STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ) REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ) ESTATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 92-3746

)

GARY W. PALMER, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

On February 17, 1993, a formal administrative hearing was held in this case in Tampa, Florida, before J. Lawrence Johnston, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire

Senior Attorney

Department of Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802

For Respondent: Gary W. Palmer, pro se

5225-A Ehrlich Road Tampa, Florida 33624

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues in this case are framed by the six-count Administrative Complaint, DPR Case No. 9180247, which the Petitioner, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, filed against the Respondent, Gary W. Palmer. The first four counts allege the improper handling of an "escrow dispute" in violation of the following sections of the Florida Statutes (1991) and rules of the Florida Administrative Code: Count I, Section 475.25(1)(b); Count II, Section 475.25(1)(d)1.; Count III, Section 475.25(1)(k); and Count IV, Rule 21V-10.032. Counts V and VI allege violations of Section 475.25(1)(b) and Rule 21V-14.012(2) and (3), regarding the general manner in which the Respondent handled all escrow monies.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on January 27, 1992.

After it was served on the Respondent, he requested formal administrative proceedings on or about April 21, 1992. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about June 25, 1992, and initially was set for final hearing on October 2, 1992.

During a telephone hearing on September 29, 1992, on the Department's motion to depose a witness (Louis Bagnell) by telephone, the Respondent requested a continuance to afford the parties the opportunity to settle the case through mediation proceedings scheduled in a related civil action and, if necessary, to depose the witness in the course of those mediation proceedings.

The request was granted.

Mediation failed to settle this proceeding, and the case was rescheduled for hearing in Tampa on January 27, 1993. However, the Department filed another motion to depose two other witnesses for use in lieu of live testimony or, in the alternative, to continue the hearing. A telephone hearing on the motion was held on January 11, 1993, during which the Respondent also moved, ore tenus, to compel Bagnell, who already had been deposed by telephone, to answer questions concerning the civil action. The Department disputed the Respondent's representations regarding what transpired during the Bagnell deposition, and ruling on the Respondent's motion to compel was reserved pending the filing of the transcript of the deposition. The Department's alternative motion for a continuance was granted, and final hearing was rescheduled for February 17, 1993, in Tampa.

The Bagnell deposition was not filed until February 16, 1993, and the Respondent's motion to compel was taken up on the record at the final hearing. As the hearing progressed, it became apparent that the Respondent was not prejudiced by Bagnell's refusal to answer questions about the civil action, and the motion to compel was denied.

During the hearing, the Department called four witnesses and, in lieu of live testimony, had the transcript of the Bagnell deposition admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The Department also had Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 3 through 9 admitted in evidence. The Respondent testified in his own behalf.

At the conclusion of the hearing, neither party ordered the preparation of a transcript of the final hearing. The parties were given ten days in which to file proposed recommended orders. Only the Department filed one. Explicit rulings on the proposed findings of fact contained in the Department's proposed recommended order may be found in the attached Appendix to Recommended Order, Case No. 92-3746.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Respondent, Gary W. Palmer, is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He has been licensed for approximately 15 years. Other than this proceeding, he has not been the subject of any discipline or any proceeding for alleged violation of Florida's real estate licensure laws or rules.

   
   

2. In the summer and fall of 1990, a licensed real estate salesman named James Woods worked for the Respondent. On or about July 30, 1990, Woods entered into a contract for the purchase of real estate from an elderly woman named Estella Bagnell, through her son, Louis Bagnell, who had a power of attorney to conduct the transaction on his mother's behalf.

   
   

3. The seller had listed the property through Century 21, Link Realty, Inc. (Link Realty). Shirley Link was the owner and real estate broker of the company. In the transaction, the seller was represented by Marge Lundberg, a licensed real estate salesperson.

4. Under the contract, Woods made a $500 earnest money deposit and was to pay an additional $2,500 cash at the time of closing. Under the terms of the contract, the earnest money deposit was given to the Respondent, who was to hold it in escrow. The seller was to take back a purchase money mortgage for the balance of the purchase price at the time of closing. The closing was to take place on or about August 30, 1990. If Woods was unable to close, the seller was to be paid the $500 earnest money deposit.

   
   

5. At Woods's request, the closing was delayed to September 6, 1990, to give him more time to come up with the down payment. Notwithstanding the delay, Woods was unable to pay the down payment, and the deal did not close.

   
   

6. Lundberg telephoned Louis Bagnell and advised him that the transaction had not closed but that she had another prospect. A contract to sell the property to the second buyer was offered by the buyer on September 10, and accepted by the seller on September 14, 1990. Under its terms, the second contract was to close on September 25, 1990. The closing was later moved up to September 19, 1990.

   
   

7. During a telephone conversation with Lundberg between September 6 and 19, 1990, Bagnell mentioned the Woods deposit and told Lundberg that, since the second tranaction followed so close on the failure of the first to close, and the closing of the second also was to happen very quickly, Bagnell would settle up with Lundberg on both transactions after the closing of the second.

   
   

8. It is not clear whether Bagnell made it clear, or that Lundberg understood Bagnell to mean, that Bagnell was expecting to be paid the Woods deposit as a forfeiture. Bagnell testified that he did make it clear that he wanted the forfeited money. Lundberg testified that she did not recall discussing the matter of the deposit with Bagnell at all.

   
   

9. The closing of the second contract took place as rescheduled on September 19, 1990. However, no arrangements were made to disburse the $500 Woods earnest money deposit from the Respondent's escrow account.

   
   

10. At some point, apparently between September 19 and October 22, 1990, Woods telephoned Lundberg to briefly discuss the matter. According to their testimony, their recollections of the conversation differ markedly.

    
    

    Lundberg recalls that Woods apologized for his inability to close the transaction. Lundberg recalls assuring him not to worry, that it was no problem since the second transaction was signed and closed so quickly. Lundberg recalled thinking that the conversation seemed odd and wondering why Woods had telephoned.

    
    

    Woods, on the other hand, recalls that he placed the call for the purpose of inquiring whether the Bagnells were going to claim his $500 earnest money deposit. He testified that he could not recall the exact words Lundberg used, but he understood Lundberg to tell him that the Bagnells were not claiming the money, since the second transaction was signed and closed so quickly, and that there was "no problem, the money is yours." He interpreted this to mean that Lundberg was authorizing the disbursement of the $500 to him from escrow. On cross-examination by the Respondent, Woods testified that Lundberg told him she had the Bagnells' authorization to release the escrow, but it is doubtful that she used those words.

11. Although the evidence is not clear, and assuming that neither party to the conversation falsely testified, it is likely that Woods was not completely forthright with Lundberg, did not clearly ask to have the $500 disbursed to him from escrow, and was too easily satisfied with what he interpreted as the response for which he was hoping. On the other hand, it also is likely that Lundberg carelessly made comments that could have been susceptible of being interpreted as an authorization to disburse the escrow money. Under the circumstances of what she thought was an "odd" conversation, it would have been wiser for her to clearly state to Woods that she had no authorization from the Bagnells to have the escrow money disbursed to Woods.

    
    

12. On or about October 22, 1990, Woods told the Respondent that Lundberg, on behalf of the Bagnells, had authorized the Respondent to disburse Woods's

    $500 earnest money deposit to Woods. The Respondent drew a check on the escrow account in the amount of $500 and paid it to Woods, who negotiated it.

    
    

13. Based on their good working relationship, the Respondent trusted Woods and, based on Woods's representation, believed that Lundsberg, on behalf of the Bagnells, had authorized release of the escrow to Woods. But even the Respondent conceded that it may not have been wise to do so in view of Woods's interest in the money. It is found that, under the circumstances, it was culpable negligence and a breach of trust the Bagnells had placed in the Respondent for the Respondent to release the escrow to Woods, notwithstanding the Respondent's good working relationship with Woods.

    
    

14. At some point in time, probably in either late October, or on November

    1 or 2, 1990, Louis Bagnell telephoned Link Realty to ask for the earnest money deposit and spoke to either Lundberg or Shirley Link. Link telephoned the Respondent's office and spoke to a male whom she could not positively identify by voice. She thinks it was Woods. She testified that she asked the man if the Woods escrow deposit already had been released. (It is unclear why she should have suspected that it had been.) She also advised him of Bagnell's request. She was told that the Respondent would get back with her after they looked into it.

    
    

15. Link also advised Bagnell to make a written demand for forfeiture of the money under the terms of the Woods contract. It is not clear whether this advice was given before or after she telephoned the Respondent's office.

    
    

16. On November 2, 1990, Louis Bagnell faxed Link Realty his written demand. Link testified that, when she received the Bagnell demand, she talked to Lundberg about it and asked whether Lundberg "inadvertently stated anything about the escrow." (It is curious that she would have asked such a question before the Respondent got back with her.)

    
    

17. On November 5 or 6, 1990, Link received from the Respondent's office a faxed letter written and signed by Woods, indicating that the money was no longer in escrow, having been disbursed to Woods on or about October 22, 1990, upon the authorization of Lundberg to Woods. (It could have been at this point that Link spoke to Lundberg to ask if she had "inadvertently stated anything about the escrow." Cf. Finding 16, above.) On November 6, 1990, Link faxed to the Respondent a letter stating that Lundberg was not a broker and had no control over the escrow and stating that the only people who can release an escrow deposit are the "Seller, Buyer, or Realtors, all with the signed release of escrow (not the word of anyone)." The faxed letter concluded: "As you are aware the Seller is making a formal request on this deposit and it is my duty at this time to send this to FREC [the Florida Real Estate Commission]."

18. Upon receipt of the Links fax, and further discussion with Woods, the Respondent was unsure how to proceed. In part to test Woods's motives, the Respondent decided to ask Woods to return the $500, reasoning that if Woods had lied to the Respondent in order to get the money, he probably was in financial need of it, and would be unwilling or unable to return it. Woods passed this test, willingly returning the $500 to the Respondent by check dated November 9, 1990. The memorandum on the check indicated "escrow replacement."

    
    

19. At the same time, Woods continued to maintain that, in his telephone conversation with Lundberg, she had authorized the release of the escrow. The Respondent was concerned that, by redepositing the $500 into his escrow account, he would be making an admission against interest that the Respondent wrongfully had released it to Woods on October 22, 1990. The Respondent telephoned Randy Schwartz, a Florida licensed attorney with the Florida Board of Realtors, to discuss the question. Schwartz was not available, and the Respondent was referred to a woman named Grace Guardiz (phonetic), who the Respondent was given to understand also was an attorney. The Respondent did not retain the individual for the purpose of giving him legal advice or a legal opinion. It is not clear precisely what the Respondent asked or what the person told him. The Respondent testified that they discussed the subject in general terms and that the woman essentially agreed with the Respondent that he was in a "catch 22":

    if he did not deposit the money in his escrow account, he would be susceptible to the charge of not maintaining the money in escrow; if he did deposit the money in his escrow account, he would be susceptible to the charge of having wrongfully released it to Woods on October 22, 1990. With Woods's agreement, to avoid making an admission against interest that the Respondent wrongfully had released the money to Woods on October 22, 1990, the Respondent decided to deposit the money in his operating account, where it has remained to this day.

    The Respondent's position is that the money rightfully belongs to Woods.

    
    

20. Woods testified that he understood the matter had been referred to the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) as an escrow dispute for resolution through issuance of an escrow disbursement order by FREC. He recalled being in the Respondent's office when the Respondent telephoned FREC about this. But the matter never was referred to FREC for an escrow disbursement order. Perhaps, Woods was recalling the concluding statement in Links' November 6, 1990, faxed letter. See Finding 17, above.

    
    

21. Eventually, Louis Bagnell, in his mother's behalf, sued the Respondent in the Florida circuit court in Hillsborough County for recovery of the $500. Meanwhile, Louis Bagnell moved his residence and place of employment from Orlando to Pensacola. After the Respondent filed his answer in court, the Bagnells dismissed the suit without prejudice.

    
    

22. During a routine August, 1990, audit that was completed before the Bagnell-Woods matter was brought to the Department's attention, it was discovered that the Respondent routinely maintains $141 of his own money in his escrow account. His purpose is twofold: first, the odd sum of $141 in the account alerts him and reminds him that it is his escrow account (to the Respondent, "141" means "one for one"); second, the odd sum of $141 added to the account helps the Respondent notice whether he wrongfully has been charged a service fee by the bank. The auditor accepted this explanation and did not cite the Respondent for an "overage" in the account. However, the auditor noted that the Respondent was not signing monthly reconciliation statements for the account, as required, and admonished him to do so. Had it not been for the

    Bagnell-Woods "escrow dispute," no further action would have been taken against the Respondent as a result of the August, 1990, audit.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

23. Section 475.25, Fla. Stat. (1991), authorizes the Florida Real Estate Commission to place a licensee on probation, suspend his license for up to ten years, revoke his license, impose an administrative fine of up to $1,000 for each count or separate offense, or issue a reprimand, or do any or all of the above, if it finds that a licensee has violated Section 475.25.

    
    

24. Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint allege the improper handling of the Bagnell-Woods "escrow dispute." Counts V and VI allege violations in the general manner in which the Respondent handled all escrow monies, as disclosed by the August, 1990, audit.

    
    

    1. The Bagnell-Woods "Escrow Dispute."

       
       

25. Count I charges the Respondent with violations of Section 475.25(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 475.25(1)(b) proscribes fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in any business transaction. The facts of this case only place in genuine dispute the issues of the Respondent's alleged culpable negligence and alleged breach of trust in any business transaction.

    
    

26. Count II charges the Respondent with violating Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 475.25(1)(d)1. requires that a licensee "account or deliver to any person, . . . at the time which has been agreed upon or is required by law or, in the absence of a fixed time, upon demand of the person entitled to such accounting and delivery, [property] . . . which has come into his hands and which is not his property or which he is not in law or equity entitled to retain under the circumstances." (Emphasis added.) It continues:

    
    

    However, if the licensee, in good faith, entertains doubt as to what person is entitled to the accounting and delivery of the escrowed property, or if conflicting demands have been made upon him for the escrowed property, which property he still maintains in his escrow or trust account, the licensee shall promptly notify the commission of such doubts or conflicting demands and shall promptly:

    1. Request that the commission issue an escrow disbursement order determining who is entitled to the escrowed property;

    2. With the consent of all parties, submit the matter to arbitration;

    3. By interpleader or otherwise, seek adjudication of the matter by a court; or

    4. With the written consent of all parties, submit the matter to mediation. . . ..

       
       

       If the licensee promptly employs one of the escape procedures contained herein, and if he abides by the order or judgment resulting therefrom, no administrative complaint may be

       filed against the licensee for failure to account for, deliver, or maintain the escrowed property.

       
       

       (Emphasis added.)

       
       

27. Count III charges the Respondent with violating Section 475.25(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 475.25(1)(k) requires a licensed broker to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof is properly authorized. (Emphasis added.)

    
    

28. Count IV charges that the Respondent failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of a deposit dispute and failed to implement remedial action, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.032, and therefore Section 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991). (In pertinent part, Section 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991), simply makes it a violation to violate any Florida Real Estate Commission rule.) Rule 21V-10.032 states:

    
    

    (1) A real estate broker upon receiving conflicting demands for any trust funds being maintained in the broker's escrow account must notify the Florida Real Estate Commission, in writing, within five (5) working days of the last party's demand and the broker must institute one of the settlement procedures as set forth in Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, within 30 days after the last demand. A broker who has a good faith doubt as to who is entitled to any trust funds held in the broker's escrow account must notify the Florida Real Estate Commission in writing, within fifteen (15) working days after having such doubt and must institute one of the settlement procedures as set forth in Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, within thirty

    (30) days after having such doubt.

    
    

    (2) If the broker has instituted a settlement procedure other than a request for an Escrow Disbursement Order, the broker shall notify the Florida Real Estate Commission, in writing and within thirty (30) days of the initial notification, of the procedure instituted to resolve the matter. If the broker has requested an Escrow Disbursement Order and the dispute is subsequently settled or goes to court before the Order is issued, the broker shall notify the Commission within ten (10) days of such event. Upon final disposition

    of the matter, the broker shall notify the Commission within ten (10) days of the final account and disbursement of the trust funds.

    (Emphasis added.)

    
    

29. As found, in this case the Respondent was culpably negligent and in breach of the trust placed in him by the Bagnells to release the escrow to Woods on Woods's representation to the Respondent that the Lundberg had authorized the release of the money to Woods. This was a violation of both Section 475.25(1)(b) and Section 475.25(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (1991). It was also a violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (1991), to the extent that the Respondent delivered the money to Woods, on the demand of Woods, who was not a person entitled to receive it.

    
    

30. The Bagnells had a right to expect more of the Respondent. Under the circumstances, the Respondent should at least have himself verified with Lundberg, who represented the sellers, the authorization to release the money to Woods. Had he done this, he probably would have been told that Lundberg did not have the Bagnells' authorization. If Lundberg told the Respondent directly that the Bagnells had released the escrow money to Woods, the Respondent would not have been guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust, even if Lundberg was mistaken or telling a falsehood, since Lundberg had no interest in the money. The safest and best thing for the Respondent to have done would have been to get written authorization.

    
    

31. Already having improperly released the escrow money, Woods's initial deposit no longer was in the Respondent's trust account, and the Respondent did not violate the part of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (1991), relating to the "escape procedures," or F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.032, as to those moneys.

    However, the Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (1991), by not putting the "second" Woods deposit in his trust account in order to avoid making what the Respondent perceived to be an admission against his interests.

    Clearly, the Respondent had no right to the money. Even under the Respondent's view of the facts, the money belonged to Woods. Woods re-deposit should not have been placed in the Respondent's operating account.

    
    

32. The Respondent attempted to utilize the defense that he relied on advice of counsel in not placing the Woods re-deposit into his trust account. But it is concluded that it takes more to establish that defense than what the Respondent did in this case. The Respondent merely testified that he telephoned the Florida Board of Realtors and spoke to an unidentified person connected with that Board. Even assuming that the person was indeed an attorney, the Respondent did not retain the individual for the purpose of giving him legal advice or a legal opinion. It is not clear precisely what the Respondent asked or what the person told him. The Respondent testified that they discussed the general subject and that the person told him essentially that the Respondent might be subject to discipline of some kind regardless whether or not he placed the Woods re-deposit in escrow.

    
    

33. If the Respondent had placed the Woods re-deposit in his trust account, where it belonged, he then could have utilized one of the "escape procedures" in Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (1991), and complied with

    F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.032, as to the re-deposit.

    
    

34. Besides being legally correct to place the re-deposit in the Respondent's trust account, as a practical matter, it would have been far preferable to do so and resolve the dispute through the statutory escape procedures. Had the Respondent followed that course, the dispute probably already would have been resolved between the actual real parties in interest--

    Woods and the Bagnells. As it is, the money--be it Woods's or the Bagnells'-- still remains in the Respondent's operating account.

    
    

    1. The Respondent's General Escrow Account Procedures.

    
    

35. Count V of the Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with violations of Section 475.25(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991), in the general manner in which the Respondent handled all escrow monies, as disclosed by the August, 1990, audit. See Conclusion of Law 25, above.

    
    

36. Count VI charges the Respondent with violating F.A.C. Rule 21V- 14.012(2) and (3) and, therefore, Section 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991). (In pertinent part, Section 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991), simply makes it a violation to violate any Florida Real Estate Commission rule.) F.A.C. Rule 21V- 14.012(2) requires a broker to prepare and sign written monthly escrow reconciliation statements. If the trust liability and the bank balances do not agree, F.A.C. Rule 21V-14.012(3) requires that the reconciliation contain a description or explanation for the difference(s). It also requires that checks on the account returned for insufficient funds, and negative balances, be disclosed in the reconciliation, together with corrective action taken.

    
    

37. The only violation proved under Counts V and VI was the violation of

F.A.C. Rule 21V-14.012(2) by the Respondent's failure to prepare and sign monthly reconciliation statements. The $141 overage maintained in the account is not a violation of any of the cited provisions. Had it not been for the Bagnell-Woods "escrow dispute," no further action would have been taken against the Respondent as a result of the August, 1990, audit.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: (1) reprimanding the Respondent for his violations of Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d)1.,

(e) (by violating F.A.C. Rule 21V-14.012(2)), and (k), Fla. Stat. (1991); (2) fining him $1,500; (3) requiring him to immediately place the $500 Woods re- deposit in his trust account and, within 30 days of entry of the final order, exercise one of the "escape procedures" set out in Section 475.25(1)(d)1.; and

(4) requiring him to successfully complete 60 hours of post-licensure education for brokers, including a 30-hour broker management course, and provide evidence of completion to the Department within one year of entry of the final order.

RECOMMENDED this 16th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.

J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1993.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3746

To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the Department's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any):

1.-22. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

23. Rejected as not proven as to Woods. They had a conversation which Woods, at least, thought was about the deposit.

24.-26. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

1. Rejected as not proven that it was on November 3; otherwise, accepted and incorporated.

   
   

2. Accepted and incorporated.

   
   

3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

30.-33. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

34. Rejected as not proven that it was to "'prove' that it was not an escrow deposit."

35.-37. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary.

38. Rejected as not proven.

39.-42. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

43. Rejected as not proven.

44.-47. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney

Department of Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Gary W. Palmer

5225-A Ehrlich Road Tampa, Florida 33624

Darlene F. Keller Division Director

400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel

Department of Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit to the Florida Real Estate Commission written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least ten days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should consult with the Florida Real Estate Commission concerning its rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order.

Docket for Case No: 92-003746

Orders for Case No: 92-003746