. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 27, 1984, a radio dispatch was transmitted to Clearwater police officers advising that there was an armed black male in the area who had threatened that he was either going to get some money or someone would be hurt. Respondent observed a suspect, later identified as Harold Anderson, in front of a laundromat where three or four people were sitting in chairs. Respondent drove up to the laundromat, and observed Mr. Anderson walk inside. A woman and a child were inside the front area of the laundromat. Respondent followed Anderson into the laundromat and Anderson proceeded to walk the back area, keeping his back to the respondent. Assuming that

   Anderson had a gun in his hand and fearing a possible hostage situation with the woman and child, respondent drew his service revolver and informed Anderson that he was under arrest. With pistol drawn and facing Anderson's back, respondent made two attempts within the laundromat to take Anderson into custody.

   During the second attempt and while respondent's gun was placed on Anderson's spine, a struggle ensued near the front doorway. The struggle caused both the respondent and Anderson to fall, with Anderson on the bottom, upon the hood of a car parked outside the entryway to the laundromat. Sometime during the struggle, respondent was attempting to place his service revolver under Anderson's chin. Instead, the barrel of respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth, where it remained for between

   20 and 40 seconds, causing Anderson to make choking and gagging sounds. Respondent's pistol was removed from Anderson's mouth after Anderson was handcuffed with the assistance of two other police officers. A loaded handgun was retrieved from the waistband of Anderson's trousers.

4. Officer Kettel arrived on the scene as respondent and Anderson were struggling at the doorway of the laundromat. He observed that Anderson was resisting arrest and that respondent was attempting to calm Anderson down and to retrieve his gun. He recalled that respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth as they both landed on the car hood.

   
   

5. Officer Watson was the third police officer to arrive. He did not observe the struggle between respondent and Anderson prior to the two reaching the hood of the parked car. When Watson arrived at the scene, Anderson was lying on his back on the car hood and respondent was holding a pistol in Anderson's mouth. Watson's testimony was conflicting as to the exact point in time that Anderson ceased to struggle and the point in time that the pistol was removed from his mouth.

   
   

6. Until the point in time that Anderson was handcuffed and his loaded gun retrieved from him, respondent was in fear for his life. He admits that the barrel of his service revolver went into Anderson's mouth, but states that this was unintentional and that he could not remove it without endangering himself until he received assistance from other officers in subduing Anderson.

   
   

7. The testimony of two civilian eyewitnesses to this incident was somewhat conflicting as to when the gun went into Anderson's mouth, when Anderson ceased resisting his arrest, and when the gun was removed from Anderson's mouth. There was no evidence that Mr. Anderson was injured as a result of respondent's revolver being inside his mouth.

   
   

   THE HEYWOOD INCIDENT

8. On November 3, 1984, three police officers responded to a radio dispatch concerning an individual who had returned to a Maas Brothers department store armed with sticks and bricks after previously having had an altercation with the security guard there. The individual was Steve Heywood, a 19 year old black male, who had testified that he had returned to Maas Brothers "to defend himself" because the security guard had broken his necklace approximately one-half hour earlier in the evening.

   
   

9. When respondent drove into the Maas Brothers parking lot, he observed five or six people standing near the doorway and saw Heywood, dressed only in shorts and tennis shoes, throw some bricks and sticks in a bush. Respondent got out of his cruiser and Heywood started walking away from him. Respondent told Heywood to "freeze" and to "hit the ground." Heywood took three or four more steps, then turned around quickly. At that point, respondent drew his service revolver. Heywood put his hands out or up, started pleading that he had done nothing and went down to the ground on his stomach, with his hands visible. Respondent then approached Heywood with his gun still pointing at him, put his knee on Heywood's back, and placed the barrel of his service revolver next to Heywood's head where it remained for a period of about 30 seconds until another officer handcuffed Heywood. While Heywood appeared excited or upset during this process, he did not fight or struggle.

   
   

   THE TRUBY INCIDENT

   
   

10. On October 5, 1984, respondent and Reserve Officer Karen Jackson were dispatched to investigate a report of a fight at an apartment complex. Soon after the officers arrived, Paul Truty began creating a disturbance in the parking lot by shouting abusive and threatening remarks at a victim of a prior sexual abuse, her family and the police officers. Detective Margaret Jewett was also dispatched to the scene to assist the sexual a~use victim. When Truby refused to stop yelling obscenities and inciting the crowd, respondent told him he was under arrest. Truty then began to walk backwards away from the respondent. Respondent pounded his nightstick on the ground three or four times, demanding that Truby return, and Truby then turned and started walking between two apartment buildings. Respondent and Detective Jewett followed Truby a short distance and apprehended him. The respondent pushed Truby against a wall and Jewett placed handcuffs on Truby, securing his hands behind his back. The respondent and Detective Jewett each took one of Truby's arms and escorted him approximately fifty yards back to the respondent's police car. During the walk back to the car, Truby did not resist or struggle and was cooperative and submissive.

11. From this point, there is conflicting evidence between respondent's recollection of events and the recollections of Reserve Officer Jackson and Detective Jewett. Respondent states that Truby was highly intoxicated at the time of his arrest and that he had to use his nightstick to keep Truby's spine stiff and steer him while they were walking back to the patrol car. Respondent explains that Truby stumbled near the car due to the presence of some concrete tire stops adjacent to the passenger side of the cruiser.

    
    

12. Detective Jewett and Officer Jackson recall that respondent positioned his police baton parallel to Truby's spine and under his handcuffed hands. As Truby was beginning to enter the police cruiser, respondent intentionally pulled up on the lower end of the nightstick near the handcuffs, thus causing TruLy to stumble and fall off balance. According to these witnesses, respondent then made a sarcastic remark about Truby falling and subsequently pulled Truby up with the nightstick and placed him in the car. Detective Jewett stated that Truby may have been intoxicated.

    THE VONDERAU INCIDENT

    
    

13. On the evening of October 5, 1984, Officer David Watson was dispatched to investigate a report of a domestic disturbance in a residential neighborhood. Officer Green was dispatched as a back-up officer. Upon arrival at the scene, the officers spoke to a very upset woman who told them that her son had done extensive damage to her home and had threatened her. The interior of the woman's home was in shambles.

    
    

14. A neighbor led the son, later identified as John Vonderau, to the area of the street where the officers were. He was wearing no shirt and the officers believed he had been drinking. Vonderau exhibited bizzare behavior, marked bye dramatic swings of mood from calm and lethargic to aggressively pacing the street with clenched fists. Officer Watson was concerned that Vonderau could become violent, but he was unsure of his legal right to arrest him since no crime had been committed in Watson's presence. He considered taking Vonderau to a detoxification center or effecting an involuntary commitment to a treatment facility for the mentally ill, pursuant to the Baker Act. Being unsure of the legal ramifications of doing so, Watson radioed respondent, who was his superior on duty that evening, and asked him to come to the scene to advise on the proper course of action. Before respondent arrived, Officer Desrosiers drove by and Officer Watson requested that he stay because Vonderau appeared to be getting more agitated.

15. When respondent and Reserve Officer Jackson arrived on the scene, Officers Watson, Green and Desrosiers were standing in the street in a loose circle around Vonderau, who was pacing back and forth. Officer Watson advised respondent that Vonderau had made death threats to his mother and had completely ramshackled her house. A decision was made that the officers would take Vonderau into custody as a Baker Act patient.

    
    

16. When respondent and Watson began to approach Vonderau, he brushed against respondent's shoulder and then assumed a martial arts/karate-type stance, and said, "You'd better get your clubs out. You're going to need them." The officers all took out their police batons, and Vonderau continued to make karate- type motions. Officer Desrosiers was talking on his radio when Vonderau swung at him. Respondent thought Vonderau struck Desrosiers, but no contact was made. Vonderau also approached Officers Watson and Green in an aggressive fashion. When he turned away from Officer Watson, Watson struck Vonderau's leg with his police baton. Vonderau then ceased his crouched stance, stood erect, put his hands in the air and said, "You got me."

    
    

17. Officer Watson then ordered Vonderau to get down on the ground. After hesitating momentarily, Vonderau then assumed a push-up position, facing the street and suspending himself with his feet and hands. Immediately after Officer Watson ordered Vonderau to lie flat on the street, the respondent struck a very hard blow with his police baton across Vonderau's shoulders, causing a welt. Vonderau then went immediately to the ground.

    
    

18. Once Vonderau was down flat on the street, at least three of the officers quickly moved to securely hold him down and handcuff his hands behind his back. The fourth officer walked over to the police vehicle to retrieve a set of "flex cuffs" to place around Vonderau's legs.

    
    

19. At some point, respondent drew his service revolver and, after Vonderau was down and was being handcuffed by the other officers, respondent held his gun to the back of Vonderau's neck behind his ear, while pushing his nightstick against Vonderau's neck. Vonderau had ceased resisting and being aggressive from the time he went flat on his stomach to the street. Respondent held the gun to Vonderau's neck or head for approximately thirty seconds, angrily telling him that if he moved, respondent would "blow his head off." After Vonderau was hand and leg cuffed, he was taken to the police station by Officers Watson and Desrosiers.

    
    

20. The testimony is somewhat conflicting as to the exact point in time that respondent withdrew his service revolver from his holster. Respondent states, and the other officers present

    admit the possibility, that his pistol was drawn when Vonderau first assumed his karate-type stance and began swinging at the other officers. He further states that he thereafter attempted to place his pistol back in its holster, but, because his holster lining was torn, he had to hold it there. However, on cross- examination, respondent admitted that he intentionally placed his gun next to Vonderau's head because he felt he and the other officers were in jeopardy. Respondent felt that the placing of his service revolver against Vonderau's neck was effective in calming him down.

    
    

21. All officers on the scene believed that Vonderau possessed knowledge of a martial art and that he was dangerous. However, officers Watson, Green, Desrosiers and Jackson agreed that Vonderau ceased to resist completely once he was flat on the ground on his stomach.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

22. The City of Clearwater seeks to dismiss the respondent as a police officer on the grounds that he used excessive force during the arrest of four individuals between October 5 and November 3, 1984. The City contends that such behavior violates numerous rules, regulations and police department directives.

    
    

23. With regard to the Harold Anderson incident, the City charges that respondent used excessive force when, during Anderson's arrest,

    
    

    "he grabbed Mr. Anderson by the throat, threw him on his back onto the hood of his car, forced his service revolver in the mouth of Mr. Anderson, up to the cylinder, and permitted this revolver to remain in the suspect's mouth until he was handcuffed and placed in the police cruiser."

    
    

    The evidence adduced at the hearing does not support these factual allegations of excessive force.

    
    

24. Prior to his arrival, respondent was made aware that the suspect was armed and had threatened to harm someone if he did not obtain some money. Anderson initiated the struggle with respondent and was resisting his arrest with violence. The evidence concerning the struggle between the respondent and Anderson is consistent with the conclusion that respondent's service revolver initially entered Anderson's mouth by accident. Respondent's explanation that he could not immediately remove the gun from Anderson's mouth without endangering his own life is reasonable in light of the prior struggle and the fact that

    Anderson was in possession of a loaded firearm. The evidence did not support a finding that the service revolver remained in Anderson's mouth until he was placed into the police cruiser.

    Rather, the evidence supports a finding that respondent's gun was removed from Anderson's mouth as soon as respondent believed that Anderson was no longer a threat to the safety of respondent and others; to wit: after he was handcuffed by the other two officers who later arrived on the scene. The evidence supports a conclusion that respondent's use of force against Mr. Anderson was necessary and justified, that he did not intentionally place his gun in Anderson's mouth and that he did not permit the gun to remain in Anderson's mouth longer than the circumstances warranted.

    
    

25. The evidence supports the City's charge of excessive force in effecting the arrest of Steve Heywood. The City alleges that respondent used excessive force

    
    

    "(1) when he drew his service revolver, though it was obvious that Mr. Heywood did not have any visible weapon, pointed it at the suspect and ordered him to the ground;

    1. when he subsequently, while the suspect was on the ground, placed his revolver to the back of the suspect's head until he was handcuffed, and

    2. by the use of excessive force being not only a threat to the suspect, but also an unnecessary threat to the innocent citizens standing behind Mr. Heywood as he pointed his weapon at him."

       
       

26. There was no justification for respondent to continually display and place his service revolver against the back of Heywood's head as he lay passively on the ground. Respondent knew that Heywood f~ad discarded his weapons even before respondent left his police car. Respondent could see that Heywood was unarmed since he was wearing no shirt. Shortly after Heywood was told to "freeze," he put his hands up and then complied with respondent's command to get down on the ground. In short, Heywood did nothing to warrant having a gun placed to his head. In- addition to Heywood, innocent bystanders and other officers were unnecessarily threatened by this unjustified use of respondent's service revolver. The evidence supports a finding that respondent's conduct with regard to the Heywood incident violated the City's Civil Service Rule 14(d), which prohibits "abusive or improper treatment of a person in custody provided the acts committed were not necessarily or lawfully committed in self-defense, to protect the lives of others or to prevent the escape of anyone lawfully in custody." In addition, the rules of

    the Clearwater Police Department state that ''officers shall not use any more force than is necessary to accomplish their lawful arrest," (Rule #68) and that "a member should never draw his firearm unless he plans to and is ready to use it." (General Order 80-6). Respondent used more force than was reasonably necessary to accomplish Heywood's arrest.

    
    

27. With respect to Mr. Truby, the City alleges that respondent used excessive force when he

    
    

    "placed his nightstick between the shoulders and handcuffed hands of Mr. Truty forcing him to the ground. At the time the prisoner was not resisting arrest nor was he violent in any manner."

    
    

28. This charge is not supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing. Respondent's use of his nightstick to steady and steer Truty back to the police cruiser was not demonstrated to be improper. While it is clear that Truty stumbled or fell near the car door, respondent's explanation that the stumble was caused either by the concrete tire stops or Truty's intoxicated condition is reasonable and credible. The testimony simply does not adequately demonstrate that respondent intentionally caused Mr. Truby to fall or otherwise utilized excessive force- in arresting Mr. Truby.

29. The respondent's conduct during the Vonderau incident merits disciplinary action against him. The City charges that respondent used excessive force

    
    

    (1) when he struck John Vonderau across the back with his nightstick while the suspect was submissive and on the ground, (2) when he placed his nightstick across the neck of John Vonderau, with his boot on one end of it as he pressed down on it with one hand. The suspect was not fighting or struggling at the time, (3) when he placed the barrel of his service revolver against the head/neck area of John Vonderau while holding him down with the nightstick across his neck. Mr. Vonderau was not fighting or struggling at the time.

    
    

30. The evidence supports these factual allegations and demonstrates the use by respondent of excessive force. While Vonderau may not have yet become completely submissive at the time he assumed his push-up position on the street, a hard blow on the back with a nightstick was unjustified, as was the subsequent placement of respondent's service revolver behind Vonderau's ear. The evidence demonstrates that Vonderau had surrendered and, at least from the point of time when he was flat on the ground, he was incapable of resistance due to the presence of the other officers. At no time after Vonderau went to the ground did he present a threat of escape or violence to the officers. Holding a gun to Vonderau's head, on the other hand, created a clear and present danger to both Vonderau and the other officers and was completely unjustified.

    
    

31. The City had the burden of proving the factual allegations against the respondent. It has sustained this burden with respect to two of the four incidents at tissue. A police service revolver is, obviously, a weapon capable of causing death or serious injury. While a police officer is justified in using such force as is necessary to defend himself or protect others from harm, or to apprehend a felon, the circumstance surrounding the arrests of Mr. Heywood and Mr. Vonderau did not justify the respondent's placement of his service revolver against the heads of these two individuals after they had submitted to arrest. Respondent's conduct in these two incidents constituted excessive force for which dismissal as a police officer was warranted.

    
    

32. The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission has the authority, pursuant to Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, to revoke the certification of any officer who is not in compliance with the minimum qualifications for law enforcement officers. Among those qualifications are that the officer "have

    a good moral character as determined by a background investigation under procedures established by the commission." Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.

    
    

33. Alleging the same four factual incidents, the CJSTC contends that respondent's certification should be revoked because he lacks good moral character. As discussed above, the evidence demonstrates that respondent utilized excessive force with regard to two of the four episodes which form the basis for the charges against the respondent. While it may be said that the respondent exercised poor judgment during these two episodes, the CJSTC failed to establish that respondent lacks good moral character. "Good moral character" is not statutorily defined, and it does not appear that the Commission has adopted any rules defining the term or establishing procedures for investigating moral character. No evidence of Commission policy on this issue was presented at the hearing. The common meaning of "good moral character" connotes the qualities of honesty, intergrity, truthfulness, reputation and conforming to standards of what is right or just in behavior. Erroneous judgment, by itself, does not exemplify bad moral character. The CJSTC failed to establish that respondent lacks good moral character so as to justify a revocation of his law enforcement certification.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Respondent Joseph DeSantis be dismissed as an employee of the Clearwater Police Department for utilizing excessive force during the arrests of Steve Heywood and John Vonderau, and that

2. the Administrative Complaint filed by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission be DISMISSED.

Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of April, 1987.

DIANE D. TREMOR

Hearing Officer

The Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway

The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 488 9675

FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings

this 20th day of April, 1987.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Louis Kwall, Esq.

133 N. Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, FL 33516|

Margot Pequignot, Esq.

P.O. Box 1669 Clearwater, FL 3351

Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esq.

P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516

Miles A. Lance, Esq.

P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516

Joseph S. White, Esq.

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

APPENDIX

The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been carefully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below:

Petitioner, CJSTC

22. The evidence is unclear as to the number of officers holding Vonderau down.

40, 41 and 43. Rejected; not established by

competent, substantial evidence.

1. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence.

2. First sentence rejected; contrary to the evidence.

55. Rejected, contrary to the evidence.

Petitioner, City of Clearwater

(NOTE: Many of the City's proposed findings of fact constitute recitations or summaries of an individual's testimony. The following rejections of the proposed factual findings does not indicate that the cited witness did not so testify, but that said testimony was not sufficient, in light of other testimony, to support a factual finding.)

8(b) Rejected.

8(f) Rejected.

8(i)(2) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence.

8(i)(5) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence.

8(i)(6) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence.

8(i)(7) Rejected, as constituting a legal conclusion as opposed to a factual finding.

9(i) McKenna was accepted as an expert in the area of law enforcement standards.

9(k)(5) Rejected as a factual finding.

10(d)(l) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence.

10(d)(3) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence.

10(g)(3) & (i) Rejected, not established by

competent, substantial evidence.

Respondent

(NOTE: Many of respondent's proposed factual findings constitute verbatim recitations of testimony. These are improper findings of fact and are rejected as such.)

page 6, first Rejected, as contrary to the sentence of last evidence.

paragraph

page 24, second Rejected, not supported by full paragraph competent evidence.

page 27, first Rejected, as contrary to the paragraph evidence.

page 28A, last Rejected as irrelevant and paragraph immaterial to the issues in

dispute.

================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

vs. DOAH Case Nos. 85-3698

86-0889

JOSEPH R. DESANTIS, CJSTC Case No. L-1703

Certificate Number: 02-18239

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER

The above-styled matter came on for final action before the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)(9), F.S., at a public hearing on January 28, 1988, in Atlantic Beach, Florida, upon consideration of the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer entered herein. A transcript of the proceeding is available, if necessary. Respondent was present with counsel, Louis Kwall, Esquire.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission, having reviewed the Recommended Findings of Fact adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact of the Hearing Officer. The exceptions to the Hearing Officer's findings filed by the Respondent are DISMISSED as unsupported by the record.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Having reviewed the Recommended conclusions of law and the exceptions filed thereto, the Commission adopts the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law which are attached hereto and fully incorporated herein by reference. The aforementioned facts found by the Hearing Officer and adopted by the Commission do not

support the exceptions filed by the Respondent or the Petitioner to the Hearing Officer's Recommended conclusions of law; said exceptions are accordingly DISMISSED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

The Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, Joseph R. Desantis be Dismissed.

Pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the parties are hereby notified that they may appeal this Final Order by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the clerk of the agency and by filing the filing fee and one copy of a notice of appeal with the District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date this order is filed.

This Order shall become effective upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Law Enforcement.

DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of March, 1988.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION

COLONEL BOBBY R. BURKETT, CHAIRMAN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER has been furnished to JOSEPH R. DESANTIS,

116 Kendale Drive, Clearwater, Florida 33519, by U.S. Mail on or before 5:00 P.M., this 16th day of March , 1988.

cc: All Counsel of Record

Docket for Case No: 85-003698

Orders for Case No: 85-003698