STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND ) TRAINING COMMISSION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 88-4597

)

GREGORY E. HARVIN, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

The final hearing in this case was held on April 27, 1989, in Tampa, Florida, before Donald D. Conn, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties were represented as follows:

For Petitioner: Joseph S. White, Esquire

Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: No Appearance

The issue in this case Is whether the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner) should impose an administrative penalty against the certificate of Gregory E. Harvin (Respondent) based upon his alleged use of a stolen vehicle, and failure to report the recovery of said vehicle. At the hearing, the Petitioner called Officer Carl Anderson and Captain Benny Holder of the Tampa Police Department, and also introduced two exhibits. No transcript of the hearing was filed, and the filing of posthearing memoranda and recommended orders was waived.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Petitioner on August 11, 1986, and was issued certificate number 35-86-002-03.

   
   

2. From the time of his certification until approximately the end of August, 1987, the Respondent was employed as a police officer with the Tampa Police Department.

   
   

3. During an interview with Captain Benny Holder on July 31, 1987, Respondent admitted that he had been using a motor vehicle which he knew was stolen, and that he had failed to report the recovery of this stolen vehicle or take any action to return it to its owner. Additionally, Respondent had lied to his supervisors when he had previously denied any knowledge or use of a stolen vehicle.

   
   

4. Respondent lived with his cousin, Christopher Brown, and he allowed Brown to use the vehicle which he knew had been stolen. Debra Flowers also

   lived with Respondent and Brown, and Flowers reported to Officer Carl Anderson that Respondent had driven the stolen vehicle numerous times.

   
   

5. Between approximately September, 1986, and July, 1987, Respondent used, and allowed his cousin to also use, a motor vehicle which he knew had been reported stolen. Respondent took no action to report the recovery of this stolen vehicle.

   
   

6. Respondent was terminated from the Tampa Police Department based upon his failure to report the recovery of this stolen vehicle, his use of the stolen vehicle, and his failure to truthfully answer questions about these matters when initially confronted by his supervisors.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

7. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties, and the subject matter in this cause. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

   
   

8. Petitioner alleges that Respondent has violated Section 943.1395(5),(6),Florida Statutes, by failing to maintain good moral character in his actions as a police officer as required by Section 943.13(7). Since this case involves the possible loss of Respondent's livelihood as a police officer due to his decertification as a law enforcement officer, the Petitioner has the burden to prove the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

   
   

9. In this case, the evidence is unrebutted that Respondent did knowingly use a stolen vehicle, and also allowed his cousin to use the same vehicle. He took no action to report the recovery of this vehicle so that it could be returned to its owner, and, in fact, attempted to conceal his use and possession of the vehicle when initially confronted by his supervisors. Therefore, it has been clearly and convincingly established that Respondent engaged in the activities alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

   
   

10. The legal issue in this matter is whether Respondent's actions constitute a lack of good moral character which would thereby authorize the Petitioner to take disciplinary action against the Respondent. In the case of Zemour, Inc. v. Division of Beverage, 347 So.2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the Court defined moral character to mean

    
    

    not only the ability to distinguish between

    right and wrong, but the character to observe the difference; the observance of the rules of right conduct which indicates and establishes the qualities generally acceptable to the populace for positions of trust and confidence. An isolated unlawful act or acts of indiscretion wherever committed do not necessarily establish bad moral character. But. . . repeated acts in violation of law wherever committed and generally condemned by law abiding people, over a long period of time, evinces the sort of mind and establishes the sort

    of character that the legislature. . has determined should not be entrusted with a . . . license.

11. The intent of a good moral character requirement in a professional licensing statute has been recognized by the Court as a means of protecting the public from licensees who have evidenced dishonesty in activities relating to their profession. Pearl v. Florida Board of Real Estate, 394 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981). However, the term is not restricted to the common law notion of moral turpitude. In Florida Board of Bar Examiners, re G.W.L., 364 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that:

    
    

    A more appropriate definition of the phrase (good moral character) requires an inclusion

    of acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.

    
    

12. Based upon these prior judicial interpretations of a good moral character requirement relating to the exercise of a licensed profession, it is concluded that Respondent's activities do evidence his lack of good moral character, and do authorize the Petitioner to impose an administrative penalty against his certification. He knowingly used a stolen motor vehicle on numerous occasions over a period of time which included several months, and allowed his cousin to also use the same stolen vehicle. He took no action to report the recovery of this stolen vehicle, and instead, he initially denied any knowledge about it to his superiors in the Tampa Police Department. As a law enforcement officer, he knew or should have known the requirement and procedures to report the recovery of all stolen vehicles, and his actions, therefore, raise substantial doubts not only about his honesty, but also his respect for the rights of others.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking the certification of Respondent.

DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida.

DONALD D. CONN

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1989.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Joseph S. White, Esquire

P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Gregory E. Harvin

5707 Society Park Boulevard, #A Tampa, FL 33617

Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice standards

and Training Commission

P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director

Department of Law Enforcement

P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Rodney Gaddy, Esquire General Counsel

P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Docket for Case No: 88-004597

Orders for Case No: 88-004597