STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ROBERT SHERIN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 92-4665RX

)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND )

REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to Notice, this cause was heard by Linda M. Rigot, the assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on February 15, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Mr. Robert Sherin, pro se

1390 South Dixie Highway Suite 1310 Coral Gables, Florida 33146

For Respondent: Linda Harris, Esquire

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

1323 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues presented are as follows:

1. Whether Rule 10M-6.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority;

   
   

2. Whether Rule 10M-6.016, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority; and

   
   

3. Whether the Department's interpretation of those rules so as to include foster homes for pregnant teenagers is an agency statement required to be adopted in accordance with the rulemaking procedures set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 30, 1992, Petitioner filed his petition for administrative determination of a rule and for constitutional relief, challenging the Department's Rule 10M-6.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, and asserting that the Department's interpretation of that Rule to cover foster homes for pregnant

teenagers violates Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, requiring that agency statements defined as rules be adopted pursuant to rulemaking procedures.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in extensive discovery and motion practice. On January 8, 1993, Petitioner filed his First Motion to Amend Pleadings, requesting leave to amend his petition by inserting an allegation challenging Rule 10M-6.016, Florida Administrative Code, in certain specific sentences in his petition. Since both parties had referenced that Rule throughout their pleadings prior thereto, since that Rule had formed the basis for motions filed by the Department, and since the pleadings indicated that that Rule formed an integral part of both Petitioner's and the Department's arguments, Petitioner's First Motion to Amend Pleadings was granted by Order entered January 22, 1993.

Petitioner testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of James

1. Soles, Ph.D.; Cindy B. Evers; and Mary Ann Price. The Department also presented the testimony of Mary Ann Price and James D. Soles, Ph.D. Additionally, the Department's Exhibit numbered 1 was admitted in evidence.

   
   

   Both parties submitted post-hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed orders. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact can be found in the Appendix to this Final Order.

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   1. Florida Baptist Children's Homes (hereinafter "FBCH") is a multi- service agency providing residential care, foster care, maternity care, and adoptions. FBCH is licensed by the Department as both a child-caring agency and as a child-placing agency. Children are referred to that agency both as voluntary placements and as non-voluntary placements.

      
      

   2. With voluntary placements, arrangements are made directly between FBCH and the child's family or guardian. With non-voluntary placements, the placement is made either by the Department or by a court.

      
      

   3. The general mix of FBCH clients in its foster homes is 50 percent voluntary placements and 50 percent Departmental placements. None of those foster children are pregnant.

      
      

   4. If a pregnant child comes to FBCH for voluntary placement in a foster home due to that client's pregnancy, that client is not considered eligible for foster care in one of FBCH's licensed foster homes; rather, that pregnant child is placed in what FBCH calls its maternity foster care program. FBCH considers its foster care program and its maternity foster care program to be two different program areas.

      
      

   5. Both the foster care program and the maternity foster care program of FBCH are operated under the same traditional foster care concept. In both foster care and maternity foster care, FBCH's clients are placed in a private home with a family wanting to assist children in need of homes.

      
      

   6. FBCH does operate a maternity group home in Lakeland, Florida. Since this is the only maternity group home operated by FBCH, it provides maternity care elsewhere in the state of Florida through the vehicle of foster homes which offer "maternity foster care" to pregnant children. Foster homes are licensed by the Department in accordance with its licensure Rule 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code.

   7. Maternity homes are institutions, rather than private single family dwellings. Maternity homes serve a larger number of residents and offer more intense services. They are more expensive to operate than traditional foster homes. Maternity homes are licensed by the Department pursuant to licensure Rule 10M-9, Florida Administrative Code, which applies to residential group care.

      
      

   8. When pregnant children are brought to FBCH for voluntary placement in FBCH's maternity foster care program, the decision has already been made that the child will not have an abortion. The pregnant child comes to FBCH to be cared for through the time of delivery of her child. During her stay, she will receive counseling concerning whether she should keep her baby or place the baby for adoption.

      
      

   9. Services required to be provided to children in foster homes and child- caring agencies licensed by the Department are set forth in Departmental rules governing the operation of such homes and institutions. The specific services to be provided once such a home or agency has been licensed are set forth in different rules than the rules regulating the licensure process.

      
      

   10. Although the Department issues the license to family foster homes used solely by child-placing agencies such as FBCH and investigates complaints about such homes, responsibility for recruitment, assessment, training of staff, and supervision of these homes lies with the child-placing agency, and almost all placements are voluntary. In other words, the Department maintains no control or influence as to what the privately-placed pregnant children are taught about planned parenthood, if anything.

       
       

   11. The Department is considering the private single-family dwelling at 10061 Southwest 158 Terrace, Miami, Dade County, Florida, for licensure as an FBCH maternity foster home. The persons to be placed in that residence as the foster parents would care for five pregnant children between the ages of 11 and 17, with the provision that for a period of time after giving birth, their babies could also reside in that home. The average length of stay of clients in FBCH maternity foster homes is 3 1/2 - 4 months.

       
       

   12. Petitioner lives directly across the street from the residence the Department intends to license as a maternity foster home. Petitioner fears that the constant turnover of five pregnant teenagers will interfere with his right to quiet repose, will cause his neighborhood to be besieged by crime, and would, therefore, impair his and his neighbors' ability to detect and control criminal activity in the neighborhood.

       
       

       CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       
       

   13. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

       
       

   14. Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, regulates the licensure of family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and child-placing agencies, and provides, in part, as follows:

       
       

       1. As used in this section, the term:

          (a) 'Agency' means a residential child-caring agency or a child-placing agency.

          * * *

          1. 'Child' means any unmarried person under the age of 18 years.

          2. 'Child-placing agency' means any person, corporation, or agency, public or private, other than the parent or legal guardian of the child or an intermediary acting pursuant to chapter 63, that receives a child for placement and places or arranges for the placement of a child in a family foster home, residential child-caring agency, or adoptive home.

          3. 'Family foster home' means a private residence in which children who are unattended by a parent or legal guardian are provided

          24-hour care. Such homes include emergency shelter family homes, family foster group homes, and specialized foster homes for children with special needs. . . .

          * * *

          (i) 'Residential child-caring agency' means any person, corporation, or agency, public or private, other than the child's parent or legal guardian, that provides staffed 24-hour care for children in facilities maintained for that purpose, regardless of whether operated for profit or whether a fee is charged. Such

          residential child-caring agencies include, but are not limited to, maternity homes, runaway shelters, group homes which are administered

          by an agency, emergency shelters which are not in private residences, and wilderness

          camps. . . .

          * * *

          (4)(a) The department shall adopt and amend licensing rules for family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and

          child-placing agencies. . . .

          * * *

          (b) In promulgating licensing rules pursuant to this section, the department may make distinctions among types of care; numbers of children served; and the physical, mental, emotional, and educational needs of the children to be served by a home or agency.

          * * *

          [5](b) Upon application, the department shall conduct a licensing study based on its licensing rules; shall inspect the home or the agency and the records, including financial records, of the agency; and shall interview the applicant. The department may authorize a licensed child-placing agency to conduct the licensing study of a family foster home to be used exclusively by that agency and to verify to the department that the home meets the licensing requirements established by the department. Upon certification by a licensed

          child-placing agency that a family foster home meets the licensing requirements, the department shall issue the license. [Emphasis added].

          
          

   15. Petitioner has challenged as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority two Rules which provide as follows:

       
       

       10M-6.015 Definitions. The following definitions describe the types of care that are addressed in this chapter of the manual:

       * * *

       1. 'Foster Family Group Home' means a licensed private family home occupied by a married couple or individual who have demonstrated the interest and special qualifications to care for a total of no more than five pre-adolescent and adolescent children, including the family's own children. The family group home parent should be able to work in close cooperation with the department. Foster family group homes differ from a

          traditional foster family home in several respects:

          1. Group home must submit any requested written reports and carry out any designated treatment plans for the children in their care.

          2. Group home parents must sign the affidavit of civil rights compliance.

          3. Group work, individual casework, and psychiatric consultation are provided as needed to group homes to further the treatment objectives.

             * * *

             10M-6.016 Private Agency Foster Homes.

             The department is responsible for the issuance of licenses to family foster homes approved by licensed child-placing agencies that operate throughout the state. Licensed child-placing agencies will receive the application and complete the foster home study. The private agency must certify in writing that the family meets the licensing requirements and request the department to issue the license.

             Responsibility for recruitment, assessment, training of staff and supervision of these homes rests with the licensed child-placing agencies. Responsibility for investigating complaints of family foster homes licensed by child-placing agencies rests with the department. Section 409.175, F.S., requires that all foster homes and agencies are inspected annually. The department will verify the agency's compliance with the licensing standards set forth in F.A.C. 10M-24 at the time of the agency's yearly relicensing study.

             1. Substitute care parents licensed through private agencies are not required by statute to attend mandatory pre-service or in-service training provided to department substitute care parents.

             2. The district responsible for licensing the child-placing agency will issue the family foster home license to the private agency home. If the home is located in a district other than the district where the

                child-placing agency is located, it will be the responsibility of the district program office to notify the district where the private agency home is located.

                
                

   16. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, provides as follows:

       1. 'Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority' means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply:

          1. The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in s. 120.54;

          2. The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);

          3. The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);

          4. The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; or

          5. The rule is arbitrary or capricious.

       
       

       Petitioner has failed in his burden of proving that either Rule 10M-6.015(2) or Rule 10M-6.016 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

       
       

   17. Section 409.175(2)(e), Florida Statutes, contains the definition for family foster home and includes family foster group home. Subsection (4)(a) authorizes the Department to adopt licensing rules for family foster homes, and Subsection (4)(b) authorizes the Department to make distinctions as to the type of care, numbers of children served, and the needs of those children. Rule 10M- 6.015(2) contains a definition which is consistent with the definition of family foster home found within the statute which the rule, by its own terms, specifically implements. Further, the definition of foster family group home found in Subsection (2) is similar to the definition in Subsection (1) of that Rule which defines family foster home in almost identical language to the definition found in Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has failed to show that Rule 10M-6.015(2) meets any of the statutory tests to be determined an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

       
       

   18. Similarly, Section 409.175(5)(b) provides for the Department to authorize a licensed child-placing agency to conduct the licensing study of a family foster home which would be used exclusively by that agency and to verify to the Department that the home meets the requirements for issuance of a license. Rule 10M-6.016, Florida Administrative Code, regulates the licensing of private agency foster homes for licensed child-placing agencies in language consistent with the statutory language and consistent with the grant of authority found in Section 409.175(4)(a), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the

       Department to adopt licensing rules for family foster homes, residential child- caring agencies, and child-placing agencies. Petitioner has not shown that Rule 10M-6.016 meets the definition found in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, of an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

       
       

   19. Petitioner correctly argues, however, that the Department, in its licensing scheme, is utilizing a policy which meets the definition of a rule without following the required rulemaking procedures set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and which constitutes, therefore, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 409.175(2)(e), Florida Statutes, a family foster group home is a type of family foster home. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 409.175(2)(i), Florida Statutes, a maternity home is a type of residential child-caring agency. Chapter 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code, regulates foster homes defined in Section 409.175(2)(e). On the other hand, Chapter 10M-9 regulates group homes defined in Section 409.175(2)(i). Under both the statutory scheme and under the Department's rules, family foster homes and maternity homes are different facilities with different licensing requirements and different program content.

       
       

   20. Although the statute defines family foster homes to include specialized foster homes for children with special needs, a foster home specializing in pregnant children cannot be licensed as a family foster home since a maternity home has been specifically defined by statute to be a residential child-caring agency. Likewise, Rule 10M-9.003, Florida Administrative Code, contains the definitions for the Department's rules relating to residential child-caring agencies. Subsection (12) of that Rule recites the statutory definition of residential child-caring agencies verbatim, and Subsection (10) more specifically defines a maternity residence to be a facility which provides continuing 24-hour care for adolescent girls under 18 years of age and which may also offer care for their infants.

       
       

   21. Accordingly, the Department has taken a statutorily-established category of foster homes and a statutorily-established category of maternity homes and has created a hybrid called maternity foster homes, which is not authorized by statute. The evidence regarding the benefits of placing pregnant teenagers in private foster homes rather than in maternity group homes is irrelevant. The Department's policy of applying the challenged rules so as to encompass an unauthorized category of maternity foster homes is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the licensure of maternity foster homes contravenes the specific provisions of the law implemented. Additionally, the Department has failed to follow rulemaking procedures in creating its category of maternity foster homes. Further, the Department's non- rule policy fails to establish adequate standards for its decisions since it creates a category which is not amenable to the licensure standards in Chapter 10M-6 for foster homes or in Chapter 10M-9 for residential child-caring agencies. Lastly, the Department's non-rule policy is arbitrary and capricious.

       
       

   22. Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, defines a "rule" as an agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy. The Department's licensure of maternity foster homes is an agency statement of general applicability even though it may be that only FBCH has taken advantage of the Department's licensure of such facilities as foster homes at this time.

       
       

   23. Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, provides as follows:

       1. Rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion. Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as feasible and practicable. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible and practicable to the extent provided by this subsection unless one of the factors provided by this subsection is applicable.

          1. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible unless the agency proves that:

             1. The agency has not had sufficient time to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address a statement by rulemaking; or

             2. Related matters are not sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address a statement by rulemaking; or

             3. The agency is currently using the rulemaking procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address the statement.

          2. Rulemaking shall be presumed practicable to the extent necessary to provide fair notice to affected persons of relevant agency procedures and applicable principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions unless the agency proves that:

       1. Detail or precision in the establishment of principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions is not reasonable under the circumstances; or

       2. The particular questions addressed are of such a narrow scope that more specific resolution of the matter is impractical outside of an adjudication to determine the substantial interests of a party based on individual circumstances.

       
       

       The Department offered no evidence that rulemaking regarding its hybrid category of maternity foster homes has been neither feasible nor practicable.

       
       

   24. Subsection (2)(a) of Section 120.535 provides that any person substantially affected by an agency statement may seek an administrative determination that the statement violates that statute's requirement--that agency statements be adopted pursuant to statutory rulemaking procedures--so as to prevent the agency from continuing to rely upon such a statement and/or to require the agency to engage in rulemaking procedures. Petitioner has failed to show that he is substantially affected by the Department's licensure of maternity foster homes. Petitioner testified that the Department's licensure of the residence across the street from him as a maternity foster home would violate his right to quiet repose and may increase crime in his neighborhood and impair his neighborhood's detection and control of criminal activity. However,

       
       

       [B]efore one can be considered to have a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceeding he must show 1) that he will

       suffer injury in fact which is of sufficient immediacy to entitle him to a section 120.57 hearing, and 2) that his substantial injury is of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to protect. The first aspect of the test deals with the degree of injury.

       The second deals with the nature of the injury.

       
       

       Agrico Chem. Co. v. Dep't of Environ. Reg., 406 So.2d 478, 482 (2d DCA 1981), rev. den., 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1982); Village Park Mobile Home Ass'n, Inc. v. State Dep't of Bus. Reg., 506 So.2d 426, 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

       
       

   25. Petitioner has failed to show that the licensure of the home in question will cause him to suffer injury-in-fact of sufficient immediacy. His allegation that the licensure of the home will interfere with his quiet repose and increase criminal activity in his neighborhood is speculative. Additionally, there is no showing that the Department's licensure of foster homes or of maternity homes includes, either by statute or by rule, consideration of whether granting a license would affect the peacefulness or security of the neighborhood. Therefore, although Petitioner has proven that the Department is engaging in non-rule activity in violation of the rulemaking requirements specified in Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, Petitioner has not proven that he is a substantially affected person so as to entitle him to the relief afforded by that statute.

       
       

   26. The Department argues that it has placed the public on notice that pregnant girls will be permitted to live in foster homes by virtue of its Rule 10M-6.142, Florida Administrative Code, and relies specifically on Subsections

       (20) and (21) of that Rule. Those Subsections only relate to services which are available to children living in foster homes who become pregnant. The fact that the Department does not exclude foster children from foster homes if they become pregnant is a different concept than placing pregnant children in foster homes and is, therefore, irrelevant. Similarly irrelevant is Petitioner's argument that the Department's licensure of the home in question for five pregnant teenagers who would continue to reside there after their babies are born violates other Department rules which limit the number of children in a foster home to five, including the foster parents' own children. The issues involved in this proceeding are limited to the validity of two specific rules and of the non-rule policy of interpreting the challenged rules so as to permit the licensure of maternity foster homes contrary to the statutory scheme.

       
       

   27. The Department also argues that it has the authority pursuant to Section 409.175(4)(a) and (b) to establish categories of foster homes. Subsection (4)(a) does give the Department authority to adopt licensing rules for family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and child-placing agencies. Subsection (4)(b) does authorize the Department to distinguish among types of care, numbers of children served, and the needs of the children. Those Subsections, however, do not authorize the Department to ignore the categories established by the legislature and license one category as a different category. The legislature has determined that a maternity home is not a foster home. The Department's rulemaking authority does not allow it to contradict the plain language of the statute.

       
       

   28. Petitioner has raised constitutional arguments in this proceeding. Petitioner relies on the constitutional right to privacy and on Section 381.0051, Florida Statutes, the Comprehensive Family Planning Act. Petitioner

       argues that by licensing FBCH's maternity foster homes, the Department is violating the clients' right to privacy regarding termination of pregnancy and is failing to fulfill its statutory obligation to make available comprehensive family planning information and medical services to citizens of child-bearing age since the philosophy of FBCH (and of the persons licensed to operate its maternity foster homes) is opposed to abortions. Petitioner reasons, therefore, that the right to an abortion which the law secures to pregnant teenagers is violated by placing pregnant teenagers in maternity foster homes where their only choice is to keep the baby after delivery or to place it for adoption.

       Petitioner's constitutional challenges cannot be determined in this proceeding. A hearing officer has no power to rule on constitutional questions for petitioners challenging the constitutionality of existing rules and existing

       non-rule policies, as these issues are properly reserved for the courts upon any subsequent judicial review. Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 386 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Key Haven Associated Enter. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1982).

       Petitioner's constitutional challenges having been properly raised have been preserved for any judicial review.

       
       

   29. To summarize, Petitioner has failed to prove that either Rule 10M- 6.015(2) or Rule 10M-6.016 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Further, although the Department is applying a non-rule policy which is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and which violates the requirements of Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, Petitioner is not substantially affected by the Department's illegal licensing of what are maternity homes as foster homes.

It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Petitioner's petition for administrative determination be and the same is hereby dismissed due to Petitioner's lack of standing to initiate and maintain this proceeding.

DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida.

LINDA M. RIGOT

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1993.

APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-4665RX

1. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 4, and 14 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.

2. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7 and 12 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein.

   
   

3. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 18, and 19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause.

   
   

4. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15-17, and 20-39 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony.

   
   

5. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 4-8, 14, 22, 25, 34, 35, 39 and 43 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.

   
   

6. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 9-11, 13, 15-21, 23, 24, 26, 28-33, 36-38, 40-42, 44, and 45 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause.

   
   

7. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 12, 27, and 46-52 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Mr. Robert Sherin Suite 1310

1390 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146

Linda Harris, Esquire Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250

Carroll Webb, Executive Director

Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1300

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Docket for Case No: 92-004665RX

Orders for Case No: 92-004665RX