STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FLOYD PEACOCK, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 90-1222
) AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS, INC., )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition filed on January 18, 1995, came on for consideration by Suzanne F. Hood, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Richard E. Johnson, Esquire
SPRIGGS & JOHNSON
324 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
For Respondent: Ralph Peterson, Esquire
Russel Van Sickle, Esquire BEGGS & LANE
Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue is whether Petitioner filed his complaint against Respondent for race discrimination more than 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes (1989).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner Floyd Peacock, Jr. (Petitioner) filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) on March 27, 1989, alleging that Respondent Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (Respondent) discriminated against him because of his race. On January 25, 1990, the FCHR determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On February 14, 1990, Petitioner refiled his Petition for Relief with FCHR alleging that Respondent had violated the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended.
FCHR subsequently referred this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer on February 28, 1990. Hearing Officer Robert T. Benton, II, initially scheduled this case for formal hearing
on September 10, 1990. On August 23, 1990, Hearing Officer Benton continued the hearing to November 26, 1990, pursuant to Petitioner's request for a continuance. On September 18, 1990, the case was rescheduled for hearing on December 11, 1990, at Petitioner's request.
On October 25, 1990, Hearing Officer Benton granted Respondent leave to file an amended Answer to include, among other things, an allegation that Petitioner's claim for relief was untimely. Hearing Officer Benton granted an indefinite continuance on December 4, 1990, pursuant to the parties' joint ore tenus application for continuance. Petitioner's counsel, Jeanne M. L. Player, was granted leave to withdraw as counsel on March 29, 1990.
By letters dated April 12, 1991, and July 19, 1991, Hearing Officer Benton requested status reports from the parties. The replies to these requests indicate that the parties were working towards filing and/or responding to motions to intervene by non-parties in this case and a motion for summary disposition of certain issues.
On June 1, 1992, Hearing Officer Benton denied a Petition to Intervene filed by George Williams. On November 9, 1992, Hearing Officer Benton denied a Motion to Intervene and to Consolidate filed by Michael McQueen. A Motion to Consolidate the instant case with Case Number 93-1663 filed by George Williams was denied on April 15, 1993.
On July 1, 1994, Hearing Officer David Maloney issued a Status Order requiring the parties to file a report on or before August 15, 1994, as to the need for a formal hearing in this matter. The purpose of this order was to give the parties time to prepare a stipulated statement of facts which might resolve some of the issues in the case.
Hearing Officer Maloney issued an Order permitting Respondent to file a Motion for Summary Disposition and supporting memorandum on or before January 15, 1995. Respondent filed its motion and brief on January 18, 1995.
Petitioner filed a response on March 1, 1995. Respondent's reply brief was filed on March 23, 1995.
The subject motion alleges that Petitioner's claims for unlawful employment practices are time-barred pursuant to Section 706.10(10), Florida Statues.
Petitioner opposes the motion but agrees with Respondent that resolution of this and other issues by summary disposition may eliminate the necessity of formal hearing. The undersigned has considered the parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and memoranda of law and fact in support of and in opposition to the subject motion. The undersigned has also considered the following documents all of which were filed on January 18, 1995: (1) depositions of Petitioner and Earnest Labadie; (2) Petitioner's Answers to Respondent's First Interrogatories; and (3) Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Second Interrogatories.
On April 28, 1995, the undersigned heard oral argument on the subject motion. During the motion hearing, the parties confirmed that the Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts was sufficient for the undersigned to resolve the question of the timeliness of Petitioner's claim and that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts constitute the following findings of fact:
The Petitioner, Floyd Peacock, Jr., a black male, was hired by the Respondent, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., on August 22, 1980.
The Petitioner was initially hired and employed by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the hire (entry) level.
On August 22, 1980, James Coleman, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic.
On August 25, 1980, Elvin Higgins, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the second year step level.
The Respondent has had two means of filling the vacancies that arose in the plant. First, whenever someone left the Respondent's employ due to retirement, a voluntary discharge, or involuntary termination, that vacancy would be posted on a job board on the Respondent's premises. Employees wishing to transfer to the department where the vacancy arose were then allowed to apply, or bid, for the posted vacancy.
Bids are awarded based upon job skills and seniority. For positions within the operations department, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the company. For maintenance positions, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the maintenance department.
The second method used by the Respondent to fill vacancies was a "back- fill" procedure. When an employee's bid was awarded and that employee then transferred to another department, the vacancy created in the transferring employee's department was "back-filled" with a new hire from outside of the company. Additionally, a position that was opened for bids but not bid upon was also back-filled with new hires from outside of the company.
In 1982, the Petitioner, whose pay level as a mechanic with the Respondent was at the "second step/year level," became interested in a three- year position in the ammonia methanol area and inquired about bidding for the job. He was told by the personnel manager, Laura Finn, that since he was at the two-year level, he did not qualify for the three-year position. The Petitioner did not bid for the job. Two white males, Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, who were previously employed as mechanics with Carroll Construction, as had the Petitioner, were hired at the "third step/year level" and placed in the two "third step/year level" mechanics jobs.
The Petitioner filed no charge or complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission concerning his not bidding for the "three step/year level" mechanics position or the hiring and assigning of the two white males "three-step" mechanics to those positions in 1982.
At the time of his "fifth-year step" mechanic's interview in 1985 for obtaining his "five year/step" pay increase, the Petitioner confirmed with his supervisor that James Coleman had been made senior mechanic and had been advanced to the "senior mechanic" pay level. The Petitioner was given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase.
Soon after the 1985 pay increase interview, the Petitioner went to the Respondent's Personnel Department with his supervisor to inquire about why James Coleman had been made a senior mechanic before the Petitioner. When the personnel manager was unable to provide the reason, the Petitioner talked with a staff member of the Escambia-Santa Rosa Human Relations Commission about his being given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase while James Coleman received a senior mechanic's title and pay increase. However, the Petitioner did not file any complaint with that agency or with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission.
In June, 1986, the Respondent had a reduction in force (RIF) that resulted in some employees' employment being terminated and other employees being reassigned to other lower level and lower paying jobs.
The following actions were taken as part of the RIF process in June, 1986:
Maintenance mechanics hired prior to June 10, 1977, continued in their positions.
Maintenance mechanics hired after June 20, 1977, but before the Petitioner's date of
hire of August 22, 1980, were assigned permanent operator positions.
Fifteen or sixteen maintenance mechanics who had been hired on or after the Petitioner's date of hire were placed in a temporary job position designated as "utility operators." Among the mechanics retained in the employ of the Respondent but assigned as utility operators was Elvin Higgins, a white male senior mechanic, and the Petitioner.
The remaining mechanics were discharged as a result of the RIF in June, 1986. Among the mechanics who were discharged at that time were Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, whose hiring dates were after the Petitioner's date of hire.
The utility operator position was a new, temporary position created in response to the RIF. In lieu of being discharged, fifteen employees, including Petitioner, were placed in the utility operator position. Utility operators worked at reduced pay, performing work previously accomplished by independent contractors. As vacancies arose in other departments of the company, one by one, each of the utility operators were to fill these vacancies until no one remained in the utility operator position.
The respondent provided the utility operators with two means of transferring out of the utility operator position into a regular, higher paying position. First, utility operators were allowed to bid on any position that was subject to the Respondent's customary bid procedure.
The second means that the utility operators had for leaving the utility operator position was through the assignment of a "back-fill" position. Instead of back-filling positions with new hires from outside of the company, as was the procedure before the RIF, utility operators were to be assigned to the back-fill positions. A utility operator would be back-filled into any vacancy that had been opened up for bids under the customary bid procedure, but on which no one had bid. Second, utility operators could be back-filled into a secondary vacancy created when another employee transferred from one position to another. The utility operators were to back-fill these non-bidded [sic] positions and secondary vacancies in order of seniority with the company (i.e., by date of hire).
In June, 1986, when Elvin Higgins was reduced from senior mechanic to a utility operator because of the reduction in force (RIF), the Petitioner first became aware that Elvin Higgins had previously received senior mechanic status.
On July 28, 1987, Aubry Garrett, one of the utility operators, used the normal bid procedure and successfully "bid-out" of the utility operator's position and took an operator's position. The Petitioner did not bid for this position.
Between the time of the RIF in June, 1986, and the time the first
back-fill position arose in September, 1987, the Respondent had not provided its employees with a finalized written or oral statement about how the back-fill positions would be administered after the RIF; however, during this period before the Petitioner refused the first back-fill position, when asked about this procedure by employees, Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, told them that utility operators would be assigned back-fill positions in the order of the employees' length of service with the company.
In September, 1987, two operator positions became available for utility operators to "back-fill" as secondary vacancies. The Petitioner, as the most senior utility operator based on date of hire, was offered one of the positions, but he refused the job because it was rotating shift work and he desired to work only "day hours" like he was working as a utility operator and had worked as a maintenance mechanic. Elvin Higgins and Gene Moore, the next senior utility operators based on date of hire, accepted the "back-fill" positions and were assigned those positions in early October, 1987.
At the time of the Petitioner's refusal to "back-fill" and accept the available advancement to operator, the Petitioner was informed by Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, that the Petitioner would be placed at the bottom of the list of the utility operators for future "back-filling" of jobs by utility operators.
The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone or any agency about his being placed at the bottom of the list of utility operators for "back-filling" purposes in September, 1987, and believed at that time that his placement at the bottom of the list was fair and not discriminatory.
Gary Kent is a white male who is senior the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. Before the reduction in force (RIF) in June, 1986, Mr. Kent was a mechanic, but as a result of the RIF, he was transferred to an operator's position in the amines area of the company. The amines job was not shift work. On November 24, 1987, Mr. Kent bid for an operator's position in the PVC area and received the job on December 8, 1987. His move to the PVC area from the amines area resulted in an
operator vacancy (secondary vacancy) in the amines area that would be "back- filled" from the utility operators' list (i.e., without the need for bidding for the vacant position).
On December 8, 1987, the vacant operator position in the amines area was "back-filled" by David Hart, who was the next utility operator on the "back- fill" list since the Petitioner was at the bottom of the list. The Petitioner became aware of this assignment, or surmised that the assignment of Mr. Hart to the amines area would occur, before the announcement of the assignment was posted and when he heard that Mr. Kent had bid for the PVC area operator position.
In November or December, 1987, the Petitioner spoke with the personnel manager, Mr. Labadie, about the Petitioner's chances of getting the vacant amines area operator position that was to be "back-filled" since Gary Kent had bid for the PVC operator's position. The Petitioner was interested in this operator position because it was not a rotating shift job. The Petitioner was told that consistent with the personnel manger's discussions with the Petitioner in October, 1987, the Petitioner was not eligible to "back-fill" the position because he was at the bottom of the "back-fill" list. The Petitioner accepted the explanation and understood the policy and procedure for "back-filling." The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone about assigning the amines area operator's job to Mr. Hart instead of to the Petitioner.
In January, 1988, Bruce Holiday, a white male who is senior to the Petitioner by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who has been working as an operator after the reduction in force, bid for and received on February 1, 1988, the assignment back into the maintenance mechanic. The Petitioner had bid for this position but has no complaint of racial discrimination about his not being awarded the position because Mr. Holiday was a senior to the Petitioner for the maintenance mechanic position by the amount of time in the maintenance department.
In February, 1988, the Petitioner and the other two last remaining utility operators, Randy Mock and Lawrence Pearce, were assigned and "back- filled" to operator positions. The Petitioner made no complaint and has no complaint about this assignment.
In November, 1988, Gary Kent, who was also senior to the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department, bid for and received on November 20, 1988, an assignment back into the maintenance department as a maintenance mechanic, a position subject to the customary bidding procedures. The Petitioner had also bid for this position. The announcement of Mr. Kent's assignment was posted on the bulletin board for employees to see. The Petitioner became aware of the assignment of Mr. Kent to maintenance on or before the posting of the announcement on November 16, 1988.
On or about November 16, 1988, the Petitioner discussed with Mr. Labadie, the personnel manager, Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned into the maintenance department as a mechanic. The Petitioner complained that since Mr. Kent had previously bid and received the PVC position in December, 1987, Mr. Kent, in the Petitioner's view, had decided at that time that Mr. Kent did not want to go back into the maintenance department. Therefore, the Petitioner surmised that, even though Mr. Kent would later be the senior person eligible to be awarded a maintenance mechanic job if he had bid it, Mr. Kent should have been "placed at the bottom of the list" for purposes of bidding on any maintenance mechanic positions. The Petitioner asserted that this would be
consistent with his being placed at the bottom of the "back-fill" list when he refused to accept the "back-fill" assignment in September or October, 1987. Mr. Labadie asserted in response to the Petitioner that there was nothing inconsistent since Mr. Kent's assignment was pursuant to and consistent with the Respondent's bidding procedures and policies for maintenance department positions which were in effect and used both before and after the RIF (and under which the Petitioner was allowed to bid and did bid for mechanic's positions); while the Petitioner's assignments from utility operator to the operator positions were governed by the "back-fill" procedure.
The Petitioner personally did not agree with and did not accept this explanation, although he understood the two different procedures, and told Mr. Labadie that it was Petitioner's opinion that the bidding and "back-filling" should operate the same way.
In January, 1989, the Petitioner again had a similar conversation with Mr. Labadie about Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned a maintenance mechanic's job and the Petitioner's being put at the bottom of the "back-fill" list for assignment to operator positions.
In late February, 1989, Ricky Cook and John Rink, both white males who are senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who had been working as operators after the June, 1986 reduction in force, bid for and received assignments back into the maintenance department as mechanics. The Petitioner has no complaint, based on racial discrimination or otherwise, as to these assignments.
The Petitioner's employment discrimination charge was filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 27, 1989, and filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 31, 1989.
On or about March 29, 1989, the Petitioner bid for and received assignment to maintenance mechanic in the Respondent's maintenance department, along with Larry Perritt, who is a white male and who was a senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. The Petitioner was assigned the job on April 16, 1989, at the senior mechanic pay level. The Petitioner has no complaints about any of these assignments.
The Petitioner received a pay increase at the "top level" of senior mechanic in October, 1989, after serving six (6) months in that position.
In October, 1989, Elvin Higgins, after bidding for the position, was assigned to maintenance mechanic at the senior mechanic pay level.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this case. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (1989), makes it illegal:
To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discri- minate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or adversely affect any individual's status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes (1989), states in pertinent part:
(10) Any person aggrieved by a violation of this section may file a complaint with the commission within 180 days of the alleged violation . . .
Petitioner does not contest that Respondent had a bona fide seniority system in place before the RIF.
Where a charge of discrimination arises out of a facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied seniority system, the limitations time period begins to run from the date the system is adopted. Lorance v. A.T. & T. Technologies, Inc., et al., 490 U.S. 900, 911-912 (1989).
The determination whether an employer has a seniority system in place is question of law. Mitchell v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 936 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1991).
In California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-606 (1980), the United States Supreme Court defined a seniority system as follows:
In the area of labor relations, "seniority" is a term that connotes length of employment. A "seniority system" is a scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-"seniority" criteria, allots to employees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths
of pertinent employment increase. Unlike other methods of allocating employment benefits and opportunities, such as subjective evaluations or educational requirements, the principle feature of any and every "seniority system" is that preferential treatment is dispensed on the
basis of some measure of time served in employment.
A seniority system also includes "ancillary rules that accomplish certain necessary functions, but which may not themselves be directly related to length of employment. For instance, every seniority system must include rules .
. . that specify how and when a particular person's seniority may be forfeited." Id. at 607.
In the instant case, Respondent created the temporary utility operator positions after the RIF to keep from terminating fifteen or sixteen employees including Petitioner. The new category of employees necessitated new policy or rules in the seniority system in order to ensure that the category was phased out and the employees became part of the permanent work force. The policy of
requiring utility operators to accept a "back-fill" job assignment or lose their place in that temporary line of progression was a necessary ancillary rule of forfeiture in the seniority system.
If Petitioner was going to challenge Respondent's alleged discriminatory motive for telling him to go to the end of the utility operators line, Petitioner should have done so within 180 days of learning that utility operators could forfeit their place in the line of progression by refusing a back-fill job assignment.
In the alternative, Petitioner's cause of action, if any, arose when "the facts that would support a charge of discrimination . . . were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the [Petitioner]." Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 1975).
The essence of Petitioner's complaint is that, after he refused assignment to an permanent operator's position in September of 1987, he was placed at the end of the line of utility operators who were waiting for permanent placement based solely on their date of hire. At that time, the personnel manager told Petitioner he could refuse the position and go to the end of the line, but that the day might come when Petitioner would have to accept an assignment or be terminated. Petitioner was aware that the Respondent would no longer "back-fill" vacancies with outside hires as long as anyone remained in the temporary utility operator positions. He also knew he could participate in the customary bid process at any time and that he did not lose his seniority in the maintenance mechanic's line of progression as a result of the RIF.
Petitioner claims that he did not become aware of Respondent's alleged discriminatory motive until November of 1988, when Gary Kent bid for and received a maintenance mechanic's position. Mr. Kent bid for the maintenance mechanic's position after making a lateral move in November of 1987 from an operator's position in one workplace area to an operator's position in another workplace area.
Petitioner does not argue that he should have been awarded the job for which Mr. Kent successfully bid. To the contrary, Petitioner compares himself to Mr. Kent as if they were similarly situated employees. Petitioner claims discrimination because Mr. Kent did not have to go to the end of the maintenance mechanic's line of progression after biding for and receiving a lateral transfer from one operator's position to another. However, Gary Kent's lateral move and subsequent promotion is not analogous to Petitioner's placement at the end of the line upon refusal of a "back-fill" job assignment. Gary Kent and Petitioner were not similarly situated employees at any time material to this proceeding. Likewise, one cannot compare policy implementing the customary bid process which was in effect before and after the RIF to a policy created to accommodate employees in a temporary work classification.
Petitioner was the only employee placed at the end of the utility operators line because he was the only employee who ever refused a job assignment. He cannot claim he became aware of alleged racial discrimination only after he realized that Respondent did not intend to change the customary bid process to require forfeiture of seniority in one department when an employee, demoted by the RIF, made a bid for a lateral transfer in another department. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Kent lost their seniority as maintenance mechanics after the RIF.
Petitioner's claim is time-barred in toto because he failed to file his claim against Respondent within 180 days of the time he learned any facts which would allegedly support his claims. Furthermore, there is no record evidence of waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling of this limitations period.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charges.
DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of June, 1995.
SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1995.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Richard E. Johnson, Esq. Spriggs & Johnson
W. College Ave. Tallahassee, FL 32301
Ralph B. Peterson, Esq. Beggs & Lane
P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950
Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission
John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Dana Baird, Esq.
Human Relations Commission
325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this recommended order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Mar. 28, 1997 | Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice filed. |
| Jun. 19, 1995 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 01/18/95. |
| Apr. 28, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Telephonic Hearing filed. |
| Mar. 23, 1995 | Respondent's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed. |
| Mar. 01, 1995 | Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Depositionfiled. |
| Feb. 22, 1995 | Order Granting Extension of Time sent out. |
| Feb. 21, 1995 | Petitioner's Consented Motion for Extension of Time filed. |
| Jan. 18, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Filing; Petitioner's Answers to Respondent's First Interrogatories filed. |
| Jan. 18, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Filing; Motion for Summary Disposition; Statement of Facts In Support of Motion for Summary Disposition; Respondent's Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Summary Disposition; Deposition of Ernest B. Labadie (2 volumes, tagged |
| Nov. 18, 1994 | Order sent out. (re: response to status reports) |
| Aug. 16, 1994 | (joint) Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed. |
| Aug. 16, 1994 | Respondent's Status Report filed. |
| Jul. 01, 1994 | Status Order sent out. (Parties to file status report by 8/15/94) |
| Jun. 14, 1994 | Petitioner's Status Report filed. |
| Dec. 17, 1993 | (ltr form) Status Report filed. (From Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Apr. 16, 1993 | Order sent out. (motion to consolidate denied) |
| Mar. 23, 1993 | Order sent out. (time fro response is extended to March 29, 1993) |
| Mar. 23, 1993 | Response of Respondent to Motion to Consolidate; Amended Request for Hearing/Petition for Relief filed. |
| Mar. 17, 1993 | (Respondent) Consented Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion to Consolidate filed. |
| Mar. 05, 1993 | (Petitioner) Motion to Consolidate and Memorandum of Law and FAct in Support Thereof filed. |
| Dec. 11, 1992 | Order sent out. (motion for consideration is denied) |
| Nov. 24, 1992 | (Respondent) Response of Respondent to Motion for Reconsideration filed. |
| Nov. 24, 1992 | Petitioner's Supplement to Motin for Reconsideration filed. |
| Nov. 20, 1992 | (Petitioners) Motion for Reconsideration filed. |
| Nov. 09, 1992 | Order sent out. (petition to intervene denied; motion to consolidatedenied) |
| Aug. 24, 1992 | Petitioner's Reply filed. |
| Aug. 13, 1992 | Response of Respondent to Motion to Consolidate filed. |
| Aug. 13, 1992 | Response of Respondent to Petition to Intervene of Micheal McQueen) filed. |
| Aug. 12, 1992 | Order sent out. (motion granted) |
| Jul. 31, 1992 | (Respondent) Consented Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Petition to Intervene and Motion for Consolidation filed. |
| Jul. 24, 1992 | (Michael McQueen) Petition to Intervene and Memorandum of Law and Fact in Support Thereof; Motion to Consolidate and Memorandum of Law and Fact in Support Thereof filed. |
| Jun. 01, 1992 | Order sent out. (George Williams' petition to intervene denied) |
| May 29, 1992 | Respondent's Supplemental Response to Petition to Intervene w/Exhibits 4&4 filed. |
| Feb. 18, 1992 | Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Response to Petition to Intervene filed. |
| Jan. 28, 1992 | Response of Respondent to Petition to Intervene filed. |
| Jan. 24, 1992 | Order sent out. (Re: Motion for extension of time, granted). |
| Jan. 15, 1992 | (Respondent) Consented Motion For Extension of Time to Respond to Petition to Intervene filed. |
| Jan. 06, 1992 | (Petitioner) Notice of Appearance filed. (From Mary C. O'Rourke) |
| Jan. 06, 1992 | (George Williams) Petition to Intervene w/Exhibits 1-5 filed. |
| Aug. 12, 1991 | Letter to RTB from Ralph A. Peterson (re: filing papers in a timely fashion) filed. |
| Jul. 19, 1991 | Letter to Parties of Record from RTB (request for case status) sent out. |
| Apr. 18, 1991 | Letter to RTB from Kent Springs (re: Mr. Peterson's Ltr) filed. |
| Apr. 17, 1991 | Letter to RTB from Ralph A. Peterson (re: filing appropriate motions)filed. |
| Mar. 29, 1991 | Order (motion to withdraw as counsel GRANTED) sent out. |
| Mar. 13, 1991 | Letter to Rev. F. Peacock from D. Jarrell cc: RTB (Enclosed Motion toWithdraw and Notice of Change of Address) filed. |
| Mar. 11, 1991 | (Petitioner) Motion to Withdraw and Notice of Change of Address filed. |
| Dec. 06, 1990 | Letter to RTB from R. A. Peterson (re: conference between J. Player &R.A. Peterson 12/4/90) filed. |
| Dec. 04, 1990 | Order (Hearing set for Dec. 11, 1990 is hereby Continued) sent out. |
| Nov. 26, 1990 | cc Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Third Request for Productionof Documents & cover letter from R. Peterson filed. |
| Nov. 13, 1990 | Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Strike and In Support of Respondent's Motion to Amend Answer & attachment filed. (From Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Nov. 09, 1990 | (petitioner) Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Nov. 08, 1990 | (Respondent) Amended Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (from Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Nov. 07, 1990 | Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Second Interrogatories; Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Second Request For Production of Documents w/exhibit-A filed. (From Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Nov. 02, 1990 | (respondent) Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Nov. 02, 1990 | Affidavit (to be attatched with petitioner's answers to respondent's first interrogatories) filed. (from J. Player). |
| Oct. 29, 1990 | Petitioner's Contingent Motion to Strike filed. (From Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Oct. 25, 1990 | Order (Respondents Motion for leave to file amendment to answer is GRANTED) sent out. |
| Oct. 25, 1990 | Petitioner's Answers to Respondent's First Interrogatories & attachment; Petitioner's Response to Respondent's First Request For Productionof Documents filed. (from Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Oct. 22, 1990 | Petitioner's Third Discovery Request filed. (From Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Oct. 16, 1990 | Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion For Leave to File Amendment to Answer filed. (Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Oct. 04, 1990 | (respondent) Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Answer; Respondent's First Amendment to Its Answer; & cover letter from R. Peterson filed. |
| Oct. 02, 1990 | Respondent's Supplemental Response to Petitioner's Discovery Requests; Notice of Service of Interrogatories; Respondent's Second Request For Production of Documents to Petitioner filed. (from Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Sep. 21, 1990 | CC Notice of Service of Interrogatories filed. (From Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Sep. 18, 1990 | Order (hearing continued to 12/11/90) sent out. |
| Sep. 18, 1990 | Amended Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 12-11-90; 10:00a; Pensacola) |
| Sep. 07, 1990 | (Petitioner) Motion for Continuance filed. (From Jeanne M. T. Player) |
| Aug. 23, 1990 | Order (hearing continued to 11/26/90) sent out. |
| Aug. 23, 1990 | Amended Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for November 26, 1990: |
| Aug. 16, 1990 | Petitioner's 2nd Interrogs. and 2nd Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Aug. 15, 1990 | Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Jul. 25, 1990 | Respondent's Supplemental Response to Petitioner's First Interrogatories and First Request for Production filed. (From Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Jul. 24, 1990 | Amended Notice of Hearing (as to location only) sent out. (hearing set for 9/10/90; 10:00am; Pensa) |
| Jul. 09, 1990 | Respondent's Response to Petitioner's First Interrogatories and FirstRequest For Productionfiled. (From Ralph A. Peterson) |
| Jun. 06, 1990 | Petitioner's First Interrogatories and First Request For Production of Documents filed. (from Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| May 14, 1990 | (Respondent) Notice of Appearance filed. (From Ralph A. Peterson) |
| May 14, 1990 | (Petitioner) Request For Leave of Absence filed. (from Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Apr. 25, 1990 | (Petitoiner) Notice of Appearance on Behalf of Petitioner filed. (from Jeanne M. L. Player) |
| Apr. 19, 1990 | (Respondent) Position Statement filed. |
| Apr. 10, 1990 | Letter to RTB from L. Sonzogni (reference to case) filed. |
| Apr. 03, 1990 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 9-10-90; 10:00; Pensa) |
| Mar. 01, 1990 | Initial Order issued. |
| Feb. 28, 1990 | Notice to Respondent of Filing of Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed. |
| Feb. 28, 1990 | Transmittal of Petition; Charge of Discrimination; Notice of Determination: No Cause; Petition for Relief; Determination: No Cause; Notice to Commissioners of Filing of Petition for Relief form an Unlawful Employment Practice; Notice of Transcription rec' |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Mar. 26, 1997 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jun. 19, 1995 | Recommended Order | Respondent did not discriminate against black employee by creating a temporary catagory of workers during a reduction in force with different rules. |
SHEILA D. CRAWFORD vs ABB POWER DISTRIBUTING, INC., 90-001222 (1990)
THERESA FOSTER vs. HANDLING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INC., 90-001222 (1990)
SHANNON M. SPENCE vs OCALA MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A QUALITY INN, 90-001222 (1990)
RUBY D. JOHNSON vs. IT AND T THOMPSON INDUSTRIES, 90-001222 (1990)
JIMMY D. FOREHAND vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 90-001222 (1990)
