TONY J. MASON, )
vs. ) CASE NO. 92-6043
AND RUTH S. MITCHELL, )
Respondents. )
A final hearing was held in this case pursuant to Notice on April 6, 1993, by Stephen F. Dean, assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Tallahassee, Florida. This hearing considers the allegations of discrimination based upon handicap brought by the Petitioner against the Leon County School Board.
For Respondent: Deborah J. Stephens, Esquire
Graham C. Carothers, Esquire
Dr. Tony Mason was employed by the School Board of Leon County, Florida, as the Coordinator for Diagnostic Services on January 2, 1986. As is done with all employees of the School Board, she was recommended for employment by the board by her immediate supervisor, Dr. Ruth Mitchell.
Dr. Mitchell supervised from four to six coordinators of units similar to the Diagnostic Services during Petitioner's tenure with the Respondent. Each of these units was headed by an individual who was not handicapped and who had an educational background similar to that of the Petitioner.
The position requirements for the position of Coordinator for Diagnosis Services were a background in physiology, social work, or a related field as well as educational and administrative background or experience.
Dr. Mason holds the following degrees: Bachelor of Arts and Social Studies, English and Speech, Masters Degree in Counselling and Physiology, a doctorate in Administration and Supervision, and an Educational Specialist degree. She was employed by the U. S. Department of Education for several years in an administrative capacity. The Petitioner was well qualified for the position of Coordinator of Diagnostic Services Unit.
At the time the Petitioner was hired she was handicapped. Her primary impairment is cerebral palsy. The Petitioner has suffered from this condition since the age of three. This condition is readily apparent from talking with and observing the Petitioner. The Petitioner also has had a partial gastrectomy. This latter condition is not observable. During her employment, she advised her supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, of the nature, symptoms, and problems associated with both conditions.
Both impairments significantly limit Petitioner's major life activities. Cerebral palsy, a neuromuscular disease, impedes Petitioner's ability to walk, and causes her to speak slowly. In addition, her speech is distorted although very understandable.
A partial gastrectomy is a surgical removal of a portion of one's stomach.
Both of the Petitioner's disabilities are negatively impacted by extreme stress. Extreme stress causes the Petitioner's muscles to contract and lock causing intense pain. Inordinate stress causes the Petitioner to "dump" requiring her to go to the nearest restroom as quickly as she can. Both the Petitioner's disabilities are not affected by normal, everyday stress.
There was no evidence presented that the Petitioner's disabilities in any way impaired her intellectual capacity or mental abilities.
The Petitioner had never been terminated or asked to resign from any position prior to working for the Respondent.
While working for the Federal Department of Education and completing her doctorate in 13 months, both of which are stressful activities, the Petitioner did not suffer stress induced impacts on her disabilities.
The Petitioner performed the duties of Coordinator for Diagnostic Services for almost two years without difficulty.
As Coordinator for Diagnostic Services, Dr. Mason was responsible for the administration of this unit which employed eight social workers and ten physiologists. They were responsible for testing students within the school district and preparing reports based upon their testing to determine the eligibility of the students for participation in various educational programs. The Diagnosis Services Unit (DSU) also employed two secretaries and, at various times during the Petitioner's employment, additional interns and part-time employees. The Petitioner was also responsible for preparing staff papers on matters related to Diagnosis Services for presentation to the School Board together with budget requests, schedules, preparations of grants, and other special reports which were from time to time requested by the Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, or Petitioner's immediate supervisor.
To assist her in the preparation of these reports, the Petitioner was initially assigned a secretary. This secretary also filed the unit's paperwork and generally assisted the Petitioner. The work load of the DSU was consistently high as the unit was responsible for evaluating approximately 2,000 students each year.
There has been a steady increase in the work load of the DSU since 1976, and the work load continued to increase through the period of the Petitioner's tenure at the DSU and thereafter. The DSU had suffered from high work load and limited resources prior to and during the Petitioner's employment in the unit. A psychologist working in the unit testified that she suffered severe depression as a result of the stress created by the workload in the Unit.
For assistance in preparing reports, the DSU could send draft reports to the word processing unit. However, the word processing unit was slow and not suited to the particular needs of the DSU because the word processing personnel were not familiar with the technical terminology used in the psychological and social work reports, and did not accurately transcribe the material which the DSU sent to them. This resulted in reports having to be returned to the word processing center for corrections. Because the Petitioner's unit was only third in order of priority for using the word processing center, the DSU's turn-around time was lengthy. One school psychologist had to wait an entire summer to receive materials she had sent to the word processing center, and then found it necessary to return them for corrections. The lack of adequate secretarial support adversely impacted the work of the DSU and the Petitioner's personal performance.
Dr. Mitchell, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor, forbade the Petitioner to use her secretary for typing Petitioner's written reports because of the backlog in the unit. The Petitioner was forced to print her own work by hand. This was slow and adversely affected by her disability.
Because the Petitioner could not use the secretaries who were assigned to and physically located in her unit, the Petitioner had to walk to the word processing center, where obstructions and uneven steps in the area of the unit's office made Petitioner's walking more difficult. This caused further delay.
The practice of assigning short suspense projects made the absence of adequate secretarial support worse. The Petitioner paid for secretarial services to prepare various reports for the Respondent paying in one year over
$900.00 for secretarial support to meet the demands of her job.
The Petitioner made verbal requests for a secretary to her supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, and these requests were denied. The Petitioner made requests to the Superintendent and other members of the School Board Staff, and caused a letter to be written by her physician to the Board explaining the need for secretarial assistance as a reasonable accommodation for her disability.
Although the Respondent denies that Petitioner made a request for a secretary as a reasonable accommodation for her disability, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, a memorandum to William Wolley from the Petitioner dated May 4, 1989, which specifically addressed other issues references the aforementioned physician's letter as follows:
There is also a letter from a physician earlier relative to that issue in requesting some reasonable accommodation in terms of secretarial assistance that was an attempt to get my Secretary III reinstated . . . [.]
The Respondent never assigned a secretary to assist the Petitioner in doing her work although the timeliness of the Petitioner's work was the primary complaint regarding the Petitioner.
The school board's yearly payroll was in excess of $110 million. The salary for a secretary varied between $15,000 and $20,000 a year.
At the time of Petitioner's employment, the Petitioner walked without the use of a walker although she walked slowly and with some difficulty. The Petitioner wanted to postpone using a walker to assist her in walking because use of a walker causes certain muscles to become dysfunctional and atrophied.
Although the Petitioner had a walker in her office restroom and in her car, she avoided use of a walker wherever possible because, as stated above, they can cause the muscles to become dysfunctional, and because they can cause the individual to trip by catching on the uneven surfaces.
In late spring or summer of 1988, Dr. Mitchell, the Petitioner's supervisor, told the Petitioner that she wanted the Petitioner to use a walker around the office complex. Dr. Mitchell made the Petitioner's use of a walker a condition of continued employment after Petitioner fell outside the Board's offices when she tripped over an uneven joint in the sidewalk and landed on a piece of broken curbing.
A coworker, who is an R.N., was aware of how Petitioner felt about being asked to use a walker and explained to Dr. Mitchell that victims of cerebral palsy strive to maintain the maximum independence and postpone the use
of such devices. Dr. Mitchell advised the coworker that if Petitioner wanted to work for the Respondent that she would have to use the walker.
The Petitioner felt that Dr. Mitchell's demand was unwarranted, improper, not in her best interest, and refused to use a walker in the absence of a physician's recommendation. The Respondent never referred Petitioner to a physician for evaluation.
Subsequent to Dr. Mitchell's demands that the Petitioner use a walker and Petitioner's refusal, Dr. Mitchell made derogatory comments to staff about how slow Petitioner walked. At this time, the professional relationship between Dr. Mitchell and the Petitioner became strained.
Dr. Mitchell arranged to have a study done in early 1988 by Case Management Services Inc. Dr. Mitchell requested that Dr. Mason participate in this study which was presented to Dr. Mason as an assessment of the work environment of the board offices; however, the report prepared by the consultant appears to address not the work area, but Dr. Mason personally.
The purpose of this report was to support Dr. Mitchell's demand that Dr. Mason use a walker. Notwithstanding the findings by the consultant that there were architectural and facilities maintenance problems which posed a danger to the handicapped, the consultant's first recommendation primarily addressed Dr. Mason's use of a quad-cane (walker). The second recommendation, "occupational therapy evaluation to determine means for enhanced functioning among campus architectural problems," appears to be limited to the Petitioner.
In the spring of 1989, Dr. Mitchell gave Petitioner her first unsatisfactory annual performance evaluation. In addition, Dr. Mitchell only extended Dr. Mason's service contract for three months beyond the existing contract and denied Dr. Mason an increase in salary. Dr. Mason appealed Dr. Mitchell's evaluation and Dr. Mitchell reevaluated Dr. Mason's performance as satisfactory. Dr. Mitchell told Dr. Mason that this was the last time she would amend her evaluation of Petitioner pursuant to an appeal.
Although not readily apparent from the file, Dr. Mason's employment contract was extended for an entire year and pursuant to that contract she was evaluated again in June of 1990. At that time, Dr. Mitchell evaluated Dr. Mason as unsatisfactory and extended her contract for only three months.
During the year 1989-90, Dr. Mitchell documented every instance in which Dr. Mason appears to have departed from school board procedure or failed in any way to meet Dr. Mitchell's expectations. Dr. Mitchell contacted other supervisors of other activities within the school system and requested that they provide her with any information related to the failure of DSU to meet their expectations. See the memorandum of Dr. Mitchell to Beverly Blanton dated June 19, 1989.
Dr. Mitchell required Dr. Mason to perform additional work unrelating to any specific program or project, and announced her intention to attend Dr. Mason's staff meetings, to hold weekly meetings to review Dr. Mason's logs and summaries of activities, and to work with Dr. Mason on staff development. (See memorandum Dr. Mitchell to Dr. Mason dated April 10, 1989, subject: Suggestions for improvement in evaluation.) These requirements, placed upon Dr. Mason under the guise of improving her performance, formed the basis for additional criticism of Dr. Mason while at the same time taking up more of her time and undercutting Dr. Mason's authority with her subordinates.
Dr. Mitchell also requested access to Dr. Mason's medical records, a request she did not make of any other employee.
Dr. Mitchell demonstrated an amazing lack of tact with Dr. Mason. Dr. Mitchell advised Dr. Mason on one occasion when Dr. Mason was hospitalized for burns suffered in an accident while on school business that Dr. Mason had picked an extremely bad time to be injured, and when Dr. Mason was recuperating at home from a severe fall, Dr. Mitchell threatened to bring a television crew to Dr. Mason's house for an interview if Dr. Mason could not come to work.
One of the major complaints against Petitioner by Dr. Mitchell was the quality of the reports provided by Dr. Mason's unit to Ray King. A complete file of these reports was provided to Dr. Mitchell by Mr. King's staff as a result of a memorandum from Dr. Mitchell. (See Tab 6, Respondent's Exhibit 3.) The first of these 103 reports is dated May 18, 1988 and the last of these dated December 15, 1989. There were 97 reports returned from Mr. Ray's to Dr. Mason's section between 5-18-88 and 4-20-89. There were six reports returned from Mr. Ray's section after 4-20-89.
Contrary to the assertions made by Respondent, the number of reports kicked back by Mr. King during the period following Dr. Mason's initial unsatisfactory evaluation were significantly reduced.
The Respondent attempted to justify its denial of a secretary as a reasonable accommodation to Dr. Mason by stating that it was having fiscal problems, and by providing Dr. Mitchell with a computer.
Because of Dr. Mason's handicap, she is unable to utilize a computer to prepare her own work. Further, notwithstanding Dr. Mason's inability to use a computer, Dr. Mitchell required her to be conversant in the operation of a computer so she could utilize the computerized data base. Contrary to the Respondent's assertion that Dr. Mason was only required to be knowledgeable about the computer's capabilities, Dr. Mitchell required Dr. Mason to demonstrate use of the computer to her secretary, and was harshly critical of Dr. Mason's inability to do so.
Although additional memoranda purportedly documenting additional failings on the part of Dr. Mason and the DSU were introduced, Dr. Mason's explanations are adequate, and these secondary reasons for the adverse personnel action are not meritorious.
Because of budgetary constraints in 1990, Dr. Mason's requests for authorization to fly to St. Petersburg to make a presentation at an educational conference was denied. Dr. Mason was told to drive to the conference or not to attend because attendance at the conference was not a part of her normal duties and responsibilities. Presentations at such conferences are considered professionally beneficial both to the individual and to the board. However, Dr. Mason admitted that she had not requested air travel as reasonable accommodation due to her handicap which makes long trips by car very painful and debilitating.
On September 22, 1990, the Petitioner received a memorandum from Dr. Mitchell that her contract would not be renewed, and that Petitioner should leave all records in her office.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to Chapters 120 and 760, Florida Statutes.
Section 460.10(10), Florida Statutes, prohibits discrimination by an employer against an employee based upon the employee's handicap. In this case, the Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of such a handicap.
Employment discrimination is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence. See Perryman v. Johnson Products Company, 698 Fd.2d 1138, 1141 (11th Cir. 1983). A legal frame- work has been established which allows a court to infer discriminatory motive based on circumstantial evidence. See Perryman, above, and McDonald Douglas v. Green, 411 US 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 Law Ed. 2nd 668 (1973). The McDonald Douglas case sets forth a three part test in cases of hiring discrimination which has been broadened to apply to all types of employment related discrimination. See Sennello v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 667 Fed. Supp. 1498, 1508 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Using the criteria in McDonald Douglas, the Petitioner in this cause would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is a member of a protected class, is qualified for the position held, and was discharged and replaced by a person outside the protected class or was discharged while a person outside the class with equal or lesser qualifications was retained.
The facts in this case reveal that the Petitioner is handicapped and a member of one of the protected classes, and that she was qualified for the position which she held. Neither of these issues is controverted by the Respondent. The Respondent seeks to limit the application of McDonald Douglas because the Petitioner was not replaced by a person outside the protected class; however, Respondent overlooks the fact that individuals of equal or lesser qualifications were retained in positions similar to that held by the Petitioner.
The Respondent also argues that the Petitioner's contract was not renewed at the end of the term of the contract, and, therefore, she was not discharged. First, this overlooks the fact that in such a circumstance it refused to hire her. Whether one classifies the action of the Respondent as a termination or a failure to hire, the results are the same and are detrimental to the Petitioner. Second, it denies the actual facts of the case in which the Respondent's agent, Dr. Mitchell, evaluated the Petitioner's performance during 1989-90 as unsatisfactory, and placed the Petitioner on a three-month contract with the intent of terminating Petitioner's employment. It is clear that the action taken against the Petitioner deprived her of her livelihood and created an economic hardship for her.
As the court stated in an analogous situation in Sennello, supra, it would be grossly unjust if employers would limit their liability by demoting unwanted employees to an unprotected status shortly before actually firing them. In this case, it would be grossly unfair and contrary to the statutory intent to permit the Respondent to avoid liability upon the fiction that it did not terminate the employee, but merely did not renew her contract. Therefore, the three conditions for establishing a prima facie case under McDonald Douglas have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence by the Petitioner, and the burden shifts to the Respondent to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the action.
Pursuant to the process set out in the McDonald Douglas case, the burden shifts to the Respondent to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for taking the action against the Petitioner. The Respondent asserts that Dr. Mason's contract was not renewed because she did not adequately perform her duties as Coordinator of Diagnostic Services. It asserts that the Respondent's work and that of her unit was late, and was not up to standards. Specifically, the Respondent charges that the reports prepared by the psychologist and social workers of the DSU were returned to Dr. Mason's unit in large numbers because they were incomplete or otherwise deficient. The Respondent asserts that, although this matter was brought to Dr. Mason's attention, her staff continued to improperly prepare reports which had to be returned to the unit.
An analysis of the 103 reports returned to the DSU by the Exceptional Student Education program revealed that from May 1988, until April 1989, there were 97 reports returned to DSU as compared with 6 reports returned from ESE after March of 1989. Considering that these reports were not required to be reviewed by Dr. Mason prior to their submittal to ESE, the reduction of unsatisfactory reports from 97 to six appears to be a significant improvement.
The Respondent specifically criticized Dr. Mason's failure to complete assignments in a timely fashion. Dr. Mason has a difficult time writing, cannot typewrite or use a computer, and her speech is a hindrance to dictating reports. The lateness of her work was a direct and proximate result of the absence of secretarial support to Dr. Mason necessary to overcome her handicap. Contrary to the Respondent's assertion that Dr. Mason did not request secretarial assistance as a reasonable accommodation, the evidence shows that such a request was indeed made by Dr. Mason and that secretarial assistance was not provided by the Respondent. Furthermore, the evidence is clear that Dr. Mitchell had advised Dr. Mason not to use the secretaries already assigned to the DSU to prepare her work.
The Petitioner successfully rebutted the reasons articulated by the Respondent for not continuing the Petitioner's contract, and thereby proved that the reasons articulated by the Respondent were pretextual. Therefore, under a McDonald Douglas analysis, the Petitioner has proven her case; however, more importantly as the court points out in Sennello, cited above, where direct evidence of discrimination is available, the McDonald Douglas type of analysis need not apply.
Where direct evidence of discrimination is introduced and is found credible by the fact finder, a presumption is created that the unfavorable employment action was the product of the discriminatory intent. See Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 767 F.2nd 771, 775 (11th Cir. 1985).
In this case, evidence was introduced that the Petitioner had requested a secretary as a reasonable accommodation to her handicap in order to meet her supervisor's expectations of timely and neat reports. Further evidence was presented that the Petitioner's supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, denied Petitioner the use of the secretaries assigned to her unit, and then criticized the Petitioner for not having work completed on time. Further, Dr. Mitchell commented adversely upon the Petitioner's slow walking, attempted to require Dr. Mason to use a walker as a condition of employment, and sought to substantiate her demand by having a consultant produce a report on Dr. Mason's condition under the guise of a work place evaluation when Dr. Mason refused.
Considering first whether the Respondent denied the Petitioner reasonable accommodation, for the accommodation to be reasonable, it must not create an undue hardship on the Respondent. The Respondent asserts it was unable to provide secretarial assistance to the Petitioner due to its budget problems. The factors to be considered in determining whether a particular accommodation would be an undue hardship is the overall size of the Respondent's program with respect to the number of employees, number and types of facilities, and size of budget and the composition and structure of the Respondent's work force, and the nature and cost of the accommodations needed. A reasonable accommodation must not unduly strain the financial resources of the Respondent. However, in this case the facts show that the Respondent had a $110 million budget, that Respondent employed numerous employees at many separate facilities, and that the DSU could have used any of the time of the secretary provided as a reasonable accommodation not needed to help Petitioner to assist in the preparation of DSU's backlog. Given the aforementioned considerations, the provision of secretarial assistance to the Petitioner as not an undue financial hardship, and was a reasonable accommodation to Petitioner's handicap.
The acts of the supervisor in requiring the Petitioner to use a walker without medical evaluation, commenting on her slow walking, and having an evaluation of the Petitioner performed under the guise of a work area assessment all stand as indirect evidence of direct discrimination. The failure of an employer to provide reasonable accommodation for a handicapped individual is direct discrimination when the failure of the employer to provide the reasonable accommodation is the proximate cause of the employee's failure to meet the employer's expectations. Not only was Petitioner's supervisor aware of her request for secretarial assistance, but persons up to the level of deputy superintendent had been made aware of Petitioner's requests for a secretary as a reasonable accommodation.
When an employer engages in direct discrimination, the presumption is created that the unfavorable employment action is a product of the discriminatory intent. This intent may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse personnel action would have been taken in the absence of the discriminatory intent. See Sennello cited above, at page 508.
Although the Respondent introduced evidence that the position held by the Petitioner was eliminated, and that the position of her supervisor was eliminated upon her supervisor's retirement, the record reflects that unhandicapped persons of lesser or equal qualifications were retained by the Respondent. Further, the tasks performed by the DSU are required to meet federal guidelines, and continue to be performed within the system by qualified psychologists and social workers who are still supervised. The Respondent failed to meet its rebuttal burden of showing that the Petitioner would have been discharged and her position eliminated even in the absence of discriminatory intent.
Therefore, Petitioner has demonstrated discrimination against her both directly and indirectly, and is entitled to relief. The Petitioner requests three forms of relief: re-instatement, back pay and attorneys fees and costs. The Respondent argued in its posthearing brief that it is freed from the obligation of reemploying the Petitioner because there is a new superintendent citing the case of Oloughlin v. Pinchback, 579 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). However, Pinchback was an employee of the Sheriff, and prior to the entry of a final order in her cause a new sheriff was elected. The court, citing Section 30.53, Florida Statutes, which provides that the independence of sheriffs in hiring, firing, and setting compensation of personnel shall be preserved, found
that the new sheriff could not be forced to employ a former employee of the former sheriff. However, the School Board and Superintendent are not covered by a similarly statutory provision, and Oloughlin, supra, is not applicable in the circumstances of this case.
The Respondent argues regarding the award of back pay that the award cannot extent beyond the end of the Petitioner's employment contract citing Archambault v. United Computing Systems Inc., 786 Fed. 2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1986). The court in Archambault, supra, stated that the burden was on the Respondent- employer to show that the employee unlawfully dismissed would not have been retained in another capacity when the position was eliminated. As stated above, the evidence in this cause shows that employees having the same qualifications as the Petitioner were retained when the position was eliminated. The Respondent in this case failed to meet its burden as established in Archambault, supra.
The courts have held back pay to be a presumptive right of individuals who have been denied employment opportunities through termination, demotion,
non-promotion, or the failure to hire because of discrimination. The courts have extended the award of back pay to include fringe benefits such as health insurance coverage, life insurance benefits, annual retirement contributions, and profit sharing. However, the back pay award should be limited to proven economic loss. Particularly, the Petitioner has a duty to minimize damages by seeking alternative employment. In this instance, the Respondent offered the Petitioner employment as a counsellor and member of the instructional staff of the Board's vocational school. The Petitioner was certainly qualified, even over qualified, for this position. In this position the Petitioner would have been entitled to work an extended contract under which she would have earned
$25,600 for a ten-month 7 1/4 hour instructional position for the 1988-89 school years. For the following year, she would have been entitled to a $26,701 salary for the same type of instructional contract.
The facts reveal that Petitioner worked only sporadically in the two years between the nonrenewal of her contract and the hearing. She earned a total of $14,931 from temporary employment at the Board of Regents, Florida State University and consulting work. She also received $12,130 unemployment compensation benefits. However, in accessing her economic loss, what she actually earned should be subtracted from what she could have earned in the position offered to her by the Respondent, and that result subtracted from the salary she would have been entitled to had she been retained in a coordinator's position. The Petitioner earned $40,206 in her coordinator's position for the last year she worked. In addition, the Petitioner received retirement benefits and health and life insurance. Her annual salary was subject to annual increases in accordance with Board policy. From the amount that the Petitioner would have been paid for the school years 1989-90 and 1990-91, approximately
$80,412, a total of $25,241 should be deducted due to her failure to mitigate. To that the amount, the value of her life insurance, health insurance, and retirement benefits should be added.
The Petitioner is also entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs in this matter. If the Human Relations Commission adopts this order and finds in favor of the Petitioner, the Petitioner may file a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings for adjudication of the amount of the award of attorneys fees and costs.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is,
Petitioner.
DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.
STEPHEN F. DEAN
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1993.
APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6043
Proposed findings of both parties were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why:
Para 83-92 Irrelevant.
Para 93-99 Adopted.
Para 100-118 Adopted. Respondent's Findings:
Para 20, 21 The letter was not considered. Para 22-24 Contrary to best evidence.
Para 25-27 Adopted.
Deborah J. Stephens, Esquire Graham C. Carothers, Esquire
ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNING AGENCY RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILING EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.
