STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
JAMES A. BRAND, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 91-0004
) FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case on June 6, 1991, in Inverness, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its designated Hearing Officer, Diane K. Kiesling.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: John Barry Kelly II
Attorney at Law Ray, Kievit & Kelly
15 West Main Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
For Respondent: J. Lewis Sapp
Sharon P. Morgan Attorneys at Law
800 Peachtree-Cain Tower
229 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30303
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The ultimate issue is whether Florida Power Corporation (FPC) engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against James A. Brand on account of handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1989)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Mr. Brand presented his own testimony and that of Carey W. Hamilton, Ronald S. Kline, M.D., and Kathleen L. Moyer. Jerry Bourque was called as a rebuttal witness. Petitioner's Exhibit
1 was admitted in evidence. Florida Power presented the testimony of Carey W. Hamilton and had Respondent's Exhibit 1 admitted in evidence.
The transcript of the proceedings was filed on June 18, 1991. The parties timely filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on June 28, 1991. All proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been considered. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is made in the Appendix attached hereto and made a part of this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Florida Power Corporation is an electrical utility engaged in the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.
FPC operates and maintains electrical generating plants throughout its service area, including Crystal River, Florida, where it operates two fossil generating plants, Crystal River South and Crystal River North, and a nuclear generating plant, Crystal River 3.
The maintenance of the plants' equipment is performed by plant maintenance employees and by employees assigned from the System Maintenance Crew (SMC).
Both regular and temporary employees work as members of the SMC in the job classifications of mechanic, certified welder mechanic, and electrician.
Petitioner, James Brand, was employed by FPC on nine separate occasions during the years 1985 through 1988 as a temporary employee in the job classification of mechanic and certified welder mechanic on FPC's SMC.
Temporary employees, such as Mr. Brand, are hired by FPC for the SMC for time periods of less than six months to perform overhaul and maintenance work on boilers, turbines, generators, pumps, fans, and other plant equipment during a unit or plant outage.
Temporary employees are laid off and their employment is terminated as the outage work is completed.
Mr. Brand had a preemployment physical examination before being initially hired as a temporary employee on the SMC in 1985. Thereafter, he had preemployment physical examinations on two occasions prior to reemployment by FPC.
In June 1988, Mr. Brand was notified by letter from his attorney, Alwyn Luckey, that he has an asbestos-related lung disorder known as asbestosis.
In June 1988, Mr. Brand received a clinical evaluation from Dr. Lewis J. Rubin, Head, Division of Pulmonary Medicine, University of Maryland School of Medicine, that he has pulmonary asbestosis.
In approximately January or February 1989, Kathleen Moyer, a human resources representative in FPC's Crystal River office, contacted Mr. Brand regarding reemployment as a mechanic or certified welder mechanic on the SMC to work during a unit or plant outage.
Mr. Brand went to Ms. Moyer's office to update his records and, at that time, provided her with Dr. Rubin's clinical evaluation reflecting that he has pulmonary asbestosis and with a copy of Mr. Luckey's June 21, 1988, letter.
Ms. Moyer provided Dr. Rubin's report to Dr. Alex Sanchez, FPC's regional medical director. Mr. Brand was thereafter scheduled for a physical examination with Dr. Sanchez in February 1989.
Mr. Brand also provided Dr. Sanchez with copies of Dr. Rubin's clinical evaluation and Mr. Luckey's June 21, 1988, letter. Dr. Sanchez asked Mr. Brand to get a second medical opinion.
On March 4, 1989, Mr. Brand went to a physician, Dr. Nikhil Shah, who conducted a pulmonary examination and a pulmonary function or spirometry test. The results were given to Dr. Sanchez.
Dr. Sanchez thereafter received a letter dated March 16, 1989, from Dr. Lewis Rubin, who had initially diagnosed Mr. Brand's medical condition as pulmonary asbestosis.
Dr. Rubin stated in his March 16 letter that he had reviewed the pulmonary function test performed by Dr. Shah on
March 4, and that Mr. Brand's asbestosis "should in no way impair his ability to do his job as long as he is not being exposed to noxious fumes or other environmental irritants."
Dr. Ronald S. Kline, Director of Health Services for FPC, thereafter reviewed Mr. Brand's medical records, including Dr. Rubin's clinical evaluation diagnosing Mr. Brand as having pulmonary asbestosis and Dr. Rubin's March 16 letter.
As Director of Health Services for FPC, Dr. Kline is responsible for the overall function of the medical department, which includes responsibility for determining whether a person has a physical or mental impairment which might limit his/her activities as they relate to his/her employment.
Dr. Rubin's clinical evaluation states that Mr. Brand is at risk for the progression of pulmonary asbestosis even-in the absence of further exposure to asbestos.
Dr. Kline did not request that Mr. Brand undergo any additional tests to determine if he suffers from asbestosis nor did Dr. Kline make an independent diagnosis that Mr. Brand has asbestosis.
Dr. Kline accepted Dr. Rubin's evaluation and diagnosis of Mr. Brand. Dr. Kline had no reason to disbelieve the diagnosis of Mr. Brand's own physician, especially when the information regarding his medical condition was presented by Mr. Brand to FPC.
On April 5, 1989, Dr. Kline issued a guideline to the human resources department placing the following restriction on Mr. Brand's employment activities: "No exposure to irritating gases or fumes, or any other environmental irritant." Dr. Kline based his recommendation on Dr. Rubin's evaluation and assessment.
Moreover, Dr. Kline agreed, on the basis of his own medical experience, training, and education, that Dr. Rubin's recommendation of restrictions on Mr. Brand's activities was entirely reasonable.
In Dr. Kline's medical opinion, Mr. Brand's continued employment in a position where he would be exposed to noxious fumes, gases, or other environmental irritants would pose a substantial risk of injury or harm to Mr. Brand's health.
Dr. Kline does not and did not make decisions or recommendations regarding the hiring or reemployment of employment applicants.
At no time did Dr. Rline recommend or otherwise indicate that Mr. Brand should not be reemployed by FPC.
Rather, it was Dr. Kline's recommendation that he be employed in jobs in which he would not be exposed to noxious fumes, gases, or environmenta1 irritants.
After receiving Dr. Kline's report, a human resources representative contacted Carey Hamilton, senior mechanical supervisor, and asked if he could employ a person in the position of mechanic or certified welder mechanic on the SMC who could not be exposed to irritating gases, fumes, and other environmental irritants.
As senior mechanical supervisor, Mr. Hamilton is responsible for hiring and supervising the" regular and temporary mechanics and certified welder mechanics on the SMC.
Mr. Hamilton has working knowledge of the environment inside the power plants due to his experience as an employee and supervisor on the SMC. He has been employed by FPC for over fifteen years in the job classifications of temporary mechanic, lab technician, certified welder mechanic, first line supervisor, and senior mechanical supervisor. He has worked as a certified welder mechanic, first line supervisor, and senior mechanical supervisor in all of FPC's power plants. Moreover, approximately ten years of Mr. Hamilton's experience has involved working with the SMC and supervising regular and temporary employees on the SMC, including during unit or plant outages.
Based on his experience and firsthand knowledge of the work environment in the plants, Mr. Hamilton determined that he could not employ a person to work as a mechanic or certified welder mechanic on the SMC who could not be exposed to irritating gases, fumes, and other environmental irritants.
At the time Mr. Hamilton responded to the human resources employment inquiry, he was unaware of the identity of the individual human resources was inquiring about or that this person has asbestosis.
All employees on the SMC are initially hired into the mechanic classification. However, the temporary employees who
are hired to work during a plant outage are usually upgraded to the certified welder mechanic position after they pass certain tests.
The mechanics and certified welder mechanics working in the plant during an outage are continuously exposed to noxious fumes, gases, and other environmental irritants.
Pulverized coal and fly ash, both of which have the consistency of face powder, exist in abundance throughout the plant in areas where the mechanics and certified welder mechanics are assigned to work. They are also exposed to other major irritants including sulfur dioxide gas, flue gases, smoke and dust created by tools, and irritants created by sandblasting and grinding.
Mr. Brand was hired as a temporary on the SMC because of his welding and pipe fitting skills. He was qualified and certified to make safety-related pressure welds.
FPC expends a significant amount of money in testing and certifying persons employed on the SMC so they can be used as welders.
Prior to each period of his employment on the SMC, Mr. Brand was required to take welding certification tests in order to qualify as a certified welder. He always passed the certification tests and therefore was qualified to work as a certified welder mechanic.
As a certified welder mechanic, Mr. Brand would work primarily in and around the boiler and boiler cavity.
The work that is performed inside the boiler cavity by certified welder mechanics involves inspection, repair, and replacement of boiler tubes, replacement of burner fronts and defusers, and refractory repair.
The certified welder mechanics clean the boiler tubes with a grinder prior to inspection. Thereafter, their work typically consists of repairing boiler tube leaks with a weld and replacing sections of the boiler tubes. The performance of this work involves grinding, burning, cutting, and welding, all of which produces fumes, gases, and other airborne irritants.
The burner replacement and refractory repair work also exposes the certified welder mechanics to similar fumes, gases ~ and irritants.
In addition to the boiler area, the certified welder mechanics perform work on the precipitators. This work involves burning, welding, and cleaning.
The bottom ash hopper and the pulverizers that are used to crush coal are cleaned and repaired by certified welder mechanics during an outage. This work involves cutting, burning, grinding, and welding which produces noxious fumes and gases.
Working on the water front and in the turbine areas during an outage exposes these SMC employees to fumes and dust particles created by sandblasting.
During an outage, the SMC employees will be working on one unit that is out of operation; however, they are working next to a unit that is in operation. The unit that is in operation produces gases, fumes, and airborne irritants.
The fact that Mr. Brand might work as a mechanic instead of a certified welder mechanic would not insulate him from exposure to noxious fumes, gases, and other environmental irritants.
The duties of a SMC mechanic include sandblasting and grinding dirty or rusty metal, burning with a cutting torch, welding non-safety related welds, and' wire brushing. These activities are performed on a daily basis by mechanics.
The sandblasting or grinding work is done with an abrasive disk that creates airborne particulates that contaminate the air.
The burning process is used in making repairs such as in the steel ducts that transport air and gases to and from the boilers. Sulfur-based deposits collect in these ducts and when a torch is used in that area, the burning creates sulfur dioxide gas and other fumes. In addition, oxygen blasts are used in the burning process to increase the heat and blow metal out of the weld. This causes fly ash, dust, and other irritants to become airborne.
The welding that is performed by mechanics also produces fumes and gases.
All of the tools used by the SMC in the power plant are air-driven tools. The air discharged by these tools stirs up the dust, fly ash, gases, and other irritants in the workplace environment.
During the time periods that a mechanic is not directly engaged in grinding, burning, or welding, he is working in close proximity to other employees who are performing those tasks, and thus, is exposed to the noxious gases, fumes, and irritants.
Mr. Hamilton determined that he could not employ a certified welder mechanic on the SMC with the following restriction: "No exposure to irritating gases or fumes, or any other environmental irritant." He did not know that Mr. Brand was the proposed employee or that Mr. Brand has asbestosis.
Mr. Hamilton knew that employing an individual to work as a mechanic or certified welder mechanic would expose that individual to gases, fumes, and other environmental irritants.
The only positions supervised by Mr. Hamilton on the SMC are mechanic, certified welder mechanic, and tool room attendant. The tool room is housed in a large trailer parked outside of the plant.
The tool room attendant's duties include issuing and receiving tools and repairing tools. These duties are performed in the tool room trailer.
Because of his work location, the tool room attendant is not exposed to fumes, gases, and environmental irritants in the same way as the mechanics and certified welder mechanics. Mr. Hamilton later determined that Mr. Brand could be employed in the tool room consistent with the restrictions issued by Dr. Kline.
Mr. Hamilton discussed with a human resources representative the possibility of employing Mr. Brand in the tool room.
Mr. Hamilton had no objection to employing Mr. Brand in the tool room. However, there were no vacancies in that position and there have been no vacancies since that time.
During 1990, Mr. Brand worked in Fluor Constructors Corporation, at Crystal River 3. Fluor Constructors is an independent contractor that is employed by FPC to perform repair and maintenance work. Mr. Brand received the referral to this job site through the Pinellas Park Local of the Pipefitters Union. While working for Fluor at Crystal River 3, he was supervised by Fluor's supervisors and not by FPC's supervisors.
Mr. Brand is not seeking back pay for the period from February 23, 1991, through June 6, 1991. He was employed by a number of different employers during the period from January 1989 through May 1991. Such employers include Fluor Contractors, Inc., Teco Electric, Nisco, and a nuclear power plant in Mississippi. Mr. Brand would not be entitled to recover back pay or other monetary relief for the periods while working for other employers insofar as such interim employment periods coincided with SMC outage work periods.
The hourly rate as well as other benefits of employment for temporary employees are set forth in the labor agreement between FPC and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. As of December 5, 1988, the hourly wage rate for a mechanic was $16.51 per hour and for a certified welder mechanic was $18.72 per hour.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and subject matter of these proceedings. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Mr. Brand filed a Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging that FPC discriminate against him on the basis of his handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 (the Act), Sections 760.01 et seq., when it failed to reemploy him in April 1989 to work on the System Maintenance Crew during a plant or unit outage. Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge or to fail or refuse to hire or otherwise to discriminate against any individual because of handicap.
Mr. Brand must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his handicap in violation of Section 760.10. Initially, he must establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination. In a
handicap discrimination case, the petitioner must show 1) that he is handicapped, 2) that he is otherwise able to perform the assigned duties satisfactorily, and 3) that he was not hired under circumstances which give rise to an inference that the employment decision was based solely on his handicap. Cabany v. Hollywood Memorial Hosp., 12 FALR 2020, 2027 (FCHR 19903; Green
v. Mark III Industries, 12 FALR 1888, 1894 (FCHR 1990).
If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case, the respondent must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken in order to rebut the inference of discrimination. Green, 12 FALR at 1893.
Once the respondent states its legitimate reason, the inference of discrimination created by the prima facie case is dispelled. The petitioner must then prove that the reason offered by the respondent is not the true reason, but is merely a pretext for discrimination. Green, 12 FALR at 1893. The petitioner bears the ultimate burden of proving handicap discrimination. Cabany, 12 FALR at 2027.
The Act does not define "handicap." However, in interpreting it, the Florida Commission on Human Relations has chosen to give the term a meaning in accordance with common usage.
Generally, "handicap" connotes a condition that prevents normal functioning in some way; a person with a handicap does not enjoy in some measure the full and normal use of his sensory, mental, or physical faculties. Green, 12 FALR at 1894.
Mr. Brand carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case. He produced evidence that he suffers from an asbestos-related disease known as pulmonary asbestosis, which would be considered a "handicap" under the foregoing definition adopted by the Commission. In addition, he produced evidence that he possessed the skills necessary to perform the duties of mechanic or certified welder mechanic and that FPC did not reemploy him in either position.
FPC articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not reemploying Mr. Brand on the SMC in April 1989. FPC did not offer him employment because there was not a vacancy in the tool room attendant classification which was the only job in which he could be employed consistent with the medical
restriction placed on his employment. Moreover, the decision maker, Mr. Hamilton, was not even aware of the fact that Mr. Brand has pulmonary asbestos s at the time that he made the employment decision which gave rise to this case. This fact reinforces FPC,s position that it was the employment restriction recommended by Brand's own physician which led to its employment decision and not the fact that he has pulmonary asbestosis.
Dr. Kline reviewed Mr. Brand's medical file, including an evaluation and report from Brand's own physician, Dr. Rubin, who opined that Mr. Brand should be employed but only under certain conditions. Specifically, Dr. Rubin determined that Mr. Brand has pulmonary asbestosis, but that this disease should not impair his ability to do his job "as long as he is not being exposed to noxious fumes or other environmental irritants." Dr. Kline, relying on Dr. Rubin's evaluation and assessment, made a recommendation to human resources that Brand's activities should be restricted to "no exposure to irritating gases or fumes, or other environmental irritants." At no time did Dr. Kline recommend that Mr. Brand should not be reemployed by FPC.
Thereafter, human resources contacted Carey Hamilton, who supervises and makes hiring decisions for the SMC, and asked him if he could employ a person as a mechanic or certified welder mechanic with those restrictions. Mr. Hamilton determined, based on his 15 years of experience as an employee and supervisor with the SMC, that he could not employ a person with such restrictions in the mechanic or certified welder mechanic positions without violating the restrictions.
Employees who work as mechanics or certified welder mechanics on the SMC during unit or plant outages are continuously exposed in the workplace to noxious gases, fumes, and other environmental irritants. This environment is created by the dust and fly ash that are produced from burning coal, the maintenance and repair work such as grinding, burning, and welding being performed, the chemical composition of the equipment that is being repaired, and the air-driven tools that are used by the SMC.
The decision in Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1986), supports the action taken by FPC in the present case. In Kelley, the plaintiff, a diagnosed epileptic, was denied employment as a boilermaker mechanic. Persons applying for the position of boilermaker mechanic had to be cleared for respirator use by a local physician after passing a respirator physical. During his respirator physical, the
plaintiff acknowledged that he had been diagnosed as an epileptic years earlier, but was taking prescribed medicine and had never had a seizure. The examiner found the plaintiff to be in good health. Thereafter, the plaintiff was examined by his own physician, who informed Bechtel that the plaintiff's physical and neurological examinations were normal and that the plaintiff should have no limitations in the performance of his work. Despite this information, the company physician concluded that the plaintiff's seizure disease presented too great a risk to allow him to work as a boilermaker mechanic. The court found that the company physician had not made an individualized determination as to whether the plaintiff presented a substantial risk of having a seizure on the job. The physician had failed to evaluate the plaintiff, examine his medical records, or communicate with his personal physician to clarify any questions regarding risk of seizure. Rather, the employer's physician concluded on the basis of generalized information about epileptics and persons with seizure disorders that the plaintiff was unfit to perform the job for which he was hired.
The court held that the physician's decision-making procedure was inadequate.
The Defendant's decision must "reflect a well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks and alternatives," and must avoid being "simply conclusory statements" or "reflexive reactions." [citation omitted]
Id. at 934.
Dr. Kline's determination of Brand's medical condition and subsequent recommendation of restrictions on his work activities fully complies with the requirements in Kelley. The facts establish that an individualized investigation was made of Mr. Brand's medical situation and the physical requirements of the position in which he was seeking reemployment. Dr. Kline relied on Dr. Rubin's clinical evaluation and follow-up which dealt specifically with Petitioner's asbestos-related disease. Moreover, Dr. Kline's recommended restriction on Mr. Brand's work activities was based on Dr. Rubin's opinion that he should not be exposed to certain gases and fumes. Dr. Kline did not generalize about the condition of asbestosis as did the physician in Kelley, who generalized about the condition of epilepsy. To the contrary, all of the information relied upon by Dr. Kline was fact specific to Mr. Brand and came directly from his own physician.
In order to prevail on his handicap claim, Mr. Brand must show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by FPC is not the true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. Green, 12 FALR at 1893. The only testimony offered by Mr. Brand which conceivably could establish pretext is 1) his argument that he was treated differently than other employees with asthma and emphysema, 2) his assertions that the human resources manager, Jim Dalonzo, told him that he would not be able to work for FPC because he has asbestosis, and 3) his allegation that his spirometry tests were within normal limits.
Mr. Brand did not produce any probative evidence that persons with asthma and emphysema are employed in positions comparable to the position he was seeking, i.e., mechanic or certified welder mechanic on the SMC. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that recommendations were made concerning restrictions on these employees or that these employees were hired in violation of any such restriction. Finally, the unrefuted testimony of Carey Hamilton is that he made the decision that a person with the restrictions in question could not be employed as a mechanic or certified welder mechanic without knowing Mr. Brand's identity or medical condition of asbestosis. Mr. Brand's assertion that FPC used the fact that he has asbestosis to refuse to reemploy him is totally unsupported by the credible, competent, and substantial evidence.
Mr. Brand's allegation that Jim Dalonzo, human resources manger, told him that he would not be able to work for FPC because of his asbestosis was further unsupported by the evidence. Even if such a statement had been made, it would not establish that FPC's nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination. Dalonzo had absolutely no decision-making authority with regard to Mr. Brand's employment. Mr. Hamilton made the decision that a person with Mr. Brand's restrictions could not be reemployed as a certified welder mechanic on the SMC. He made the decision without any knowledge that the person with the restrictions has asbestosis or was Mr. Brand. He further determined that Mr. Brand could be employed in the tool room position, consistent with the restrictions issued by Dr. Kline, but no vacancies existed.
Further, Mr. Brand's argument that his spirometry tests were within the normal range has relevance only if he is asserting that Dr. Rubin is wrong and that he does not suffer
from pulmonary asbestosis. If he does not have the disease, he is not handicapped and cannot bring this claim.
Finally, Mr. Brand cited the fact that he performed repair and maintenance work for Fluor Constructors at FPC's nuclear plant, Crystal River 3, in 1990 as evidence that he could work on the SMC even though he has asbestosis. The fact that another employer may allow a person to work in an environment that is harmful to his health is not evidence of unlawful discrimination by FPC.
Mr. Brand has failed to prove that he was not reemployed to FPC as a mechanic or certified welder mechanic on the SMC because he has asbestosis.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the Petition for Relief.
DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.
DIANE R. KIESLING
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1991.
APPENDIX
The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case.
Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, James A. Brand
1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 1(2); 3(3&4); 475 (5-7); 6(63); 7(8); and 8-16(10-17).
2. Proposed findings of fact 17-19, 21-35, 50-54, 65-70,
76, 77, 84, 85, 91, and 92 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order.
Proposed findings of fact 36-49, 55-64, 82, 83 and 86-
90 are irrelevant.
Proposed finding of fact 20 is unnecessary.
Proposed findings of fact ,1-75 and 78-81 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence.
Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Florida Power Corporation
1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-63(1-62).
COPIES FURNISHED:
John Barry Relly II Attorney at Law Ray, Kievit & Kelly
15 West Main Street Pensacola, FL 32501
J. Lewis Sapp Sharon P. Morgan Attorneys at Law
800 Peachtree-Cain Tower
229 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30303
Ronald M. McElrath, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human
Relations
Building F, Suite 240
325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human
Relations
Building F, Suite 240
325 Johp Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Mar. 08, 1994 | Opinion filed. |
| Feb. 19, 1992 | Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief From an Unilawful Employment Practice filed. |
| Aug. 16, 1991 | Florida Power Corporation's Response to Petitioner's Exceptions to Hearing Officer's Recommended Order filed. (From Sharon P. Morgan) |
| Jul. 31, 1991 | Petitioner's Exceptions to Hearing OFficer's Recommended Order filed. (From John Barry Kelly II) |
| Jul. 11, 1991 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 6/6/91. |
| Jul. 03, 1991 | Revised Page #20 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact et al; & Cover Letter to DKK from S. Morgan filed. |
| Jul. 01, 1991 | Corrected pages 1, 37 and 41 of J. Kelly's Proposed RO filed. |
| Jun. 28, 1991 | (Petitioner's) Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Discussion of Applicable Law and Copies of the Federal Opinions Cited filed. (From John B. Kelly, II) |
| Jun. 28, 1991 | Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order filed. (From Sharon P. Morgan) |
| Jun. 18, 1991 | Transcript filed. |
| Jun. 06, 1991 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Jun. 03, 1991 | Petitioner's Pre-Hearing Statement filed. (From John Berry Kelly, II) |
| May 17, 1991 | Amended Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for June 6-7, 1991; 9:00am; Inverness). |
| Mar. 21, 1991 | Letter to DKK from J. Sapp; Deposition of James A. Brand filed. |
| Mar. 04, 1991 | Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 06/06-07/91;11:00AM;Inverness) |
| Feb. 28, 1991 | Letter to DKK from James A. Brand (re: Continuance) filed. |
| Feb. 11, 1991 | (Respondent) Amended Answer filed. (From J. Lewis Sapp) |
| Feb. 07, 1991 | (Respondent) Notice of Deposition filed. (from J. Lewis Sapp) |
| Jan. 30, 1991 | Order of Prehearing Instructions sent out. |
| Jan. 30, 1991 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for March 11-12, 1991: 10:30 am: Inverness) |
| Jan. 22, 1991 | Employer's Response to Initial Order filed. (From J. Lewis Sapp) |
| Jan. 18, 1991 | Election of Method of Preservation of Record filed. (From Lee A. Quillen) |
| Jan. 18, 1991 | (Respondent) Answer & cover ltr filed. (From J. Lewis Sapp) |
| Jan. 14, 1991 | Petition For Relief filed. (From James A. Brand) |
| Jan. 09, 1991 | Initial Order issued. |
| Jan. 02, 1991 | Transmittal of Petition; Complaint; Notice of Determination; Petitionfor Relief; Notice to Commissioners and Respondent's Notice of Transcription filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jul. 11, 1991 | Recommended Order | Asbestosis victim not re-employed because no job opening in job consistent with medical restrictions. Reason was legitimate and non-discriminatory. |
