STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

RICHARD SHINDLER AND GLOBAL REAL ) ESTATE AND MANAGEMENT, INC., )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-3865F

)

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL )

REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL )

ESTATE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to Notice, this cause was heard by Linda M. Rigot, the assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on February 6, 1992, in Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Harold M. Braxton, Esquire

One Datran Center, Suite 400 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815

For Respondent: James H. Gillis, Esquire

Division of Real Estate Hurston Building North Tower

400 West Robinson Street, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue presented is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover from Respondent the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Petitioners, pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, filed an Administrative Complaint against Mark H. Adler, Richard Shindler, and Global Real Estate and Management, Inc. Shindler and Global requested a formal hearing on the allegations contained within that Administrative Complaint, this matter was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of that formal proceeding, an evidentiary hearing was conducted, a Recommended Order was entered, and a Final Order was entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission on April 24, 1991. On June 24, 1991, Petitioners filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings their Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act.

At the formal hearing in this cause Respondent presented the testimony of Kenneth G. Rehm and Mark H. Adler. Additionally, Joint Exhibits numbered 1 and 2, Petitioners' Exhibits numbered 1 and 2, and Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1-

3 and 5 were admitted in evidence.

Although both parties requested leave to file proposed final orders, only Petitioners did so. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact can be found in the Appendix to this Final Order.

On April 17, 1992, Petitioners filed their Motion for Final Order requesting that a final order be entered in this cause since Respondent has not filed a proposed final order and the deadline for doing so has passed. No opposition to the granting of that Motion has been filed. Petitioners' Motion for Final Order be and the same is hereby granted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At the time material hereto, Global Real Estate and Management, Inc., was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the state of Florida, Mark H. Adler was a real estate broker licensed in the state of Florida, and Richard Shindler was a real estate salesman licensed in the state of Florida. Adler was the qualifying broker for Global, and Shindler was employed by Global.

   
   

2. On November 17, 1989, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, received a written complaint about Adler, Shindler, and Global from Jay Hirsch, a real estate broker licensed in the state of Florida.

   
   

3. Hirsch's complaint included the following allegations. Shindler had entered into two contracts for the purchase of real estate which required Shindler to place a total of $11,000 in Global's escrow account. Requests for verification of the deposit of such funds had been ignored. Hirsch had told Shindler at the time that the contracts were executed and on numerous occasions thereafter that since Shindler had chosen to participate in the real estate commission to be earned from the transaction, Shindler had assumed a fiduciary relationship with the sellers. Shindler had arbitrarily refused to close pursuant to the contracts and on October 2, 1989, Hirsch met with Shindler, reminded Shindler of Shindler's fiduciary responsibil-ities to the sellers, made demand on Shindler for the escrow deposit on behalf of the sellers, and advised Shindler of the provisions of Florida law relating to the responsibilities of the escrow holder when demands are made for release of escrowed money. Written demand was made on Adler within days of the oral demand. Hirsch subsequently spoke with Adler, the broker of record for Global, regarding the legal requirements in escrow deposit disputes but discovered that Adler "knew nothing" about the transaction. Shindler and Adler continued to ignore the demands made on them for the escrow deposit. Hirsch also alleged that there may be "certain other irregularities" regarding fiduciary responsibilities, entitlement to commissions by Global, and conflicts of interest.

   
   

4. An investigator was assigned to investigate Hirsch's complaint against Adler, Shindler, and Global. According to the investigative report issued on February 12, 1990, that investigation revealed possible serious violations of the laws regulating the conduct of real estate brokers and salespersons. Although the investigative report recited that Global waited two months after the initial deposit demand was made by Hirsch before it filed an interpleader action to resolve conflicting demands on the escrow deposit, the documentation attached to the investigative report clearly indicated that Global waited just a

   few days short of three months before filing the interpleader action. The investigative report further revealed that during the time that at least the

   $11,000 was required to be in Global's escrow account (if Global were not involved in any other real estate transactions at the time), the escrow account had less than an $11,000 balance for both the months of September and October of 1989. The report further indicated that the IRS had attached Global's escrow account for Global's failure to pay payroll taxes.

   
   

5. The investigative report revealed that there had been a problem obtaining broker Adler's presence for the interview with the Department's investigator. When a joint interview with both broker Adler and salesman Shindler did take place, the broker was unable to answer any of the investigator's questions, telling the investigator that he knew little regarding the problems since he relied on salesman Shindler to operate the business on a daily basis. In response to the investigator's continued questioning as to how IRS was able to attach an escrow account, Shindler explained that although the checks were marked escrow account, the bank statements did not reflect an escrow account but rather reflected a "special account." It was further discovered during the investigation that broker Adler had not been a signatory on the escrow account; rather, salesman Shindler had been the only signatory on the escrow account. At the conclusion of that interview, Shindler, who had taken control of the interview, agreed to supply the Department's auditors with all IRS and bank correspondence relative to the escrow account attachment.

   
   

6. During that same joint interview on January 23, 1990, when questioned about the real estate transactions which were the subject of broker Hirsch's complaint, Shindler spoke in terms of having "his" attorney file an interpleader action (although he was the buyer). He also talked about oral extensions to the written contracts. Shindler also explained that his "deposit moneys" were in the escrow account because he was using a part of sale proceeds belonging to his brother as his down payment on purchases made for himself, an explanation which suggested there might be co-mingling of funds. A complete audit of Global's escrow account by the Department's auditors was scheduled for February 7, 1990.

   
   

7. A supplemental investigative report was issued on May 3, 1990. That report contained the following recital. Shindler and Adler had failed to comply with the Department's requests for files and bank statements so that an audit could be conducted on the escrow and operating accounts. On March 22, 1990, a subpoena was served on Global requiring those records to be made available by April 3. As of April 30, complete records were still not submitted in that case files were not available and certain checks and monthly bank statements were missing. Therefore, an appointment was made to conduct the audit in Global's office on May 1 with the requirement that broker Adler be present. On that date, files were still not available and bank records were incomplete, precluding the conduct of a proper audit. Adler told the investigator on that date that Shindler had not even told Adler that a subpoena had been served, which statement reinforced the investigator's belief that salesman Shindler had been operating as a broker and running the business operations of Global, with broker Adler merely lending his license. On that same date Shindler changed his explanation of the escrow account shortages, saying the IRS had not garnished the escrow account; rather, Global's bank had transferred $3,200 from Global's "escrow" account to Global's operating account to cover checks written on Global's operating account when the account did not have sufficient funds. It was also discovered that Adler had not been performing monthly reconciliations of Global's "escrow" account. Adler told the investigator that he would supply files and reconciliations by June 1, 1990.

8. A supplemental investigative report was issued on June 12, 1990, advising that although the subpoena return date had been extended to June 1, 1990, as of June 12 Adler had still failed to respond by producing the required records.

   
   

9. On June 19, 1990, the Probable Cause Panel of the Florida Real Estate Commission considered the investigative reports and determined that there was probable cause to believe that Adler, Shindler, and Global had violated statutes regulating the conduct of real estate brokers and salespersons.

   
   

10. The administrative complaint recommended to be filed by the Probable Cause Panel was issued by the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, on June 21, 1990, against Mark H. Adler, Richard Shindler, and Global Real Estate and Management, Inc. That Administrative Complaint contained factual allegations regarding Shindler's contracts to purchase properties listed by broker Hirsch, regarding the alleged "verbal" extensions of the closing dates in the written contracts, regarding the repeated demands on broker Adler for release of the escrowed money as liquidated damages, and regarding the lengthy delay in responding to those demands. The Administrative Complaint also contained factual allegations regarding Shindler's use of a part of sale proceeds due to his brother as his own down payment on the properties and regarding the escrow account balance which was less than $11,000, the minimum balance required to be maintained in Global's escrow account if there were no other sales pending. Also included were factual allegations regarding the alleged attachment of Global's escrow account by the IRS for failure to pay payroll taxes, regarding the fact that broker Adler was not a signatory on the escrow account, and regarding Adler's reliance on Shindler to operate the real estate brokerage office on a daily basis. The Administrative Complaint also recited the failure of the Respondents to comply with the subpoena served on Global by the Department, which precluded the possibility of conducting a proper audit of Global's account. Factual allegations were included reciting that on May 1, 1990, Shindler had acknowledged that he had been operating as a broker and running the real estate brokerage business of Global with broker Adler "lending his license." In addition, the Administrative Complaint recited Shindler's original explanation that the IRS had attached the escrow account, which explanation was later changed by Shindler to be that Global's bank had taken $3,200 from Global's escrow account to cover checks written against Global's operating account when there were not sufficient funds in that operating account. Lastly, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Adler had not done monthly reconciliation statements of the escrow account from October of 1989 through the date of the Administrative Complaint.

    
    

11. Based upon those factual allegations, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Adler was guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction (Count I), that Shindler was guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction (Count II), that Global was guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction (Count III), that Adler was guilty of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized (Count IV), that Global was guilty of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized (Count V), that Adler was guilty of having failed to produce for inspection records when subpoenaed by the Department (Count VI), that Global was guilty of having failed to produce for inspection records when subpoenaed by the Department (Count VII), that Shindler was guilty of having failed to deposit funds with his employing broker (Count VIII), and that Shindler was guilty of

    having operated as a broker while being licensed as a salesman (Count IX). The Administrative Complaint sought disciplinary action against Adler, Shindler, and Global for those alleged violations.

    
    

12. Adler did not seek a formal hearing regarding the allegations contained within that Administrative Complaint. Rather, he entered into a settlement agreement with the Department, agreeing that all of his real estate licenses, registrations, certificates, and permits would be suspended for a period of eighteen months, that he would resign as an officer and/or director of Global, and that he would testify at any formal hearing held regarding the Administrative Complaint. Adler also agreed that notice would be published that he had been suspended for 18 months for culpable negligence and failure to properly supervise a licensed salesman in his employ. That agreement was approved by the Florida Real Estate Commission in a Final Order filed of record on August 31, 1990.

    
    

13. On the other hand, Shindler and Global did request a formal hearing regarding the allegations contained in that Administrative Complaint. The matter was subsequently transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of that formal hearing and was assigned DOAH Case No. 90

    That formal hearing was conducted on January 9, 1991. Based on the evidence presented during that final hearing, a Recommended Order was entered on March 20, 1991, finding that the Department had failed to prove its allegations as to Shindler and further finding that the Department had failed in its burden of proof as to two of the three counts against Global. The Recommended Order did find that Global failed to maintain trust funds as alleged in Count V of the Administrative Complaint and recommended that Global be ordered to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $500. That Recommended Order was adopted in toto by the Florida Real Estate Commission in its Final Order filed on April 24, 1991.

    
    

14. It is clear that Shindler prevailed in the underlying administrative action and that Global prevailed as to two of the three counts against Global.

    
    

15. The Department was substantially justified in initiating the underlying administrative proceeding against both Shindler and Global. At the time that the underlying action was initiated, it had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

16. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

    
    

17. Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, is the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. Subsection (4)(a) of the Act provides as follows:

(4)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney's fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.

1. To implement that section, the Division of Administrative Hearings has promulgated Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

   
   

   (4) The state agency shall either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs claimed or file a counter affidavit along with its response. The counteraffidavit shall specify each item of cost and fee in dispute.

   (5)(a) A state agency against which a petition for costs and fees has been filed shall file a response within twenty (20) days of filing of the petition, which shall state whether the state agency seeks an evidentiary hearing and shall specify whether the state agency asserts:

   1. That costs and attorney's fees claimed in the affidavit are unreasonable;

   2. That the petitioner is not a prevailing small business party;

   3. That the agency's actions were substantially justified;

   4. That circumstances exist which would make the award unjust; or

   5. That the agency was a nominal party only.

   (b) When a state agency relies upon any of the grounds listed in (a), it shall state the facts supporting its position with particularity.

   
   

2. Pursuant to Section 57.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, Petitioners filed their Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs with the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 24, 1991, within 60 days from the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 90-4522. Contrary to the requirements of Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent filed nothing in response to the Petition. Accordingly, an Order to Show Cause was entered on July 29, 1991, directing the parties' attention to Rule 22I-6.035(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, and affording Respondent 20 days from that date in which to show cause why the allegations contained in the Petition should not be deemed admitted and why the relief sought by Petitioners should not be granted.

   
   

3. On August 7, 1991, Respondent filed its Response to Order to Show Cause and Motion to Dismiss Petition for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Upon consideration of that pleading and of Petitioners' Response to Respondent's Response to Order to Show Cause and Motion to Strike, an Order was entered on September 3, 1991, finding that Respondent's Response to Order to Show Cause raised only three issues to be resolved in this proceeding: (1) whether Petitioners were prevailing parties in the underlying proceeding, (2) whether Respondent's actions in initiating the underlying proceeding were substantially justified because there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time that the underlying proceeding was initiated, and (3) whether Petitioners had entered into an agreement with Respondent to not seek reimbursement for attorney's fees and costs incurred by them in defending the underlying action. That Order further determined that no other issues had been raised by Respondent's Response and that the following criteria were therefore admitted: that each Petitioner is a small business party, that no circumstances exist that would make the award of attorney's fees and costs unjust, that Respondent was not a nominal party

   only in the underlying proceeding, and that the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Petitioners in this matter are reasonable. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs was also denied.

   
   

4. On October 7, 1990, Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike the third issue then remaining in this proceeding because the agreement under which Petitioners had allegedly waived their rights to attorney's fees and costs had been rejected by the Florida Real Estate Commission and, therefore, the defense based upon the stipulation had been rendered moot. No opposition to the granting of that Motion was filed, and the Motion was granted by Order entered October 28, 1991. Accordingly, only two issues remain for determination herein, i.e., (1) whether Petitioners were prevailing parties in the underlying proceeding and (2) whether Respondent's actions in initiating the underlying proceeding were substantially justified because there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time that the underlying proceeding was initiated.

   
   

5. In order to prevail in this action, the initial burden of proof is on each of the Petitioners to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that each was a prevailing party in the disciplinary proceeding. It is clear that Shindler was a prevailing party in that all counts in the Administrative Complaint against him were dismissed. Similarly, Global was a prevailing party since it prevailed on two of the three counts charged in the Administrative Complaint. It is not required of Global to have prevailed on all counts against it. To be viewed as a prevailing party, one must succeed on issues that are significant and achieve some of the benefits sought through litigation. Gentele

   v. Department of Professional Regulation, 513 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Prisament v. Department of Professional Regulation, 13 FALR 1286 (DOAH 1991). The two counts on which Global prevailed in the disciplinary proceeding involved culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction and the failure to produce records when subpoenaed. Accordingly, Petitioners have met their burden of proving that they were prevailing parties.

   
   

6. Respondent did not dispute that Petitioners were small business parties and it was unnecessary for Petitioners to present evidence to prove that fact. However, it is clear that Shindler cannot be concluded to be a small business party as a matter of law. Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes, provides as follows:

   
   

   (d) The term "small business party" means:

   1.a. A sole proprietor of an unincor-porated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time the

   action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of

   not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments; or

   b. A partnership or corporation, including a professional practice, which has its principal office in this state and has at the time the action is initiated by a state agency not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of

   not more than $2 million; . . .

   
   

7. The Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed herein alleges that Shindler is a small business party because "(1) he is the sole shareholder of

   Global Real Estate Management, Inc., and (2) his net worth is less than $2 Million including both personal and business investments." Respondent did not contest those allegations. Even if Shindler is the sole shareholder of Global and his net worth is less than $2 million, he is not a small business party as a matter of law because he is not the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, he is not a partnership, and he is not a corporation. As a matter of law, only those three types of businesses are entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. See, for example, Alfert and Toledo Realty, Inc. v. Division of Real Estate, 10 FALR 5201 (1988). Although there is some indication in this record that Shindler is the owner of Global, a corporation, his claim for attorney's fees and costs can only be derivative, i.e., if Global were awarded attorney's fees, Shindler, as the "owner" of Global, may derive some benefit from the benefit realized by the corporation.

   
   

8. Since Global met its initial burden of proof in establishing that it was a prevailing small business party, the burden shifted to Respondent to demonstrate that it was substantially justified in bringing the underlying action. Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that "A proceeding is 'substantially justified' if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency." Respondent has clearly met its burden.

   
   

9. The investigation which resulted in the underlying proceeding arose from a complaint from a licensed broker. That complaint involved Adler, Shindler, and Global. That complaint contained allegations that persons entitled to that information were unable to obtain verification that money had been placed in escrow, that real estate licensees were permitting oral modifications to written contracts, that requests for release of funds were being ignored, and that a licensed broker had no knowledge of transactions occurring in his office which indicated a lack of control over, and knowledge of, the contents of his escrow account. Petitioners' implication that Respondent would have no interest in Shindler's purchase of property on his own behalf overlooks the fact that in the transaction complained of by broker Hirsch, Shindler was not just the purchaser, he was also participating in the commission to be paid by the seller, as was Global.

   
   

10. The ensuing investigation revealed serious questions about the propriety of the conduct of Adler, Shindler, and Global in the transaction involving Hirsch. The investigation further revealed that Shindler had "his" attorney file an interpleader action almost three months after the initial demand for the release of escrowed money was made. It revealed that Adler was unable to respond to questions regarding the conduct of affairs in Global's office, that Adler was not even a signatory on Global's escrow account, and that there was a shortage in the escrow account and possible co-mingling of funds. Although a salesman would not normally have responsibility for the escrow account, in this situation Shindler did have responsibility for the escrow account since his was the only authorized signature on that account. Further, books and records were not maintained in Global's office and were not available for review by the Department, and a subpoena was ignored. It was clear to the investigator both through statements made to him and the obvious implications of the conduct of Adler and Shindler during the investigator's repeated visits to Global's office that Adler was not running Global's business but, rather, Shindler was doing so. The Florida Real Estate Commission acted properly in determining that there was probable cause to file an administrative complaint against Adler, Shindler, and Global.

11. Accordingly, the underlying administrative proceeding was clearly and substantially justified because it had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact at the time it was initiated by Respondent. Petitioners have presented their claim herein as though the underlying action was initiated only against Shindler and Global. Petitioners' position has no factual or logical basis. When the underlying proceeding was initiated, it involved Adler as well as Shindler and Global, and the underlying proceeding must be viewed in that context. Adler was not the subject of the evidentiary hearing in the underlying proceeding or the Recommended Order and the Final Order entered thereafter because he chose to accept a suspension of his licenses for a period of 18 months rather than contest the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him.

    
    

12. Respondent offered seventeen exhibits during the final hearing in this case. Four of them were admitted, and thirteen were specifically rejected as being irrelevant to any of the issues involved herein. One of those rejected exhibits was Respondent's proposed recommended order filed in the underlying proceeding. That document, filed after the evidentiary hearing in the underlying proceeding, did not exist at the time that the underlying proceeding was initiated, was not considered by the Probable Cause Panel, and can shed no light on whether Petitioners were prevailing parties in the underlying proceeding or whether the underlying proceeding was substantially justified at the time that it was initiated. The remaining exhibits which were specifically rejected all related to administrative proceedings against Shindler and Global subsequent to the underlying proceeding and could, therefore, shed no light on whether Petitioners were prevailing parties in the underlying proceeding or whether the underlying proceeding was substantially justified at the time that it was initiated. Those specifically rejected documents and some of Respondent's evidence in this proceeding are simply attempts on the part of Respondent to re-argue the merits of the underlying proceeding. The outcome of the underlying proceeding was controlled by the evidence presented by the parties during that evidentiary hearing. Respondent's failure in its burden of proof in the underlying proceeding does not relate in any way and, therefore, does not control the determination of the propriety of Respondent's initiating the underlying proceeding based upon the information available to it at the time that the underlying proceeding was initiated.

    
    

13. Petitioners are not entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs in this proceeding. Although Shindler prevailed in the underlying proceeding, he is not a prevailing small business party as a matter of law. Although Global prevailed on two of the three counts filed against it and is, therefore, a prevailing small business party, Global cannot recover its attorney's fees and costs for defending the underlying proceeding. The Department was clearly and substantially justified both in fact and in law in initiating the underlying proceeding against Adler, Shindler, and Global since the Department's investigation indicated that Adler, Shindler, and Global were engaging in serious and flagrant violations of the laws regulating the conduct of licensed real estate brokers and salesmen in the state of Florida.

    
    

    It is, therefore,

    
    

    ORDERED that the Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed by Petitioners Shindler and Global pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act be and the same is hereby dimissed.

    DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of May, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida.

    
    

    
    

    LINDA M. RIGOT

    Hearing Officer

    Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

    1230 Apalachee Parkway

    Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

    (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675

    
    

    Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1992.

    
    

    APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER

    
    

    1. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 1,3, and 7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.

    2. Petitioners' proposed finding of fact numbered 2 has been rejected as not being supported by any competent evidence in this cause.

    3. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 9 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause.

    4. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 4-6 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony.

    5. Petitioners' proposed finding of fact number 10 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Harold H. Braxton, Esquire One Datran Center, Suite 400 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815

James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Suite N308

Hurston Building North Tower

400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772

Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate

400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Jack McRay, General Counsel

Department of Professional Regulation

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68. FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

Docket for Case No: 91-003865F

Orders for Case No: 91-003865F