STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
In Re: CLIFF HAYDEN, JR., )
)
Respondent, ) CASE NO. 91-1889EC
) COMPLAINT NO. 89-137
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)
)
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to written notice a formal hearing was held in this case before Larry J. Sartin, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on July 17, 1991, in Tampa, Florida.
APPEARANCES
The Advocate: Virlindia Doss
Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1601
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
For Respondent: David M. Carr, Esquire
600 Madison Street
Tampa, Florida 33602 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the Respondent, Cliff Hayden, Jr., violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by having the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority pay for food and beverage expenses incurred at the Tampa Club for meetings between the Respondent and members and/or staff of the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority?
Whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by having the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority pay for golfing expenses for himself and a member of the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority?
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On or about October 9, 1989, a Complaint was filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). The Complaint contained allegations of misconduct by Cliff Hayden, Jr., the Respondent in this case. Based upon a review of the Complaint against the Respondent, the Commission issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate on April 3, 1990, ordering the staff of the Commission to conduct a preliminary investigation into whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes.
Following the Commission's investigation of the Respondent, a Report of Investigation was issued on June 29, 1990. Based upon the Complaint and the Report of Investigation, an Advocate for the Commission issued an Advocate's Recommendation on July 18, 1990. The Advocate determined that there was no probable cause to believe the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes.
Despite the recommendation of the Advocate the Commission issued an Order Finding Probable Cause on September 12, 1990. The Commission ordered that a public hearing be conducted.
By letter dated March 22, 1991, the Commission referred this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings and, in accordance with Rules 34-5.010 and 34-5.014, Florida Administrative Code, requested that the public hearing of the Complaint against the Respondent be conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings.
On April 3, 1991, at the request of the parties, the case was placed in abeyance until April 29, 1991, to allow sufficient time for the parties to resolve some of the issues in this case. On May 2, 1991, the case was set for formal hearing on July 17, 1991.
Pursuant to a Pre-hearing Order, the parties filed a Prehearing Stipulation. The parties stipulated to the issues, certain conclusions of law and several findings of fact. The stipulated facts have been accepted and incorporated into this Recommended Order.
At the formal hearing the Advocate presented the testimony of Randolf Kinsey and Lillian Stringer. The Advocate also offered seven exhibits. The exhibits were marked as "Advocate's" exhibits and were accepted into evidence.
The Respondent testified and presented the testimony of John King. The Respondent also offered three exhibits. The Respondent's exhibits were marked as "Respondent's" exhibits and were accepted into evidence.
At the conclusion of the formal hearing the parties indicated that no transcript of the hearing would be filed. The parties also indicated that they waived their right to file proposed recommended orders.
FINDINGS OF FACT
General.
The Respondent, Cliff Hayden, Jr., served as the Executive Director of the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Authority"), from January, 1985, until January 19, 1990. Stipulated Fact I. 3. The Respondent was the Executive Director of the Authority at all times pertinent to the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. Stipulated Fact II. 4.
The Authority was established pursuant to Part V of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, which provide for the establishment of regional transportation authorities. Stipulated Fact I. 2.
The Respondent was employed by the Authority for 13 years prior to his employment as the Executive Director.
John King served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), the governing body of the Authority, from 1982 through 1987. From 1987 through 1989, Mr. King served as Chairman of the Board. Stipulated Fact I. 16.
Expenditures at the Tampa Club.
During the 1980's the Authority began efforts to build a bus terminal on Marion Street in Tampa, Florida. Initially, the Authority was not sensitive to the concerns about the proposed terminal of business owners on Marion Street. This insensitivity caused the Authority to have difficulties with business owners in the area which the Board believed needed to be rectified in order to effectively carry out the responsibilities of the Authority.
During 1985 or 1986, as a result of the difficulties with Marion Street business owners, the Chairman of the Board, Charles Banks, suggested that a membership be established at a Tampa social club that served meals. Stipulated Fact I. 4.
As a result of Mr. Banks' suggestion, the Respondent checked into the cost of joining several Tampa social clubs that served meals, including one known as the Tampa Club. See Stipulated Fact I. 4.
Following discussion of the Board at a Board meeting, the Board unanimously approved the opening of an account for use by the Executive Director at the Tampa Club. Stipulation of Fact I. 4. and 5.
The Board authorized and directed the Respondent to open an account at the Tampa Club. The Board also authorized and directed the expenditure of Authority funds to reimburse the Respondent for the initial membership fee of the Tampa Club, monthly charges for the membership in the Tampa Club and the cost of meals incurred by the Respondent at the Tampa Club for meals at which Authority business was discussed by the Respondent.
The Respondent was authorized by the Board to use the Tampa Club for personal purposes if he reimbursed the Authority for any such expenditures. Stipulated Fact I. 7. The Respondent did not use the Tampa Club for any personal purposes.
The Respondent was a member of the Tampa Club from February, 1986, until September 30, 1989, his entire term as Executive Director. Stipulated Fact I. 8. and 11.
Membership in the Tampa Club was an employment benefit and part of the Respondent's economic compensation from the Authority. Stipulated Fact I. 12. This finding of fact was stipulated to by the parties, although evidence was presented by the Advocate suggesting a different conclusion. That evidence is rejected because of the agreement of the parties that Stipulated Fact I. 12. is an established fact.
The Board also established and approved a public-relations account during 1985 or 1986. The public-relations account was to be used by the Executive Director and Authority Board members in furtherance of Authority business. Funds were to be paid out of this account for Authority business- related social activities, including expenditures incurred by the Respondent at the Tampa Club. Stipulated Fact I. 14.
The public-relations account, like the membership in the Tampa Club, initially was established because of the difficulties with Marion Street business owners.
The Respondent was directed by the Board to "hold hands" with the Marion Street business owners and to use the Tampa Club and the public-relations account for that purpose.
Pursuant to the direction of the Board, the Respondent paid the Tampa Club $1,500.00 as a membership entrance fee. The Respondent was reimbursed by the Authority for this expenditure. Stipulated Fact I. 6.
During the three years and seven months that the Respondent was a member of the Tampa Club the Authority paid a total of $5,854.08 for food and beverages charged by the Respondent at the Tampa Club. Stipulated Fact I. 8. and 9.
The Authority also paid monthly membership charges of the Tampa Club during the time that the Respondent was a member. Monthly charges ranged from
$40.00 to $65.00 per month. Stipulated Fact I. 10.
Amounts expended out of the public-relations account, including amounts paid to the Tampa Club, were included in the Authority's Board-approved budget. During the fiscal year ending September, 1988, the amount of the
public-relations account approved by the Board was $3,023.47. During the fiscal year ending September, 1989, the amount of the public-relations account approved by the Board was $4,215.89. Stipulated Fact I. 15.
The Authority's budget was prepared by the staff of the Authority.
The public-relations account was included as a separate item in the budget. The particular expenditures to be paid from the public-relations account, including amounts to be paid for the Tampa Club, were not specifically identified in the budget submitted to the Board for approval. Information concerning the specific expenditures to be covered by the public-relations account was, however, available to Board members.
The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the manner in which the public-relations account was presented to the Board for approval and review was inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles.
The Board reviewed and approved the Authority's budget, including the public-relations account.
Although the Board did not closely scrutinize the budget, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that any attempt was made by the Respondent or any other person on his behalf to conceal information about the public-relations account or his use of the Tampa Club from the Board or the public. The Board's failure to closely review the Authority's budget was a problem of the Board and not the Respondent.
All expenditures made by the Authority out of the public-relations account, including amounts paid to the Tampa Club, were part of the records of the Authority and constituted public records available to the public and the members of the Board.
Each month, approximately three to four days before each Board meeting, Board members were provided with a monthly summary of Authority
expenditures. This summary included the total amount expended from the public- relations account, including amounts paid to the Tampa Club. The Board was not provided with a detailed break-down of each expenditure from the public- relations account. The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, that the manner in which the account was reported was inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles or that any attempt was made by the Respondent or any other person on his behalf to conceal information about the public-relations account or his use of the Tampa Club from the Board or the public.
All expenditures from the public-relations account, including those for the Respondent's use of the Tampa Club, were reviewed by the Respondent.
The expenditures were paid by the Authority's accounting staff after approval by the Respondent.
Expenditures from the public-relations account for lunch and breakfast charges at the Tampa Club made by the Respondent were also authorized by the John King, Chairman of the Board. Stipulated Fact I. 17.
In 1989, John King was alleged in Commission Complaint No. 89-58, to have misused his office by charging to a credit card issued to him by the Authority meals taken with business associates. This Complaint was dismissed by the Commission with a finding of no probable cause. Stipulated Fact I. 18.
The Respondent's membership in the Tampa Club was used solely for business lunches and breakfasts by the Respondent. Stipulated Fact I. 13.
The Respondent only charged food and beverages to the Tampa Club for payment by the Authority for food and beverages consumed while discussing Authority business with members of the Board and staff members, or guests of the Authority and staff members. Staff members only accompanied the Respondent to the Tampa Club if a Board member or guest of the Authority was present with the Respondent.
The Respondent took Board members to the Tampa Club approximately 30% of the time and guests of the Authority approximately 70%.
The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent charged any amount to the Authority for use of the Tampa Club that was not directed and authorized by the Board.
Although the Respondent benefited from the food and beverages he consumed at the Tampa Club, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent used of the Tampa Club with the intent of securing a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others or that his action was taken with a wrongful intent. The Respondent was carrying out the instructions of the Board concerning how the Tampa Club was to be used.
Expenditures for Golf.
Randolf Kinsey is a member of the Authority's Board. Mr. Kinsey has been a member of the Board since approximately 1987.
Mr. Kinsey has, as a member of the Board, been an advocate for the use of Black businesses by the Authority and the hiring of Blacks by the Authority.
At times Mr. Kinsey has advocated for Blacks to the exclusion of other minorities.
During all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Kinsey and the Respondent did not get along. A great deal of friction has developed between Mr. Kinsey and the Respondent.
Following a Board or committee meeting in 1988, John King and legal counsel for the Authority met with the Respondent concerning the problems between Mr. Kinsey and the Respondent. During this meeting Mr. King, who was then the Chairman of the Board, told the Respondent to resolve the problem with Mr. Kinsey. It was suggested by Mr. King that the Respondent "get Mr. Kinsey in a more relaxed environment" and "mend the broken fences between them."
The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. King specifically suggested that the Respondent play golf with Mr. Kinsey.
The Respondent contacted Mr. Kinsey and suggested lunch. When Mr. Kinsey declined lunch, the Respondent invited Mr. Kinsey to play golf. Mr. Kinsey accepted.
On November 10, 1988, the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey played golf together at Northdale Golf Course in Tampa. Stipulated Fact II. 1.
The greens fees charged to play golf for the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey totalled $69.01. Stipulated Fact II. 2.
The Respondent charged the greens fees for himself and Mr. Kinsey on a credit card issued to him by the Authority. Stipulated Fact II. 4. The greens fees were ultimately paid by the Authority as a charge to the public-relations account.
During the golf outing the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey discussed Authority business, including the hiring of a Black at the administrative level by the Authority.
The Respondent is an avid golfer.
The Respondent played golf approximately 10 to 15 times with other members of the Board. The Respondent did not, however, charge any of the fees attributable to these golf outings to the Authority. This fact supports a finding that the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey was not a social occasion.
Because of the animosity between the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey, the only reason the Respondent played golf with Mr. Kinsey was to attempt to resolve their differences. This fact further supports a finding that the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey was not a social occasion.
The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent attempted to conceal the fact that he had charged the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey to the Authority. The charges were public records.
Although the Respondent benefited from the free golf outing, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent played golf with Mr. Kinsey or charged the outing to the Authority with the intent of securing a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others or that his action was taken with a wrongful intent. The Respondent reasonably believed that he was carrying out the instructions of the Chairman of the Board to resolve a
problem between the Executive Director of the Authority and a Board member which was adversely impacting on the Authority.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1989).
The Respondent has been charged with violating Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, based upon the payment for his use of the Tampa Club and the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey by the Authority. Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, provides:
(6) MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION.--No public officer or employee of an agency shall corruptly use or attempt to use his official position or any property or resource which may be within his trust, or perform his official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31.
The parties have stipulated that a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, requires proof of the following elements:
The Respondent must be either a public officer or a public employee.
The Respondent must have used or attempted to use his official position or property or resources within his trust, or performed his official duties.
The Respondent's actions in element b. must have been done with an intent to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others.
The Respondent's action and intent in element b. and c. must have been done corruptly, i.e., (1) done with a wrongful intent and (2) done for the purpose of benefiting from some act or admission which is inconsistent with the proper performance of public duties.
The burden of proof, absent a statutory directive to the contrary, is on the party asserting the affirmative of the issue of the proceeding. Balino
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA). In this proceeding it is the Commission, through the Advocate, that is asserting the affirmative; that the Respondent violated the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. Therefore, the burden of proving the elements of the Respondent's alleged violation was on the Commission.
The First Element; Public Officer or Public Employee.
The parties have stipulated that the Respondent, as Executive Director of the Authority, was a public officer or employee at the time the incidents
alleged in the Complaint filed against the Respondent took place. The parties have also stipulated that the Respondent was subject to the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, Part III of Chapter 112, Florida Statutes.
Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, is contained in Part III of Chapter 112, Florida Statutes. Therefore, the first element of a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, has been proved.
The Second Element; Use of Official Position or Property or Resources.
The second element of a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, has also been proved. The evidence proved that the Respondent used property or resources within his trust. The Respondent, as Executive Director of the Authority, authorized funds of the Authority to be spent for food and beverages and for the Respondent's golf outing with Mr. Kinsey.
Proof of the second element cannot be considered alone, however, in determining whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. The Respondent's use of property or resources within his trust must also be shown to meet the last two elements of a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. The weight of the evidence failed to prove these two elements.
The Third and Fourth Elements; Were the Actions Corruptly Done With An Intent to Secure a Special Privilege, Benefit or Exemption?
1. Expenditures at the Tampa Club.
The weight of the evidence in this case failed to prove that the charges made by the Respondent at the Tampa Club were made with an intent to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others. The Respondent did of course benefit from the charges since he did not have to pay for food and beverages which he would have otherwise had to pay for. The evidence failed to prove, however, that this benefit was what motivated the Respondent to incur the charges. The evidence proved that the Respondent incurred the charges at the Tampa Club to carry out the business of the Authority as directed by his employer, the Board.
A public official or public employee should not be allowed to escape responsibility for violating the law solely because he or she was "ordered by superiors" to do something which the official or employee knows or should have known was illegal. The action that the Respondent was told to take by the Board was not, however, such an obviously illegal or improper act. The Board's action in directing the Respondent to join the Tampa Club and use it to entertain on behalf of the Authority may have been a questionable use of public funds. This directive was not, however, obviously illegal. The action was consistent with business operations in the private sector and consistent with how the Authority operated in carrying out its duties.
The fact that the Board may not have closely scrutinized the Authority's budget in the years after the Board directed the Respondent to open an account at the Tampa Club also does not support a finding that the Respondent's intent in continuing to use the Tampa Club was to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others. The fact is that the Board approved the continued use of the Tampa Club and all other expenditures from the public-relations account when it voted to accept the Authority's budget. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the manner in which the public-relations account was included in the budget presented to the Board was
inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles or otherwise indicated that the Respondent was attempting to conceal his continued use of the Tampa Club from the Board.
Finally, the fact, as stipulated to by the parties and supported by the evidence in this proceeding, that all of the charges incurred at the Tampa Club by the Respondent were for business lunches and breakfasts by the Respondent supports the conclusion that the Respondent did not use the Tampa Club with an intent to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others. The Respondent's intent was to carry out the business of the Authority as directed by the Board.
The facts which support a finding that the Respondent's intent in using the Tampa Club was not to secure a privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others also support a conclusion that the weight of the evidence failed to prove the last element, that the Respondent's actions were done "corruptly." The term "corruptly" is defined in Section 112.312(7), Florida Statutes, as follows:
(7) "Corruptly" means done with a wrongful intent and for the purpose of obtaining, or compensating or receiving compensation for, any benefit resulting from some act or omission of a public servant which is inconsistent with the proper performance of his public duties.
Although the use of public funds to pay for lunches and breakfasts may be inconsistent with the proper performance of public duties, the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's actions were taken with a "wrongful intent." As indicated, supra, the Respondent's use of the Tampa Club was at the direction of the Board of the Authority and not for any wrongful purpose.
2. Expenditures for Golf.
The weight of the evidence in this case also proved that the charges made by the Respondent for the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey were not made with an intent to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others. The Respondent did benefit from the payment of for the outing since he did not have to pay for his round of golf. The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, that this benefit was what motivated the Respondent to incur the charges. The Respondent was directed by the Chairman of the Board to take steps to resolve the conflict between the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey, a Board member. Although the Respondent's decision to invite Mr. Kinsey to play golf may have been a questionable use of public funds, his action was intended to resolve a conflict detrimental to the business of the Authority. His action was also consistent with business operations in the private sector.
In light of the Respondent's relationship with Mr. Kinsey and the animosity between them, it is doubtful that the Respondent suggested playing golf with Mr. Kinsey simply because he enjoyed playing golf. The only reasonable conclusion that can be reached, based upon the ill-will between the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey, is that the Respondent believed that their differences could be resolved if they were able to talk, as suggested by the Chairman of the Board, in a more relaxed setting.
Again, the fact that the Board may not have closely scrutinized the Authority's budget and the use of the public-relations account to pay for the golf outing does not support a finding that the Respondent's intent in charging the golf outing to the public-relations account was to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others. The fact is that the Board approved all expenditures from the public-relations account. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the manner in which the public-relations account was included in the budget presented to the Board was inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles or otherwise indicated that the Respondent was attempting to conceal his use of the account to pay for the golf outing from the Board.
The facts which support a finding that the Respondent's intent in charging the golf outing to the public-relations account was not to secure a privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others also support a conclusion that the weight of the evidence failed to prove the last element, that the Respondent's actions were done "corruptly." Although the use of public funds to pay for the golf outing may be inconsistent with the proper performance of public duties, the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's actions were with a "wrongful intent." As indicated, supra, the Respondent's golf outing was only undertaken after he was directed to get Mr. Kinsey into a more relaxed setting and to resolve the conflict between the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey. The Respondent's conclusion that this action was for the benefit of the Authority and, therefore, a legitimate charge to the public-relations account, was reasonable and not with a "wrongful intent." This conclusion is further supported by the fact that golf outings with other Authority Board members were not charged to the Authority by the Respondent.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public
Report finding that the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent, Cliff
Hayden, Jr., violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Complaint No. 89-127.
DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.
LARRY J. SARTIN
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Virlindia Doss
Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1601
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
David M. Carr, Esquire 600 Madison Street
Tampa, Florida 33602
Bonnie J. Williams Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Sep. 20, 1991 | Final Order and Public Report filed. |
| Aug. 16, 1991 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 7/17/91. |
| Aug. 01, 1991 | Letter to LJS from Debra L. Romanello (re: request for a copy of the Recommended Order) filed. |
| Jul. 19, 1991 | Notice of Filing w/Exhibits 1-13 filed. (From Virlindia Doss) |
| Jul. 17, 1991 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Jul. 10, 1991 | Prehearing Stipulation filed. (From Virlindia Doss) |
| Jun. 07, 1991 | Order of Prehearing Instructions sent out. |
| May 24, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (from V. Doss) |
| May 02, 1991 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 7/17/91; 10:00am; Tampa) |
| Apr. 24, 1991 | Letter to LJS from Virlindia Doss (re: Order dated April 3, 1991) filed. |
| Apr. 24, 1991 | Transcript (Evidentiary Hearing) filed. |
| Apr. 03, 1991 | Order of Abeyance sent out. |
| Apr. 02, 1991 | Letter to LJS from V. Doss (Re: Holding Case in Abeyance until April 26, 1991) filed. |
| Mar. 25, 1991 | Agency Referral Letter; Complaint; Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate w/exhibits A-D; Advocate's Recommendation; Order Finding Probable Cause filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Sep. 18, 1991 | Agency Final Order | |
| Aug. 16, 1991 | Recommended Order | Payment of golf fees and membership in Tampa club by executive director of Hillsborough Transit Authority not made corruptly in violation of ethics code. |
