STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEVOE L. MOORE )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-4108VR

)

CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, )

)

Appellee. )

)

FINAL ORDER

This case came before the undersigned pursuant to Section 120.65(9), Florida Statutes (1989), and City of Tallahassee Ordinance No. 90-0-0043AA, adopted July 16, 1990.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the Appellant, Devoe L. Moore, has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

An Application for Vested Rights Determination dated November 13, 1990, was filed with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department by the Appellant, Devoe L. Moore. The Application for Vested Rights Determination was ultimately reviewed by the Respondent, the City of Tallahassee (hereinafter referred to as the "City"), and was denied. Notice of the denial was provided to Mr. Moore by letter dated March 19, 1991. By letter dated April 4, 1991, the denial was appealed by Mr. Moore. On or about July 3, 1991, the City referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer.

Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, a hearing was held on August 27, 1991, to give the parties an opportunity to supplement the record with additional documentary evidence and testimony. At the commencement of the hearing, which was conducted in accordance with City of Tallahassee Ordinance No. 90-0-0043AA, the transcript of the hearing before the City and exhibits filed with the original request for the assignment of a Hearing Officer were accepted into evidence.

During the hearing, Mr. Moore offered several exhibits. All of those exhibits, except exhibits 25 and 26, were accepted into evidence. A ruling was reserved on the admissibility of exhibits 25 and 26. Exhibits 25 and 26 are hereby rejected.

The parties were informed that they could file a proposed final order before this Final Order was issued. Both parties have filed proposed final orders which contain proposed findings of fact. A ruling on each proposed

finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Final Order or the proposed finding of fact has been accepted or rejected in the Appendix which is attached hereto.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Property at Issue.

   
   

   1. On September 18, 1987, Devoe Moore acquired a tract of approximately 28 acres of real estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), located on Lake Bradford Road just south of Gaines Street, in the City of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

      
      

   2. The Property was the former location of the Elberta Crate and Box Company.

      
      

   3. The Property was at the time of purchase, and still is, zoned M-2, Industrial.

      
      

2. Development of the Property.

   
   

   1. Mr. Moore intended to develop the Property consistent with the Property's M-2, Industrial zoning. Mr. Moore intended to build a service/commercial/mini-storage development similar to another such development of Mr. Moore in the City.

      
      

   2. In December, 1987, Mr. Moore had his engineer prepare grading and drainage plans for the Property.

      
      

   3. On January 29, 1988, Mr. Moore had an application for an amendment to a stormwater permit, Environmental Management Permit 87-1087, filed with the Leon County Department of Public Works. At that time, Leon County issued such permits for property in unincorporated areas and inside the City's limits. The grading and drainage plans for the Property were filed with the application.

      
      

   4. Leon County had not been delegated any responsibility or authority to make land-use decisions for the City.

      
      

   5. The requested amendment to Permit 87-1087 was based on an assumption of Mr. Moore that the Property would consist of 80% coverage with impervious surface. Therefore, the City was aware or should have been aware that Mr. Moore intended to construct a major development on the Property. Such a development was consistent with the zoning on the Property at the time. Neither Leon County nor the City, however, approved or in anyway addressed the issue of whether 80% coverage of the Property with impervious surface was acceptable. Nor did the City or Leon County make any representation to Mr. Moore different from that made by the City's zoning of the Property.

      
      

   6. Mr. Moore filed a site plan showing a development of 80% coverage with the application for amendment to Permit 87-1087. These plans showed a development consisting of thirteen rectangular buildings, driveways and parking area. The indicated development, however, was not reviewed or in anyway approved by Leon County or the City.

      
      

   7. On May 6, 1988, a Stormwater Permit, amending Permit 87-1087, was issued to Mr. Moore. This permit only approved the construction of a holding

      pond and filling on the Property. The issuance of the permit did not constitute approval of any proposed development of the Property.

      
      

   8. In 1988, Mr. Moore began clearing the Property of buildings on the Property which the City had condemned. Mr. Moore also began filling and grading the Property in 1988, and has continued to do so to varying degrees through July 16, 1991.

      
      

   9. From January 1989, through August, 1990, SANDCO placed 1,174 loads of fill on the Property. Jimmy Crowder Construction Company has also performed filling and grading work on the Property since 1988.

      
      

   10. As of the date the City's vesting ordnance was adopted and as of the date of the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings Mr. Moore has not completed filling on the Property. Mr. Moore also has not completed filtration improvements to the storm water hold pond to be constructed on the Property. Additional water treatment facilities on the Property must be constructed to handle runoff from the Property.

       
       

   11. No roadways, water services, sewer services or electric services have been constructed on the Property.

       
       

   12. Site preparation on the Property has not been completed so that construction of vertical improvements can begin.

       
       

   13. At the time that Mr. Moore acquired the Property, only building permits were required for the development of the Property. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore obtained the required building permits. The law was changed, however, to require approval of a site plan. Mr. Moore decided not to submit a site plan at least in part because of the City's work on the sewer main. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that Mr. Moore was prohibited by the City from obtaining site plan approval.

       
       

   14. The City has not approved or reviewed a site plan for the Property.

       
       

   15. At the time Mr. Moore purchased the Property, and continuing to the present, a City sewer main which runs along the southern border of the Property has been a problem. The sewer main is a health hazard because it is located in proximity to the surface of the ground and it has numerous leaks.

       
       

   16. The City indicated that it intended to build a new sewer main across the Property and Mr. Moore agreed to give the City an easement for the sewer main.

       
       

   17. After Mr. Moore purchased the Property and before February, 1989, Mr. Moore made a number of requests to the City that the City identify the easement it desired and prepare the easement grant so that the City could construct the new sewer main and Mr. Moore could proceed with his development.

       
       

   18. Requests were also made by some City employees of the City Attorney that the easement be prepared and executed because of the problem with the existing sewer main.

       
       

   19. In April, 1989, the easement grant was prepared and executed.

       
       

   20. On August 3, 1990, James S. Caldwell, Assistant Director of the City Water and Sewer Department, wrote the following letter to Mr. Moore:

       It has been brought to my attention that your are proceeding with construction of a stormwater holding pond on the referenced site [the Elberta Crate Site]. As discussed with you this date and as you are aware, the City has a sewer line on this property. The sewer line would be damaged by your construction activity.

       The City has designed a relocation and upgrade of the sewer line to be constructed on an easement previously acquired from you. Our schedule for the sewer line construction is completion by January 1, 1991. A review of your stormwater holding pond drawings and the proposed sewer line reveals a potential conflict between the proposed line and the holding pond.

       We shall have City staff stake out and flag the existing sewer line and the proposed sewer line. We are requesting that your construction activity stay away from the existing sewer line. After stakeout of the proposed sewer line, you may check your stormwater pond plans to assure that there is no conflict. [Emphasis added].

       
       

   21. Mr. Moore was also told on other occasions to avoid interfering with the existing sewer line and the construction of the new sewer line.

       
       

   22. Construction of the new sewer main on the Property was not commenced until January, 1991. The construction had not been completed as of March, 1991. Part of the delay in completing the sewer main was caused by contemplated changes in the location of the sewer main and the possible need for a different easement.

       
       

   23. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore was told to cease all activity on the Property.

       
       

3. Costs Incurred by Mr. Moore.

   
   

   1. Mr. Moore paid approximately $1,000,000.00 for the Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this cost was incurred in reliance upon any representation from the City as to the use the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property.

      
      

   2. Mr. Moore spent approximately $247,541.22, for demolition of existing buildings, site clearing and grading, engineering costs, fill, permitting fees and partial construction of the stormwater management system for the Property. Mr. Moore also donated an easement to the City with a value of approximately

      $26,000.00. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit.

      
      

   3. Mr. Moore also incurred approximately $100,000.00 in expenditures similar to those addressed in the previous finding of fact for which Mr. Moore

      was unable to find documentation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit.

      
      

4. Development of the Property Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

   
   

   1. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property appears to meet the concurrency requirements of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

      
      

   2. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property, however, appears to be inconsistent with the 2010 Plan because the Future Land Use Element district in which the Property is located does not permit industrial uses and the intended industrial use of the Property is incompatible with some of the uses to which adjacent property has been put.

      
      

5. Procedure.

1. Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination prior to the filing of the application at issue in this proceeding. That application was denied by the City on October 16, 1991. In the first application Mr. Moore indicated that the Property was to be used for student housing.

   
   

2. On or about November 13, 1991, Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") (Application VR0295T), with the City.

   
   

3. "Devoe L. Moore" was listed as the owner/agent of the Property in the Application.

   
   

4. It is indicated that the project at issue in the Application is "[i]ndustrial development of former Elberta Crate and Box Company site by Devoe

   L. Moore."

   
   

5. "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as (1) Owner/contractor estimate; (2) Environmental Management Permit; (3) Site preparation from December, 1987, to the date the Application was filed; and (4) Construction of the stormwater system in 1990.

   
   

6. In a letter dated February 6, 1991, Mr. Moore was informed that his Application was being denied.

   
   

7. By letter dated February 18, 1991, Mr. Moore requested a hearing before a Staff Committee for review of the denial of his Application.

   
   

8. On March 11, 1991, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. The Staff Committee was comprised of Jim English, City Attorney, Mark Gumula, Director of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department and Buddy Holshouser, Director for the City's Growth Management Department. At the conclusion of this hearing the Staff Committee voted 2 to 1 to deny the Application.

   
   

9. By letter dated March 19, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, informed Mr. Moore that the Application had been denied.

10. By letter dated April 4, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Mr. Moore appealed the decision to deny the Application.

    
    

11. By letter dated July 3, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter.

    
    

12. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on August 27, 1991.

    
    

    F. Other Projects Approved by the City.

    
    

13. Mr. Moore submitted, without objection from the City, other vesting rights applications and final orders concerning such applications which were ultimately approved by the City.

    
    

14. All of those cases are distinguishable from this matter. See the City's proposed finding of fact 30.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

    1. Jurisdiction.

       
       

15. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.65(9), Florida Statutes (1989), and City Ordinance No. 90-O-0043AA (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance").

    
    

    1. The Ordinance.

       
       

16. Pursuant to Section 163.3167, Florida Statutes, the City was required to prepare a comprehensive plan governing the use and development of land located within the City. In compliance with Section 163.3167, Florida Statutes, the City adopted a comprehensive plan (hereinafter referred to as the "2010 Comprehensive Plan), which was submitted to the Department of Community Affairs for review on February 1, 1990.

    
    

17. The City adopted the Ordinance to insure that existing rights to develop property of City property owners created by the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States, are not infringed upon by application of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The purpose of the Ordinance is to establish the:

    
    

    sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

    
    

    Section III of the Ordinance.

    
    

18. Pursuant to the Ordinance, any City property owner who believed that his or her property rights to develop property were vested and, therefore, believed that the property may be developed without complying with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was required to have filed an application provided by the City within 120 days after July 16, 1990. If an application was filed pursuant to the Ordinance and it was determined that development rights had vested, the consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan do not apply to the property.

19. Applications to determine if development rights have vested are initially reviewed for technical correctness by the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department's (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Department"), staff. Section III.3.a. of the Ordinance. Once the Application is accepted, the staff of the Planning Department makes the initial determination whether development rights in the property are vested. Id. If staff cannot determine whether an applicant's development rights in the property are clearly and unequivocally vested, a hearing before a Staff Committee consisting of the City Attorney, the Director of Planning and the Director of Growth Management is to be conducted within fifteen days after the Planning Department staff's decision. Section III.3.c. of the Ordinance. A hearing before the Staff Committee may also be requested by an applicant if staff determines that the applicant's property is not vested. Id.

    
    

20. An applicant is required to present all evidence in support of his or her application at the hearing before the Staff Committee. Section III.3.d. of the Ordinance. At the conclusion of the hearing the Staff Committee must "adopt a decision of approval, denial, approval with conditions, or to continue the proceedings to a date certain." Id. Written notice of the Staff Committee's decision is to be provided within ten calendar days after the hearing. Id.

    
    

21. If a hearing before the Staff Committee is waived or if the decision of the Staff Committee is adverse to the applicant, Section III.3.e. of the Ordinance provides for an appeal to a Hearing Officer. The nature of such an appeal is set out in Section III.3.e.2 of the Ordinance:

    
    

    This "appeal" is not intended to mean an appeal in the traditional sense, that is, only a review of the Staff Committee record of their hearing. The Hearing Officer "appeal" shall be construed in its broadest, nontechnical sense, which is merely an application to a higher authority for a review of the Staff Committee action taken.

    
    

    In reviewing the action taken by the Staff Committee, Section III.3.e.3 of the Ordinance provides the following:

    
    

    If the Staff Committee record of their hearing is full and complete, the Hearing Officer may determine that the record is the only evidence that is necessary. However, the Hearing Officer may determine that additional evidence and oral or written testimony, including cross-examination, is necessary to properly evaluate the Staff Committee's action and render a decision as to its validity. The Hearing Officer shall have the authority to determine the need for additional evidence and/or testimony.

    
    

22. Section III.3.e.5 and 6 of the Ordinance governs the manner in which an appeal is filed and the manner in which any hearing conducted by a Hearing Officer is to be conducted.

    
    

23. Section III.3.e.7 of the Ordinance governs a Hearing Officer's decision:

    1. The Hearing Officer shall review the record and testimony presented at the hearing before the Staff Committee, if any, and at the Hearing Officer's hearing. . . .

    2. The Hearing Officer shall be guided by the previously adopted Comprehensive Plan, the adopted 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Land Development Regulations, this ordinance, and established case law.

    3. The burden shall be upon the appellant to show that the decision of the staff or Staff Committee cannot be sustained by a preponderance of evidence or the staff or Staff Committee decision departs from the essential requirements of law.

    4. The Hearing Officer's determination shall include appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decisions in the matter of the appeal. The Hearing Officer

       may affirm, affirm with conditions, or reverse the decision of the staff or Staff Committee.

    5. The Hearing Officer shall file his written determination on each appeal with the Director within thirty (30) calendar days of the date of the appeal hearing and a copy shall be provided to the City Clerk and the applicant.

       . . . .

       
       

24. Section IV of the Ordinance governs the determination of whether an applicant's development rights in property have vested. Section IV.A of the Ordinance provides two situations where develop rights will be considered vested: "common law vesting" and "statutory vesting."

    
    

25. In this matter Mr. Moore has argued that the development of the Property in this case meets the definition of "common law vesting" and the definition of "statutory vesting".

    
    

26. "Statutory vesting" is defined as follows:

    
    

    1. The right to develope or to continue the development of property shall be found to exist if: A valid and unexpired final development order was issued by the County prior to January 1, 1990, substantial development has occurred on a significant portion of the development authorized in a single final development order, and is completed or development is continuing in good faith as of July 16, 1990.

    2. Each statutory vesting determination also requires that all material requirements, conditions, limitations, and regulations of the development order have been met.

       . . . .

       Section IV.A of the Ordinance. Section II.5 of the Ordinance defines a "final development order" to include the following:

       
       

       1. Any other development permit which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued.

    
    

27. Mr. Moore has also argued that development rights in the Property have vested pursuant to the common law vesting definition of the Ordinance. "Common law vesting" is defined as follows:

    
    

    A right to develop or to continue the development of property notwithstanding the 2010 Comprehensive Plan may be found to exist whenever the applicant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the owner, acting in good faith upon some act or omission of the city, has made a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right to develop or to continue the development of the property.

    
    

    Section IV.1.a of the Ordinance.

    
    

    1. Mr. Moore's Application; Statutory Vesting.

       
       

28. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that a "final development order" has been issued by the City on the Property. The stormwater permit issued to Mr. Moore, when the above definition is considered in light of the laws governing the development of property existing at a the time the Ordinance was adopted, is not a "final development order." Therefore, it is concluded that the evidence failed to prove that statutory vesting is applicable to this matter.

    
    

29. Mr. Moore has argued that he would have obtained a final development order if it had not been for the actions of the City. This argument confuses the two separate grounds for vesting under the Ordinance. Mr. Moore's argument attempts to apply common law vesting to show why statutory vesting should be applied. This argument is rejected for two reasons. First, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore was prevented from obtaining a final development order from the City. The evidence only proved that Mr. Moore made a business decision to wait until the City sewer main problem was addressed before seeking approval of a site plan.

    
    

30. Additionally, even if the City had prevented him from obtaining a final development order, the Ordinance does not support a legal conclusion that statutory vesting applies.

    
    

31. Based upon the foregoing and a review of the record and testimony presented at the hearing before the Staff Committee it is concluded that Mr. Moore has failed to prove that the Staff Committee's conclusion that he did not prove that the elements of statutory vesting apply to the Property cannot be

    sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The weight of the evidence supports the Staff Committee's decision that statutory vesting has not been proved.

    
    

    1. Mr. Moore's Application; Common Law Vesting.

       
       

32. Common law vesting under the Ordinance contains the same elements of proof as the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been described as follows:

    
    

    The doctrine of equitable estoppel will limit a local government in the exercise of its zoning power when a property owner (1) relying in good faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurred such excessive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights he has acquired.

    
    

    Smith v. Clearwater, 383 So.2d 681, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). See also, Key West

    v. R.L.J.S. Corporation, 537 So.2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); and Harbor Course Club, Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs, 510 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Case law applying common law vesting may be relied upon for guidance in determining whether the development of the Property in this case is subject to common law vesting under the Ordinance. See Section III of the Ordinance.

    
    

33. Mr. Moore has failed to prove that common law vesting, as defined in the Ordinance, exist in this case:

1. Good Faith Reliance.

   
   

   65. Without suggesting that Mr. Moore acted in bad faith, it is concluded that Mr. Moore failed to prove that he acted in good faith reliance upon any act or omission of the City concerning how the Property could be developed.

   
   

2. Acts or Omissions of the City Relied Upon.

   
   

   1. Mr. Moore has suggested that he relied on an omission of the City in this case: the omission of the City to construct the City's new sewer main so that Mr. Moore could proceed with his development of the Property. Because of this delay, Mr. Moore suggests that he did everything that he could do to move the development of the Property along.

      
      

   2. Mr. Moore's characterization of the City's actions is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Moore has suggested that the City prevented him from moving forward with the development of the Property. The evidence, however, only proved that the City requested that Mr. Moore not interfere with the construction of the sewer main on the southern boundary of the Property.

      The evidence did not prove that Mr. Moore was prevented by the City's actions from proceeding with all development of the Property.

      
      

   3. More importantly, Mr. Moore failed to prove that he ever proposed a particular development of the Property to the City which the City represented to Mr. Moore it approved or that Mr. Moore was prevented from seeking approval of such a development. If Mr. Moore had obtained such approval, it is possible that the City could now be estopped from changing its approval. It is also

      possible that Mr. Moore would be entitled to vesting under statutory vesting because such approval may have constituted a final development order and Mr. Moore may have been prevented from developing the Property because of the actions of the City. But that is not what occurred in this case.

      
      

   4. Any possible role the City may have played in the delays Mr. Moore may have experienced in finalizing his development of the Property is not sufficient to require a conclusion that common law vesting applies in this case.

      
      

   5. Although not argued by Mr. Moore, the evidence proved that the only significant actions on the Property taken by the City were the zoning of the Property and the issuance of a storm water permit. These actions do not, however, support a conclusion that common law vesting applies in this case.

      
      

   6. Reliance upon zoning alone is insufficient as a matter of law to conclude that common law vesting applies. Section IV.1.c. of the Ordinance provides that "[a] zoning classification or a rezoning does not guarantee or vest any specific development rights." This provision is consistent with case law. See Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Inc., 77 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1955); Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 509 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 427 So.2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); and Gainesville v. Cone, 365 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

      
      

   7. In issuing the stormwater permit, the City (through the County) made no more of a representation concerning the development of the Property than it had made when it zoned the Property. The City did not, through the issuance of the permit, indicate to Mr. Moore that any particular development of the Property had been approved by the City. There was, therefore, no representation made by the City when it issued the stormwater permit upon which Mr. Moore can now be said to have relied.

      
      

   8. Mr. Moore has cited a number of cases in support of his position. Those cases are all distinguishable from this case.

3. Mr. Moore's Expenditures and Changes in Position.

1. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the expenses which were incurred by Mr. Moore were incurred in reliance upon any act or omission of the City other than the zoning of the Property and the issuance of the stormwater permit.

   
   

2. Based upon the foregoing and a review of the record and testimony presented at the hearing before the Staff Committee it is concluded that Mr. Moore has failed to prove that the Staff Committee's conclusion that he did not prove that the elements of common law vesting apply to the Property cannot be sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The weight of the evidence supports the Staff Committee's decision that common law vesting has not been proved.

   
   

   1. Constitutional Arguments.

   
   

3. Mr. Moore has raised a number of constitutional arguments in this proceeding. Based upon the provisions of the Ordinance concerning the role of the Hearing Officer in these proceedings, those issues are not properly before the undersigned.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the denial of Devoe L. Moore's Application by the Staff

Committee is AFFIRMED.

DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.

LARRY J. SARTIN

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 1991.

APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER

The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Final Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted.

Mr. Moore's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Final Order

of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection

1. 1 and hereby accepted.

2. 1 and 3.

3 11 and 18.

4 5-6 and 8.

5 9.

6 4.

1. See 10.

2. See 11.

9 18.

10 See 23 and 24. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the City issue any "orders" or took any action to prevent Mr. Moore from proceeding with all development of the Property.

11 20.

12 21-22.

13 25.

14 25. See 23-24.

1. See 16.

2. Hereby accepted.

3. Too speculative.

18 28.

19 29.

David LaCroix, Esquire

300 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301

John H. Sytsma, Esquire

117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Robert B. Inzer

City Treasurer-Clerk

300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, FL 32301

Mark Gumula

Director of Planning Tallahassee - Leon County

Planning Department

300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, FL 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. SOME AGENCIES ALLOW A LARGER PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNING AGENCY RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILING EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.

Docket for Case No: 91-004108VR

Orders for Case No: 91-004108VR