STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-6300

) GUS MACHADO BUICK-GMC TRUCK, INC.,)

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter was heard by William R. Dorsey,Jr., the Hearing Officer designated by the Division of Administrative Hearings, on November 7, 1991, in Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Craig Edward Stein, Esquire

Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash Block & England

100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131

and

James D. Adams, Esquire 7300 West Camino Real

Boca Raton, Florida 33433-9984

For Respondent: Edward W. Risko, Esquire

Office the of the General Counsel General Motors Corporation

3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48202

and

Dean Bunch, Esquire

Cabaniss, Burke & Wagner, P.A. 851 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issue is whether the Verified Complaint filed by General Motors for review of its decision to deny a transfer of Buick and GMC Truck franchises from Gus Machado to Alan Potamkin should be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

This proceeding was initiated by a Verified Complaint filed by General Motors Corporation, seeking review of its decision to deny an application made by Mr. Gus Machado (Machado), for Machado to transfer his interest in Dealer

Sales and Service Agreements for the sale and service of new Buick and GMC Trucks to Mr. Alan Potamkin. According to the complaint, the proceeding was filed by General Motors "as a precaution only." Before General Motors received Machado's application to transfer the Dealer Sales and Service Agreements to Potamkin, General Motors had notified Machado of its intent to cancel his dealer agreements for abandonment under Section 320.641(4), Florida Statutes (1989).

Machado had challenged the attempted cancellations in a separate proceeding [Gus Machado Buick-GMC Truck, Inc. vs. Buick Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Case No. 91-1997 (Machado I)]. Mr. Machado and Mr. Potamkin entered into their agreement for the transfer of the General Motors' franchises to Potamkin after that abandoment proceeding began.

Machado I was based on the closure of the Machado Buick-GMC dealership on February 1, 1991. General Motors informed Machado on March 5, 1991, that it was exercising its rights to cancel the agreements for abandonment, because the Buick-GMC Truck dealership had been closed for more than 10 business days. The agreement Machado reached with Potamkin for the sale of his franchises was signed on July 25, 1991.

This case and Machado I, the abandonment case, are interrelated. If the Buick-GMC Truck franchise is terminated for abandonment, Mr. Machado has nothing to transfer to Mr. Potamkin. Because of this, Machado moved, on at least three occasions, to abate the abandonment action. All of those motions were denied.

The most complete statement of the reasons for going forward with the abandonment proceeding is found in the Order Denying Renewed Motion of Gus Machado Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., to Stay Proceeding, entered in Machado I, Case No. 91-1997 on December 10, 1991. The parties' cross motions to dismiss this proceeding were argued in Miami on November 7, 1991, in conjunction with the final day of testimony in Machado I.

A Recommended Order was entered in Machado I on April 9, 1991, recommending that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles find that Machado had ceased operations on February 1, 1991, and that the Buick and GMC Truck Divisions of General Motors were entitled to cancel the Dealer Sales and Service Agreements for abandonment. There is no reason for this action (Machado II) to go forward, for if a final order is entered by the Department accepting the recommendation of the Hearing Officer, nothing remains for Mr. Machado to transfer to Mr. Potamkin.

General Motors actually moved to dismiss this action at the same time its Verified Complaint was filed. This is a most unusual step, but General Motors did so because Section 320.643(1), Florida Statutes (1989), prohibits a manufacturer from unreasonably withholding consent to a proposed transfer of a franchise agreement, and also imposes on the manufacturer an obligation to file a Verified Complaint seeking review of the denial within 60 days of receipt of a transfer application if it disapproves a transfer. Otherwise, the transfer is approved as a matter of law. General Motors had to file a complaint to preserve its objection to the transfer, so its application to dismiss this proceeding is understandable.

Mr. Machado also moved to dismiss the Verified Complaint. In Mr.

Machado's view, the reasons General Motors gave in the Verified Complaint to deny the proposed transfer to Mr. Potamkin do not fall within the grounds which Section 320.643 makes available to a manufacturer to disapprove a transfer.

Those grounds are limited to lack of good moral character on the part of the transferee, or the failure of the proposed transferee to meet written reasonable and uniformly applied standards or qualifications relating to business

experience. The reasons for rejection General Motors gave in its Verified Complaint were that the sales agreement between Machado and Potamkin contemplates the discontinuance of Buick and GMC Truck operations at the present location of the Machado dealership, and the reestablishment of operations somewhere else (Verified Complaint, paragraph 6), and that Mr. Potamkin did not agree in writing to comply with all the requirements of the dealer agreements then in effect between General Motors and Machado (Verified Complaint paragraph 10). According to General Motors, this was impossible because the documents for the sale of the franchise specifically provided that Mr. Machado was not selling the land on which Machado's dealership was located nor the facilities (showroom, parts department and service department) so that Mr. Potamkin could not truthfully make a statement that he would comply with all terms of Machado's dealer agreements, which specify Machado's location.

On balance, the arguments of General Motors are persuasive. The critical evidence is found in Machado's Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit in Support Thereof, filed in this proceeding (Machado II) on December 13, 1991. It contains an affidavit from Mr. Potamkin, and several exhibits are annexed to that affidavit. One of the exhibits is a letter dated November 11, 1991, in which Mr. Potamkin informs General Motors that he agrees to comply with all the requirements of the Machado franchise now in effect, but this statement is hedged with the additional statement that "although I feel that the current pending proposal satisfies the franchise 'requirements' with respect to facilities, I am investigating other alternatives and will be in contact with you in that regard as soon as practical." The "current pending proposal" involves such things as moving the Buick and GMC Truck franchises to a different location three blocks from the existing Machado facility where Potamkin already owns a Dodge and Volkswagon dealership, which Mr. Potamkin proposed to modify.

Mr. Potamkin's letter of August 2, 1991 (attached to his affidavit as exhibit 3), shows other possible permutations for relocation of the Buick and GMC Truck franchises. At bottom, however, Mr. Potamkin simply cannot substitute himself for Mr. Machado on Machado's Dealer Sales and Service Agreements because under his contract with Mr. Machado, he will not become the owner of the existing premises of Gus Machado Buick-GMC, Inc. This is a critical fact, for under the statute which gives the manufacture the duty to review proposed franchise transfers, Section 320.643(1), Florida Statutes (1989), "no such transfer, assignment, or sale will be valid unless the transferee agrees in writing to comply with all requirements of the franchise then in effect."Mr. Potamkin's equivocation about compliance with the franchise agreements, which necessarily flows from the structure of his contract with Mr. Machado, under which he will not become owner of the Machado dealership property and facilities, excludes this proposed transfer from the reach of the statute.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles dismissing the Verified Complaint filed by General Motors for review of its decision to disapprove the proposed transfer of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreements from Gus Machado Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., to Alan Potamkin. The proposed transfer does not include the sale of the Machado land and facilities, and consequently the proposed transfer cannot meet the requirements of Section 320.643(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Moreover the Recommended Order in Case 91-1997 (Machado I) if accepted by the Department, will mean that Mr. Machado has no franchise for Buick or GMC Truck to transfer to Mr. Potamkin.

DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of April 1992.

WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR.

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April 1992.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Craig Edward Stein, Esquire Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash

Block & England

100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131

James D. Adams, Esquire 7300 West Camino Real

Boca Raton, Florida 33433-9984

Edward W. Risko, Esquire

Office the of the General Counsel General Motors Corporation

3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48202

Dean Bunch, Esquire

Cabaniss, Burke & Wagner, P.A. 851 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles

Room B439, Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500

Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

vs. DOAH CASE NO. 91-6300

GUS MACHADO BUICK-GMC TRUCK, INC.,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order of Dismissal by William R. Dorsey, Jr., a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order of Dismissal as its Final Order in this matter, 1/ except for the following:

The following sentence on page 2 is not adopted: There is no reason for this action (Machado

II) to go forward, for if a final order is entered by the Department accepting the recommendation of the Hearing Officer, nothing remains for Mr. Machado to transfer to Mr. Potamkin.

The following sentence from the Recommendation on pages 5 and 6 is not adopted:

Moreover the Recommended order in Case 91-1997 (Machado I) if accepted by the

Department, will mean that Mr. Machado has no franchise for Buick or GMC Truck to transfer to Mr. Potamkin.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the proposed transfer of its franchise by Respondent Gus Machado Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., is invalid and this matter is hereby DISMISSED;

DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

CHARLES J. BRANTLEY, Director

Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this 8th day of July, 1992.

ENDNOTE

1/ Respondent, Gus Machado Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. These exceptions are ruled on in the Appendix to this Order.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHT

Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Copies furnished:

Craig Edward Stein, Esquire

100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131

James D. Adams, Esquire 7300 West Camino Real

Boca Raton, Florida 33433-9984

Edward W. Risko, Esquire Office of the General Counsel General Motors Corporation 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48202

Dean Bunch, Esquire 851 East Park Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Michael J. Alderman Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504

William Dorsey Jr., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Freddie Duggar

Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385

Gainesville, Florida 32602

APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER

RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER

The department rules as follows on the Respondent's exceptions (numbers refer to the "Specific Exceptions" contained in part II of Respondent's Exceptions):

1. Denied. The Hearing Officer was correct in ruling that the proposed transfer was invalid under 320.643(1), Florida Statutes, because the transferee did not agree in writing to comply with all the requirements of the franchise then in effect. This distinguishes this case from Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc.,

   v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 561 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) review denied 574 So.2d 142, and Bayview Buick GMC Truck, Inc., v. General Motors Corp., 597 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

2. Granted.

3. Denied. The Hearing Officer correctly ruled that the transferee did not agree in writing to comply with all the requirements of the franchise then in effect.

================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION

=================================================================

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

GUS MACHADO BUICK-GMC NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO TRUCK, INC., FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

Appellant,

vs. CASE NO. 92-2644/92-2645

DOAH CASE NO. 91-1997

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Appellee.

and (note: unconsolidated DOAH Cases,

2 Recommended Orders issued.)

GUS MACHADO BUICK-GMC TRUCK, INC.,

Appellant,

DOAH CASE NO. 91-6300

vs.

BUICK MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Appellee.

/ Opinion filed August 30, 1993.

An Appeal from an order of the Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles.

James D. Adams of the Law Office of James D. Adams, Boca Raton, for Appellants.

Edward Risko, Office of General Counsel, General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Michigan; Dean Bunch of Cabaniss, Burke & Wagner, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

ERVIN, J.

We have consolidated these two cases for the purpose of this opinion, because the outcome of the latter case, No. 92-2645, is dependent upon our resolution of the former, No. 92-2644. In Case No. 92-2644, appellant, Gus Machado Buick-GMC Truck, Inc. (Machado), seeks review of a nonfinal order entered by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) granting a motion to dismiss filed by appellee, General Motors Corporation (GM), wherein GM sought to dismiss its own complaint regarding a proposed transfer of Machado's franchise. In Case No. 92-2645, Machado seeks review of a final order entered by the Department determining that Machado had abandoned its franchise and was no longer a franchised Buick and GMC truck dealer. Because we conclude that the Department correctly determined that the proposed transfer of the franchise by Machado to another dealer, Potamkin, was invalid under Section 320.643(1), Florida Statutes (1989), we affirm as to both orders.

The facts in these cases are essentially undisputed. Machado closed its dealerships on February 1, 1991. Thereafter, on March 5, 1991, GM notified Machado, pursuant to Sections 320.641(4) and (5), Florida Statutes (1989), that it was exercising its right to cancel its dealership agreements with Machado on the ground of abandonment, because the dealerships had been closed for more than ten business days. On March 22, 1991, Machado filed a petition pursuant to section 320.641(S) for determination of whether an abandonment had, in fact,

occurred (the termination case, which is now the subject of the appeal in Case No. 92-2645).

While the termination proceeding was pending, but before the final hearing, Machado and Potamkin entered into an agreement to transfer the franchise, and Machado notified GM. Thereafter, GM filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.643(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as a precautionary response to the proposed transfer (the transfer case, which is the subject of the appeal in Case No. 92-2644). GM complained therein that Machado's intended transfer contemplated discontinuance of the Buick/GMC truck operations at the present approved location and reestablishment of the operations at one or more alternative locations in conflict with the provisions of its existing dealership agreements with GM. GM argued that as a result of the planned relocation, Potamkin could not agree "in writing to comply with all requirements of the franchise then in effect," as is required by section 320.643(1), and that the envisaged transfer was therefore invalid under the statute.

Machado filed a motion to dismiss GM's complaint in the transfer case, arguing that GM's complaint was not authorized under section 320.643(1). 1/ GM then filed a motion to dismiss its own complaint, wherein it asserted that the transfer proposal was void under section 320.643(1), because Potamkin, by virtue of the proposed relocation, could not agree to comply with all the requirements of the existing franchise agreement. The Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) hearing officer assigned to the case agreed with GM and entered a recommended order of dismissal, which the Department adopted in its final order of dismissal, the subject of the appeal in Case No. 92-2644.

The crux of the appeals in each case concerns the Department's interpretation of section 320.643(1), as applied to GM's complaint in the transfer case. Thus, in reviewing the final order, we recognize that administrative agencies are afforded wide discretion in interpreting statutes they administer. The agency's statutory construction is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Braman Cadillac, Inc. v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 584 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Our task, then, is to determine whether the Department, as the agency regulating the applications, transfers, and revocations of motor vehicle franchise agreements, correctly interpreted the provisions of section 320.643(1). Cf. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc.,

407 So.2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Department of Business Reg., 397 So.2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Section 320.643(1) prohibits a dealer from transferring its franchise agreement to another person unless the dealer first gives notice to the manufacturer of the decision to make the transfer. The manufacturer then has 60 days to inform the dealer either of its approval or the unacceptability of the transfer. If the manufacturer does not so inform the dealer within the 60- day period, approval of the transfer is deemed granted, that is, the transfer occurs by operation of law. The statute continues that the manufacturer cannot unreasonably withhold acceptance of the proposed transferee, and that refusal to accept a proposed transferee who is of good moral character and who meets the standard qualifications for business experience is presumed to be unreasonable. The statute states, however, that "[n]o such transfer, assignment, or sale will be valid unless the transferee agrees in writing to comply with all requirements of the franchise then in effect."

Appellant argues that because GM's complaint did not challenge Potamkin's moral character or business experience, but rather challenged the proposed

relocation of the dealership, the complaint does not fall within the purview of section 320.643(1), and, as a consequence, GM failed to file a valid complaint within the 60-day period, thereby allowing the transfer to occur by operation of law. In support of its argument, Machado relies on Mercedes-Benz of North America v. Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc., 561 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 574 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1990), and Bayview Buick-GMC Truck, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 597 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 2/ We find the facts in both cases distinguishable from those at bar.

In Mike Smith Pontiac, GM filed a complaint to a proposed transfer, and the Department granted the dealer's motion to dismiss GM's complaint, because the complaint failed to meet the requirements of section 320.643(1), i.e., it did not challenge the proposed transferee's moral character or business experience. This court affirmed, concluding that GM did not state a valid basis for a transfer complaint, and that the Department correctly dismissed the complaint, thereby causing a transfer to occur by operation of law.

In Bayview Buick-GMC Truck, after GM received notice of a proposed transfer, GM asserted its contractual right of first refusal and opted to purchase the dealership, instead of filing a complaint protesting the qualifications of the proposed transferee, pursuant to section 320.643(1). The trial court upheld GM's contractual right of first refusal, notwithstanding GM's noncompliance with the provisions of section 320.643(1). This court reversed, stating that once GM received notice of the transfer, it was required to comply with section 320.643(1) and file a complaint. As GM did not file the complaint, the transfer occurred by operation of law.

As indicated, neither case involved a transfer coupled with a relocation; therefore, both cases are factually distinguishable and do not control.

Instead, we agree with the Department's implicit construction of section 320.643(1), recognizing that a "transfer" of a motor vehicle dealership does not include a relocation. "Transfer" is defined as "chang[ing] over the possession or control of (as, to transfer a title to land)." Black's Law Dictionary 1497 (6th ed. 1990). Location is certainly an important consideration in any type of franchise agreement, and it is undisputed that the franchise agreement at bar contemplates a specific address. Thus, it was reasonable for the Department to interpret the transfer of a franchise under section 320.643(1) as encompassing only use of the same location and not a relocation.

In so concluding, we note that sections 320.60-.70 recognize the importance of location and the effect of a relocation. For instance, when applying for a license, which must be annually renewed, the manufacturer is required to notify the Department of all its authorized dealers and their addresses. 320.63(3), Fla. Stat. (1989). Section 320.642(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that once a manufacturer proposes to establish an additional motor vehicle dealership or permit the relocation of an existing dealership, notice must be published in Florida Administrative Weekly, so as to allow similar dealers in the area the opportunity to respond. When a manufacturer contends that existing dealers are not adequately supplying a particular territory, the Department may consider whether the manufacturer has attempted to coerce an existing dealer to relocate. 320.642(2)(b)(5), Fla. Stat. (1989). Finally, no existing dealer has grounds to protest when a dealership is reopened or a successor dealership is opened within twelve months, if it is within two miles of the former location, because it would not be considered an additional dealership. 320.642(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989).

To conclude, as it is undisputed that the proposed transfer contemplated a relocation of a dealership, the Department could reasonably interpret the intended transfer as failing to comply with the "franchise then in effect," as required by section 320.643(1), which thus rendered the proposed transfer invalid. It therefore follows that the provisions of section 320.643(1) are inapplicable to the proposed transfer, and the dismissal of GM's complaint, or its failure to protest Potamkin's qualifications in accordance with the statute, does not result in the transfer of the franchise by operation of law. We therefore affirm the order of dismissal in Case No. 92-2644.

Turning to the termination case, No. 92-2645, Machado contends that the agency erred by denying its motions for stays and abatement, 3/ and by entering the termination order, while the proposed transfer to Potamkin was pending. 4/ Although it is clear that, a pending transfer acts to continue the franchise agreement in a termination proceeding commenced under section 320.641(3), see Mike Smith Pontiac, it is unnecessary to determine whether the proposed transfer in the instant case would have the same effect in GM's abandonment/termination proceeding commenced under sections 320.641(4) and (5), because the proposed transfer to Potamkin was invalid. Consequently, it could not form a basis to stay the termination proceeding. We therefore affirm as well the order in Case No. 92-2645.

AFFIRMED. MINER, J., and SHIVERS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCUR.

ENDNOTES

1/ Namely, because GM had not alleged in its complaint that the proposed transferee lacked good moral character and/or sufficient business experience, as required by section 320.643(1).

2/ Appellant also relies on an order denying a motion to dismiss entered in Volkswagen of North America, Inc. v. Brumos Jacksonville, Inc., DOAH Case No. 90-5509 (DOAH Oct. 22, 1990). Even if this court were bound by agency orders, this order is so lacking in detail that it cannot be considered.

3/ Machado first moved to abate this action on July 26, 1991, which denied by order dated August 1, 1991. Machado then filed a motion to stay and supporting memorandum, but that motion was denied by order dated December 10, 1991. In so doing, the hearing officer found that the proposed transfer to Potamkin was not valid under section 320.643(1), because Potamkin could not agree to comply with all the requirements of the existing franchise in that he did not represent he was purchasing the land and facility from Machado, but rather intended to relocate the franchise contrary to the terms of the agreement. As there was no valid transfer, the stay provisions of section 320.641(7) do not apply. Machado filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Machado also moved to stay entry of the final order, which was denied by the Department's order dated July 8, 1992, wherein the Department adopted the hearing officer's order of December 10, 1991.

4/ Machado does not contend that the finding of abandonment is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

MANDATE

from

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable, Charles J. Brantley, Director

Division of Motor Vehicles

WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION Case No. 92-2644

vs.

GUS MACHADO BUICK-GMC TRUCK, INC. Your Case No. 91-6300

The attached opinion was rendered on August 30, 1993

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings he had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable E. Earle Zehmer

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 15th day of September, 1993

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida First District

Docket for Case No: 91-006300

Orders for Case No: 91-006300