STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
BETTY CASTOR, as COMMISSIONER ) OF EDUCATION, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 89-2656
)
WILLIE MAE JOHNSON, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the above matter was heard before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Donald R. Alexander, on January 4, 5, 8 and 16, 1990, in Tampa, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Steven A. Burton, Esquire
Catherine Peek McEwen, Esquire
P. O. Box 3273
Tampa, Florida 33601-3273
For Respondent: Robert B. Morrison, Esquire
610 Horatio Street
Tampa, Florida 33606 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue is whether respondent's teaching certificate should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the amended administrative complaint.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In an administrative complaint filed on April 14, 1989, petitioner, Betty Castor, as Commissioner of Education, charged that respondent, Willie Mae Johnson, a licensed teacher, had violated Subsections 231.28(1)(f) and (h), Florida Statutes (1987), and Rules 6B-1.006(4)(c), (5)(a) and (5)(g), Florida Administrative Code (1987). More specifically, the complaint alleged that respondent, while employed as a principal at an elementary school in 1986-1988, utilized school funds for her own personal use on several occasions, ordered various publications with school funds but repeatedly took those publications home for her own personal use, falsified a sick leave form to reflect that a teacher was on sick leave when in fact the teacher was on administrative leave, allowed a student to attend kindergarten in school year 1987-1988 even though the student did not meet the age requirements for kindergarten, and interfered with an investigation of her own performance in March 1988. The complaint also alleged that during 1982 respondent utilized school funds for her own personal use on two occasions. By an amended administrative complaint filed on December
26, 1989 petitioner alleged further that respondent erroneously charged that two teachers were having a lesbian affair without any substantiating facts to support the charge and accused four others of being gay. The amended complaint also alleged that respondent's conduct violated not only the rules and statutes cited in the first administrative complaint but also rules 6B-1.006(5)(c) and (d).
Respondent disputed the above allegations and requested a formal hearing pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The matter was referred by petitioner to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 17, 1989, with a request that a hearing officer be assigned to conduct a formal hearing. By notice of hearing dated June 9, 1989, a final hearing was scheduled on October 3 and 4, 1989, in Tampa, Florida. At the request of the parties, the matter was rescheduled to November 28 and 29, 1989, at the same location. Upon motion of respondent, the matter was rescheduled to December 18 and 19, 1989, and then again to January 4 and 5, 1990, in Tampa, Florida. Continued hearings were held on January 8 and 16, 1990, at the same location.
At final hearing petitioner presented the testimony of Lois Bowers, Patricia Mixon, Mary Lou Wallace, Janis Payne, Debbie Hannon, Karen Burnett, Gloria Washington, Minina Nelson, Peter D. Davidson, Dr. David G. Binnie, accepted as an expert in school administration, Paul D. Porter, Wayne Dasinger, Rene J. Escobio, and Wilma Smith, accepted as an expert in handwriting analysis. It also offered petitioner's exhibits 1, 2, 4-8, 10, 11, 13-22 and A-C. All exhibits were received in evidence. In addition, portions of respondent's deposition were made a part of this record. Respondent testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Calvin Johnson, Debbie Hannon, Vickie Lynn Howcraft, Augusta Thomas, Esther Mae Pugh, Mary Dawson Lee, Maedean Johnson, and Peter D. Davidson. Also, she offered respondent's exhibits 1, 2, and 4-18. All exhibits were received in evidence.
At the conclusion of its case-in-chief, petitioner voluntarily dismissed paragraphs 6, 12 and 13 of the amended complaint. Upon motion of respondent, the undersigned also struck the last sentence of paragraph 11 of the amended complaint on the ground respondent had insufficient time to conduct discovery as to that charge. The sentence contained the allegation that respondent voiced a "suspicion that at least four other teachers . . . were gay."
The final volume of the transcript of hearing (seven volumes) was filed on March 29, 1990. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were originally due on April 13, 1990. At the request of respondent, this time was extended to April 30, 1990, and the same were filed by petitioner and respondent on April 30 and May 4, 1990, respectively. A ruling on each proposed finding has been made in the Appendix attached to this Recommended Order.
At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner renewed its earlier request for reimbursement from respondent of certain fees and costs incurred as the result of respondent filing a motion to continue on the last working day prior to the hearing then scheduled on December 18, 1989. That motion is dealt with in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:
Introduction
At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Willie Mae Johnson, held Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 276107 issued by petitioner, Betty Castor, as Commissioner of Education (petitioner). The certificate covers the areas of elementary education and administration for the period July 1, 1977 through June 30, 1992. The periods of time relevant to this controversy are the spring of 1982 when respondent was employed by the School Board of Hillsborough County (Board) as a curriculum intervention specialist (CIS) at Just Sixth Grade Center (JSGC) in Tampa, Florida and 1986 through 1988 when respondent was employed by the Board as the principal of Bryan Elementary School (BES) in the same city.
The amended complaint, as further amended at hearing, charges generally that respondent, while principal at BES, converted school funds to her own personal use on several occasions, made an unwarranted accusation against two teachers, hindered a school investigation, ordered with school funds numerous publications for her own use, and falsified school records. The complaint alleges further that respondent misused school funds while employed as a CIS at JSGC in March and May 1982. Respondent has denied all such charges. To support or refute the above allegations, the parties presented the testimony of twenty- three witnesses, including respondent. As might be expected, sharply conflicting versions of the events were given. In reconciling these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive testimony of those witnesses. That testimony is embodied in the findings below.
School Year 1981-82
The amended complaint (paragraph 4) alleges first that during March and May 1982 Johnson "mishandled funds by failing to maintain bank records or documentation and by drawing two checks on the school's Courtesy Club account for her own personal use."
Respondent served in the position of a CIS at JSGC during school year 1981-82. Her principal was Lois Bowers. One of Johnson's responsibilities was to serve as treasurer of the school's "Courtesy Club" (club), a club which maintained a small bank account for the purpose of buying miscellaneous school related items. As treasurer, Johnson had the authority to sign checks on behalf of the club. It was also her responsibility to keep the books in order and balance the account as needed. The treasurer had the authority to designate other persons to write checks, and Johnson claimed, without contradiction, that one Laura Pilligi was so authorized. Indeed, Pilligi's signature appeared on at least one of the checks written on the club account during the spring of 1982 but this fact is not dispositive of the allegation. Johnson's tenure as treasurer of the club ended in June 1982.
In the late fall of 1982 Bowers had reason to believe that money might be missing from the club's bank account and that the shortage might have occurred while Johnson was treasurer. Bowers confronted Johnson, questioned her about the missing funds, and requested copies of certain missing checks.
Johnson initially denied any wrongdoing and failed to produce those cancelled checks that were missing from the club's records. However, in early 1983 Bowers obtained from the bank copies of checks written on the account during Johnson's
stewardship of the club. They reflected that check number 1050 in the amount of
$85 was written on March 8, 1982 to Progressive Realty and Appraisal, Inc. for an "appraisal" and check number 1054 in the amount of $10 was written on May 26, 1982 to United Insurance Company of Tampa for "insurance". Both checks carried what purported to be the signature of Johnson. After being confronted with those items, in February 1983 Johnson admitted to Bowers that she had written those checks for non-school purposes because she "needed the money." Although Johnson contended she "cleared" with Bowers the larger of the two checks at the time it was written, Bowers disputed this, and Johnson's testimony is not accepted as being credible. After being requested by Bowers on several occasions to reimburse the money, Johnson finally repaid the money more than a month later. Bowers did not take disciplinary action against Johnson because she desired to "keep her own house in order" and attributed the incident to "poor judgment" on the part of Johnson. There is no record of the matter in Johnson's personnel file. The use of such money by Johnson for her own personal use was improper.
School Year 1986-87
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the amended complaint concern the alleged misuse of school funds by Johnson in November and December 1986. It is first alleged that in November 1986 Johnson "cashed a check on the school's checking account for $70.28 and kept the money for her own personal use." It is also alleged that in December 1986 Johnson "removed $85 in cash from the school's bank deposit bag" and later "requested the secretary to attempt to reconcile the book's without having to replace the missing money."
Johnson became principal of BES on February 6, 1986. From that time until February 1988 one Mary Lou Wallace was Johnson's secretary. Wallace's responsibilities included maintaining and performing the bookkeeping for all internal funds, including petty cash, a small cash fund (around $125) kept on hand to reimburse teachers for purchasing small items for classroom use. Wallace was described by one teacher as "inefficient" and by another as lacking in bookkeeping skills. Under then existing school policy, after a teacher made a purchase, the teacher would bring the receipt to Wallace and be given a cash reimbursement. At the end of the month, or whenever a number of receipts had accumulated, Wallace would send the receipts to the area office with a request for reimbursement of those funds. A reimbursement check was then prepared by the area office and made payable to Johnson who was supposed to cash the check and place the proceeds in the petty cash fund.
In November 1986 Wallace gave Johnson a reimbursement check in the amount of $70.28 made payable to Johnson. If school procedure had been followed, Johnson would have cashed the check and returned the cash to Wallace for deposit in the petty cash account. After Johnson cashed the check but did not return the money, Wallace asked Johnson for the money. Johnson told Wallace the money was in a folder on her desk and she would give it to Wallace later. After asking Johnson for the money on many occasions but with no success, Wallace quit asking because she knew she did not have to balance the account until the end of 1986.
On December 20, 1986 BES closed down for the Christmas holidays and did not reopen until January 2, 1987. In accordance with school procedure, Wallace gathered all cash, except that in the petty cash account, various checks and some deposit slips, and placed them in a sealed money bag kept in Johnson's office safe. Because of a lack of time, Wallace did not deposit the cash and checks in the bank, as she should have, but kept the bag in the safe over the
school holidays. The cash totaled around $85, but the entire deposit was for
$187.62. When Wallace returned to school on January 2 she found the money bag missing from the safe. When she asked respondent about the missing money bag, Johnson told her not to worry, that she (Johnson) had it, and it would be returned by the end of the week. On Friday, Johnson again gave the same answer to Wallace. Around the end of January, and after repeated requests for the money by Wallace, Johnson opened up her desk drawer and showed Wallace the money bag with a broken seal. However, she explained that she did not have the money to replace the missing funds and instructed Wallace to try to think of a way to reconcile the account even though the money was missing. Wallace declined to do so.
When the missing money had still not been replaced by early February 1987, Wallace overheard Johnson on the telephone one day telling the caller that her husband was going to donate a new lawn edger to the school. Wallace voluntarily suggested to Johnson that, rather than donating the edger, Johnson ought to sell the edger to the school and use the proceeds to replace the missing money. Johnson agreed this was a good idea and instructed Wallace to follow through with the plan. Wallace then prepared a memorandum to the area office requesting permission for Johnson to purchase an edger. After approval was obtained from the area office, on February 27, 1987 Johnson was authorized to receive $199.95 from school funds as reimbursement for the edger. The money was immediately given to Wallace who redeposited $187.62 (including $85 in cash) and replaced the shortage in the petty cash account. The full details of the complicated edger scenario, which constitutes a separate charge, is recounted below. By using the school money ($155.28) for her own personal use, keeping the money bag in her desk drawer, and delaying the deposit for more than two months, Johnson violated school procedures.
In a memorandum authored by respondent on April 14, 1988, and sent to the assistant superintendent for instructional personnel, Johnson denied that she had kept the $70.28 in petty cash funds "for any extended period of time". As to the delay in not depositing the $187.62 until February 27, 1987, Johnson blamed her secretary (Wallace) who "didn't understand that the deposit slip could have been written again and the remaining amount deposited before the February date." The use of the $85 out of the sealed money bag was blamed on "poor administrative judgement" on Johnson's part but she maintained that the money was spent on "custodial supplies for cleaning the cafeteria." She did, however, accept responsibility for the deposit delay.
At hearing, respondent denied taking the $70.28 from petty cash and claimed she repaid that amount only because Wallace had told her that amount was "outstanding" in the account. She also continued to maintain that she used the
$85 in the money bag for maintenance purposes and gave that amount to Mr. Inman, a custodian, to purchase "stripper" to remove wax from the cafeteria floors.
Even though she knew that school regulations called for her to obtain a receipt from Inman for the supplies and work, she could not produce a receipt. In addition, Inman no longer works for the Board and his whereabouts are unknown. This version of the events is rejected as not being credible.
Paragraph 4 of the amended complaint alleges that during February 1987 Johnson "requested and received permission to purchase an edger for the school using internal account funds", was issued a check on February 24, 1987 in the amount of $199.95 made payable to respondent, and "cashed the check and did not purchase the edger which had been authorized but instead retained the funds for her own personal use." The complaint goes on to allege that when a school auditor inquired as to the whereabouts of the edger in January 1988, even though
the "Property Control Office had no record of the edger", respondent "indicated it was being repaired." However, the "repair shop"... had no record of the edger." Finally, it is alleged that "respondent produced a receipt from Sears as proof of purchase", that the receipt was "backdated to February 24, 1987", that Sears "has no record of the purchase", and that respondent twice "produced an edger to investigators as the one purchased at Sears on February 24, 1987 (but) the edger produced by respondent was the brand name Penncraft which is distributed by J. C. Penny, Inc., not Sears."
As noted above, Wallace prepared a memorandum on February 16, 1987 to Peter B. Davidson, area director, requesting authorization to purchase an edger for the school. No mention was made that Johnson intended to purchase the edger from herself, something prohibited by school policy. In addition, on February 23, 1987, she submitted a check requisition form for $199.95 for the purchase of the edger from herself but failed to attach a receipt to the form, as is Board policy. On February 27, Davidson granted the request by writing the word "Approved" on the memorandum and returning the same to Johnson. He also wrote "Check with Arnold Vance regarding recommended make and model." Vance was the area custodial supervisor whose job was to insure that any equipment purchased met school specifications and was of a type that could be repaired by the school repair shops. Johnson did not follow this instruction.
In mid-January 1988, or a year later, and just after she had received notice that BES was about to be audited, Wallace decided to report the missing money and edger affairs to Davidson. Davidson promptly ordered the Board's internal auditors to conduct an investigation. This was accomplished the same month. During the course of the audit, the supervisor of auditing, Debbie Hannon, found that the check made payable to Johnson for an edger was not supported by a receipt. In addition, the edger could not be located by Hannon nor did property control have a record of that item. Johnson claimed that the new edger was being repaired at the school maintenance department. However, a check of maintenance shops revealed that they had not received an edger from BES. In her audit findings prepared on January 22, 1988, Hannon directed Johnson to respond in writing where the edger was located, to advise why there was no receipt, and to state why a purchase order was not issued in order to take advantage of the school's tax exempt number.
In a letter dated January 28, 1988 from Johnson to Hannon, Johnson gave the following response to Hannon's questions concerning the missing edger, sales receipt and tax exempt sale:
As per the lawn edger: I talked with the custodian about the whereabouts of the lawn edger, he informed me that it was in the shop, and that is what I told you. He later informed me that he brought the lawn edger to the front steps and that you informed that it was not necessary for you to see it.
As far as the receipt, I did not have one at the time I purchased and asked if I could get a copy of the receipt. I was able to get a copy of the receipt for auditing purposes. I am aware that no purchase order was written up, and am also aware that since I made the purchase myself, I did not present my tax exempt number and was not charged taxes on this item.
I do hope this is sufficient documentation as to (the) lawn edger. If not please feel free to confer with me.
As a new principal I am very open to any suggestions that will be helpful to me as needed to improve my documentation in future audits.
It should be noted that at no time did Johnson advise Hannon that the purchase of the edger was related to the replacement of the missing monies.
Respondent produced for Hannon a Sears sales receipt which purported to evidence her purchase of a 2.5 horsepower gas powered lawn edger from a Sears store in the University Square Mall in Tampa. Johnson had just obtained the receipt from a Sears clerk by the name of Buciglia after telling him she needed it for "auditing" purposes. The upper portion of the receipt reflected a sales price of $199.99, a sales date of February 27, 1987, and respondent's name, Mac Johnson, as purchaser. The bottom portion of the receipt reflected that the item was stock number 79651 and carried BES's tax exempt number. Hannon thereafter attempted to ascertain the validity of the receipt by telephoning the general manager of the store. She learned it was invalid for the reasons set forth below.
According to the general manager of the store where Johnson claimed she made the purchase, and who testified at final hearing, whenever a customer purchases merchandise, such as an edger, the clerk fills out a six-copy sales check. The tickets are "rung up" on the cash register and authenticated with one copy given to the customer. Another copy is entered into the computer system while another is used to post the transaction to a user book, which contains the name, address and telephone number of all purchasers of gasoline powered lawn equipment, date of purchase, stock number of the merchandise and sales clerk's name.
It was standard policy during the relevant years in question that a tax exempt number be used on any purchase of equipment by school personnel. This enabled the school to be exempted from paying the state sales and use tax. When such a purchase was made at the Sears store, special store instructions required that the clerk write the tax exempt number on the six-copy sales slip
along with the name of the organization that was purchasing the item. Because a tax exempt number could not be used by an individual, the purchase necessarily had to be in the name of the organization. Finally, each tax exempt purchase at the store required the personal approval of a second staff clerk.
Through the testimony of a handwriting expert, it was established that the writing on the top of the receipt was filled in by an unknown person while the tax exempt number on the bottom of the receipt was written by respondent. The Sears manager established that the receipt was invalid because it did not comply with the procedures described in findings of fact 18 and 19. In addition, the serial number on the receipt would mean that the purchase was for a "Craftsman" edger, a brand name sold by Sears. However, the model produced by Johnson for Hannon's inspection was an old 1974 model carrying tide brand name "Penncraft", a model that was once sold by J. C. Penny's stores but not by Sears. Finally, a review of the Sears user book for the years 1986, 1987 and early 1988 reflected that no one with respondent's name, or that of her husband, Calvin Johnson, had purchased a gas powered edger from the Sears store.
When the invalidity of the receipt was established, Davidson made a visit to BES for the purpose of seeing the edger. He was taken to a storage building by the head custodian and shown two edgers, one approximately twenty years old while the other was a Penncraft model, a model sold by J. C. Penny's stores. At that point, Johnson admitted for the first time that she had purchased the edger from herself.
Later on, the assistant principal for instructional personnel, Dr. David G. Binnie, became involved in respondent's investigation. On March 2, 1988 he visited BES and asked Johnson to show him the edger. She took Binnie to a storage shed and showed him two edgers. However, she pointed to a Penncraft model as the one she had purchased at Sears. Thereafter, Binnie requested a written explanation as to all matters under investigation, including the edger affair. In a responsive memorandum prepared on April 14, 1988, Johnson agreed the purchase of the edger from herself "was not in my best judgement" and that she was "confused/confounded when discussing the situation with (her) Area Director." However, she held fast to the story that she "obtained (a receipt) from the store clerk for the edger that I purchased." She added that she regretted the entire situation.
At hearing, Johnson acknowledged that the explanation given to Debbie Hannon in January 1988 was not true. Thereafter, she recounted the following version of events. Her husband, Calvin, had purchased an edger at Sears for
$239 and, with his permission, she had carried it to school in February 1987. She also claimed that she telephoned the area custodial supervisor to verify that the equipment was in compliance with specification and maintenance requirements. When she returned to Sears a year later to get a receipt, the same model was then on sale for $199.99. On the ground she needed a receipt for "auditing purposes", she convinced a Sears salesman to make up a receipt in that amount. She also contended the salesman ran the receipt through the cash register to validate the same. To partially corroborate that story, Calvin testified he purchased with cash an "old black and white Sears edger" in 1986 or 1987 at University Mall for around $230 or $240. Later on, he placed the edger in his wife's car and she carried it to work. However, he claimed he lost the sales receipt and owner's manual, and he remembered the Sears clerk did not fill out a lengthy sales receipt or make a user book entry, both of which the general manager stated were required for every purchase. This version of events is not accepted as being credible.
Respondent also presented the testimony of Ester Mae Pugh whose husband, now deceased, once worked at the BES maintenance shop. Pugh recalled one day in 1987 that her husband brought home from school an edger for repair purposes. After repairing the same, he placed it in the back of his pickup truck but found it missing the next morning. However, there is no competent evidence to establish that the edger brought home was the one allegedly purchased by respondent's husband and then sold to the school.
Respondent was also charged in paragraph (7) of the complaint with having "ordered the following publications using school funds intended for the library: Newsweek, Wall Street Journal, Florida Trend, Time, Savvy, Ebony and Jet." It is further alleged that "(u)pon delivery, Respondent repeatedly took these publications home for her own personal use." The illicit conduct is alleged to have occurred while Johnson was principal at BES.
During school year 1987-88, BES received an allocation (approximately
$450) that was specifically earmarked for purchasing periodicals and newspapers for the school library. These funds were maintained in a special account known
as the library account (number 6020) and were not to be used except for ordering magazines and periodicals for the library's use. A decision on how to spend the money was based on the collective judgment of the faculty, principal, CIS and library media specialist, Patricia Mixon. In all cases, however, Mixon had the responsibility for personally ordering all publications. Although there was evidence that on one occasion respondent asked the faculty for suggestions on magazines to order for the teacher's lounge, this is irrelevant to the issue of whether respondent had authority to purchase magazines from the library fund.
Mixon established that in 1987 someone, other than herself, had ordered $180 worth of periodicals and magazines using library account funds. She was not notified of any purchase nor did any of the periodicals end up in the library. However, a few periodicals were seen in the teacher's lounge. Petitioner's exhibit 4 contains copies of checks written principally on the library account. A few represent purchases from a general miscellaneous account. All checks carry the signature of respondent and she later acknowledged, that she had placed those orders. This was corroborated by Johnson's secretary who mailed the orders at Johnson's direction. When the magazines were received, the secretary placed them in respondent's box. Although Johnson had the authority to order magazines and periodicals when needed, respondent's authority was limited to ordering them from a different internal account and not from the library account. Moreover, if magazines were
ordered, they should have been ordered from EPSCO, a magazine jobber used by the Board. Respondent did not use EPSCO. By ordering $180 worth of magazines with library account funds, respondent violated school procedure.
The charge that respondent took the above publications home for her own personal use cannot be established by the evidence of record. None of petitioner's witnesses saw respondent leaving the school premises with the magazines in question, and no witness testified that the magazines were seen in Johnson's home. Although respondent's secretary contended she saw respondent place a magazine in her briefcase one day, this is insufficient to establish that the illicit conduct occurred. Further, the fact that several witnesses, including the internal auditors, did not see the magazines in the teacher's lounge is insufficient to raise an inference that the magazines were actually at respondent's home.
The amended complaint charges further in paragraph (8) that in December 1987 respondent "assigned a full time teacher to administrative duties and secured a substitute teacher to take over the teacher's class for approximately five (5) days", that respondent "did not inform the teacher in question that the teacher's salary for those days was being deducted from her sick leave days," and that respondent "then falsified the sick leave claim form to read that the teacher in question was absent due to illness and by signing on behalf of the teacher in question."
The teacher in question was Dorothy Harmon. Respondent, and other administrators, considered Harmon to be lacking in instructional skills.
Indeed, at hearing the assistant superintendent described Harmon as "a poor teacher". After Johnson's efforts to improve Harmon's skills were unsuccessful, Johnson directed the assistant principal to put pressure on Harmon to either retire or seek a transfer to another school. This was accomplished through various evaluations and observations, and Harmon eventually transferred to another school and then retired. Prior to her transfer, however, Johnson reached the point where she did not want Harmon teaching the children during the last week before Christmas holidays, particularly since Harmon's class included low achievers and students with attendance problems. Harmon had been ill the
previous few days and a substitute teacher had done an excellent job. Johnson accordingly placed Harmon on administrative leave for the last week before the holidays and secured the same substitute teacher to teach Harmon's class.
However, Harmon reported to school on all or parts of three of those days. This created a problem since a substitute teacher cannot be paid unless the teacher is absent from work. Respondent then directed Payne, the assistant principal, to put in a sick leave form on behalf of Harmon. When Payne questioned this order, respondent answered that Harmon would never know about the leave.
Thereafter, a "claim for sick leave" form for Harmon was prepared by Payne reflecting that Harmon was absent on December 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1987 due to illness. It should be noted that Harmon was actually on sick leave on December 10 and 11. Therefore, the "bogus leave" was for the week of December 14. The form carries what purports to be Harmon's signature and the approval signature of respondent. Next to Harmon's signature were the initials "M. J.", which are respondent's initials. Respondent readily concedes that she signed the form without Harmon's knowledge and that her actions were wrong.
However, she contends that she intended to take full responsibility for the action since she placed her initials next to the signature. She also contended that she prepared the form in the best interests of the children since they were receiving inadequate instruction from Harmon. Even so, Johnson's conduct constituted a violation of school procedure.
Paragraph (9) of the amended complaint contains the charge that during school year 1987-88 respondent "was notified by a teacher that a student in her class did not meet the age requirements for kindergarten", that "(n)o corrective action was taken", and that "(s)ubsequently, the child was retained in kindergarten the next school year." There is no allegation in the complaint that respondent falsified her school records regarding this student or ordered other school personnel to do so. Therefore, evidence pertaining to those matters is irrelevant and will be disregarded.
To determine the number of teachers (units) to be assigned to a particular grade level in a school, the Department of Education uses the number of students in attendance at a school during the first twenty days of a school year. For example, in school year 1987-88, the kindergarten level of instruction received three units if, on the twentieth day, a school had 63 or more students in that grade level. An enrollment of less than 63 students reduced the allocation of units by one. During the first part of each school year, it was the responsibility of each teacher to count the number of students enrolled in his or her class and report that count to the principal's office. A secretary in the office then tallied the total number of students by grade level and telephoned that number to the area superintendent who in turn relayed the information to a bureaucrat in Tallahassee. Due to such factors as illness and changes of residence by the students, some confusion always existed during the first twenty days over a student's true status. For this reason, and because student counts were so important, a principal was reluctant to remove a student from the rolls until after the twentieth day, when counts no longer mattered.
In order to qualify, age-wise, for kindergarten, a child must have attained the age of five by September 1 of the school year. A student by the name of A. J. enrolled in kindergarten at BES in September 1987 but, as it turned out, she did not turn five years old until September 15, 1987. Thus, the student missed the September 1 cutoff date by two weeks and should not have been enrolled in school. Although a data processing clerk, Karen Burnett, had the responsibility of enrolling students and rejecting any who did not meet residence and age requirements, Burnett failed to initially discern the fact that A. J. was underage. However, a screening process involving a
diagnostician, the student's teacher and the assistant principal, Janis Payne, occurred sometime within the first eight weeks of the school year and A. J.'s age was noted at that time. Even so, Burnett established that respondent became aware of A. J.'s situation within the first twenty days but told Burnett to do nothing until after the twentieth day. By not taking corrective action at that time, Johnson was in violation of school policy. Finally, it is true that the same student remained in school for the entire year and was required to repeat the same grade the following year. However, Burnett acknowledged that she, and not Johnson, forgot to have the student withdrawn after the twentieth day.
The next charge in the amended complaint is found in paragraph (10) and alleges that "on or about March, 1988, respondent . . . interfered with an investigation of respondent's performance by instructing a teacher how to respond to the Area Director's questions."
Although the record is replete with instances of respondent changing her story from time to time, particularly after administrators found holes in each story there is no evidence that fits the allegation in the complaint, namely, that Johnson "instruct(ed) a teacher how to respond to the Area Director's questions." Indeed, the charge apparently stems from certain allegations by Dr. Binnie, as memorialized in respondent's exhibit 6, but no evidence was adduced to support that charge.
The final charge is found in paragraph (11) of the amended complaint and alleges that respondent, while principal at BES during school year 1987-88, "inappropriately charged that two teachers in her employ were having a lesbian affair without having any substantiating facts to support such a claim." The complaint goes on to state that the two women were in fact "married with children" and that respondent "instructed a member of her staff to keep an eye on the alleged `lesbians' and even instructed a member of her staff to call the home of one of the teachers in order to find out additional information regarding any alleged lesbian affair."
To preserve the confidentiality of the names of the two teachers in question, they will be referred to by their initials, G. W. and M. N. The former was a kindergarten teacher's aide while the latter was a sixth grade teacher. The charge arises out of statements allegedly made by respondent to certain school personnel. One, Janis Payne, the assistant principal, recalled Johnson telling her that it was "not natural" the way M. N. looked at G. W., and that she could not understand why M. N. would want to leave an attractive man (her husband) for G. W. Payne was also told by respondent to "keep tabs" on G. W., and on one occasion she was asked to go to M. N.'s classroom and see if G.
W. was there. However, respondent never used the word "lesbian" when discussing the matter. Payne was also present when respondent told her secretary to telephone G. W.'s home and ascertain if G. W. was still living with her husband. The secretary did not make the call. While in the presence of her secretary, respondent commented that G. W.`s husband was gone all the time and that the two women were "together too much to be normal." On another occasion, after respondent observed the two go into a portable classroom together, Johnson remarked that such conduct was "sickening". Again, however, the words "lesbian" and "gay" were never used. Through the testimony of another teacher, it was established that "it was just common talk around the school" that "there was a lesbian affair going on." Even so, it may be reasonably inferred that respondent was inappropriately perpetuating a rumor that the two employees were engaging in a lesbian affair, particularly since at least two bystanders interpreted respondent's comments in that context.
Respondent denied that she had made comments that the two were having a lesbian affair. She contended that she was simply concerned that they were spending too much time out of the classroom and not attending to their duties. Further, since one was a kindergarten teacher's aide and the other a sixth grade teacher, they had no reason to be conferring with each other during class hours. Respondent also denied asking her secretary to telephone G. W.'s house or asking Payne to keep tabs on the two. However, these assertions do not belie the more credible and persuasive evidence that respondent was perpetrating a rumor about the two employees.
Loss of Effectiveness as a Teacher
According to Dr. David G. Binnie, who was accepted as an expert in education administration, respondent's effectiveness as an administrator has been reduced because of her conduct in this affair. He pointed out that respondent exercised an "incredible pattern of poor judgment" and that her credibility and trust have been destroyed. As a teacher, Dr. Binnie opined that her effectiveness has likewise been impaired since her leadership, management and instructional skills have been reduced. However, he added that the specific allegations against respondent are not widely known by the community since the newspaper media did not report on the full scope of charges. Consequently, he has received no complaints from parents or students regarding her continuing employment as a classroom teacher. He characterized her effectiveness as a teacher with her colleagues to be only "somewhat negatively impacted" because of her conduct. Although a brief story on the matter appeared on a local television station, it may be reasonably inferred that respondent's credibility and trust in the eyes of the general public, students and their parents have not been impaired.
Mitigating factors presented by respondent
Respondent has been a classroom teacher for over twenty years in some five states. She holds both a bachelor degree and a master's degree as well as credits towards her doctorate. Prior to the school audit in January 1988, respondent had received satisfactory evaluations as both a teacher and a principal. While not binding on petitioner, it is of some persuasion that the Hillsborough County School Board did not see fit to terminate respondent as an employee after the alleged misconduct occurred but rather chose to reduce her from a principal to a classroom teacher. She has functioned well in that position since her reduction and has received good evaluations from her supervisor. Respondent desires to continue as a teacher and maintains she has already suffered sufficient monetary and professional punishment in this matter. She has expressed regret over the entire episode and acknowledges that she used extremely poor judgment in all facets of the case. She blames part of her problems on the fact that she had no training in bookkeeping and had to rely on an inexperienced secretary, Wallace. It should be noted that after this matter arose, the Board strengthened its on-the-job training for new principals, including additional training in basic bookkeeping and financial management skills. When Johnson assumed the position of principal, the Board did not require any financial background as a prerequisite to appointment and only offered limited training in Board fiscal policies and other management areas.
Motion for fees and costs
Based upon the pleadings filed in this cause, as well as representations of counsel during argument on the motion, it is found that on November 14, 1989 respondent's original counsel was authorized to withdraw as
counsel in this cause. At the same time, the final hearing then scheduled on November 28 and 29 was rescheduled to commence at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, December 18, 1989. Respondent thereafter attempted to obtain new counsel and eventually met with her present counsel for the first time on December 4. A subsequent meeting was held on December 5. At that time, respondent's counsel advised Johnson that he would accept the case and became aware that a hearing was scheduled on December 18. However, a notice of appearance was never filed and counsel's signature did not appear on any document until December 15, 1989. On Friday, December 15, 1989, or the last working day before the hearing, a motion for continuance was filed by respondent's counsel, and a telephonic conference call with counsel was conducted by the undersigned at approximately 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. Although petitioner objected to the granting of the motion, the continuance was granted so that new counsel would have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for final hearing. In so ruling, the undersigned noted that, if the motion was denied, the prejudice to respondent outweighed the prejudice to petitioner, particularly since respondent's livelihood as a teacher was at risk and the charges herein were fairly complex and lengthy. However, the undersigned's order noted that the motion did not comply with the requirements of Rule 22I-6.017, Florida Administrative Code (1987) in that no "extreme emergency" existed as required by the rule. 1/
In his motion, counsel for respondent alleged that he was attempting to settle the case during the week prior to hearing but when settlement efforts failed, he filed the motion. In addition, he contended he was absent from his office for much of the week of December 4, needed further time to prepare for hearing and desired to take the depositions of certain witnesses. Because of respondent's delay in not filing the motion until the last working day before the hearing, counsel for petitioner contends he incurred costs in (a) preparing for the telephonic conference call, (b) utilizing time to contact witnesses who were already under subpoena to attend the final hearing scheduled the following Monday morning, and (c) paying the process server who had already served sixteen subpoenas. The amount of fees and costs associated with the above, and their reasonableness, have not yet been established.
Neither the motion nor counsel offered a legitimate reason as to why the motion was filed on the last working day prior to hearing. During argument on the motion, counsel proffered that he thought the matter might settle and was out of town on other legal matters during part of that time. In response, petitioner's counsel represented that he advised respondent's counsel that he was continuing to prepare for trial in the event a settlement could not be reached. In addition, the record shows that no further discovery was undertaken by respondent's counsel between December 15, when the motion was filed, and January 4, 1990, when the continued hearing commenced. This was one of the grounds cited as a reason for the continuance. Under these circumstances, the motion may be said to have been filed for an improper purpose that had increased the cost of litigation by (a) causing unnecessary process server fees to be incurred and (b) requiring opposing counsel to expend time to advise sixteen witnesses that the hearing had been continued. Accordingly, reasonable fees and costs are justified as a sanction for such conduct.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1989).
Because respondent's teaching certificate is at risk, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the allegations in the amended administrative complaint are true. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
According to the amended administrative complaint, respondent has violated Subsections 231.28(1)(f) and (h), Florida Statutes (1987). Those subsections authorize disciplinary action against a licensee if it can be shown that a licensee:
(f) Upon investigation, has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces that person's effectiveness as an employee of the school board;
* * *
(h) Has otherwise violated the provisions of law or rules of the State Board of Education, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate.
* * *
In addition, respondent is charged with having violated Rules 6B-1.006(4)(c) and (5)(a), (c), (d) and (g), Florida Administrative Code (1987). Those rules contain the principles of professional conduct for the education profession in Florida and read as follows:
Obligation to the public requires that the individual:
* * *
(c) Shall not use institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage.
* * *
Obligation to the profession of education requires that the individual:
Shall maintain honesty in all professional dealings.
* * *
Shall not interfere with a colleague's exercise of political or civil rights and responsibilities.
Shall not intentionally make false or malicious statements about a colleague.
* * *
(g) Shall not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with professional activities.
* * *
To the extent that respondent's conduct bears upon her activities as an administrator, the evidence is clear and convincing that Johnson's effectiveness as a principal has been seriously impaired. Thus, she has violated Subsection 231.28(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1987). As to the charge that Johnson's effectiveness as a member of the instructional staff has been seriously impaired, this charge must fail since her misconduct had no bearing on the exercise of her duties to the public. Cf. Smith v. School Board of Leon County, 405 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)(conduct must adversely affect teacher's relationship with the public). Moreover, the Department's own expert
witness agreed that little public notoriety of the events had occurred, and thus the public had little, if any, knowledge of the details of this matter, and her effectiveness as a teacher was only "somewhat negatively impacted." This is borne out by the established fact that Johnson has received good evaluations since being transferred to a teaching position, and since the illicit conduct occurred, the Board has received no complaints concerning Johnson from students or parents. Johnson is also alleged to have violated a myriad of ethics for educators embodied in Rule 6B-1.006, Florida Administrative Code (1987). First, the evidence shows clearly and convincingly that Johnson used institutional privileges (as a CIS and principal) for her own personal gain by utilizing petty cash and internal account funds for an extended period of time in 1982 and 1986-
87 in violation of rule 6B-1.006(4)(c). Also, she lacked honesty in all professional dealings as required by rule 6B-1.006(5)(a) by failing to initially disclose the true facts concerning the missing money and purchase of the edger and by submitting a false sick leave form. Next, in contravention of rule 6B- 1.006(5)(d), respondent made false statements about two colleagues by inferring, but not specifically stating, that they were engaged in a lesbian affair. While the word "lesbian" was never used, those persons who heard the comments assumed this is what she meant. Finally, Johnson violated rule 6B-1.006(5)(g) by submitting a fraudulent sick leave form for Dorothy Harmon in December 1986 and submitting a false sales receipt for the edger in 1988. The remaining principle was not shown to be violated. All such rule violations in turn constitute a violation of subsection 231.28(1)(h), which makes it unlawful to violate a rule of the State Board of Education. There is less than clear and convincing evidence to sustain the remaining charges.
Subsection 231.28(1). Florida Statutes (1987) provides that:
The Education Practices Commission shall have authority to suspend the teaching certificate of any person as defined in s. 228.041(9) or (10) for a period of time not to exceed 3 years, thereby denying that person the right to teach for that period of time, after which the holder may return to teaching as provided in subsection (4); to revoke the teaching certificate of any person, thereby denying that person the right to teach for a period of time not to exceed
10 years, with reinstatement subject to the provisions of subsection (4); to revoke permanently the teaching certificate of any person; or to impose any other penalty provided by law, provided it can be shown that such person:
* * *
(f) Upon investigation, has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces that person's effectiveness as an employee of the school board.
* * *
(h) Has otherwise violated the provisions of law or rules of the State Board of Education, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate.
* * *
In its proposed order, petitioner suggests that respondent's teaching certificate be revoked, that she be suspended from teaching school for four years, and thereafter be placed on probation for five years. It also recommends that she be reprimanded and receive a psychological examination and certification from a psychologist prior to the resumption of her teaching duties. To support the suggested penalty, petitioner has submitted copies of four final orders issued in other disciplinary cases, 2/ all of which involved the misappropriation of school funds by employees. However, two cases involved the misappropriation of substantial amounts of moneys ($6,825.00 and $8,288.88) and, as such, they are distinguishable from the facts herein. In the third case, the teacher voluntarily relinquished her certificate for revocation, while in the fourth the teacher agreed to a minimum three year revocation of her certificate prior to the issuance of the administrative complaint. Thus, the penalties utilized therein are not necessarily appropriate in this proceeding.
In her proposed order, respondent suggests that a far less severe penalty is warranted, particularly since she had already been disciplined by the local board which saw fit only to demote her from a principal to a teacher and give a corresponding reduction in pay. Given the fact that respondent has already been punished on the local level, and because her effectiveness as a classroom teacher has not been impaired, respondent's teaching certificate should be suspended for six months.
A final aspect of this case requiring discussion is petitioner's ore tenus motion for attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of respondent, without an extreme emergency, filing her motion for continuance on the last working day prior to final hearing. 3/ As a basis for granting the motion, petitioner relies on Rule 221-6.024, Florida Administrative Code (1987) which provides as follows:
The Hearing Officer before whom the case is pending may issue any orders necessary to effectuate discovery, to prevent delay, and to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of all aspects of the case.
Under petitioner's theory, it concedes that respondent may have had valid reasons for seeking a continuance, particularly since her counsel had just become involved in the case and needed more time for preparation. Even so, petitioner contends that sanctions are appropriate because counsels without good cause, waited until the last working day before final hearing to file his motion even though he had opportunity to do so much earlier. It accordingly seeks reimbursement for time expended by its attorney in preparing for the telephonic conference call on December 15 and contacting witnesses the same date to advise them that the hearing had been continued. In addition, it seeks reimbursement for costs expended in having the process server deliver subpoenas to sixteen witnesses.
While not cited by petitioner, Subsection 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes (1989) is relevant to its request. It reads in pertinent part as follows:
5. All pleadings, motions, or other papers filed in the proceeding must be signed by ... the party's attorney. The signature of a ... party's attorney . . . constitutes a certificate that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, and to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as
to . . . cause . . . needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a . . . motion ...
is signed in violation of these requirements, the hearing officer, upon motion or his own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, . . . an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party . . . the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the ... motion . . . including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Under this seldom used statute, recovery of reasonable fees and costs is allowed if the undersigned finds that a motion was filed for an improper purpose, including the causing of a "needless increase in the cost of litigation." Using this language to determine whether sanctions are warranted, it is concluded that although respondent's motion was meritorious to the extent that she needed a delay to allow new counsel to adequately prepare for hearing, counsel's delay in filing the motion until the last working day prior to hearing caused a "needless increase in the cost of litigation." In other words, if the motion had been timely filed, petitioner would not have instructed the process server to serve subpoenas on sixteen witnesses and thereafter expended additional time contacting those witnesses to advise them the hearing had been continued.
Therefore, sanctions are warranted, and petitioner is hereby authorized to recover from respondent's counsel (a) the cost of the process server having to serve sixteen witnesses, and (b) fees incurred as a result of its counsel having to contact those witnesses to advise them that the hearing had been continued.
As to the request for reimbursement for the time spent in preparing for the telephone conference call on the motion for continuance, it is apparent that, even if a motion had been timely filed, petitioner's counsel would have been required to expend time to prepare for the motion since he opposed a continuance under virtually under any circumstances. Therefore, jurisdiction is retained by the undersigned to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions in this cause and to enter a final order confirming that award. The parties shall attempt to reach an agreement on the amount of such fees and costs and advise the undersigned within fifteen days from date of this recommended order whether such an agreement has been reached. If no agreement is reached, the matter shall be determined by the undersigned through affidavits or live testimony, if necessary.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 231.28(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes (1987) and that her teaching certificate number 276107 be suspended for six months.
RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
DONALD R. ALEXANDER
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904)488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this
8th day of May, 1990.
ENDNOTES
1/ The rule provides that "except in cases of extreme emergency, requests for continuance shall be made at least five (5) days prior to the date noticed for the hearing."
2/ They include Turlington v. Rodgers, Case No. 86-062-RT (DOE, January 24, 1987), Turlington v. Finman, (DOE, September 15, 1986), Castor v. Blumberg, Case No. 87-115-RA ([DOE, March 7, 1988), and Turlington v. LaSane, Case No. 86-107- RT (DOE, April 10, 1987). All were either uncontested matters or the result of stipulated settlements.
3/ At the conclusion of the telephone conference call on December 15, 1989, petitioner was granted leave to make such a motion at a later date and to demonstrate that the undersigned had authority to grant such relief.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-2656
Petitioner:
1-3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1.
4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4.
5-16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5.
17. Partially adopted in finding of fact 26.
18-19. Partially adopted in finding of fact 28.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 27.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 25.
23-27. Partially adopted in finding of fact 27.
Rejected as being irrelevant.
Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. 30-31. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. 32-37. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8.
38. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. 39-49. Partially adopted in finding of fact 9.
50-52. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10.
53. Partially adopted in finding of fact 23.
60. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10.
54-58. Partially adopted in finding of fact 14.
59-61. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. 62-67. Partially adopted in finding of fact 15.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 16.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 19.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 16.
71-75. Partially adopted in finding of fact 23.
Partially adopted in findings of fact 18 and 19.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 21.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 24.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 20.
80-81. Partially adopted in finding of fact 30.
Rejected as being irrelevant.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 33.
Rejected as being irrelevant.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 33.
Rejected as being irrelevant.
87-92. Partially adopted in finding of fact 37. 93-101. Partially adopted in finding of fact 39.
102. Credibility has been taken into account and incorporated into the various findings.
Respondent:
1-3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 40. 4-5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 12.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 16.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 10.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 23.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 10.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 17.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 18.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 15.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 23.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 24.
Rejected as being contrary to the evidence.
Partially adopted in findings of fact 21 and 22.
Rejected as being irrelevant.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 12.
Rejected as being irrelevant.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 26.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 27.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 28.
Partially adopted in finding of fact 27.
24-26. Partially adopted in finding of fact 30. 27-28. Partially adopted in finding of fact 33.
29. Rejected as being unnecessary.
30-33. Partially adopted in finding of fact 38. 34-35. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5.
36. Partially adopted in finding of fact 40.
37-38. Partially adopted in finding of fact 39.
39. Rejected as being unnecessary.
40-44. Partially adopted in finding of fact 40.
Note - Where findings have been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, cumulative, subordinate, irrelevant, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Steven A. Burton, Esquire Catherine Peek McEwen, Esquire
P.O. Box 3273
Tampa, FL 33601-3273
Robert B. Morrison, Esquire 610 Horatio Street
Tampa, FL 33606
Karen B. Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission
301 Florida Education Center
325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
Martin B. Schapp, Administrator Professional Practices Services
352 Florida Education Center
325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
BEFORE THE EDUCATION PRACTICES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
BETTY CASTOR, as
Commissioner of Education,
Petitioner,
vs. FINAL ORDER
WILLIS MAE JOHNSON, EPC CASE NO. 89-058 RA DOAH CASE NO. 89-2656
Respondent.
/
Respondent, WILLIE MAE JOHNSON, holds Florida educator's certificate no.
276107. Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint seeking suspension, revocation, permanent revocation or other disciplinary action against the certificate.
Respondent requested a formal hearing and such was held before a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Recommended Order was forwarded to the Commission pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S., which is attached to and made a part of this Order.
A panel of the Education Practices Commission (EPC) met on June 18, 1990 in Naples, Florida to take final agency action. Petitioner was represented by Steven Burton, Esquire. Respondent was neither present nor represented by counsel. The panel reviewed the entire record in the case.
The panel adopts the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law as set forth in the Recommended Order. The panel then considered Petition's Notice of Filing of Documents in Aggravation of Penalty, and Respondent's Petition for Modification of and Stay of the Hearing Officer's Recommended Penalty, and argument thereon. Being fully advised of its premises and applicable law regarding the Recommended Penalty, the Board rejected Respondent's Petition and unanimously voted to increase its Recommended Penalty based on evidence in the record that Respondent misappropriated or mishandled school monies or otherwise violated school procedures as described in the transcript of the formal hearing of this cause pages 114-116, 133-135, 280-283, 375-376, 739 and the Recommended Order pages 8 and 10-17.
Wherefore, it is Ordered that Respondent's educator's certificate be suspended for a period of one year and thereafter she serve a period of five years probation, the conditions of which shall be that she notify EPC immediately upon employment as an educator in any public or private school in the State of Florida, arrange for her immediate supervisor to submit performance reports to the EPC at least every three months, submit true copies of all formal observation/evaluation forms within ten days of issuance. Furthermore, Respondent's educator certificate administrator endorsement shall be restricted for a period of five years from the date of filing this Order. This Order takes effect upon filing.
This Order may be appealed by filing notices of appeal and a filing fee, as set out in Section 120.68(2), F.S., and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b) and (c), within 30 days of the date of filing.
DONE AND ORDERED, this 27th day of June , 1990.
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Martin Schaap, Administrator Professional Practices Services JAMES GATLIN,
Alternate Presiding Officer
Daniel Bosanko, Esquire I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the Attorney General's Office foregoing Order in the matter of
BC vs. Willie Mae Johnson, was Sydney McKenzie, III mailed to Robert B. Morrison, General Counsel Esquire, 601 W. Horatio St. Tampa, this
Florida 33606, 28th day of June, 1990, Florida Admin. Law Reports by U. S. Mail.
Dr. Walter L. Sickles, Supt. Hillsborough County Schools A 901 E. Kennedy Blvd.
Post Office Box 3408 Tampa, Florida 33601-3408 KAREN B. WILDE, Clerk
Dr. David Binnie Assistant Supt. Personnel
Hillsborough County Schools
Donald R. Alexander Division of Admin. Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Steven G. Burton, Esquire
P.O. Box 3273
Tampa, Florida 33601-3273
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| May 08, 1990 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jun. 27, 1990 | Agency Final Order | |
| May 08, 1990 | Recommended Order | Teacher found guilty of misconduct. |
PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs DEBORAH STARK, 89-002656 (1989)
ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs LILLIAN HOTZ, 89-002656 (1989)
AFTER SCHOOL PROGRAMS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION vs BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 89-002656 (1989)
PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ADRIANA DELGADO, 89-002656 (1989)
FRANK T. BROGAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs RICHARD V. POWELL, 89-002656 (1989)
